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Imperial Russian armed forces were garrisoned in eastern Finland from 
1710 onwards, and in the rest of the country from 1808 to 1918. In 
the following story, I shall show how the Tsar's soldiers and sailors 
guaranteed the sovereignty of the Russian Empire in this north-western 
borderland, which was vitally important especially for the security of 
St Petersburg, the Imperial capital. The supposed intentions of 
Russia's potential enemies, first Britain, then Germany (to be aided 
by Sweden, it was felt) influenced the plans and actions of the Imperial 
generals in the country. So did the supposed loyalty or otherwise of 
the local population, which, under the protection of the Emperor and 
his military and naval forces, developed from being a population of 
the previous Hinterland of Sweden into an autonomous nation. This 
development was first favoured by the Imperial government, but by 
the end of the nineteenth century it started to trouble the Russian 
officers and officials, and the so-called Finnish question, finliandskii 
vopros, was added to the many problems which, in the end, proved 
insoluble for the Tsarist regime. 
I am going to give a rather detailed description of the Russian 
military and naval forces in the country, of their plans and eventual 
activities there, and the result will be a comprehensive military-
political history of the Russian period in Finland. The experience, with 
its light and dark moments, left a lasting historical memory which 
was afterwards not without importance in the relations of independent 
Finland with Soviet Russia and the Soviet Union.' 
I have based my study first on the documents which the Russians 
left behind in Finland when they fled the country in 1917-18, then 
1 	 Unhappily, no good history of Finland exists in English. Klinge, Finlands historia 
3, Kejsartiden is the newest work. An introduction to the political history: Jussila, 
Nevakivi and Hentilä, Suomen poliittinen historia. A detailed history of Finnish 
central administration: Suomen keskushallinnon historia 1809-1996. Suomen 
itsenäistymisen vuodet 1917-1920, vols. I—III, is the most recent introduction to 
the critical years of Finland's divorce from Russia. 
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on the documents microfilmed for the National Archives of Finland 
in the Soviet era, and, finally, on the archives of military history in 
Moscow and of naval history in St Petersburg, during the glasnost' 
and post-Soviet period.' I would like to thank these archives, as well 
as the Public Record Office at Kew, the Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv 
in Freiburg i.Br., and the French Military and Naval archives at 
Vincennes for their friendly and competent help. 
Professor David Kirby has written an admirable introduction to the 
history of the Baltic world;3 Edward Thaden's work on Russification4 
can also be recommended. There are innumerable books on Russian 
military history in general, written in Russia as well as in the West. 
For the general background, I rely on those books, listed in "Works 
consulted". The list cannot pretend to be an exhaustive bibliography, 




	 I have previously written å study on Russian war plans as reported 
by French military attachés in St Petersburg.' On the theme of the 
Russian military presence in Finland, Olavi Seitkari and Tuomo 
Polvinen have written the most important works. I am impatiently 
looking forward to the completion of Pertti Alanen's study on the 
Russian military organization during the first half of the nineteenth 
century. Dr J. E. O. Screen has written several studies on various 
aspects of military life in Finland, and his The Finnish Army, 1881-
19016 is a complete handbook of every aspect of the national Finnish 
rifle troops. The final phase, the revolution and civil war in 1917-18, 
has been competently dealt with by Ohto Manninen and Sampo Ahto. 
Other colleagues, too, when cited, will find their studies mentioned 
2 	 I made my first notes in 1990 and 1992, when the Russian military archives were 
still called Tsentralnyi Gosudarstvennyi Voenno-Istoricheskii Arkhiv SSSR, in 
short TsGVIA, but in 1996 they were called Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi 
Voenno-Istoricheskii Arkhiv, RGVIA, and the naval archives in St.Petersburg are 
the Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Voenno-Morskogo Flota, RGAVMF. 
3 	 Kirby, The Baltic World, 1772-1993; Europe's Northern Periphery in an Age of 
Change. 
4 	 Thaden, "The Russian Government." Russiftcation in the Baltic Provinces and 
Finland, 1855-1914, ed. by Edward C. Thaden. 
5 	 Luntinen, French Information on Russian War Plans. In Moscow, in the 1980s, 
I was told — by bureaucrats, not by archivists — that no documents on the defence 
of the Baltic coast existed, so I went to Vincennes instead to see what the military 
attaches had reported. It seems that in the 1990s the documents have been found 
to exist in Russia, after all. 
6 	 Screen, The Finnish Army, 1881-1901: Training the Rifle Battalions. 
in footnotes. In the histories of the nineteenth-century Finland, military 
questions have been mentioned, understandably enough without any 
lengthy discussion, with the main interest centred on ethnic Finnish 
troops, politically important and nationally interesting for the Finns, 
but numerically minimal and thus of less military interest. A general 
overview of the military in Finland in this period has been sketched 
by Jarl Gallen in 1961, but I believe that a fuller and more modern 
study, based on all available archive material, is called for. 
The U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey during and after World War 
II "was to ascertain facts and to seek truth, eliminating completely 
any preconceived theories or dogmas".' To me, this seems a worthy 
even if unattainable ideal. 
I am grateful to friends, colleagues, departments, archives, libraries 
and foundations who have made my work possible and pleasant. I 
would especially like to thank Dr. George Maude for his valuable 
advice and comments, not only for this work but over the more than 
twenty years of my endeavours in the field of historical research. I 
very much appreciate the advice and criticism by Professor Kirby and 
Doctor Screen on my text. The list of works consulted (p. 316 et seq.) 
cannot pretend to be an exhaustive bibliography, but only an 
acknowledgement of my indebtedness to other historians and authors. 
I am grateful to the Finnish Historical Society for taking my work in 
their series of publications; their Editor Rauno Enden has been most 
helpful. Thanks are also due to Pirkko Numminen who has drawn the 
maps and to Maija Räisänen for the layout. 
I have divided the story of the Russian armed forces in Finland 
into major chapters; first, when the Finns accepted their previous 
hereditary enemy as their own monarch; second, when this dynastic 
loyalty was testd by war and rewarded with reforms; then, when the 
dynastic loyalty was disturbed by the development of nationalist ideas 
in the Empire as well as in the Grand Duchy of Finland, so that even 
military problems were tainted with nationalist thinking; fourth, when 
there followed an open conflict; and finally, when the break-down of 
the Russian Empire occurred, with the intervention of foreign Empires, 
a phase which for Finland brought with it independence. 
7 	 Thomas A. Keaney and Eliot A. Cohen, Revolution in Warfare, Air power in the 
Persian Gulf. Airlife Publishing, Shrewsbury 1995, p. xii. 
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Russian names and words I have transliterated according to the 
Library of Congress system recommended by the Slavonic and East 
European Review.' In Finland, many localities have both Swedish and 
Finnish names, reflecting the centuries-old history of the country as 
part of the Swedish Empire 1155-1809, and the existence of a 
bilingual population. I have preferred Finnish place-names, giving 
Swedish and sometimes Russian names in brackets when necessary, 
and all three forms in the Index. Dates are given in the Old or the 
New Style, depending on whether the source in question is Russian 
or Western; the Old Style was eleven days late in the eighteenth 
century, twelve days in the nineteenth and thirteen days in the 
twentieth. Thus the Bolshevik revolution of 25 October 1917 in the 
old reckoning took place on 7 November 1917 according to our 
calendar. 
14 
8 	 The system of transliteration is not applicable on Russian names which have 
always been written in their traditional form, e.g. Menschikoff, not Menshikov, 
or Seyn, not Zein, or when the transliteration would result in a wrong form of 
the original name in Latin scripture, e.g. von Plehwe, not Pleve. In my defence 
I should like to resort to the example of the great historian John Julius Norwich, 
Byzantium; the Decline and Fall. Penguin Books, London 1996, p. xxxvii: 
"Consistency has always seemed to me a greatly overrated virtue, and I have 
made little or no effort to preserve it where the spelling of proper names is 
concerned". 
The Conquest 
FROM THE SWEDISH TO THE 
RUSSIAN EMPIRE 
Before the Russian conquest 
Dominion over the area from the Gulfs of Finland and Bothnia to 
Lake Onega, an area very sparsely inhabited by Finnish-speaking 
tribes or clans, was contested by neighbouring states as soon as they 
were formed in the Middle Ages. In Sweden and Russia, tribal thugs, 
after killing each other, were slowly emerging as kings and princes 
from the ninth century onwards. The Novgorodian tribute-gathering 
raids seem to have reached rather far to the West, while the 
south-western part of the Finnish area was confirmed as a constituent 
part of the young kingdom of Sweden and included in the Roman 
Catholic sphere in the twelfth century. The interior of the country was 
subdued by the Swedes in the thirteenth century. Their attempt to 
cross the River Neva was defeated by Prince Alexander Nevski of 
Novgorod in 1240, who thus saved Ingria and Eastern Karelia for 
Orthodox and Russian influence. After many campaigns a line of 
demarcation was drawn in the Peace of Pähkinäsaari (Nöteborg)' in 
1323. Western Karelia, with the fort and town of Viipuri (Viborg, 
Vyborg), thereafter belonged to Sweden, while eastern Karelia, with 
its fishing and hunting grounds reaching to the northern edge of the 
Gulf of Bothnia, remained in the Novgorod sphere. The ephemeral 
border was soon crossed by settlers from the West, and peace was 
broken by innumerable local raids and even by wars of a more 
organized and serious nature. 
I 	 Most of the toponyms in Finland are known in their Swedish form in Russian 
sources and consequently in Russian and other books; Finns, naturally, use the 
original Finnish names. 
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Finland as such was of no special interest for the contestants, except 
for her fur resources. The interest shown in Finland by Swedes, 
Russians, and also by Hansa traders was due to its strategic position 
between the contestants on the flank of the main trade route between 
the West and Russia. 
It has sometimes been said, in Finland, that the Pähkinäsaari border 
was unnatural because it divided the Finnish nation, which God had 
ordained to be one,' but in fact the Finnish population had never been 
united. Eastern Finns or Karelians, who adopted Orthodox 
Christianity, called their Western kinsmen Swedes, while the Karelians 
were often called Russians by the Catholic, later Lutheran Finns. Both 
halves of the language group took part in the wars of their overlords 
and even made raids of their own against each other. The Western 
tribes were destined to become the Finnish nation in the nineteenth 
century. On the western and southern coastal regions of the country 
16 
	
	 lived Swedish-speaking settlers from the West, and many Finns also 
adopted the Swedish language, especially officials of the Crown and 
tradespeople who often visited Stockholm. The country where they 
lived, the Östland or Eastern land of the Swedish kingdom, was 
already called Finland in the Middle Ages, but the name did not 
indicate any political or ethnic entity; it only had a geographical and 
perhaps feudal or heraldic importance. 
After the conquest of Novgorod by Ivan III in 1478, the Swedish-
Russian quarrel was kept up by the Grand Prince of Moscow. The 
main armies were accompanied by guerillas of both sides, who 
garrotted men, slit women open, and impaled children. But the grand 
Muscovite offensive was fended off by the defenders of Viipuri in 
1495 and the Russians had to be satisfied with laying waste the 
surrounding countryside before retreating. The resources of medieval 
Muscovy did not allow for a sustained warfare, only for annual raids. 
Sweden rapidly organized centralized government in the sixteenth 
century, at a time when internal disorganization weakened Germany, 
Poland, and — worst of all — Muscovy. The Swedes succeeded in 
winning a foothold in the Baltic provinces, starting from 1561. In the 
long war of 1570-95, Moscow, which was simultaneously threatened 
by a victorious Poland, had to give up her pretensions to the Gulf of 
2 	 Sotilaspojan käsikirja 1942 (Handbook for Boy Soldiers). This is one of the more 
extreme examples, being an aspect of war-time propaganda for Greater Finland, 
but the idea did endure from the nineteenth century to 1944. 
THE BORDER BETWEEN 
RUSSIA AND SWEDEN 
The border between Russia and Sweden 
	 17 
For centuries Sweden and Russia fought each other for domination over the region to the 
east of the Baltic Sea, inhabited by Finnish-speaking peoples. In the 14th-17th centuries 
Sweden pushed the Russians back. (Peace Treaties of Påhkinåsaari 1323, Täysinä 1595, 
Stolbova 1617). The eastern part of the Kingdom of Sweden got the name of Finland, parts of 
which the revived Russia annexed in the 18th century. (Peace Treaties of Uusikaupunki 1721, 
Turku 1743). 
Bothnia and retreat to the watershed in the interior of Finland. The 
Swedes, arguing from a falsified copy of the 1323 treaty, even 
demanded that the border run to the Arctic Sea. The Russians had to 
concede in principle, but in practice the border in the north remained 
unmarked until the nineteenth century. 
The Time of Troubles in Russia made possible a further Swedish 
push towards Moscow in 1609 and the occupation of Novgorod in 
1611. When peace was signed in 1617 at Stolbova, Russia had to 
retreat beyond Lake Ladoga and thus lost part of Karelia, all of Ingria, 
Estonia and Livonia, and, worst of all, access to the Baltic Sea. Russia 
was spared further losses in the region of Lake Onega and the White 
Sea when Sweden turned its warlike attention to Central Europe, 
behaving like a Great Power for a century. 
The core of the Swedish army was national, recruited on the ancient 
principle of a military service of one man from each homestead. 
Finnish troops served as integral constituent parts of the Swedish 
army. In the sixteenth century there were about 4,000-6,000 Finns 
under arms. In times of war, the contingent had to be constantly 
replenished by renewed recruitment. During the Thirty Years' War, 
the maximum number of Finns in the Swedish army of 40,000 men 
was about 18,000. In addition to the Swedes and Finns, there were 
mercenary troops from different European countries, hired with money 
raised from taxes, customs revenue, French subsidies, or German 
booty. The Finnish contingent was especially numerous in the 
garrisons of Ingria, Estonia, and Livonia. The long wars bled the 
country white, while the men took part in all the violence and 
destruction of a 'religious' strife. Three hundred years later it was 
proudly reported that people in central Europe still prayed de agmine 
haccapellorum salve nos Domine.3 At home, the country was spared 
enemy attacks thanks to the forward defence line of the Ingrian castles. 
Sustaining a Great Power position surpassed the human and 
economic resources of the Swedish Empire. Peace, first after 1648, 
and again after 1658-60, meant the end of booty and foreign subsidies, 
retrenchment was compulsory, and the military machinery soon lost 
18 	 its sharpest edge. 
Peacetime service was regulated in the 1690s on the basis of the 
indelta system, where peasant households were obliged to hire a man 
for the army and to pay him with a plot of land on which he could 
earn his living as a crofter. Officers were given estates on which they 
could live as gentleman farmers. The system was economical, as the 
government only needed to pay cash for weapons and arms. It also 
made mobilization faster than recruitment had been, and guaranteed 
a minimum training, but, of course, the military value of the peasant 
troops could not be compared to that of regular paid armies. The 
Finnish indelta troops consisted of about 6,000 infantry, 3,000 cavalry 
and 600 seamen, with eight enlisted infantry regiments and one 
artillery regiment in addition. 
3 	 In fact, people in Europe did not know the nationality of the various troops of 
the Swedish army, cf. Lappalainen, "Ex agmina..." The name haccapellorum or 
hakkapeliitta comes from the Swedish war cry hacka på, translated into bad 
Finnish as hakkaa päälle, i.e. strike on. 
For a thorough history of the Swedish Imperial wars, see Englund, Ofredsår. For 
the wars in Finland, see Hainari, Suuri venäläissota 1495 (the Great Russian 
War); Juwelius, Suomen sotahistorian pääpiirteet vuoteen 1617 (Finnish Military 
History); and Virkkunen, Vanhan vihan aika (the war of 1570-95 and the 
consequent peasant rebellion). 
The conquest begins 
Part of the formerly Swedish Finland was transferred to the Russian 
Empire as a result of the Great Northern War of 1700-21. The Russian 
victory was due to the revival of the country during the seventeenth 
century after the chaos which had paralysed Muscovy after Ivan the 
Terrible. Under the Tsars Mikhail Romanov (1613-45) and Aleksei 
Mikhailovich (1645-76) the revival went on slowly and fitfully, with 
serious setbacks. Russia's growing strength, however, made possible 
the conquest of Smolensk and parts of the Ukraine in the 1660s, but 
the attempts to render harmless the Crimean Tartars miscarried. 
Tsar Peter (1689-1725) determined definitely to put an end to 
Russia's fatal military backwardness. He considered free access to the 
sea and to the West vital for his modernizing programme. That made 
Turkey and Sweden his enemies, because these powers sat athwart 
the routes from Russia to the Mediterranean and to the Baltic Sea. 
In addition to the landed cavalry and militia infantry, in the sixteenth 
and seventeenth centuries soldiers enlisted in the Russian army had 
been organized into infantry, musketeers, and artillery regiments, but 
only intermittently. Now, Peter dissolved these obsolete and reactionary 
detachments. Instead, peasant serfs were recruited for lifelong military 
service and trained into a modern standing army of infantry, cavalry 
and artillery regiments, and also into sailors of a modern navy. The 
nobility was forced to serve the Tsar as officers or officials. The human 
and financial cost was immense, but Russia was saved from the fate 
of becoming a victim of Western imperialism, as the oriental Empires 
became; instead, Russia turned herself into an Empire.4 
The Swedish army and navy had enjoyed an uninterrupted series 
of victories for more than a century. Against this daunting enemy, 
Peter was able to join other victims of Swedish expansion, viz. 
Denmark, a few German principalities, and Poland. The beginning of 
the war was disastrous, however. Charles XII's army knocked 
Denmark out in the very beginning, and in a lightning operation 
destroyed a Russian army of 40,000 men with his 10,000 at Narva in 
Estonia. After that, the Swedes carried out a lengthy series of 
campaigns in Poland, compelling Saxony, in 1707, to withdraw from 
the war and Poland to accept a Swedish puppet for her king. 
4 	 An exampleof the innumerable works dealing with Peter I: Tarle, Russkii flot i 
vneshniaia politika Petra I. 
19 
Egged on by the disaster which his raw recruits had met at Narva, 
Peter continued his reforms and plans of expansion with increased 
energy. In a continuous campaign, his troops wore down the small 
Swedish garrisons in the Baltic countries. In the very beginning, they 
conquered Nevanlinna (Nyenschantz) and Schlüsselburg, the Swedish 
forts on the Neva line. In 1703, Peter founded the fortress of Peter 
and Paul in Jänissaari (Hare Island) in the delta, with a naval base or 
'Admiralty' on the opposite side of the river. Kronschlott, later 
Kronstadt, was established on the Retusaari or Kotlin Island to protect 
the access to the river from the sea. In Estonia, Narva and Tartu 
(Dorpat, Iurev) were conquered in 1704. Thus protected, the city of 
St Petersburg started growing around the military and naval 
installations. Counter-attacks from Finland were easily fended off. 
The battle of Poltava in 1709 proved Peter's confidence to be 
well-founded. Momentarily, the battle may have been close to a 
20 
	
	 Russian defeat, but it was inevitable that sooner or later the poor and 
thinly-inhabited Sweden and its hardened but worn-out army would 
fail to withstand the growing might of Russia.' 
Next year, 1710, the Karelian Isthmus with Viipuri, the central town 
of the region, was conquered. The siege was led by Admiral Fedor 
Apraksin. The advance further west was interrupted by a new threat 
from the south, where Charles XII had escaped from his defeat to 
Turkey and managed to make the Sultan declare war on the Tsar. In 
1711, Peter was practically defeated by the Turks, who, however, gave 
up their advantage and accepted the return of Azov as a sufficient 
price for releasing the Russian army they had surrounded. 
With remarkable confidence, the centre of gravity of the Russian 
state was transferred from Moscow to the Finnish marshland inside 
the Swedish Empire, with peace far from sight. In 1712, St Petersburg 
was officially made the capital of the Russian state. Next year, the 
Russian army continued its advance to the north-west, ably supported 
by Peter's young navy. The Russians landed at Helsinki, with Peter 
and Admiral Apraksin in command, and marched to Turku (Åbo). 
Troops led by Prince Golitsyn chased the fleeing Finns, a weak army 
of boys and invalid soldiers, who vainly tried to stand against the 
attacker at Napue (in Isokyrö, Storkyro) in 1714. In that year the 
Russians also defeated a Swedish naval detachment at Hankoniemi 
5 	 Englund, Poltava. 
(Hangöudd in Swedish, Gangut in Russian). The Tsar's army occupied 
the whole of the country, and the supremacy of his navy made possible 
raids from Åland over the sea to the Swedish coast. The purpose of 
these operations was to make the enemy admit defeat and the 
subsequent Russian dominion over the Baltic Sea.6 
The British were to a degree concerned in the conflict in the Baltic 
region, from where they imported tar, hemp and timber for their naval 
needs. In 1715-18 they sent fleets to the Baltic to check the Swedes, 
but then, in 1719-21, alarmed by the growth of Russian might, started 
to support Sweden.' However, they were not able to prevent the 
Russians from crossing the sea over ice from Åland to Sweden. Even 
in summertime, ships of the line could only with difficulty intervene 
in the operations of coastal galleys in the archipelago.' 
In occupied Finland, guerilla bands sometimes rose against the 
Russians, who answered by taking their customary revenge of laying 
waste the country, while the Cossacks had their usual fun with the 	 21 
inhabitants. Booty was taken and taxes collected, and Finns were 
abducted for forced labour in Russia or to be sold on the Asian slave 
markets. Similar measures were also taken in Estonia and Livonia. 
Apart from being the normal method of warfare — booty was a 
welcome supplement to the meagre pay of the soldiers — these 
measures were calculated to prevent Sweden from using the resources 
of these countries in any future war of revanche. 
Finland was placed under the military governorship of Prince 
Menshikov at Viipuri and Admiral Apraksin in the West. The daily 
routine of administration, under the great admirals, was carried on by 
Ivan Shuvalov at Viipuri and Mikhail Golitsyn in Turku. As the war 
went on and on, in 1717 the military administration in western Finland 
was replaced by an attempt at civil government headed by Count 
Douglas, who had been made a prisoner of war at Poltava and had 
gone over to Russian service. Regular and extraordinary taxes were 
collected. Charles's conscriptions had exhausted the country, but fresh 
6 	 A handbook on Russian naval operations is: Tri veka rossiiskogo (iota 1696-1996, 
vols. I— III. 
7 	 Kennedy, The rise and fall of British naval mastery, p. 105. 
8 	 Detailed descriptions of the Russian operations on land and sea: P.O. Bobrovskii, 
Zavoevanie Ingrii Petrom Velikom 1701-1703 gg.; A.Z. Myshlaevskii, Severnaia 
voina na inzhermanlandskom i finskom teatrakh v 1708-1714 g; Myshlaevskii, 
Voina v Finliandii v 1712-1714 godakh, sovmestnaia operatsiia suhoputnykh 
armii, galernago i korabel'nago flotov. 
groups of youth were now reaching military age and in 1720 about 
1,500 recruits were taken into the Russian army. 
When the war ended, at long last, in 1721, with the peace of 
Uusikaupunki (Nystad), Peter annexed Ingria, Estonia and Livonia to 
his Empire. In Finland, he kept the Karelian Isthmus and the Käkisalmi 
region (which was close to Lake Ladoga, and had not been a 
constituent part of the Swedish Kingdom but an occupied province 
under a governor general) with the towns Viipuri, Käkisalmi (Kex-
holm in Swedish, Keksgol'm in Russian, the modern Priozersk), and 
Sortavala. This area was annexed as a glacis for the defence of St 
Petersburg, but the rest of the exhausted country was returned to 
Swedish sovereignty. The Great Power interlude in Swedish history 
was over and Russia inherited the dominium maris Baltici from 
Sweden. Peter took the title of Emperor in order to express his Western 
orientation and to stress his equality with European monarchs; the title 
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	 also embodied the idea that he was not only a Muscovite Tsar, but 
the sovereign monarch of all his peoples. 
For two decades, the Swedes tolerated their fate as a second-class 
power, but by the end of the 1730s a new generation had grown up 
who had no immediate memory of the terrible Great Northern War. 
They dreamed of revanche and deemed the moment propitious in 1740, 
when Russia got into renewed difficulties with Turkey, and the 
problems of the Austrian succession were looming, not to speak of the 
problems of succession to the throne of Russia with the death of 
Empress Anna. Without any serious preparation, the Swedish revanchist 
party declared war in 1741. They hoped that Princess Elizabeth, the 
daughter of Peter the Great, would be grateful for the opportunity of 
seizing power, which the suddenly materialized Swedish threat created 
for her. Elizabeth did carry out her coup and was made Empress, but 
she responded to the Swedish 'help' with a military offensive. In the 
battle of Lappeenranta (Villmanstrand), Finnish regiments fled first, 
and the Swedes soon followed their example. The Swedish war of 
revanche thus turned into a defeat because of amateurish leadership 
and lack of training. The Russian troops were ably led by Peter de 
Lacy, the cosmopolitan Russian general, already distinguished in Peter 
the Great's wars, and by James Keith, previously a supporter of the 
Stuarts, and later a Prussian Field Marshal. 
Empress Elizabeth may have planned to annex the whole of Finland 
in order to prevent future surprise attacks against the Imperial capital. 
In the spring of 1742, she published a manifesto exhorting the Finns 
to evict the Swedes and to elect a Grand Duke of their own. If they 
accepted, the Empress would protect them; if not, to her regret, she 
would be compelled to destroy the country with fire and sword. 
The Empress probably knew that Finns were dissatisfied with the 
weak Swedish interest in the security and welfare of the eastern half 
of the kingdom. The imperial manifesto was obviously aimed at 
separating them from the Swedes and at paralysing their opposition 
to a Russian conquest. After the whole of Finland had been conquered, 
and much more easily than had been expected, the manifesto was not 
mentioned again, and Finnish petitions for the election of the promised 
Grand Duke were ignored. Dismayed, the Finns soon rediscovered 
that they were good Swedes, after all, although they did not go as far 
as to rise against the Russian occupation. 
Whatever Empress Elizabeth may have meant with her manifesto, 
the seeds of the idea of an autonomous Grand Duchy of Finland had 
been sown and were to take root in time. 
Elizabeth's generals were eager to take all Finland or, at least, most 
of the southern part of the country westwards to Hankoniemi, in order 	 23 
to possess both sides of the navigation passage through the Gulf of 
Finland. In the end, however, Elizabeth desisted from taking the whole 
country and was content with only a small additional zone in the 
south-eastern part of Finland. In the peace of Turku, in 1743, three 
small towns, Hamina (Fredrikshamn), Lappeenranta (Villmanstrand) 
and Savonlinna (Nyslott), were added to Russian Finland, and the 
border was drawn along the River Kymijoki and the inland lakes. 
Annexing more of the barren country probably seemed unnecessary 
to the Empress, as she had compelled Sweden to accept her protégé, 
Adolf Fredrik from Holstein, as Crown Prince. She thus believed she 
had the whole kingdom under her thumb. 
After the war the Swedish government constructed a new naval 
fortress, called Sveaborg, on a few islands in front of the small town 
of Helsinki (Helsingfors). The fortress was intended to make the Finns 
feel safe and more attached to the kingdom. It was also to cover the 
navigational passage from the east towards Stockholm against Rus-
sian surprises. From the Russian point of view, the new fortress, with 
a coastal flotilla based there, threatened to cut the waterway from St 
Petersburg and Kronstadt to the Baltic Sea. 
On the Russian side of the new border, fortifications against the west 
were constructed at Hamina, Lappeenranta — there was also a flotilla on 
the Saimaa lake — Taavetti (Davidstad) and a few other points.9 
9 	 Ranta, Lappeenrannan kaupungin historia, vol. 2, p. 491, et seq. 
Russian Finland in the eighteenth century 
In Russian Finland, the inhabitants continued speaking Finnish or 
Swedish or German (a few merchants of German origins). The region 
was administered in the Swedish language and according to Swedish 
laws and customs, with a Baltic German influence felt in the higher 
echelons and among educated people in Viipuri. The Lutheran church 
worked on as before, with some of the clergy trained in Turku. As 
in other recently conquered areas of the vast Empire, the process of 
spontaneous Russification went on rather slowly in the absence of a 
purposeful unificatory policy. After 1721, Viipuri was governed by a 
military governor, and after 1743 the province was organized as a 
guberniia, at times under a Governor-General aided by a civilian and 
a military governor. Commercially, the area was fairly prosperous, 
thanks to the export of sawn timber from Viipuri. On the other hand, 
24 	 many free peasants were made tenants of Russian absentee pomestniki 
(landlords). The nearby city of St Petersburg attracted a growing 
amount of Finnish labour, and by the end of the century the region 
began to feel a more intense Russian influence in its everyday life. 
The main interest of Empress Elizabeth was directed towards 
Central European conflicts and the Tartar-Turkish borders, while the 
north-western direction was accorded only secondary attention. The 
Russian Baltic fleet was neglected and carried out operations of only 
limited importance in the Seven Years' War. 
Empress Catherine II (1762-96) expressly tried to revive the 
military and naval traditions of Peter the Great. The navy was 
reorganized and a Mediterranean squadron established, the carving-up 
of Poland was started, and the Turks and Tartars were rolled back in 
successful wars. The Crimea was made a protectorate in 1774 and 
annexed in 1783. Catherine dreamed of further expansion in the south, 
and had her eldest grandsons christened Alexander and Constantine 
after the great Macedonian and Roman conquerors, although the third 
one was called plain Nicholas. 
The main interest of the Empress thus turned towards the west and 
south-west, but some attention had to be paid to Baltic affairs. In 1780 
Catherine, with Prussia, Austria, Sweden and Portugal, planned an 
Armed Neutrality to protect merchant ships against the privateering 
and blockade measures of the British and their rebellious American 
subjects. If enforced, Armed Neutrality would have made the Baltic 
Sea a Russian mare clausum, which would have been against the naval 
principles and commercial interests of Britain because of the 
importance of Finnish tar and Russian hemp for British shipbuilding. 
But the participants were not united enough to try really to carry out 
their intention. For the Russian navy, it might have been problematical 
because of the numerous British officers serving in Russian ships. 
Peace therefore reigned in the North until again disturbed by the 
Swedes later in the 1780's. 
In Sweden, governed in a proto-parliamentary system after the 
defeat of 1721, bribes to governing parties had guaranteed Russia 
more influence than the fact of King Adolf Fredrik's being a protege 
of Empress Elizabeth, for his constitutional position was weak. His 
successor, King Gustavus III, took the reins of government firmly into 
his hands in a coup in 1772. The new king tried to rid his kingdom 
of Russian tutelage and sought perhaps to play a European role in 
leading a movement against the growing power in the east. Again, a 
successful foreign policy was necessary for consolidating his position 
at home, where opposition was growing against his absolutist 
tendencies. 	 25 
Russia's new Turkish war in 1787 seemed to provide the right 
chance and a Swedish offensive occurred in 1788. The King planned 
to attack St Petersburg in a pincer movement. A land army was to 
advance from the north through the Karelian Isthmus, while a landing 
was to be made south of the Russian capital. Peace was to be dictated, 
the areas lost in 1721 and 1743 recovered, and Sweden's Great Power 
position enhanced. 
The offensive ended in a fiasco, because the King's officers refused 
to obey the unconstitutional order to attack. They had reason enough 
for their disobedience. Most of them belonged to the nobility, who 
had lost much of the power they had held before 1772 to the King; 
several of them also were reminded of what had happened in 1700-21 
or 1741-43 and feared provoking a new Russian occupation of 
Finland, which might also have brought with it the loss of their estates. 
There was treason, too. A few officers were dissatisfied with the 
King's adventurous foreign policy and the loss of their influence on 
government, as well as their slow advance in the military career. 
Perhaps some of them were influenced by the then modern ideas of 
the French philosophers and American separatists. The officer plotters 
planned to separate Finland from the mother country and to transform 
it into a gentry republic under Russian protection, but free from the 
compulsory service of the Russian nobility. Voluntary submission to 
Russian power would, it was hoped, spare the country a renewed 
conquest and occupation. 
Catherine accepted the idea of the Finns separating from Sweden, 
a recommended by Colonel Göran Magnus Sprengtporten, who had 
left the service of the Swedish King earlier to enter the service of the 
Empress in 1786. But she did not aid the separatists in any material 
way. Alone, they were unable to achieve anything, because the idea 
of surrendering to Russia, the hereditary enemy, was alien to the 
majority of Finns. 
By deft political operations, Gustavus III succeeded in overcoming 
both the constitutional and the separatist aspects in the opposition 
against him by blending and then thwarting them so that even later 
historians have had difficulties in unravelling the tangle. The other 
Estates, especially the peasants, supported the King against the noble 
plotters. 
In spite of its inglorious start, the Swedish offensive disturbed the 
concentration of Russian forces against Turkey; a naval detachment 
was detained in the Baltic, because St Petersburg had to be secured 
against the potential threat. After Gustavus had recovered his position 
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	 and made his troops obey, a few inconclusive battles took place. A 
Swedish fleet was soundly beaten by the Russians at Ruotsinsalmi 
(Svensksund, Rochensalm) in 1789, and, in 1790, with the King 
aboard, closely escaped annihilation at Viipuri, but was able to defeat 
the Russian coastal fleet at Ruotsinsalmi a little later in the same year. 
With the main Russian forces tied down in the Turkish war in the 
south, the Swedish army was able to defend the Finnish borders, while 
a Danish attack in the south of Sweden was easily fended off. It was 
evident, however, that Sweden had no chance of making any useful 
advance in the east. 
Russia, too, was ready to make peace. With a serious war in the 
south, with the unsolved problem of Poland, and with the new threat 
from the French revolution, Catherine decided to desist from further 
operations in the north-west. The peace of Värälä in 1790 confirmed 
the territorial status quo ante bellum. 
Having successfully avoided defeat in a war against the eastern 
colossus, Gustavus had somewhat improved his internal and 
international standing, although, in fact, his comparative success was 
due to Russia being mainly occupied in the Turkish war. He legalized 
his near-absolutist power with an addendum in 1789 to the 
Constitution of 1772. Denied legal methods, the dissatisfied plotters 
among the nobility took revenge by the regicide of 1792. 
Russia's war against the Turks was concluded in 1791 with the peace 
made at Jassy. The Empire gained a broader access to the Black Sea 
and was confirmed in its possession of the Crimea. Then Poland could 
be divested of further slices of its territory in 1793 and the rest of the 
unhappy kingdom was divided among the neighbouring states in 1795. 
The north-west glacis of the Russian capital was further fortified 
against the possibility of a renewed Swedish surprise attack. Suvorov 
himself was for a time (1791-92, 1795) occupied in directing this 
work. He was ably assisted by Fabian Steinheil, who as a young 
captain had been transferred to the province in 1788 to fend off the 
Swedish surprise attack, and had remained in military-topographical 
service there; later, he was to play an important role in the history of 
the country. The defences of Viipuri were strengthened, the forward 
positions of Hamina and Lappeenranta were extended, as also were 
the naval forts of Ruotsinsalmi, Kyminlinna (Kymmenegård) and 
Svartholma. The work was continued intermittently under Emperor 
Paul (1796-1801) and Alexander I. Between 1803-08 Engineer 
General Paul van Suchtelen led the work. 
The slow process of assimilation in the Karelian province went on. 
The Russian language seeped into the administration. For military 
administration there was a district staff at Viipuri.10 A few regiments 	 27 
of the Russian army were named after Finnish localities. One of 
Russia's oldest regiments, formed in 1699, was named the Vyborgskii 
after succesfully taking part in the conquest in 1710." There were 
also the Neishlottskii and the Vil'manstrandskii regiments, called after 
the Swedish names of Savonlinna and Lappeenranta, that is Nyslott 
and Villmanstrand. In the Imperial Guards there was a Keksgolmskii 
(Kexholm = Käkisalmi) infantry regiment, formed in 1710, which had 
taken part in the conquest of Finland in 1713, 1742, and 1788, and 
was to fight there again in 1808-09.12 In 1806, a battalion of the 
Imperial Militia was established, which in 1807 was increased to 
regimental strength, earned Guards honours, and in 1808 was named 
the Imperial Life Guards Finland Regiment.13 
10 	 In 1800 there were 14 military inspectorates in the Russian Empire: St Petersburg, 
Finland, Moscow, Livonia, Smolensk, Lithuania, Brest, Kiev, the Ukraine, 
Dniester, the Crimea, Caucasia, Orenburg, and Siberia, each of which was to form 
a corps in case of mobilization. The more modem division system was adopted 
in 1806, with 18 divisions, the following year 24 divisions and 26 in 1809, in all 
more than 730,000 men. Beskrovnyi, Russkaia armiia i floc v XIX veke: 
Voenno-ekonomicheskii potentsial Rossii, p. 193; Kersnovskii, Istoriia russkoi 
armii, vol. 1, p. 200. 
11 	 "Vyborgskii 85-i pekhotnyi Ego Imp. i Kor. Vel. Imp. Germanskago i Kor. 
Prusskago Vil'gelma II polk." Voennaia Entsiklopediia , vol. VII, pp. 98-99. 
12 	 "Keksgolmskii leib-gvardii Im. Avstriiskii Polk." Voennaia Entsyklopediia, vol. 
XII, pp. 487-489. 
13 	 Kersnovskii, Istoriia russkoi armii, vol. 1, p. 292. 
In peace-time the garrisons in Russian Finland consisted of more 
than twenty thousand soldiers, while the coastal and inland lake 
flotillas consisted of 30-60 boats armed with 3-pound falconets. The 
guberniia formed a strong glacis for the defence of St Petersburg and 
a base for an eventual conquest of Swedish Finland.14 
The small permanent garrisons were augmented in times of crisis 
by troops from all over the Empire, for example from Naiva, Vologda, 
Vladimir, Pskov, Riazan, Velikie Luki. In the war year 1789, the 
nominal strength of the garrison in Russian Finland was 43,979 men, 
of whom 982 were killed in action and 191 wounded, 85 permanently 
invalided, and 1,728 died of sickness, while 470 deserted; of the 
remaining 40,721 men, 33,434 were fit for duty, 3,566 sick, and 3,721 
on leave. In addition there were irregular troops, that is 2,200 Cossacks 
and 1,500 Bashkirs.15 Disobedient soldiers in garrisons in Russia were 
sometimes punished by expelling them not to Siberia but to the equally 
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	 dismal Finland, which probably explains why there were numerous 
run-away soldiers on the lists.16 
Finns were free from recruitment until 1797, after which about 
5,700 men in all were recruited in eleven successive levies of 
recruitment. Each time one man was taken from 500, a burden made 
rather heavy by the fact that the period of service was twenty-five 
years." It is not (as yet) known whether any, or how many, Finns 
served in the regiments named after the Finnish localities; Karelian 
recruits usually served in the Russian navy, because "they were not 
afraid of water".18 The Vil'manstrandskii regiment was organized in 
1805 in Tver, rather distant from Finland but populated, among others, 
by Finnish-speaking people, who had emigrated there in the 
seventeenth century. 
The presence of Russian garrisons was tolerable enough for the 
small towns of the district the garrison was situated in. Field troops 
on the march could cause a heavy burden of quartering and carriage 
for the parishes they marched through, and the inhabitants were also 
forced to acquire firewood for the military. But, on the other hand, 
14 	 A detailed but far from clear study is: Astala, "Venäläistä puolustus- ja selusta-
toimintaa Suomessa vv. 1808-1809 sodan edellä ja aikoina." (Russian defensive 
preparations and operations before and during the war of 1808-1809). 
15 	 Borodkin, Istoriia Finliandii,- Vremia Ekaterina II i Pavla I, p. 383. 
16 	 Borodkin, Istoriia... p. 382. 
17 	 Astala, Venäläistä... p. 195. 
18 	 Astala, Venäläistä... p. 195. 
the army did purchase many materials and thus stimulated commerce. 
Later, when Russia had conquered the whole of Swedish Finland 
in 1808-09, the Viipuri province or Russian Finland started to be 
called Old Finland by the Russians, and the name remained in use in 
the Finnish historiography of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.19 
The conquest of New Finland 
The rest of Finland to the west of Viipuri Province was conquered 
by Russia in 1808-09. It was the third time within a century, and this 
time the country was not given back to Sweden. 
The poor and sparsely inhabited country had no importance for its 
own sake for the Empire. The possession of Finland in 1713-21 and 
1742-43 had been a means of pressing Sweden to concede Russian 
demands. Booty or taxes from Finland had been only an incidental 
benefit. After attaining its political goal, Russia had given the 
conquered country back to the weakened neighbour. 
It seems, however, that from a strategic point of view Russia had 
reason to be displeased with the continued Swedish presence in 
Finland. Peter the Great had taken Viipuri in 1710 to form a glacis 
for St Petersburg, but it had not been enough, as was proved by the 
unpleasant surprise of the Swedish attack in 1741. For the further 
protection of the capital, Empress Elizabeth pushed the border a few 
miles more to the west, to the River Kymi, in 1743. 
However, in spite of the threat from Sveaborg to Russia's 
navigation on the Gulf of Finland and the renewed attempt against 
the Imperial capital in 1788, Catherine II had deemed it best to leave 
the Swedish border on the Kymijoki. The danger was not great enough 
to warrant a campaign of conquest, especially at the time of the giant 
effort in the south and west, in Turkey and Poland, and in the absence 
19 Lindequist, "Iso Viha" (the Great Northern War); Sepp, Tsaari Pietarin sota-
suunnitelma Viroa, Liivinmaata ja Suomea vastaan. (Tsar Peter's war plan against 
Estonia, Livonia and Finland); Juva, Idän uhkan varjossa (Under the threat of the 
East), published in 1920, 1937, and 1943, reflect the Finnish view of Russia as 
the hereditary enemy: the Swedish loss of Finland was regarded as a Finnish loss, 
too. A classic of Russian military history is: Myshlaevskii, Petr Velikii, voina v 
Finliandii v 1712-1714 godakh. On the administration of the Old Russian Finland: 
Ranta, Vanhan Suomen talouselämä 1721-1743 (The economy of Old Finland), 
Ranta, Viipurin komendanttikunta 1710-1721; valtaus, hallinto ja oikeudenhoito 
(The commandantship of Viipuri 1710-21; capture, administration and judicial 
system). 
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of diplomatic support from any European power. 
Russia had grown to cover large areas of Eurasia, without any fixed 
purpose or plan, advancing and retreating step by step, provoked by 
enemy attacks as well as lured by weak neighbours. Seldom did there 
exist a definite programme of expansion, like Peter's quest for the 
open sea or Catherine's wish to emulate his great predecessor. Driven 
by religious enthusiasm, lust of conquest, economic need or greed, 
quest for power and glory, Russia advanced as far and as fast as she 
could, and stopped when opposition grew too strong for her. 
The conquest of Finland in 1808-09 also came about for extraneous 
reasons, not as a considered move to the north-west. Under Emperor 
Paul, Russia had become involved in the all-European revolutionary 
war, with detachments fighting in Italy and Switzerland, and a 
squadron in the Mediterranean. Then, Alexander I joined the alliance 
against Napoleon but, after his army had been defeated at Austerlitz 
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	 in 1805 and at Friedland in 1807, Alexander deemed it best to 
reconcile himself to Napoleon's wishes. The Treaty of Tilsit in 1807 
still left Russia a Great Power, unlike Austria or Prussia, which were 
subjected to the French diktat. Russia joined the Continental Blockade, 
and also undertook to discipline Sweden, which had joined Napoleon's 
enemies in the preceding years and now refused to participate in his 
measures against Britain. France could not divert any forces to the 
north from the fight against the Spanish guerillas. It also seems that 
Napoleon hoped to turn Russia's attention away from Turkey, where 
French interests were vitally involved, towards the uninteresting north. 
The Swedish King Gustavus IV Adolf refused to collaborate with 
the two Emperors. Reluctantly, pressed by Napoleon, Alexander I 
started preparations for war. He hoped to frighten the Swedes with a 
show of force, and disinformation about a mighty concentration of 
troops was transmitted to Stockholm. Trusting in British support and 
loathing Napoleon, the King remained stubborn. By the end of 1807 
it seemed clear that he had to be persuaded by war. 
In February 1808, three Russian divisions under the command of 
Count Friedrich Wilhelm von Buxhoevden crossed the Swedish border 
in Finland. The attack was made in winter, when ice prevented 
reinforcements from being sent from Sweden. The attacking force was 
rather small, in all 24,000 men, in order to facilitate supply in this 
wild country. The infantry was reinforced with artillery, cavalry and 
Cossack troops. There were four regiments of three battalions in each 
division, but while crossing Russian Finland each regiment 
strengthened two of its battalions from the third one, for which only 
cadres were left to be completed with new recruits. There were 20,500 
men in the infantry, 2,100 in the cavalry, and 1,200 artillerymen with 
66 guns. 
Buxhoevden's chief of staff, General Paul van Suchtelen, had 
drawn up the plan for the offensive, on the basis of Suvorov's ideas 
from the previous century. He had been aided by Sprengtporten's 
knowledge of local conditions; the defector travelled with the Russian 
staff as a consulting general.20 
Lieutenant General Prince Petr Bagration's 21st Infantry Division 
was directed against the main Swedish army, which slowly retreated 
towards Hämeenlinna (Tavastehus) and from there to the north. 
Lieutenant General Prince Gorchakov's 17th Infantry Division 
advanced along the southern coast to Helsinki-Sveaborg and then to 
Turku. The 5th Infantry Division under Lieutenant General Tuchkov, 
for a while acting commander instead of Lieutenant General 
Kamenskii, was to attack through the interior of the country towards 
the coast of the Gulf of Bothnia and in the rear of the Swedish army. 	 31 
This was a novelty; earlier wars had been waged in the south only, 
but new roads built during the eighteenth century made it possible for 
small bodies of troops to cross the lake district in the north. 
The Finnish troops of the Swedish army, crofter21 soldiers led by 
the gentleman-farmer officers of the indelta army, with enlisted 
regiments as fortress garrisons, consisted of about 20,000 men in all, 
the field army about 12,000 men. The Russians were hardened in the 
numerous conflicts against Napoleon, while the Swedes had not 
recently been in battle. The Swedish leadership was also rather inept 
and their war plan extremely timid, with an extraordinary lack of 
enthusiasm for any real resistance: the army was to retreat until help 
20 Tommila, Suomen autonomian synty 1808-1819 (The origins of Finnish 
autonomy), p. 18. The war has been described in innumerable books, an unusually 
readable one of which is Schulman's Striden om Finland 1808-1809. The most 
detailed, almost unreadable account is the nine-volume military history of the 
Swedish General Staff: Sveriges krig åren 1808 och 1809. From the Russian side 
of the front, the best account is always Aleksandr Ivanovich Mikhailovich-
Danilevskii's book Opisanie Finliandskoi voiny v 1808 i 1809 godakh, printed in 
1849 and translated into Swedish: Michailofski-Danilefski, Beskrifvning öfeer 
finska kriget till lands och sjös åren 1808 och 1809, Tavastehus 1850. 
21 	 A crofter was a tenant of a detached part of a farm, who remunerated the landlord, 
usually a peasant, by manual work. In the indelta military system, a few peasants 
(from two to six) hired a landless worker as soldier and gave him a croft to live; 
weapons and uniform were supplied by the army; training took place during a 






~ ~ 	 ) i• N _ ~ • 	 r: 





NLINN  A 	 A7LAITEENRANT ÅLAND 	 TURKU 1~ 
q•------ 
° 
	 \` ~ 	 VIIPURI 




PORI 	 TAM.P,ERE 
HAMEENLINNA 
KUOPIO .
I T\ - 
c\ 







THE RUSSIAN CONQUEST OF THE 
SWEDISH FINLAND IN 1808-09 
RUSSIAN ADVANCE IN THE SPRING OF 1808 
ST.PETERSBURG 









	 MIKKELI 'i 	 )SAVONLI 
HAMEENIINNA 	 LAPPEENRANTA 
• 



















The Russian conquest of Swedish Finland in 1808-1809 
The occupation of Southern Finland was an easy task for Russian army commanded by 
Barclay de Tolly in the spring of 1808, but the long distances and bad roads in the north 
made advance difficult and the Swedish counter-attack in the summer made necessary a 
strengthening of the Russian forces, which then slowly fought their way to the far north in the 
autumn of 1808 and even crossed the Gulf of Bothnia in the spring of 1809. 
could be sent from the Swedish side of the Gulf of Bothnia in the 
spring. 
The Russians took the fortresses of Svartholma in the east and 
Hanko in the west in March. Suchtelen easily persuaded the 
demoralized or defeatist officers of Sveaborg to surrender by the 
beginning of May, before any help could reasonably be expected from 
beyond the ice-covered sea. The Russians took about 6,500 prisoners 
of war, more than one hundred ships, and nearly one thousand fortress 
and ship cannons. Prisoners who gave an oath of allegiance to the 
Emperor were soon set free, but a few recalcitrants had to spend years 
in Russia. 
It became obvious that Sprengtporten had been right in surmising 
that the Finns would easily be persuaded to give up. The upper-class 
Finns had perceived the growth of Russia's might and the increasing 
weakness of Sweden. Henrik Gabriel Porthan, a leading Finnish 
academician in the eighteenth century, had said that the Finns should 
pray for Russia to succeed in making Constantinople her capital. Then 
Russia could leave Finland in peace under the Swedish sceptre; 
otherwise, with St Petersburg so close, sooner or later Finland would 
be dominated by Russia.22 The common people may have thought 
otherwise, but they had no leaders and no proper occasion for 
resistance. 
Meanwhile, the 21st Division, tired by its rapid advance, and 
depleted by the detachments it had left to guard its rear 
communications, had been stopped near the coast of the Gulf of 
Bothnia. Nicholas Raevskii, who had led the advance to the north but 
turned back and suffered a minor defeat at Lapua (Lappo), was 
replaced by Lieutenant General Count Kamenskii. Tuchkov was 
dismissed, but reappointed after rehabilitation. The defenders 
advanced towards the south, but timidly. There were a few battles in 
which the Finnish soldiers of the Swedish army showed no lack of 
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	 spirit, especially in the interior region of Savo, where they were ably 
led against the 5th Division. But southern Finland remained firmly 
under Russian occupation. In the lake district, a few operations were 
carried out by guerilla patrols against the long Russian supply lines. 
Denmark having submitted to Napoleon, the Danish fleet was 
seized as a precautionary measure in 1807. Thus the Royal Navy had 
free access to the Baltic Sea. During the navigation season of 1808, 
the British Royal Navy supported the Swedes against the common 
enemy. Admiral Lord Gambier, soon succeeded by Vice-Admiral Sir 
James Saumarez, sailed with a fleet of ships of the line to the western 
coast of Sweden in the spring of 1808. The presence of the British 
warships protected Sweden from a landing, then being busily prepared 
by Napoleon's Marshal Jean Baptiste Bernadotte, and freed the 
Swedish fleet for action in the east. A British detachment visited the 
Baltic, but Swedish demands for a naval attack on the Gulf of Finland 
and a British landing on the coast of Finland remained without 
response. The main task of the British fleet was to convoy merchant 
ships through the Danish Straits and to keep an eye on Napoleon's 
troops in Denmark and the German coast. In a remarkably successful 
operation, a few thousand Spanish soldiers were persuaded to 
surrender and were sent home in British ships. The Russian fleet 
moved cautiously to the region of Hankoniemi, and, after a call for 
22 	 Tommila, Suomen autonomian synty, pp. 59-60. 
help from the Swedes, the British, in a skirmish, took and burned 
the Vsevolod, a Russian ship of the line, in August.23 
During these operations, the garrison in Russian Finland was 
maintained in strength by reinforcements from St Petersburg and the 
Baltic provinces, in spite of the demand for reinforcements on the 
Turkish, Austrian, and Prussian frontiers. The garrison in Old Finland 
secured the communications of the attacking army with Russia, stood 
ready to fend off any Swedish or British landing, and was able to 
reinforce the field force operating in Swedish Finland.24 In May 1808, 
about 11,000 men from the 6th and 14th Divisions, part of them 
experienced soldiers freed from French captivity since 1805-07, others 
recently conscripted recruits, arrived for the army. The main body, 
about 7,500 men, was sent to the Savo front, while the rest, the third 
battalions of the regiments already in Finland, and a few regiments 
from the St Petersburg garrison among them, were to reinforce the 
depleted detachments on the other fronts. 
It seems that the rather recent divisional organization was loosened 
during the battles, when regiments, battalions and even companies 
were sent as detached units to the different fronts or directions where 
reinforcements were needed. In May the strength of the Russian army 
was 34,000, in July only 26,000.25 By the end of the summer, the 
troops were divided in five provisional corps — not regular army corps 
— named after their chiefs, which is a bit confusing because the 
generals were often changed. Tuchkov in Savo had 6,617 men, 
Kamenskii was in northern Karelia with 10,435 soldiers, Golitsyn in 
Häme with his headquarters at Hämeenlinna (Tavastehus) commanded 
8,554 warriors of his recently arrived 4th Division, Bagration was on 
the south-western coast with 8,641 men, and Wittgenstein on the 
southern coast with 10,006 men. In all there were 44,614 soldiers in 
the army, of whom 38,074 were infantry, 3,918 cavalry and 2,622 
artillery, and, in addition, 3,238 sailors in the coastal flotilla.26 
23 PRO, ADM I — 6, Baltic 1808; ADM 1 — 7, Baltic 1808; Ryan, The defence of 
British trade with the Baltic; Ryan, The Saumarez Papers; Ryan, An ambassador 
afloat; Trulsson, British and Swedish policies and strategies in the Baltic after 
the Peace of Tilsit in 1807. These works were pointed out to me by Kari Murtola, 
who is preparing his study pro gradu Ison-Britannian Suomen sota 1808-1809 at 
the University of Tampere (The Finnish War of Great Britain in 1808-1809). 
24 Astala, Venäläistä... p. 209. 
25 	 Mihailovskii-Danilevskii, pp. 77, 132. 
26 Mihailovskii-Danilevskii, p. 174. The exact numbers given are very much to be 
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Russian troops were positioned in small detachments and far from 
each other in the sparsely populated country where roads were few 
and the supply of the troops difficcult. Due to the utter incompetence 
of the Swedish high command, the chance for taking advantage of 
the situation for countermoves was lost. 
The rapid changes in the reported strength of the Russian army — 
from the original 24,000 to 39,000 in May and to 24,000 in July and 
then to almost 50,000 in September may denote casualties and 
reinforcements, but partly also different ways of counting, e.g. 
sometimes the total strength was given, at other times the number of 
combatants only; there may have been incompetent or corrupted 
accounting, too. 
After the skirmish with the British, the Russian fleet retreated to 
Kronstadt. They had more ships than the British, but apparently no 
confidence in their fighting ability, because the navy had again been 
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	 neglected and run down since the days of Catherine II. In the 
following summer, there were only a few minor operations by small 
coastal gunboats. In fact, the British were not interested in fighting 
the Russians but in trading with them; soon, in 1810, British 
merchantmen were already visiting Russian ports, and Russia's new 
customs regulations boldly ignored Alexander's promises to support 
Napoleon's Continental Blockade.' 
A small Russian vanguard had advanced to Åland, but the 
inhabitants expelled them from the archipelago, after which about 
7,000 Swedes occupied it during the summer of 1808. The French 
and Danish threat tied down important Swedish forces on the southern 
front, but, protected by the British navy, the Swedes undertook 
landings on the Finnish coast, too. The operations were diffuse, 
cautious, and were easily repelled by the Russian detachments on the 
coast. It had been hoped that these attempts would inspire popular 
uprisings against the Russians, and uprisings did occur, but they were 
quelled with the customary severity. The risings seem to show that 
the Finns would have defended their country had their government in 
Stockholm and generals given them more efficient leadership. The 
difficulties with the guerillas in the interior with sparse habitation, 
long distances, bad roads, inpenetrable woods, and without supply, 
suspected, but there is no way of knowing the real strength of the detachments. 
27 	 Jane, The Imperial Russian Navy, pp. 123-26. 
"Prisoners of war in Russia. A watercolour by Johan Fredrik Malmberg 1808°. The Russian conquest of Swedish 
Finland in 1808 brought with it the usual hardships of war, although afterwards the Finns rather easily accepted the 
fact of Russian superiority. 
Photo: Museovirasto Neg 57040. 
housing or proper clothing in autumn and winter weather, were all 
factors which made a deep impression on the Russian leaders, and 
had a lasting importance in military and political planning for the 
border country, as we shall see later on. 
The naval threat had military importance, however. Numerous 
Russian troops were garrisoned in the southern part of the country to 
repel eventual further Swedish counter-attacks, and the force available 
for the northward advance was correspondingly weakened. 
The regions of popular uprisings or guerilla activity excepted, the 
occupying forces behaved much more humanely and were better 
disciplined than in 1713-14 or even 1742. The population suffered 
more from the usual epidemics carried along by the invading armies 
than from any wilful violence. When Turku was taken in March 1808, 
the Emperor declared his intention to annex Finland for ever, and an 
oath of allegiance was taken of the high officials. The commander-
in-chief of the Russian troops General Buxhoevden was perhaps no 
military genius, but he tried to maintain peaceful conditions in the 
country and friendly relations with the population in order to facilitate 
the supply of his troops. In such a poor country, with long distances, 
supply was difficult and in fact "immense corruption took place in 
the supply of provisions, and the troops had to eat berries, roots and 
mushrooms".28 The local administration co-operated with the 
conquerors to escape the consequences of any disorder. Commanders 
also made the population in the region where they operated swear 
allegiance, so that any opposition could be dealt with as rebellion. 
In August—September 1808 the reinforced Russians started a new 
advance to the north. The operation continued during the autumn, with 
intermittent battles and an occasional cease-fire. By 19 November, the 
38 	 Finnish troops had left the country south of the River Kemijoki to the 
Russians and had retreated to the Swedish side of the Gulf of Bothnia. 
Alexander I was dissatisfied with Buxhoevden, because the 
conquest of the country from a weak opponent had taken too long. 
His dissatisfaction was inflamed by Buxhoevden's enemies at court, 
mainly by the Minister of War General Arakcheev, and also 
Chancellor Count Rumiantsev, who deplored Buxhoevden's cease-
fires, which caused him difficulties with Napoleon. Buxhoevden was 
replaced by General Bogdan von Knorring, who was appointed 
commander-in-chief in December. 
In January 1809 the troops were re-organized for the operations in 
the following spring, with the idea of restoring the regular divisions. 
The corps were still identified with the names of their commanders. 
General Tuchkov and then Pavel Shuvalov commanded 10,000-
11,000 men at Oulu, Golitsyn's 13,000 at Vaasa were reduced to less 
than 6,000 under Barclay de Tolly, Bagration had about 10,000 in 
Turku, Demidov 4,000 in Åland, and Wittgenstein at Helsinki 
commanded 9,000 men (4,000 of them garrisoning Sveaborg). There 
were a little over 1,300 men in northern Savo and Karelia under the 
military governor of Viipuri. In January the reported strength was 
2,730 cavalry, 40,808 infantry, 1,963 artillery and 2,917 sailors, with 
3,961 non-combatants, in all 52,439 men; at the end of April 1809 
28 	 Kersnovskii, Istoriia russkoi armii, vol. I, p. 245. 
the number of combatants was reported to be 39,000.29 
The army was ordered to re-open operations against the Swedes 
before the sailing season began. Knorring and Bagration were 
unwilling to risk their troops on the uncertain ice of the Baltic, and 
the Emperor had to send Arakcheev to Turku to force them to attack 
from Åland over the melting ice to Grisslehamn on the Swedish coast. 
The operation was warmly egged on by Caulaincourt, the French 
Ambassador to the court of St Petersburg. 
In the north, General Pavel Shuvalov advanced over the river 
Tornio, and Barclay de Tolly crossed the Gulf of Bothnia over the 
ice to Umeå. The attacks were again aimed at pressing Sweden to 
accept its definite defeat. The aim was not that of further conquest, 
and the Russians soon retreated from their raids.30 However, the 
defenders in the north felt trapped between the Russians in Tornio 
(Torneå) and Umeå. In March, they laid down their arms and Finnish 
soldiers were allowed to return home. 
Barclay de Tolly then succeeded von Knorring as commander-in-
chief and, after fighting ceased, was appointed Governor-General of 
the conquered Finland when the cantakerous Sprengtporen had proved 
impossible. In 1810 Barclay de Tolly advanced to become Minister 
of War and was succeeded by Fabian Steinheil.31 The new Governor-
General was at the same time appointed commander of the troops in 
Russian Finland and bore the title of 'Commander of the Two 
Finlands' _32 
In the peace of Hamina (Fredrikshamn), signed on 17 September 
1809, the Russian Empire annexed the following Swedish län (Finnish 
lääni, county or guberniia) to the east of the Gulf of Bothnia:33 
29 Mihailovskii-Danilevskii, pp. 174, 223-28, 282. 
30 	 Martin Hårdstedt, Kriget och lokalsamhället — Övre Norrland och kriget 1808-09, 
forthcoming, is a study of the consequences of the war for civilian society, which 
had to feed the troops and horses, and provide shelter for the men. 
31 	 On the war and the pacification of Finland, see: L.G. v. Bonsdorff, Den ryska 
pacifzceringen i Finland 1808-1809; G.A. Gripenberg, Suomen sota 1808-1809 
(the war in Finland); Ordin, Pokorenie Finliandii; Osmonsalo, Suomen valloitus 
1808 (the conquest of Finland); Osmonsalo & Viljanen, Suomen sota vv. 
1808-1809 (The war in Finland); Schybergson, Från Tilsit till Sveaborgs 
kapitulation. However, the best account is written by an amateur historian 
Schulman, Striden om Finland. On Great-Power politics see: Tommila, La 
Finlande dans la politique europ6enne en 1809-1815. 
32 	 Borodkin, Istoriia Finliandii; Vremia Imperatora Aleksandra I, p. 422. 
33 	 Finland had not hitherto existed as a definable political entity. 
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The formation of the Grand Duchy of Finland 
In the Peace of Hamina (Fredrikshamn) in 1809 Russia annexed Sweden's Finnish counties 
and part of Lapland up the River Tornio and Muonio, up to the border agreed between 
Sweden and Denmark in 1751. In 1812 '01d Finland' annexed by Russia in 1721 and 1743 
was transferred to the administration of Finland. The border between Russia and Norway in 
the north was marked in 1826, and the borderline between Finnish and Russian administration 
was settled in the 1830's. Thus the Grand Duchy of Finland was delineated on the map, and 
in due time its population was to grow into the Finnish nation. 
1809 
Turku and Pori (Åbo och Björneborg), Uusimaa and Häme (Nyland 
och Tavastehus), Kymenkartano (Kymmenegård), Savo and Karjala 
(Savolax och Karelien), Vaasa (Vasa), and Oulu (Uleåborg), as well 
as part of Länsipohja (Västerbotten) up to the rivers Tornio (Torne 
älv) and Muonio (Muonio älv), and Ahvenanmaa (Åland). 
The published reports do not give any definite number of casualties; 
apparently thousands were killed and wounded in battles, but the 
fluctuation of the number of soldiers in tens of thousands must be 
due to sickness, primitive care for wounded, and disorderly supply. 
PACIFICATION 
The administration of the conquered country 	 41 
The purpose of the war in Finland had been to press Sweden to accept 
the demands of Napoleon and Alexander; after that the conqueror was 
to leave the country. But when hostilities had been opened the aim 
changed. It seems that Emperor Alexander had decided to keep the 
conquered country in order to have at least some booty to show for 
his alliance with the detested French, which caused commercial 
difficulties in the important trade with the British and prevented any 
advance in Poland or in Turkey. At the very beginning, Buxhoevden 
declared that the country would for ever be part of the Russian Empire, 
and similar declarations were made in St Petersburg, too, in April 
1808.'4 
The better-off Finns readily submitted to Russian rule. The Bishop 
of Turku instructed the parish priests to preach submission, and the 
members of the Court of Appeal hurried to swear allegiance. 
Submitting to the hereditary enemy was much more difficult for the 
common people, devoted to the King for centuries, but there was no 
one to agitate among them or organize their resistance. 
In the spring of 1809, the representatives of the four Estates — 
nobility, clergy, burghers, and peasantry — were elected in accordance 
with the ancient (1617) Swedish parliamentary or Diet constitution 
but, of course, only from the conquered country, and convened to 
34 	 Tommila, La Finlande dans la politique europeenne en 1809-1815, p. 18. 
meet Emperor Alexander at the town of Porvoo (Borgå). There they 
repeated their oath of allegiance in constitutional form. It is true that 
the Finns had sworn allegiance to King Gustavus IV Adolf in 1792, 
but, happily for their consciences, Swedish army officers, dissatisfied 
with the unhappy result of an inept reign, overthrew the King in March 
1809 in the course of the disorder caused by one of the Russian attacks 
from Åland. 
Alexander I confirmed his new subjects in their ancient rights, 
privileges, religion and constitution. Advised by his Chancellor 
Mikhail Speranskii and Sprengtporten, the Emperor thus secured the 
loyalty of the recently conquered country. Of course, it could have 
been secured with military measures, but that would have necessitated 
maintaining numerous troops in the impoverished country, which 
would have been expensive; even the minimal Finnish guerilla 
operations had made the generals wary. Napoleon's marshals were 
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	 having considerable difficulties in Spain, and it would have been 
equally difficult to seek and destroy guerillas hiding among the 
Finnish lakes and forests. All possible forces had to be kept ready for 
the war against Napoleon, which was ever more clearly threatening. 
The Finnish peasants were pacified by the promise of the Orthodox 
Emperor to respect their Lutheran creed; nor was there any attempt 
to submit them to serfdom. Property was secure and trade within the 
country and over the Gulf of Bothnia with Sweden continued as 
previously, which satisfied the bourgeoisie. The Bishop of Turku was 
made Archbishop (in 1817), not only in recognition of his timely 
submission, but as a gesture to stress the independence of the diocese 
from the Swedish archbishopric of Uppsala. 
Maintaining the ancient laws and administration unchanged implied 
one essentially new feature: to replace the central administration in 
Stockholm, new organs for Finland were created which were directly 
under the Emperor, independent of the Russian ministries in St 
Petersburg. A Government Council, in 1816 renamed the Imperial 
Finnish Senate, carried on the day-to-day administration in Turku, later 
in Helsinki which was closer to the new possessor of power. 
Alexander I took the title of Grand Duke of Finland, appointed a 
Governor-General to guard his new province, and a Committee for 
Finnish Affairs with a State Secretary, later Minister State Secretary, 
was established in St Petersburg. The administration was paid for from 
local taxes and customs revenues, which the Emperor left at the 
disposal of his Finnish government, instead of transferring them to 
the Imperial treasury. 
It is not known what exactly Alexander I meant by the terms 
'constitution' or 'nation' which he mentioned in his speeches to the 
representatives of the Diet. He talked with his trusted advisors of a 
regime based on legal limits instead of the practically unlimited 
absolutism in Russia, which presupposed superhuman qualities in the 
monarch; and of giving political existence to Finland. In practice, the 
separate administration, with finances of its own, grew in the course 
of time into a Finnish state. Finnish affairs were even later resolutely 
kept separate from the Russian central administration by Governor-
Generals35 as well as by Minister State Secretaries.36 Gustaf Mauritz 
Armfelt, who had been a favourite of Gustavus III, entered Russian 
service in 1811 and obtained the confidence of Alexander I, was 
influential in the creation of this system. His successors in the office 
of the State Secretary continued the tradition in the following reigns 
of Nicholas I, Alexander II, and Alexander III. 
By the peace of Hamina Sweden consented to the annexation of 
her Finnish provinces by Russia. The Russians wanted to push the 	 43 
border to the River Kalix (Kainuu), while the Swedes tried to keep 
the region retained down to the River Kemi, but after a long dispute 
the River Tornio was agreed on as a compromise. Russia took all 
Lapland up to the border line agreed by Sweden and Denmark-Norway 
in 1751. Thus, on the map, an arm was formed for Finland reaching 
towards the northern Atlantic. Losing Åland to the Russians was a 
bitter matter for the Swedes, whose capital seemed extremely 
threatened from the archipelago, but they were powerless to keep it 
from the mighty conqueror. 
The inhabitants of Finland had been "good Swedish men"; the fact 
that 80% of them spoke Finnish, or that 50% of them were women, 
had no political or national significance. The new border was drawn 
irrespective of any ethnic point of view — such a point of view did 
not exist in 1809. Many Finnish-speaking regions in the north were 
left on the Swedish or Norwegian side of the new border, while most 
of the Swedish-speaking Finns remained in the new Russian Finland. 
After the conquest, the victorious Russian troops were garrisoned 
35 	 F. Steinheil 1810-24, Arsenii Zakrevskii 1824-31, Prince Menschikoff 1831-55, 
F.W.R.von Berg 1855-61, Platon Rokassovskii 1861-66, Nicholas Adlerberg 
1866-81, and Ivan Logginovich Heiden 1881-97. 
36 	 Gustaf Mauritz Armfelt 1811-13, Robert Henrik Rehbinder 1813-41, Alexander 
Armfelt 1841-76, C.K.E. Stjemwall-Walleen 1876-81, Th. Bruun 1881-88, 
Casimir Ehrnrooth 1888-91, Woldemar von Daehn 1891-98. 
in Finland. From the maximum number of 55,000, the troops were 
reduced to 30,000 by the beginning of 1812. 
The Finnish troops of the Swedish army had ceased to exist with 
the surrender of 1809. The Russians enlisted a few Finns from the 
previous fortress garrisons, but this 'Ruotsinsalmi' detachment had no 
importance and no future. Finnish officers were allowed to continue 
living on their estates, although no military service was demanded of 
them; Alexander I thus secured their loyalty. 
Sometimes people in Finland joked that "we are Russians now", 
but in fact the Empire was not regarded as ethnically Russian, and 
the Emperor succesfully adopted the role of Finland's own monarch. 
A 'Finn' implied someone speaking Finnish, but equally well an 
inhabitant of Finland without regard to his language, and 'Finnish 
nation' meant those people in the country who belonged to one of the 
four Estates, loyal subjects of the Emperor. A nation as a conscious 
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	 political entity in the modern meaning did not exist as yet, and the 
circle of people who were involved in politics was very small indeed, 
mainly officers and officials of the regime and in time a few students 
and professors of the University (transferred from Turku to Helsinki 
in 1827). 
During the following century, about three thousand sons of the 
Finnish gentry sought service in Russia, and approximately three 
hundred of them reached the rank of general, admiral, or the 
equivalent position in the civil service.37 At home, it was thought that 
it was important to have people in Russia who were loyal to their 
Finnish homeland and whom the Emperor trusted in Finnish questions, 
too, though a few of them were Russified. Problems emerged only 
with the conflict between Russian and Finnish nationalism at the end 
of the nineteenth century.38 Knowledge of the Russian language was 
not demanded from students or from officials in Finland — there was 
a Russian language requirement for entry to the civil service, but it 
was not enforced as it was soon proved that Swedish-, German- and 
Finnish-speaking subjects in the country were completely loyal to the 
Emperor. Educated people were encouraged to become Finns, i.e. no 
37 Screen, 'Våra landsmäm', Finnish Officers in Russian Service, 1809-1917; 
Screen, "Undersåte och medborgare: finländska officerare i rysk tjänst"; Pikoff, 




Screen, Mannerheimin muukalaisvuodet (Mannerheim: the Years of Preparation), 
p. 33, 54. 
longer Swedish patriots, though of course they continued to speak 
Swedish. French or German was used in correspondence with the 
government, court and society in St Petersburg. 
The indelta military system remained in force, but only in principle, 
while in practice the peasants were freed from the upkeep of the 
crofter soldiers and paid a tax instead. The soldiers, who had lost their 
livelihood, were unhappy, of course, but in the agrarian rural society, 
dominated by peasants, poor landless people had no political importance. 
With the dissolving of the ancient troops, the Finns were freed from 
the fear of having to fight against their former mother country. The 
Russians, on their side, could remain secure in the knowledge that 
any chance of organized armed resistance against the Imperial 
dominion had disappeared. 
Of the previous military establishment, the officer's school was 
soon revived. Sprengtporten, during the time he had still been in 
Swedish service, had established training courses for officers at his 
official manor, Haapaniemi. The courses were now re-established as 
a school of topography, and in 1812 the school was transferred to 
Hamina (Fredrikshamn) and transformed into a cadet corps, similar 
to the prestigious Imperial Russian institutions. The Hamina Cadet 
School educated and trained Finns from the gentry to serve the 
Emperor in Finland and in Russia until 1905.39 
Sweden desists from revanche 
Meanwhile, the Tilsit alliance of Alexander and Napoleon began to 
break up. Napoleon created a new Poland in the Grand Duchy of 
Warsaw out of Austria's and Prussia's Polish regions, which of course 
did not please the Russians. For its part, Russia was a very reluctant 
ally in Napoleon's Austrian war in 1809, in fact, of more harm than 
help. Worst of all, for Napoleon, was the fact that the Russians did 
not willingly observe the prohibition on commerce with England. A 
conflict between France and Russia was developing and was obviously 
soon to turn into war. 
The threat of a war from Sweden, probably allied with France, was 
the reason why so many troops were maintained in the recently 
conquered but successfully pacified Finland. 
39 Gripenberg & Ignatius, "Sotakoulut Suomessa" (Military Schools in Finland). 
45 
The Russian grip on Finland was even further reinforced, but again 
by political rather than by military means. In 1812 Old Finland, which 
had been taken in 1710 and 1742, was united with the New, i.e. the 
recently conquered, Finland. It obviously made sense to unite the two 
regions which were administered according to the ancient Swedish 
laws and customs. The border between the Russian and Finnish 
administration thereafter ran on the Karelian Isthmus a few miles to 
the north-west from the Imperial capital. This area, which had slowly 
started turning Russian at the end of the previous century, was now 
linked once again with pace of Finnish development. G. M. Armfelt, 
who had proposed the measure, wrote privately that even Russian 
Karelia, being in fact Finnish-speaking (but subjected by Novgorod 
in the Middle Ages), should also have been united with the Grand 
Duchy, but its history, customs, and religion, as well as the general 
political situation made such a union unpropitious. In the Russian 
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	 capital some dissatisfaction was felt at the Emperor's over-generous 
gifts to the Finns, and Rehbinder, Armfelt's successor, even proposed 
giving back the Orthodox part of Old Finland to avoid trouble with 
influential Russian landowners in the region. Similar plans for uniting 
former Polish areas in the Ukraine and White Russia with the new 
Russian Kingdom of Poland after 1815 came to nothing, because the 
political climate had changed.4°  
However, politically and strategically more important in securing 
St Petersburg from the north-west was the fact that Sweden had ceased 
to be a threat to the Russian capital. After their coup d'etat in 1809, 
the Swedes had chosen Bernadotte, one of Napoleon's Field Marshals, 
for their Crown Prince and, in fact, Regent (King 1818-44). They 
naturally wanted to be on the victorious side in the European war that 
was then going on. Bernadotte, or Karl Johan as he was called after 
being adopted by Karl XIII, soon guessed, however, that his former 
master, Napoleon, was doomed. He changed sides and a treaty was 
signed on 24 March/5 April 1812 between Sweden and Russia. The 
new alliance was manifested in a meeting of the two rulers in Turku, 
where they agreed that Sweden was to take Norway as a replacement 
for Finland.41  
40 Hovi, "Miksi Aleksanteri I ei palauttanut Puolan itäalueita Puolan kuningas-
kuntaan?" (Why didn't Alexander I reunite the Polish eastern regions with the 
Kingdom of Poland?) 
41 	 Tommila, La Finlande... 
The idea of revanche had to be given up by Sweden, and the idea 
of reuniting with the ancient mother country proved to be a futile 
dream in Finland. From the more than 30,000 Russian troops in 
Finland in the beginning of the year, the numbers were reduced to 
twenty thousand in the summer.42 
Russo-British relations also improved, with Suchtelen the Russian 
negotiator, and peace was signed at Örebro in Sweden on 6/18 June 
1812. There was even a plan to carry out a joint operation under the 
command of Steinheil, with British ships and Russian troops from 
Sveaborg, Turku and Åland over the Baltic Sea to the Pomeranian 
coast. Nothing came of the idea, and soon Napoleon took the initiative 
into his hands.4' 
A Russian fleet was based at Sveaborg under Admiral Sablin, with 
smaller detachments in Turku, in Viipuri, and at Oulu (Uleåborg), and 
further flotillas at Kronstadt, in Reval and in Riga. As no enemy 
existed at sea, after the British naval victories, the Russian ships were 
mainly used for transport purposes. Rowed gunboat and landing 
flotillas made themselves useful in small attacks against the enemy-
held coasts.44 
Steinheil's corps against Macdonald and Oudinot 
Napoleon first had the idea of starting his offensive to the east with 
the conquest of Riga and the crossing of the River Dvina, in order to 
advance on the Russian capital, but this plan proved impracticable 
because his enemies dominated the sea and would have threatened 
the left wing of the advancing force. Instead, Napoleon made his main 
thrust directly to the east, towards Minsk, Smolensk and Moscow. 
But he left a couple of corps under Field Marshals Oudinot and 
Macdonald threatening the Russian capital through the Baltic 
provinces; their first task was to lay siege to Riga.45 
The main Russian army was concentrated against the Grande 
Armee, but detached divisions were left to guard the Crimea and 
Caucasia, and Finland, too, insofar as Sweden was still deemed faintly 
42 	 D. Buturlin, Istoriia nashestvii imperatora Napoleona na Rossiiu v 1812-m godu. 
SPeterburg 1823, vol. I, p. 87, cited by: Helme, 1812 aasta Eestis ja Lätis, p. 87. 
43 	 Beskrovnyi, Otechestvennaia voina 1812 goda , p. 134. 
44 	 Tri veka rossiiskogo Hota, vol. I, p. 166-167. 
45 	 Beskrovnyi, Otechestvennaia... p. 157. 
47 
unreliable.46 But soon Steinheil with his troops were ordered from the 
Grand Duchy to the theatre of war in the south. Reinforcements were 
badly needed against an enemy superior in numbers, and so it was 
decided to run the risk with Finland since Sweden was formally 
Russia's ally and the alliance had recently been reinforced by a new 
agreement. The Finns seemed pacified and loyal, and Napoleon had 
no navy in the Baltic Sea. 
From the troops Steinheil took with him from Finland — 10,500 
men — and from grenadiers from Russia, he formed an army corps of 
15,000 men. Cadre battalions were left in Finland to mobilize 
additional troops. — When Steinheil crossed the Gulf of Finland in 
August-September 1812, more than five hundred men and six guns 
went down in a storm; an example of the uncertainties of operations 
over the sea. — At first, Steinheil's corps helped the garrison of Riga 
to withstand Macdonald, then the corps marched along the River 
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	 Dvina and took part in the battle of Polotsk. Thereafter, Steinheil's 
troops formed an army corps in the army of General Ludwig Adolf 
Peter (Khristianovich, chevalier of St.George)47 von Wittgenstein 
Count Seyn.48 In November, Steinheil with his corps fought the 
retreating French at Borisov by the River Berezina.49 It was reported 
that Steinheil proved a good, cool-headed soldier, not only a staff or 
topographical officer. His corps went on to battle against the French 
in the west, but the general himself soon took leave and returned to 
his post in Finland.50 It has been said that Steinheil's troops fought 
well in the modem way — in battalion columns preceded by scattered 
sharpshooters — because of their battle experience in the difficult 
terrain and cold climate of Finland during the Swedish war of 1808-
09, where line tactics had been proved outmoded.51 But they probably 
had leamed something even earlier, in their battles against the French 
in 1799-1807. 
46 	 Beskrovnyi, Otechestvennaia... p. 195. 
47 	 Lubchenkov, Spasitel' grada Petrova; General feldmarshal Petr Khristianovich 
Vitgenshtein. 
48 	 Helme, 1812 aasta Eestis..., p. 87. 
49 	 Beskrovnyi, Otechestvennaia... skhema 17 (between pp. 576 and 577). 
50 	 Shteingel'. Russkii Biograficheskii Slovar' , vol. XV, pp. 412-15. 
51 	 Helme, 1812 aasta Eestis..., p. 29. 
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Military garrisons in the 1820s 
The map shows the localities of the battalion headquarters (or regimental headquartes in 
Vaasa), while the troops were billeted partly in the surrounding countryside — sometimes quite 
distant, in the sparsely inhabited country — until barracks were completed in the following 
decades. 
Garrisons in the Grand Duchy 
After the war, Steinheil's troops returned to Finland. The force was 
organized into a division, which consisted of four infantry regiments 
and an artillery brigade. Three of the four regiments were named after 
Finnish localities, as indicated earlier on p. 27; there was the 
Vyborgskii polk, the Vil'manstrandskii, and the Neishlottskii, but the 
fourth was Petrovskii or regiment of Peter. The Viipuri regiment had 
got its name after it had taken part in the capture of the town in 1710, 
but in general the regiments had not much to do with the towns after 
which they were named.52 The regiments may have had a few Karelian 
52 	 "Vil'manstrandskii 86-i peh. polk". Voennaia Entsiklopediia, vol. XVI, p. 387. 
49 
recruits, but no Finnish recruits were taken into Russian regiments 
after Old Finland was reunited to the rest of Finland. 
The coastal forts of Viipuri, Ruotsinsalmi and Sveaborg had their 
garrisons of fortress infantry and fortress artillery. 
In the second infantry division of the Imperial Life Guards in St. 
Petersburg, the second brigade consisted, in addition to a Guards Jäger 
regiment, of a Finland(skii) Guards regiments;  The name was given 
to honour the regiment's participation in the conquest of the Grand 
Duchy54 but otherwise it had nothing to do with Finland. 
From 1815 to 1831 the Governor-General was aided in his task of 
Commander-in-Chief by a Staff of the Detached Army Corps of 
Finland. The staff had the usual departments of quartermaster-general, 
engineers, duty officer, military justice, and medicine. 
For a long time after 1815 peace reigned in the Baltic region. The 
troops exercised mainly for parades. It was politically necessary to 
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	 give the impression of Russia's military might to foreigners and to 
the Emperor's own subjects. Perhaps the leadership lacked an 
understanding of the practical needs of war and held the aesthetical 
factor of military uniforms, marching music, the whole artistic and 
decorative side of military life to be more important or more 
impressive. 
Planning and preparing for real war were almost forgotten matters. 
Nevertheless, the disposition of the garrisons in Turku and Helsinki 
as well as at Hämeenlinna, Lappeenranta, Hamina and in Viipuri 
shows that the main strategic consideration was to secure the coasts 
of Finland against an enemy landing from the Baltic Sea, along with 
the politically most important towns and the road communications to 
St Petersburg. The interior and the north of the country had no great 
military importance and was garrisoned only by second-rate ethnic 
Finnish troops, an aspect which will be discussed later. 
In the beginning, there were occasional conflicts between Russian 
soldiers and Finnish civilians, quarrels or fisticuffs, but no armed 
fights, though one Russian soldier was killed accidentally.55  Barracks 
53 	 von Stein, Geschichte des Russischen Heeres vom Ursprunge dasselben bis zum 
Thronbesteigung des Kaisers Nikolai I Pawlowitsch, p. 359. 
54 	 "Gvardiia." Voennaia Entsiklopediia, vol. XIII, pp. 200-204. 
55 	 Castrén, "Turun ylioppilaat ja venäläinen varusväki I810-1820-luvulla", (Students 
and the Russian garrison at Turku); Ven sot asiak 13, Ven sot asiak 16, National 
Archives of Finland, give a few examples of conflicts dealt with by the 
Governor-General's office. 
started to be constructed to avoid quartering the troops in the homes 
of the inhabitants of the country, but progress was slow. The barracks 
constructed in Helsinki in 1817-33, for example, were giant 
enterprises in the small town, as were those constructed at Hämeen-
linna in the 1840s and 1850s. Home owners were paid for housing 
troops by the local communes, and barracks were constructed by the 
Finnish state, which also paid part of the costs of the fortification 
works started at Bomarsund on Åland. 
The Russians remained strangers in the country because of their 
different religion, language, and customs, but it seems that they were 
not regarded as an army of occupation. After completing their 25-year 
period of service, which alienated them from their homes, a few 
soldiers remained in Finland. A professor of the Russian language at 
the University of Helsinki, Jakov Grot, met a compatriot in 1846: 
"The inn was kept by a Russian tradesman Kononov. He had remained 
in Finland after the campaign of 1808 ... many of the Russians moving 
with the army remained here and started trading" 56 No study exists 
to show how many Russians remained in Finland, how many were 
married to Finnish women, how completely they remained Russian, 
Tartar, or whatever their ethnic and religious origin may have been, 
or whether they were assimilated into the local population. Jews and 
Muslims were not otherwise allowed to reside in Finland, but by the 
end of the century a population of a couple of hundred Jews and 
Tatars had settled in the country after completing their period of 
service in the army garrisoned there. 
The militarily important fact about the troops was the number of 
bayonets and sabres they were able to take into battle, but of the men 
carrying the weapons the documents do not tell much. They lived 
under harsh military discipline, the regiment was their home and 
provider, the co-operative artel was their everyday sphere. Religion 
and language separated them from the local population, but not 
hermetically. Finnish women sometimes lived in the garrison in a more 
or less married state. In one girl's memory the picture of Russian 
soldiers remained rather positive: "There seemed to be awfully many 
of them. They all had similar clothes. They were very friendly; though 
I was a bit afraid of them, I liked them. They spoke a language I did 
not understand, they took me on their knee, stroke my long tresses, 
56 Grot, Matka Suomessa 1846 (A Voyage in Finland), p. 30. 
51 
and gave me sweets. And they smelled alien. [...] Their homes were 
very far away, and they longed for home, that was why we had to be 
friendly with them."57 Social contact sometimes had the usual result: 
"Many a girl at Hamina lost her heart to a Russian soldier. One of 
them, my Aunt Lempi, was enamoured of a handsome musician in 
the Tsar's army [...] Soon, my aunt was expecting a baby by him. My 
aunt was twenty-four, the boy at most eighteen. I don't blame him 
for escaping when he had the chance".58 Very rarely does an individual 
emerge from the faceless uniformed mass: "In the garrison there was 
one soldier, who from the first attracted the sympathy of all the small 
boys [...] Ivan was very small and pale, but he always smiled gladly 
and in a friendly fashion [... and] tried to speak to us with expressions 
and gestures added to the few Finnish words he knew. [...] once Ivan 
came to bathe in the mill brook and somehow slipped from a stone 
into the water. He could not swim [...] Viki lifted Ivan from the bottom 
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	 [...and] said that he could be revived with artificial respiration [...but] 
the captain of the Russian garrison [...] said that it was not necessary, 
because Ivan was so wretched a soldier."59 The childhood memories 
cited above are from the final years of the period when Russian troops 
were present in Finland, random examples, but the picture of humble 
friendly men, not arrogant conquerors, has a certain degree of 
significance, because in those years the national conflict between the 
Empire and its border country already had estranged upper class Finns 
from social contact with Russian officers and officials. 
At first, for the higher strata of society there were no great 
problems, because the gentry was traditionally cosmopolitan. In the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries noblemen had frequently 
transferred from the service of one monarch to another, without much 
national consideration. The better-off Finns made social contact with 
the officers of the conquering army while the war was still going on 
in the north.60 When Tuchkov's troops approached Oulu in 1808, 
people remembered the destruction of earlier wars, but for the young 
demoiselles of the town the only problem was to guess whether the 
57 	 Kilpeläinen, Irja Kilpeläinen kertoo ja muistelee (Memoirs of K.), p. 14. 
58 	 Haavikko & Hämäläinen, Ketunkivellä; Helvi Hämäläisen elämä 1907-1954, pp. 
34-35 (Life of Hämäläinen). 
59 	 Nurmela, Suuri pieni maailma, pp. 67-70 (memoirs of N.). 
60 	 This has provoked a few novels later when a more nationalist outlook prevailed, 
e.g.: Mika Waltari, Tanssi yli hautojen (Dancing on the graves, a novel from the 
time of the Porvoo Diet). 
Russian officers would be better cavaliers than the Swedes who had 
only just left the town.6t During the following decades, Russian 
officers, e.g. v. Etter, Manderstern, Kaulbars, Wallerode, Traverse, 
Friberg, or Kantsov visited Finnish homes.62 The surnames of the 
visitors are a proof of the cosmopolitan nature of Russian government 
service. A few of them remained in Finland and became Finns. For 
example, Nikolai von Acht, born in Livonia, an officer of the Imperial 
Guards, took part in the Decembrist revolt in 1825, but was not 
banished to Siberia due to the intervention of the Imperial 
Chamberlain, General Christian Acht von Achtfelsen, but only 
demoted to the lowest grade and transferred to Warsaw; then, favoured 
by the Viceroy, the Grand Duke Konstantin, he was ordered to 
Finland, where he regained the rank of Major and married the 
flowerlike, fine-featured and blue-eyed, seventeen-year Sofia Charlotta 
from the wealthy merchant family of Gottleben.63 The few Russian 
officers who settled in Finland were in time easily assimilated into 	 53 
the Swedish-speaking gentry of the Grand Duchy. 
Evgenii Abramovich Baratynskii, a lieutenant in the Russian 
division in Finland, and no mean poet, admired the romantic Finnish 
nature in his poems. But, generally, Russians regarded Finland as a 
distant, cold, bleak country of forests and swamps.64 It was a place 
where people still could be expelled instead of Siberia, as the 
Decembrist Vladimir Mussin-Pushkin was to "the distant Petrovskii 
Regiment".65 The poet journalist Faddei Bulgarin compared his service 
in Finland to Pushkin's expulsion to Caucasia, though he found the 
local society rather pleasant.66 With a few exceptions, as those 
mentioned above, the Russian gentry, if they did not ignore the 
existence of the Grand Duchy, at least had no great wish to be 
appointed to serve in this inhospitable corner of the Empire. This 
Russian lack of knowledge and interest essentially helped the local 
gentry to keep the government posts of Finland in their own hands. 
In Russia, Finns served the Emperor side by side with Caucasian 
61 	 Wacklin, Sata muistelmaa Pohjanmaalta, p. 130 (reminiscences of W.). 
62 	 Ramsay, Muistoja lapsen ja hopeahapsen , vol. 1, p. 131, 170 (memoirs of R.). 
63 	 Leppänen, Tulesta tuhkaksi; Emmy Achte ja hänen maailmansa, p. 11-12 (Life 
of Emmy Achte). 
64 Kiparsky, Suomi Venäjän kirjallisuudessa. Helsinki 1943, p. 23 (Finland in 
Russian literature). 
65 	 Lehto, Kytäjän kreivitär, p. 20 (The Countess of the Kytäjä Estate). 
66 	 Bulgarin, Sotilaan sydän, Suomen sodasta Engelin Helsinkiin (memoirs of B.). 
princes, Kalmuk khans, Greek expatriates, Baltic German barons, 
Polish pans, and, of course, Russian chinovniki. For example, of the 
family Furuhjelm, Johan Hampus served the Tsar as military governor 
in eastern Siberia, Karl Harald Felix governed imperial family 
domains in the Amur region, Sten Knut Felix, when a colonel at 
Bomarsund, became a prisoner of war in 1854, and afterwards led the 
military department of the Finnish Senate between 1862-82, and Johan 
Otto reached the rank of Lieutenant General in Russia; many other 
members of the family served in civil posts in Finland. 
"In general the relations between Russians and Finns were good 
and natural" says the Russian historian Mikhail Borodkin.67 
Alexander I, with his policy and with personality, charmed the 
Finns, not least the ladies. He visited the Grand Duchy twice, first 
in 1809 and had a longer tour into the interior in 1819, and his visits 
gave rise to innumerable stories of a friendly, polite, and kind 
54 	 monarch. 
Finland had been conquered by the Russian army, which then left 
a few garrisons in the country, and in international law the country 
was part of the Russian Empire. But the conquest was not 
accompanied with the usual consequences: property had not been 
taken, the population had not been massacred, displaced or enserfed, 
and no invasion of Russian officials into the administration had taken 
place. Protected by the Emperor, Finns were able to live as they 
always had done, or even better. Perhaps they might have developed 
a modern society more rapidly if they could have continued their life 
as a Swedish province, but historical science cannot study something 
which did not take place. There might very well have become a period 
of Swedification in the history books and a story of Finnish volunteers 
seeking military training in Russia to liberate their country from the 
Western oppressor with the aid of the Eastern neighbour. 
A Finnish contribution to the Patriotic War 
When the previous Royal Finnish troops of the Swedish army had 
been dissolved in 1809, there had been talk of enlisting Finns into 
Russian service, which would have made possible the transfer of the 
Russian divisions from the Grand Duchy to other frontiers of the 
67 	 Borodkin, Kriget vid Finlands kuster 1854-1855, p. 196. 
Empire, and would have given employment to the substantial Finnish 
vagrant population.68 Plans were made in 1809-11 for raising Finnish 
troops so as to make Finns protect their country and free them from 
having to house Russians. These plans remained on paper. But when 
Napoleon attacked Russia in 1812, G.M. Armfelt and others who were 
concerned about Finland's political future considered it embarrassing 
and harmful for Finns if they were to remain outsiders in the defence 
of the Empire. 
National conscription was too revolutionary and too French an idea, 
and there was no hope of getting imperial consent to such a military 
system. Instead, soldiers were enlisted for six years. Three regiments 
of two battalions each were formed, with a nominal strength of 3,600 
bayonets in a11.69  These regiments were classified as local troops, 
intended mainly for the defence of their own country in case of an 
enemy landing there, or elsewhere on the Baltic coasts.70 The regiment 
in Viipuri was organized first, because in Old Finland the Russian 	 55 
recruitment system was still available, and one battalion of these 
troops was transferred to garrison duty in St Petersburg from 29 
February 1813 to 31 August 1814,7' thus freeing first-line detachments 
for the battle front. No Finns were lost in action, but 25% of the men 
died of sickness in the unhealthy capital, 11% deserted, and twenty 
men were court-martialled.72 
The Finnish battalions were armed as jäger troops, i.e. light 
infantry, but in 1819 two of the regiments were transformed into 
infantry of the line. Line troops were armed and equipped for the 
local defence of border regions, but not for rapid movement in 
offensive warfare.73  
68 	 Den 15/27 Martii 1810, Hans Kejserliga Maj:ts Nådiga Manifest angående de f.d. 
finska Militarien tillägne Löneförmåner mm.; dett 21 Maji, Hans Kejserliga Maj:ts 
Nådiga Kungörelse angående Gemene Manskapet wid Indelte och Wärfwade 
Regementerne af den nu mera upplöstä Kungl. Armeen i Finland. Samling af 
Placater, Förordningar, Mansfester och Påbud, sam andre Allmänna Handlingar, 
hvilka i Stor-Furstendömet Finland sedan 1808 års början ifrån trycket utkommit. 
Första delen 1808-1812. Abo 1821. 
69 	 RGVIA, fond 1019, opis' 1, Shtab voisk v Finliandii raspolozhennykh 1831-1864, 
Shtab otdel'nago Finliandskago korpusa 1815-1831, delo 573, Ukazy Aleksandra 
I i Nikolaia I o sozdanii natsional'noi militsii i egerskikh battalionov v Finliandii 
1810-1827. 
70 	 RGVIA, fond 1019, opis' 1, delo 573 o finskikh voiskakh, 6. IX 1812. 
71 	 Gripenberg, Lifgardets 3 finska skarpskyttebataljon 1812-1905, p. 5, 8. 
72 	 Borodkin, Istoriia Finliandii, Vremia Imperatora Aleksandra I, p. 446. 
73 	 Sometimes the regular army troops are called line troops in contrast to the guards, 
As ordered in 1812, the first regiment consisted of the Turku 
battalion, with companies at Turku, Pori (Björneborg), Huittinen 
(Hvittis), and Tampere (Tammerfors), and of the Helsinki battalion, 
with companies at Helsinki, Hämeenlinna, Kangasala, and Hanko 
(Hangö). The second regiment had one battalion at Heinola, with 
companies at Hollola, Sysmä, Heinola and Elimäki (Elimä). A further 
battalion was located at Kymi (Kymmene), Viipuri, Käkisalmi, and 
Sortavala. 
It seems that men eager to enlist in the battalions were not of the 
first quality, cajoled into joining by rose-coloured promises from the 
recruiters.74 The battalion which had served in St Petersburg was 
dissolved after returning to Viipuri, its unreliable elements transferred 
to Hämeenlinna. The other battalion staff was quartered at Vaasa 




	 The Governor-General annually accounted for his Finnish troops. 
For instance, in March 1820 there were 3,785 men on the rolls.75 In 
1823 there were sixteen colonels or majors, 122 captains and 
lieutenants, 325 non-commissioned officers, 280 musicians, 3,745 
privates, and 55 non-combatant soldiers.76 
State Secretary G.M. Armfelt deemed the military value of these 
troops to be rather low because they were trained for only short 
periods.77 Every company was to assemble twice a year for church 
parade. Every summer new recruits were to be trained for twenty days, 
and then the complete battalion was to have a training period of four 
weeks in July. Then weapons and uniforms were put back into store 
and the soldiers were free to return home to work and earn money 
for their housing, upkeep and clothing. They were strictly forbidden 
to leave their home districts. 
which may cause confusion and is better avoided. 
74 	 Gripenberg, Lifgarderts 3 finska skarpskyttebaltaljon 1812-1905, p. 19. 
75 	 Raport Finliandskogo General-Gubematora o sostavlenii finskih voisk, 25. V 1820. 
TsGVIA SSSR, fond 35, delo 6/247. Microfilm NL 189, National Archives of 
Finland. 
76 	 RGVIA, fond 1019, opis' I, delo 573 o finskikh voisk, Raport o sostoianii finskikh 
voisk za minuvshago Avguste mesiatse, 12. IX 1823, Shteingeil'. 
77 	 Included in: Materialy i cherty k biografi Nikolaia I i k istorii ego tsarstvovaniia; 
Kratkii ocherk po tsarstvo Polskomu, raport Rizhkago voennago, Lifliandskago, 
Estlandskago i Kurliandskago general-gubernatora, ocherk Finlandii 1825-1850 
gg., pp. 182-83. TsGIA SSSR, fond 728. Microfilm NL 171, National Archives 
of Finland. 
In 1817, to improve the training of young officers and non-
commissioned officers, a training battalion of three hundred men or 
two companies (with weapons and uniforms for three hundred more 
men ready in store) was established, first at Parola and then 1824 in 
Helsinki. It remained in service all the year sound. For example, in 
the summer of 1827 the 1st Battalion trained at Pori, the 2nd at Vaasa, 
the 3rd at Hämeenlinna, the 4th at Heinola, the 5th at Kuopio, and 
the 6th at Lappeenranta, while the training battalion stayed in 
Helsinki.78 The Finnish troops were trained and exercised in a similar 
manner to the Russian troops, but until 1828 they were commanded 
in Swedish because the men did not know Russian.79 
The Finnish troops were paid for by the Finnish government, 
administered by the Military Department of the Senate, and inspected 
by a Senior Inspector heading an Inspector's Office, under the overall 
command of the Governor-General, who had an additional Senior 
Adjutant for Finnish troops on his staff. In the Main Staffs° in St 	 57 
Petersburg, there was one officer and one official (chinovnik) for 
Finnish affairs. The Finnish regiments were commanded by a Finnish-
born general, with the authority of a divisional commander, but aided 
by only two staff officers.81 Without a staff, the troops would hardly 
have been able to operate as a division, if ever called upon to do so.82 
Local regiments were not an exclusively Finnish feature; there were 
ethnically separate troops in other areas of the Empire. Princes or 
peoples who had voluntarily joined the Empire were allowed to keep 
a few traditional native detachments, which served as irregular 
reinforcements for the Imperial army; Bashkirs and Kalmuks had such 
troops, the Cossacks are the best known, and several Caucasian princes 
78 	 RGVIA, fond 1019, opis' 1, delo 583, kvartimoe raspisanie divizii finskih voisk 
na leto 1827. 
79 	 RGVIA, fond 1019, opis' 1, delo 573 o finskikh voisk, Vypiska iz Vysochaishe 
utverzhdennyh postanovlenii Finskih voisk. 
80 	 Glavnyi shtab, a staff for military administration, with the General Staff one of 
its departments. 
81 	 RGVIA, fond 1019, opis' 1, delo 119, Otchet o voennom upravlenii Finliandskago 
General-Gubematora i Komandira byvshago Otdelnago Finliandskago Korpusa 
General-ot-Infanterii Grafa Zakrevskago 16. III 1824-26. IX 1831. 
For an overview of Finnish military questions in the beginning of the Russian era 
in Finland see: Carl von Bonsdorff, Finländska militärfrågor vid ryska tidens 
början. 
82 	 Until the reforms of D.A. Miliutin, corps and division staffs were occupied with 
regional military administration more than with operational or training questions; 
see Beyrau, Militär und Gesellschaft im vorrevolutionären Russland, passim. 
were allowed to keep their life guards, as were later the Emirs of 
Khiva and Bokhara. The separate Polish army, commanded by the 
Emperor's brother Konstantin in Warsaw, was militarily the most 
competent local army. 
The uniforms of the soldiers were regulated in every detail; by 
Imperial order, the Finnish troops wore the heraldic lion of the Grand 
Ducal arms on their buttons.$' In 1820, the young Alexander Armfelt,84 
who was destined to succeed Rehbinder in 1841 in the office his father 
Gustaf Mauritz had created, wrote that with the aid of its own military 
forces, Finland would be able to maintain her privileges and laws 
under the sovereignty of any foreign power should Russia ever 
collapse.85 This was only the irresponsible dreaming of a young man, 
probably influenced by the anti-reactionary discussion in Russia which 
later resulted in the Decembrist conspiracy of 1825, but it shows that 
even a small military force was apt to inspire ideas about Finland 
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	 being a nation able to fend for itself. Armfelt's dreams did not result 
in any practical conclusions, and in a riper age he was a most loyal 
servant of his Emperor as well as of his own country. 
83 RGVIA, fond 1019, opis' 1, delo 573, delo 573 shtaba voisk v Finliandii 
raspolozhennykh, Glavnyi Shtab, Obshchee Upravlenie 18. II 1819, "Ego 
Imperatorskoe Velichestvo povelet soizvolit..." 
84 	 Alexander Armfelt was bom 1794, entered the army 1814, took part in the war 
against Napoleon, was promoted captain, then served as aide for Minister State 
Secretary Rehbinder, whom he succeeded in 1841 and was promoted deistvitelnyi 
tainii sovetnik, the civilian rank equal to full general. 
85 	 "Coup d'oeil d'un patriote", 1820. Cited by Hans Him, Alexander Armfelt, 
Ungdom och läroår intil 1832, pp. 111-19. 
Loyalty Tested, Proved, 
and Rewarded 
NICHOLAS I AND HIS ARMY 
Governing a generalguberniia 
The Empire did not break down at the death of Alexander I, as 
Alexander Armfelt had forecast, but the Decembrist conspiracy of 
1825 cast a shadow over the reign of Nicholas I for a long time. He 
resorted to a policy of maintaining everything as unchanged as 
possible against the menace of revolution, which had started from the 
West in 1789, from the Far West in 1776, and now seemed to threaten 
the ancient throne of Russia. The memory of the popular rage of the 
time of the Pugachev rebellion was still alive. The Emperor and his 
advisers may have understood that reforms were necessary, but more 
compelling was the necessity of avoiding an all-devouring chaos. 
The Russian state rested mainly on military force, supported by 
dynastic loyalty, religious conviction, and bureaucratic control. 
Because the big wars of the previous reign had shattered the Imperial 
finances, Nicholas I had to reduce military expenditure and at the 
same time had to try to maintain his military might in an impressive 
enough fashion to fullfil its purpose. 
In Finland, Nicholas I was feared and respected but also admired. 
He visited Helsinki in 1830 and 1833 and made quite an impression: 
"his ideal military personality, his majestic voice, his imperial 
countenance made ladies tremble with rapture, men with fright".' 
Nicholas's Finnish Governor-Generals Arsenii Zakrevskii (1824-
31)2 and Prince Alexander Menschikoff3 (1831-55) had important 
I 	 Schauman, Kuudelta vuosikymmeneltä, vol. I, pp. 101-02. (memoirs of S.) 
2 	 Zakrevskii (1786-1865) had been a captain in the war of 1808-09 in Finland, and 
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tasks in the Russian government, too, and the everyday administration 
of the Grand Duchy was presided over by acting Governor-Generals. 
Alexander Amatus Thesleff had commanded the Russian division in 
Finland since 1819 and then had worked in several administrative 
posts until he served as Acting Governor-General 1833-47. For a 
while, the Finnish administration was divided into two branches: 1848 
N.K. Muravev was appointed commander of the military forces in the 
border country, while Platon Ivanovich Rokassovskii looked after 
civilian business as acting Governor-General. But soon Muravev was 
ordered to the Caucasian theatre of war, and all the work of 
Governor-General was done by Rokassovski. In 1853, Menschikoff 
was sent as Nicholas's envoy to Constantinople and then to lead the 
Crimean garrison in the Crimean war, and Count Berg was appointed 
Governor-General on 7. XII 1854. Rokassovski was appointed his 
successor in 1861-66.4 
Finliandskie troops 
Troops garrisoned in Finland were called finliandskie, 'Finlandish', 
which may cause misunderstanding if it is translated 'Finnish', 
because it meant Russian troops in the Grand Duchy. They formed 
the Detached Corps of Finland, commanded by the Governor-General, 
General of Infantry Count Zakrevskii 1824-31. The corps now 
consisted of the 23rd Infantry Division of three brigades, each of two 
regiments of four battalions: the Vyborgskii, the Vil'manstrandskii, the 
Neishlottskii, and the Petrovskii infantry regiments, as well as the 45th 
and 46th Jäger Regiments; the infantry was supported by the 23rd 
Artillery Brigade of three battalions.5 
The nominal strength of the corps was 17,080. During Zakrevski's 
period 6,979 fresh recruits joined the troops and 2,558 men were 
had then taken part in the Turkish and French wars. He was in fact expelled 
from Russia to Finland by Arakcheev under Alexander I, but, as a strict 
disciplinirian, was favoured by Nicholas I and appointed Minister of the Interior 
in 1828 in addition to his Finnish office. "Zakrevskii, A.A.", Russkii 
biograficheskii slovar', vol. XXIII, pp. 195-99. 
3 	 Transliterated from the Russian the Prince's name should be written as Menshikov, 
but the Governor-General was registered in the Finnish House of Nobility as 
Prince Menschikoff. 
4 	 "Rokasovskii, P.I.", Russkii biograficheskii slovar', vol. XVIII, pp. 426-31. 
5 	 Jäger troops had been established as light infantry to fight in free formation 
supporting the regular infantry columns with rifle fire. 
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transferred from troops in Russia, while 9,982 men were discharged. 
The actual numbers varied monthly from report to report, between 
13,062 and 15,723.6 
In 1831, the Detached Corps of Finland was abolished and its staff 
transformed into a smaller Staff of the Troops Garrisoned in Finland. 
Prince Menschikoff was appointed Commander-in-Chief of these 
troops when he succeeded Zakrevskii as Governor-General. 
According to the policy of cutting down the costs of the enormous 
army, which Nicholas I had inherited from his brother, the division 
in Finland was reduced in 1833 to two brigades, each of two 
regiments, which consisted of three battalions and one reserve 
battalion each. In the first brigade were included the Vyborgskii and 
Petrovskii regiments, in the second the Neishlottskii and 
Vii'manstrandskii jäger regiments. The artillery brigade now consisted 
of one heavy, two light and one reserve batteries. In a further 
reorganization or reduction in 1835, the infantry and jägers were 
transformed into line battalions, six in each brigade. For three decades 
the regiments lost their historical town names. Supernumerary 
infantrymen and jägers were sent to Russia to the grenadier corps and 
the navy.' 
In the 1835 reorganization, the artillery brigade was disbanded, but 
a few field guns were added to the local fortress artillery to serve the 
line battalions in case of need. This fact further underlined the 
defensive character of the army in Finland, as did the absence of 
cavalry, the arm for a strategic offensive. 
It is true that there was one regiment of Don Cossacks in Finland, 
who might have been useful for raids and reconnaissance in war. In 
peacetime they were dispersed in small detachments in several towns 
in the country, for guard duties and for the purpose of keeping an eye 
on the population. The Cossacks, for example Lieutenant Colonel 
Denisov's regiment of Don Cossacks in 1824,8 served their period of 
6 	 RGVIA, fond 1019, opis' 1, delo 119, Otchet o voennom upravlenii Finliandskago 
General-Gubematora i Komandira byvshago Otdel'nago Finliandskago Korpusa 
General-ot-Infanterii Grafa Zakrevskago 16. III 1824_26. IX 1831. 
7 	 Line regiments were special troops for defending border regions of the empire; 
in 1850 they held their 150th jubilee and received new colours. RGVIA, fond 
1019, opis' 1, delo 245 Delo o nagrazhdenii novymi znamenami 2., 5 
8 	 Otchet o voennom upravlenii Finliandskago general gubematora i komandira 
byvshago otdel'nago Finliandskago korpusa general of infanterii Grafa 
Zakrevskago 16. III 1824_26. IX 1831. 
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three years of active service in Finland, and were then replaced with 
another regiment after its long march from the Don. 
With a law-abiding and loyal population, the Cossacks were seldom 
needed for police tasks, but they were there as the last resort of the 
authorities. Seven unruly and loutish brothers, the principal characters 
in the first Finnish novel, were threatened: "The vicar has discussed 
you with the bishop, who will ask for fifty Cossacks for our parish 
[...] what a shame! Military force into our parish because of seven 
men!"9  
The reduction of the Imperial army also caused a renumbering of 
the division in Finland. In the main armies in the European part of 
the Empire, there had been twenty-two divisions and thus the division 
in Finland, the last one in order, had been number twenty-three, but 
after the reduction of the main army to eighteen divisions the Finnish 
one was the 19th, and then along with further reorganizations the 20th, 
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	 21st, and finally the 22nd in 1845. This renumbering has caused 
historians no end of confusion; they supposed that the division was 
frequently changed because Finnish-born officers tended to gather in 
the division which was stationed in the country of their origin. But 
the eminent military historian J.E.O. Screen remarked, and Pertti 
Alanen definitely showed, that it was the same division in Finland all 
the time, although numbered differently and called infantry, jäger, or 
line troops. 
The division was quartered in numerous towns and villages, and it 
has not been possible to identify all the localities where they were 
billeted, but only the locality where the battalion headquarters staffs 
took the oath to the new Emperor in 1825 from their soldiers. Of the 
Vyborgskii regiment, two battalion staffs were in Viipuri and one 
battalion at Käkisalmi; the battalion staffs of the Neishlottskii 
regiment were at Kymenkartano (Kymmenegård), Ruotsinsalmi 
(Svensksund) and Hamina; the Petrovskii regiment at Helsinki, 
Sveaborg and Hanko; of the Vilmanstrandskii regiment there were two 
battalions at Loviisa and one at Hamina; the 45th Regiment staff was 
at Vaasa, and the 46th Regiment in Turku, on Åland, and at 
Hämeenlinna. After the reorganization the Vyborgskii line regiment 
was at Lapua (Lappo), Uusikaarlepyy (Nykarleby), Hämeenlinna and 
Vaasa, the Petrovskii regiment at Rauma (Raumo), Turku and 
9 	 Kivi, Seitsemän veljestä, (The seven brothers), p. 455. 
Tammisaari (Ekenäs), the Neishlottskii jäger regiment at Käkisalmi 
and Viipuri, and the Vil'manstrandskii jäger regiment at Loviisa, 
Ruotsinsalmi, and Hämeenlinna; some troops were temporarily 
quartered in Helsinki, at Hamina, and at Sveaborg, or were sometimes 
detached to guard the Kronstadt fortress for a while. 
The main reason for choosing the locations for the troops in Finland 
seems to have been the demand for strategic preparedness in case of 
enemy attack from the Baltic Sea, as was previously the case. A 
secondary consideration was garrisoning the country in order to 
maintain Imperial power and prestige there.10 Finding satisfactory 
quarters must also have been a factor which led to the scattering of 
troops at distances from each other, before barracks were constructed 
over many decades for the different troops. Officers were quartered 
in the garrison towns by the local authorities, and the costs were paid 
by the Finnish Senate." 
Military commandants were appointed to keep an eye on military 
administration, stores and establishments in various localities, 2nd 
class commandants in Viipuri and Sveaborg, 3rd class at Hamina, in 
Helsinki, in Turku, on Åland, 4th class at Savonlinna, Hanko, 
Svartholma and Loviisa, Ruotsinsalmi, 5th class platsmaiors' 2 at Tor-
nio (Torneå), Vaasa, Hämeenlinna, Kyminkartano, Lappeenranta, and 
Käkisalmi. Invalid detachments guarded stores at Hämeenlinna, 
10 "The people showed unswerving loyalty towards the government and were of 
exemplary honesty; among the gentry there were ambitious and self-serving 
individuals, who engrossed the administrative offices of the country for their 
personal interest, but Count Zakrevskii soon put an end to that", according to the 
report of Prince Menschikoff. RGAVMF, fond 19, opis' 4, delo 429, p. 34: 
Istoricheskiia svedeniia, Vzgliad na Finliandiiu v 1832 g. 
11 Officers were entitled to living quarters with a kitchen and a servants' room 
according to their rank: 
General 9 rooms and stabling for 5 horses 
Lieutenant General 7 4 
Major General 6 3 
Colonel and Major 3 1 
Captain 2-3 
Lieutenant 1-2 
RGVIA, fond 1019, opis' 1, delo 485 Shtaba voisk v Finliandii raspolozhennyh. 
Proekt po vozobnovliaemu ustavu o postoinoi povinnosti v Finliandii, po kotorym 
otlozheno ispolnenie, po prikazaniiu Ego Svetlost', do udobneishago vremeni, s 
tern, chtoby delo sie khranili v Arkhive shtaba vpred do vostrebovaniia, 
predlozhenie Senata 14/26.V 1836 — The Finnish Senate tried in vain to reduce 
the number of rooms by one for each rank. 
12 	 platsmaior indicates the lowest rank of a local commandant. 
63 
Helsinki, Hamina, Käkisalmi, Lappeenranta, Savonlinna, Sortavala, 
Turku, Viipuri, and Åland. 
One battalion of garrison troops was stationed in Viipuri and at 
Kuopio, later transferred to Sveaborg, and there was one additional 
battalion on Åland. 
In the 1830s, there were in all perhaps two or three thousand men 
of these local, i.e. non-operational troops. 
Artillery garrisons in Viipuri, at Savonlinna, Ruotsinsalmi, Hamina, 
on Åland, at Sveaborg, Hanko, and Svartholma probably consisted of 
a couple of thousand men in all. At Savonlinna, for example, the 
garrison consisted of 84 men plus one company of the Viipuri fortress 
infantry, with 48 cannons and 12 mortars, until the fort was abandoned 
in 1835." In addition there were engineer troops, labour troops, and 
penal companies, in all twelve or fourteen hundred men, and about 
one hundred men in the gendarmerie or uniformed political police 
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	 detachment.14 In 1847 there were 9,599 men on the rolls of the 22nd 
Division (nominal strength 12,772), 1,327 in the fortresses, 819 
Cossacks, and finally 624 men in the engineer penal company15 — 
probably constructing fortresses. 
Ethnic Finnish troops 
The battalion headquarters staffs of the two Finnish infantry regiments 
and one jäger regiment were still located in Turku, at Vaasa, 
Hämeenlinna, Heinola, in Viipuri and at Kuopio, and the training 
battalion in Helsinki. Sometimes these troops were called the operative 
army of Finland, at other times the Finnish Division, or simply the 
Finnish troops. 
The staffs of the Finnish regiments were dissolved in 1826 and 
their commanders appointed brigade commanders instead. Recruit-
ment in the battalions was ordered to cease in 1827 until their numbers 
were reduced to four hundred men each and they were transformed 
into rifle or sharpshooter battalions, a new version of light infantry. 
13 	 "Neishlott", Voennaia Entsyklopediia, vol. XVI, pp. 580-581. 
14 	 This chapter is based on Pertti Alanen's unpublished study in the University of 
Tampere: Venäläiset maavoimat Suomessa Nikolai I:n aikana (The Russian army 
in Finland during the time of Nicholas I) 
15 RGAVMF, fond 19, opis' 4, delo 400 'Voiska Finliandskiia', Chislennoe 
sostoianie voisk v Finliandii razpolozhennykh, January 1847, p. 4. 
"Captain Karl Andreevich 
Hallberg" (of the Finnish 
Naval Equipage). The naval 
battalion was recruited from 
among Finnish fishermen and 
seafarers, was quartered in 
barracks in Helsinki in 
wintertime, and served in the 
Imperial Baltic Fleet in 
summertime. In the picture, 
Captain Hallberg leans on a 
heavy breach-loading naval 
gun, in a ship powered by 
sail. 
Photo: Museovirasto Neg 
76718. 
65 
Instead of having Swedish as the language of command, they started 
to be commanded in Russian in 1828.16 
In the papers of the Main Staff in St Petersburg the name "General 
Staff of the Finnish Army" was sometimes mentioned, due to a 
misunderstanding in 1817 when the uniform for the officer dealing 
with Finnish Affairs in the Main Staff was prescribed. The 
grandiloquent name was abolished in 1826 by a special order." 
In 1830 the Finnish troops were dissolved, as was also the Finnish 
war commissariat and the military court of appeal. In that year, the 
separate Polish army took part in the rebellion against Russia, but it 
seems that military and fiscal reasons were a more important reason 
for the reduction of the Finnish units than any suspicion of disloyalty. 
16 RGVIA, fond 1019, opis' 1, delo 573 o finskikh voisk, Nikolai I , 2. V 1827, 
"My priznali za blago..." 
17 RGVIA, fond 1019, opis' 1, delo 573 o finskikh voisk, Sravnenie vremennago 
shtata Finskikh Voisk i sostavlennye vnov... 5. XII 1826. 
Zakrevskii, who had been appointed Minister of the Interior, returned 
to Finland ostensibly to prevent cholera from spreading there (which 
he was unable to do), but, in fact, to investigate the rumoured 
smuggling of weapons for revolutionaries, which rumour he, a most 
suspicious and particular martinet, found to be completely false.'$ 
In place of the disbanded troops, a naval equipage or battalion of 
five hundred men (to be doubled in time of war) was established in 
1830 to train sailors. Zakrevskii reasoned that the population was 
skilful in seafaring, sailing, and shipwrighting, and that it was in the 
Imperial interest to take advantage of this fact. Finns had served in 
the Swedish navy, and now they could be useful for the imperial fleet 
under Russian officers. The Finnish sailors were recruited by 
enlistment for six years. Finnish-born officers from Russia and Finland 
were transferred to the equipage under the command of Lieutenant 
Commander Nikolai Possiet, and bosuns, helmsmen and other 
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	 competent men from the Finnish merchant fleet were encouraged to 
enlist as non-commissioned officers.19 
The Finnish Senate expressed its heartfelt gratitude for the planned 
creation of a naval service in the form of the training battalion. It 
was, the Senate said, necessary in the new political position of the 
country, as well as natural and important for the protection of its 
coasts and navigation 29 
In fact, no Finnish navy or coastal defence had been created. The 
equipage of five hundred men21 was quartered first at Sveaborg, then 
from 1832 in its barracks in Helsinki during the winter season. In the 
summer sailing period, it manned ships of the Russian Baltic fleet. 
The first time the equipage manned three ships of its own was in 
1842, one of them the Leipzig, a ship of the line of 74 guns. Sometimes 
the Finns even served aboard a ship which carried a name recalling 
their home country, e.g. the Finland in 1850 or the Kalevala in 1859.22 
I8 	 "Zakrevskii, A.A", Russkii biograficheskii slovar', vol. XXIII, pp. 196-99. 
19 	 RGAVMF, fond 19, opis' 4, delo 428, Proekt o finskoi ekipazhe, Vysochaishe 
Ego Imperatorskoe Velichestva obiavlenie ob uprazdnenii dvukh Finskikh 
strelkovykh batalionov i sformirovanii v Finliandii Morskago Ekipazha pod 
nazyvaniem Pervago Finskago, 21. V 1831. 
20 	 Cited by K. W. R(auhala), "Zakrevski', Kansallinen elämäkerrasto, vol. V, p. 
700. 
21 	 In 1847 there were 506 men present, 24 in hospital, and 126 detached elsewhere. 
RGAVMF, fondl9, delo 400, p. 4, chislitelnoe sostoianie voisk v Finliandii 
razpolozhennykh. 
22 	 At other times these ships were manned by Russians, see: RGAVMF, fond 1304, 
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"Company Commander Baron Aleksander Wrede receiving a report'. A copy of a drawing by 
Hugo Backmansson, who, in numerous drawings, illustrated the everyday life of the Hamina 
Cadet School. 
Photo: Suomen kansallismuseo Km inv. no 38019:9. 
A second naval battalion was established during the Crimean War, 
but it was disbanded in 1856. The first equipage was reduced to a 
cadre company of 131 men in 1862, but it continued to exist until 
1880.23 
opis' 1, delo 1, Prikazy komandira vintovago korveta Kalevala s 1864 i 1865 
goda. 
23 	 Pikoff, "Landsmän... ", p. 45; Manninen, J., "Suomen laivasto"(The Finnish Navy). 
All this time, the Hamina Cadet School existed without interruption. 
It worked according to the Russian regulations of 1831 and 1845, and 
under the Imperial Inspector of Military Schools from 1836, teaching 
120 boys. Part of the cost was paid by the Finnish Senate, increased 
to two thirds in 1863 and even more in 1888. Only people living 
under the Finnish laws and administration, in course of time defined 
as Finnish citizens, were admitted to the corps. 
General Manderstierna, the commander of the division in Finland 
in the 1840s, proposed establishing a yunker school for Finns to study 
Russian language and military knowledge and thereby to help them 
gain admittance into the Imperial army. The school was founded by 
Imperial order, paid for by the Finnish Senate, and started teaching 
in 1846. At first it worked under the divisional commander, then after 
1861 under the staff of the Russian troops in Finland. The school 
initially admitted sixty students, later one hundred, and two hundred 
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	 in 1872, also Russians among them, usually sons of officers of the 
division stationed in Finland. The school in Helsinki was modelled 
after the yunker schools in Russia. The school was closed down in 
1880, because it did not fit in well with the scheme planned for a 
new Finnish national service army, also because the Ministry of War 
did not want to pay for any changes, and finally because the Finnish 
Senate wanted the school building for their own needs.24 
Of the enlisted Finnish military forces established in 1812, only 
the training battalion remained after 1830, and, in contrast to the other 
battalions, it was destined to have a long history till 1905. It was very 
well trained, though mainly on the parade ground, of course. Line 
tactics had been made obsolete by the end of the eighteenth century 
by tactical and technical development, but most armies maintained the 
aesthetically satisfying formations. In 1829, the march-past of the 
Finnish battalion at the Tsarskoe Selo military camp so impressed 
Emperor Nicholas that he exclaimed "there is my guard!". Colonel 
Anders Edvard Ramsay, the Finnish commander of the battalion and 
a favourite of the Emperor, took him at his word and had the battalion 
pp. 58-61, 74; Mattila, "Suomen laivastovoimien vaiheita ennen itsenäisyyden 
aikaa" (Finnish Naval Forces Before Independence), pp. 33-42. The equipage was 
part of the Imperial Baltic fleet, and calling it a national Finnish navy, as Mattila 
and J. Manninen do, is clearly anachronistic. 
24 
	
	 Screen, "Venäläiset sotaoppilaitokset Suomessa"; Screen, The Helsinki Yunker 
School 1846-1879. 
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"Imperial Guards; the Finnish Rifle Battalion; a lithograph." The Guards were the elite troops 
of the Imperial army, proud of their privileges, but trained and equipped for parades rather 
than for battles. The picture belongs to a series showing the uniforms of various Russian 
units. The uniform of each regiment or detached battalion varied in their details, although the 
general design resembled the Prussian model. 
transformed into the "Finnish Third Rifle Battalion of the Imperial 
Life Guards", with the privileges of the Russian junior guards 
regiments. In Finland, it was usually called simply the Guards 
Battalion. The anti-Finnish historian Borodkin says a bit sourly "its 
first military laurels the Finnish battalion earned not in battle but on 
parade„.2s 
But the following year the Guards Battalion "already fought for, 
and proved the Finnish loyalty towards, their Monarch", in the words 
of the Governor-Genera1.26 When the Poles rose in rebellion in 1830, 
the Finnish battalion was ordered to take part in putting down the 
rebels. The marching order called forth "stormy joy" in the words of 
one of Zakrevski's aides. Finns, in general, were loyal to their 
Emperor and could only comprehend that the Poles were out of their 
minds.27 The battalion and its commander earned the Emperor's 
gratitude for the pacification of Poland. It is not known how many 
Poles the battalion managed to kill, but of the 740 soldiers who 
marched to war in January 1831, and of 145 reservists sent to reinforce 
them, only eighty-two, decorated with St George crosses, Virtuti 
Militari medals, or medals for the conquest of Warsaw, took part in 
the victory parade in Helsinki. Of the rest, it was said that more than 
70 	 three hundred died of sickness or in battle, and those who survived 
were permanently invalided from frost-bite and many other causes.28 
Again, in 1848-49, the Guards Battalion proved Finnish loyalty to 
the Empire: they started marching to Hungary to participate in putting 
down the republican rebels, but cholera stopped them at Riga and 
Brest-Litovsk.29 
In 1838 a project for re-establishing the indelta troops was planned 
by the Staff of the Troops in Finland, but was not accepted in St 
Petersburg.30 Instead, it was planned to improve the defences of the 
Empire in the Grand Duchy by enlisting four rifle or sharpshooter 
battalions. But only One grenadier battalion was formed in 1846, 
consisting of four companies of 250 men each at war-time strength. 
25 	 Borodkin, Finskiia voiska pri Imperatore Nikolae I, p. 145. 
26 	 Materialy i cherty k biografii Imperatora Nikolaia I i k istorii ego tsarstvovaniia; 
kratkii ocherk po tsarstvo Polskomu, raport Rizhkago voennago, Lifliandskago, 
Estlandskago i Kurliandskago general-gubematora, ocherk Finliandii 1825-1850 
gg. Tsentral'nyi Gosudarstvennyi Istoricheskii Arkhiv SSSR, fond 728/ Microfilm 
NL 171, National Archives of Finland, p. 184. 
27 	 Pohjolan-Pirhonen, Kansakunta löytää itsensä 1808-1855, pp. 461-62. 
28 	 Schauman, Kuudelta vuosikymmeneltä, vol. 1, p. 110. 
29 	 Gripenberg, G.A., "Suomen kaarti” (The Finnish Guards). Oma maa, vol. VI, pp. 
895-902. 
30 	 RGVIA, fond 1019, opis' 1, delo 485 shtaba voisk v Finliandii raspolozhennykh, 
proekt po vozobnovliaemu ustavu o postoinoi povinnosti v Finliandii, po kotorym 
otlozheno ispolnenie, po prikazaniiu Ego Velitshestvom, do udobneishago 
vremeni, s tern shtoby delo sie khranili v Arkhive Shtaba vpred do vostrebovaniiu. 
Ramsay had been appointed inspector of Russian rifle troops in 1838, 
and under his command, too, Russian grenadiers were trained in 
Finland and then sent to their permanent garrisons in the various 
corps in Russia, in all nine battalions in succession. After the Crimean 
War, Ramsay was appointed Commander of the Imperial Grenadier 
Corps, promoted general in 1859, and in 1867 second-in-command of 
the Warsaw military district.3' The Finnish grenadier battalion was 
transformed in 1856 into a training battalion and garrisoned at 
Hämeenlinna, and disbanded in 1860. 
The troops recruited in Finland and paid for by the Finnish Senate 
were ethnically Finnish, but they were organic parts of the Imperial 
army. At least among the officers, no national separatism existed, as 
the example of Ramsay shows. The idea of fighting for the Emperor 
was not alien to the Finns; Iiro Hakkri, a sailor character from Rauma 
in a short story, was recruited for the Imperial army when drunk, and 
was quite eager for military service and the consequent glory and 
chance of causing destruction: "goddam how I'll lay waste everything 
but dear old Rauma".32 While the eighteenth century had known that 
war was destructive, the romantic nineteenth century idealized war, 
and regarded permanent peace as incompatible with the laws of 
history. For example, the national Finnish poet, Johan Ludvig Rune-
berg, extolled military heroism and self-sacrifice 33 
31 	 Anders Edvard Ramsay, born at Kuopio 1799, served in the Corps of Pages in 
St Petersburg, won the trust of Nicholas I in quelling the conspiracy of December 
1825, chief of the Finnish training battalion in 1827, led the Guards Battalion in 
Poland in 1830-31, studied rifle troops in Berlin, chief of the Naval Equipage in 
1830, Major General in 1836, inspector of imperial rifle troops in 1838, Lieutenant 
General and inspector of Finnish troops in 1847. Ramsay, of Scottish origins, 
whose forefathers were in Swedish service, was born in Finland, had a career in 
the Empire, and is a good example of the fact that it is futile to try to define the 
ethnicity of the nineteenth-century aristocracy. 
Alanen specially underlines the organic unity of Finnish troops with the Imperial 
army during Nicholas I's time, p. 79. 
32 	 Nortamo, "Hakkri Iiro otta sotamiähem besti", Nortamon kootut teokset, vol. IV, 
p. 146. (The story of a sailor recruited into the army). 
33 	 Forsman, Fredrik Cygnaeus kirjailijana ja ajanilmiönä, pp. 103-30. 
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Coastal defence 
The establishment of the naval equipage in 1830 was part of the 
strengthening of the coastal defence of Russia in the Baltic region. 
The international prestige of the Empire stood high after 1815, but its 
very might also provoked fear and jealousy in other countries. For 
Palmerston in London, Russia seemed threatening on many frontiers: 
from Finland, her arm reached towards the northern Atlantic, her 
successful war against Turkey in 1827-29 was not believed to be so 
much in aid of the Orthodox peoples in the Balkans as an advance 
towards a power position in the Mediterranean and the Near East, and 
the war against Persia and the conquest of Caucasia brought Russia 
uncomfortably close to India. As seen from St Petersburg, the Western 
Powers were scheming against vital Russian interests while suboming 




in Poland. To protect his northern flank, Nicholas proposed closing 
the Baltic Sea to Denmark and Sweden, but these countries did not 
wish to provoke the Western Powers with such measures. 
Admiral Lazarev tried to improve the Russian Black Sea fleet and 
had some success, while ships were constructed in the Baltic, too. 
However, the construction work proceeded slowly, ships made of 
unseasoned fir were apt to rot rather rapidly, and the naval 
administration was one of the most corrupt among the Russian 
offices.34 
In order to improve the defences against the Western menace, 
fortifications were constructed or improved in Warsaw—Novogeorg-
ievsk—Ivangorod, Brest, Grodno, Rovno, and Dubno.35 On the Baltic 
coast Dünamunde and Kronstadt were reinforced, as were the 
fortifications on the Finnish side, in Viipuri, at Svartholma, at 
Sveaborg, and at Hanko. Archangel with its shipyards on the White 
Sea was the northernmost point in the chain of strongpoints. 
Sveaborg served as a naval base and naval fortress,36 and Viipuri 
was a second-class fortress. Käkisalmi and Savonlinna, the ancient 
forts on the Russo-Swedish border in the interior, were decommis- 
34 	 See: Daly, Russian Seapower and the Eastern Question 1827-41, passim. 
35 	 Iakovlev, Istoriia krepostei, pp. 106-10. 
36 	 RGAVMF, fond 326, opis' 1, delo 12313, Generalnyi plan Sveaborgskago porta 
s pokazaniem na onom rabot proizvedennykh v 1833 godu. Sostavlen 26go Maia 
1834 goda. 
sioned in 1810 and 1835 because they had lost their strategic 
importance with the annexation of all Finland by Russia. The small 
forts at Hamina and Svartholma were also taken out service in 1835 
and 1851. Only Hanko and 'Fort Slava' at Ruotsinsalmi remained as 
third-class forts. 
A new fortress of the second class, i.e. quite an important one, was 
to be established on Åland at Bomarsund. The site was chosen in 
1825; three years later military engineers received the order to start 
planning the fort, while construction work started in 1829. The fortress 
ought to have been completed in five years. Bomarsund was chosen 
for a base because the waters around it were navigable, i.e. free from 
ice, from the very beginning of the sailing season. The fleet at 
Sveaborg and Reval, not to speak of Kronstadt, stayed ice-bound many 
weeks longer." 
These measures for improved defence did not imply any offensive 
plans. Financially and materially, Russia was in no position to attack 	 73 
modern Great Powers. "The extreme slowness of the construction of 
Bomarsund" was noted and in 1854 only one fifth of the fortress, i.e. 
three towers and a barrack for 2,500 men, had been completed.38 
Barracks continued to be constructed for garrisons on the mainland, 
too, but it was only under Alexander II that all troops in Finland were 
living in government quarters. The Russian army had difficulties in 
finding quarters for its masses, of which as late as 1871 more than 
one third (42%) were billeted in peasant homes. An extraordinary 
effort in the ethnically non-Russian border regions was necessary to 
construct permanent barracks for the army, so as to avoid conflicts 
with the local populations, difficulties in training, and maintaining 
discipline.39 
The Finnish administration paid pensions to the former Finnish 
officers in the old Swedish army and their families, and the Russian 
army needed housing and transport, which was arranged by the local 
districts and paid for by the Finnish Senate. This military expenditure 
caused difficulties, especially in 1830-31, when the Guards Battalion 
was campaigning in Poland and the fortress of Bomarsund was being 
constructed. The first public debt of the Finnish state was contracted 
37 	 RGAVMF, fond 19, opis' 4, delo 427 o Alandskikh ukrepleniiakh 1832-1841. 
38 	 "Bomarsund". Voennaia Entsyklopediia, vol. IV, p. 639. 
39 	 Bogdanovich, Istoricheskii ocherk deiatel'nosti voennago upravleniia v Rossii..., 
vol. IV, p. 87, annex 61. 
then. On the other hand, the Russian army brought money from the 
Imperial treasury and spent it in Finland on its provisions. In all, the 
financial burden caused by the military was much lighter than during 
the Swedish time4° Of even more importance, but difficult to estimate 
in money, was the fact that Finland was protected by the mighty 
Empire, while, on the other hand, Russia's distant conflicts could 
provoke war even on Finnish coasts, as was to be seen before long. 
In 1828-32, the efforts of Russia to improve her defences, together 
with the Polish rebellion, the Persian war, intervention in Greece, and 
the Straits question, caused much apprehension in the West and almost 
a naval scare in England. Of course, the fact that the measures were 
defensive and that no offensive plans existed did not exclude the 
possibility of a future advance if the opposition should prove weak 
enough. Russia's advance in Asia, the great game against the English, 
went on from step to step, without any grand plan. But no chance of 
74 	 easy conquest turned up in the north after 1809. 
The first twenty-five years of Nicholas I's reign were a peaceful 
time for Finland, without problems in defence or in keeping order. 
The Emperor was no friend of constitutions, but he was satisfied that 
the non-intervention of Russian ministers in Finnish affairs guaranteed 
political peace in the country, and letting the Finnish bureaucrats enjoy 
their high salaries without Russian competition was in itself a 
constitutional way of administering the border country, in the view of 
its inhabitants. The economy of Finland grew, even if very slowly at 
first. New ideas of nationhood, the national state, and constitutional 
procedure were cautiously discussed in a few closed circles, without 
much political seriousness. Russian elites rather favoured romantic 
Finnish national ideas, with the purpose of making Finns forget their 
Swedish past and Western orientation. But too much spontaneous 
40 Myllyntaus, "Suomen talouspolitiikka ja valtiotalous 1809-1860", Suomen 
taloushistoria, vol. I, pp. 362-63. (The Finnish public finances 1809-1860). The 
Finnish military revenue, collected instead of the indelta service, amounted to 
326,717 roubles in 1849, while the Finnish troops caused an expenditure of 
289,179 roubles, the salary and pensions for the officers dismissed in 1809 and 
1830 amounted to 24,331 and 8,840 roubles, the cadet corps 39,311 roubles and 
the pilot, lighthouse, local commandant and other non-combatant establishments 
cost 132,051, in all 493,614 roubles, thus leaving the difference of 166,997 roubles 
to be paid from other, civilian, revenues. The Imperial treasury paid for the 
Russian troops. RGAVMF, fond 19, opis' 4, delo 400, Voiska Finliandskiia, 
Sravnitelnaia tablitsa, pokazavaiushchaia dokhody i raskhody po militsionnomu 
vedomstvu Finliandii, p. 115. 
popular activity was frowned upon, for instance religious 
evangelicalism or secular literature written in Finnish. 
In the revolutionary year 1848 the flotilla in Sveaborg was ordered 
to bombard Helsinki in case of disorders breaking out there,41 but no 
reason for any repressive measures emerged. 
Nicholas had reason to be satisfied with the policy of pacification 
which he and his brother Alexander had carried out in Finland. In the 
report on his 25-five year reign Nicholas proudly wrote on the margin 
of the chapter dealing with the Grand Duchy: See here my account 
for Finland!42 
THE TEST AND THE PROOF 
The Near Eastern Question proves difficult to deal 
with 
It seems that, the years 1828-32 excepted, there was no serious threat 
to Russian security on the Baltic Sea after the Napoleonic Wars. At 
least the extreme lack of urgency in the construction of Bomarsund 
and the neglect of other coastal fortifications indicates that Prince 
Menschikoff, the Imperial Minister of the Navy and Governor-General 
of Finland, did not regard the situation as dangerous. 
It was a world-wide conflict and a distant battle that brought war 
to the Baltic coasts and made necessary the reinforcement coastal 
defences; and, once again, brought forth the question of Finland's 
political position. 
Nicholas I did not intend to start the war that was to be called the 
Crimean War;43 he only wanted to revive his right to protect the 
Orthodox subjects of the Sultan. The claim was based on the treaties 
41 	 Borodkin, Voina 1854-1855 gg na Finskom poberezh'e,; Istoricheskii ocherk, p. 
54. 
42 'Vot tebe moi otchet po Finliandii'. (note in the Emperor's own hand on the 
margin) Materialy i cherty k biografi Imperatora Nikolaia i k istorii ego 
tsarstvovaniiu. Tsentralnyi Gosudarstvennyi Istoricheskii Arkhiv SSSR, fond 728/ 
Microfilm NL 171, National Archives of Finland, p. 165. 
43 A good, even if rather detailed, introduction to the theme is: Goldfrank, The 
Origins of the Crimean War; also Saab, The Origins of the Crimean Alliance, 
is a useful book. 
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his grandmother, Catherine II, had made with the Porte in 1774 and 
1791. The treaties were far from clearly worded; perhaps Russia had 
been given the right to supervise one church in Constantinople only, 
but the Emperor thought that the treaties covered all Christians in 
Turkey. Of course, the Turks had no wish to consent to the Russian 
demands, and were supported by the Western Powers who realized 
that Russia might have under her protection one third of the Sultan's 
subjects. Because of the Turkish system of self-government of the 
various religious communities, their protection would have meant 
political domination, too. Nicholas had already, in 1830, established 
his protection over the Turkish Straits, which the other Powers, only 
after much trouble, had succeeded in making harmless in 1840. Now 
the Russian Emperor seemed again to be attempting to subjugate the 
Near East. 
Nicholas's proposal for dividing the inheritance of the Turkish 
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	 Empire between the Powers in case the Sick Man of Europe should 
die, even if earnestly meant only as a precaution, appeared only too 
menacing to Western eyes when he backed up his demands on the 
Turks by a military occupation of the Danubian Principalities of 
Moldavia and Wallachia. The destruction of a Turkish flotilla at 
Sinope in 1853 and the inept bullying in Constantinople by the 
Emperor's envoy Menschikoff44 made the threat seem only too serious. 
The British Prime Minister Aberdeen was a cautious man, but he 
was swept aside in an anti-Russian wave of feeling headed by 
Palmerston. In Paris, Napoleon III was ready to resort to any chance 
of securing his recently-won throne by a successful foreign policy. 
His aim was to break the ring of Great Powers which had isolated 
France since the fall of his namesake in 1815. This aim did not conflict 
with the reassertion of the interests of his country in the Levant. A 
Russo-British conflict was very welcome to him. 
Polish refugees from the rebellion of 1830-31 and Hungarian 
emigres from the massacre of 1849 did their best to blacken the image 
of Nicholas, the gendarme of Europe, and they found an eager 
audience in the Western public. For once, the Turk was the underdog, 
and Russia was the despotic, oriental, backward country that deserved 
to be held in chek by progressive, enlightened and imperialistic 
Western powers. 
44 	 The very same Menschikoff who was Governor-General of Finland. 
Austria, Russia's conservative ally and one-time companion-
in-arms against the Turks, did not like the Russian advance over the 
Danube towards the Balkan peninsula. As the price of her neutrality, 
Austria demanded the evacuation of the principalities by the Russians. 
Nicholas I complied, with bitter feelings. But the West was not pleased 
with Austria, either, for it was felt that Austria had anyway left the 
anti-Russian alliance. Austria did not take any active part in the 
ensuing war, but lost in prestige and good-will, a loss which was felt 
for a long time afterwards. 
Prussia was the sole Power to retain some goodwill towards Russia. 
In the West, Palmerston and other rabid anti-Russians set as the 
aim of their policy the weakening of this over-blown Eastern Empire. 
No fixed plan was made, but the most extreme measure might have 
been to dismember Russia by cutting off the areas conquered by 
Catherine II and Alexander I, either to be made independent or given 
back to their previous owners. Thus Russia would have lost Crimea 
and 'New Russia' on the southern steppes, as well as Poland and the 
recent conquests in the Caucasia. In the north, Finland might have 
been separated from Russia and given back to Sweden.45 
In Stockholm, people were of two minds as to whether to continue 
Karl Johan's cautious policy of 1812. Conservatives saw Russia as a 
pillar of the social order, but in Sweden there was also a growing 
liberal opinion for whom the Tsar was the arch-reactionary. Then, 
there were the Scandinavian idealists who dreamed of a Swedish-
Danish-Norwegian Union. A few of them thought, too, that Sweden 
was still responsible for safeguarding the inheritance she had left in 
Finland, i.e. Western culture, the Swedish language, and liberal 
political institutions. In these circles, emigres from Finland were 
among the most eager, e.g. Emil von Qvanten, who dreamed of a 
Scandinavia which reached from the North Sea to the White Sea and 
Lake Onega. 
King Oscar I (1844-57) was, in fact, inclined to take a forward 
policy, in sympathy with liberal opinion, in order to enhance his 
prestige and strengthen his position; but only if it could be done 
without any risk. As a precondition for joining the war, he demanded 
unconditional support from the West and Austrian participation in the 
45 	 Maude, Finland and Britain 1854-1914, p. 29: "These schemes should be regarded 
as thoughts on the possibilities that the fortunes of war or the negotiations of 
peace-table might provide". 
war. This would have meant more of a burden than help to the Western 
Powers, whose main force was directed towards the Crimea and who 
could only send a fraction of their military and naval power to the 
Baltic Sea. Nor could they make Austria join the war. In the end, 
caution won and Sweden did not declare war on Russia. She only 
allowed the Allied fleet to use anchorages on her coasts. The treaty 
of Sweden-Norway with England and France, which was not signed 
until November 1855, bound Sweden-Norway only to maintain its 
territorial integrity, which the Western Powers in turn guaranteed. In 
practice this meant that Russian or Finnish Lapps were not allowed 
to herd their reindeer on the Norwegian fells, so as not to cover a 
clandestine Russian advance to the Atlantic coast. The treaty freed 
the British from the apprehension that the Russians were reaching out 
for a naval base on the Norwegian coast, which, in fact, had never 
been in the Russian plans. 
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	 The principal effort of the West was directed to the Crimea. The 
Russian Black Sea fleet was captured or sunk. The war was reduced 
to a siege of Sevastopol, the principal Russian naval base on the Black 
Sea, starting from September 1854 with British, French, and Turkish 
troops, and with the Sardinians joining in January 1855. The city was 
not totally encircled, which in fact meant that Russia was able to send 
reinforcements to the fortress, although not as many as the Allied 
were able to transport on their ships to their assault forces. The 
agrarian Empire, with serf soldiers, without good roads, with supplies 
carried on horse-carts, with a corrupt and inept organization, was not 
able to compete with the industrialized naval Powers, even when their 
military organization was far from faultless and their steam-powered 
machinery still rather primitive. Thus, during the eleven months of 
the siege Russia was bled white of soldiers and money, with internal 
social and political discontent taking ever more threatening forms. The 
final fall of Sevastopol on 18 September 1855 was no definite military 
catastrophe, but by then Russia was ready to submit to the dictate of 
the Western Powers.46 
46 	 Curtiss, Russia's Crimean War; Treue, Der Krimkrieg und seine Bedeutung fir 
die modernen Flotten. 
The British Royal and French Imperial Navies in 
the Baltic Sea 
The main effort against Russia was directed to the south, but the Baltic 
Sea also served as a theatre of war, because the allies wanted to bind 
Sweden to their side and harass Russia so as to prevent her from 
concentrating her forces in the Crimea. 
The Baltic Sea had been a traditional theatre of war for the Royal 
Navy since the days of Peter the Great. Many British naval officers 
had taught their Russian colleagues the art of naval war; at times, the 
British had fought against the Russians, at other times together with 
them against common enemies. They also had supported the Russian 
Mediterranean flotilla against the Turks in the 1770s and against 
Napoleon. The occasional Russian attempts to close the Baltic Sea to 
outside Powers, in practice meaning the British, had not had any 
success. During the Napoleonic wars, the Royal Navy had not shrunk 
from violent measures against the Danes in order to keep access to 
the Baltic Sea open. 
Thus it was natural that in the war against Russia, a naval force 
was sent to the Baltic in 1854, in all eighty ships with 43,000 men 
and 3,652 guns. The British weighed anchor in March 1854, under 
the command of Admiral Sir Charles Napier, soon to be joined by a 
French squadron under Vice-Admiral Perceval-Deschenes. Both 
admirals are usually dismissed as elderly gentlemen without much 
noticeable energy or any clear idea of what they were going to do, 
but in fact they did exactly what they were ordered to do. The 
Admiralty wrote to Napier that because the enemy was not inclined 
to avail himself of the opportunity offered to him of battle, the Admiral 
was to seek for other points where the enemy might be more 
vulnerable, and to cause him all the annoyance possible upon his own 
shores. The Russian fleet was known to consist of twenty-two ships 
of the line, and while carrying out other tasks, the Admiral had always 
to keep at hand a sufficient force to hold this fleet in check. Napier 
was to establish a strict blockade of the Gulf of Finland and the Gulf 
of Bothnia, and the great objective was to render the enemy fleet 
useless by confining it to its moorings.47 
The Russians did keep their ships behind the walls of Sveaborg 
47 	 Admiralty to Napier 7. III 1854, 5. IV 1854, 11. VII 1854. Adm 2 Sec Out letters, 
102 Blockade, PRO. 
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and Kronstadt, so no great battle was to be fought. "The Russian [...] 
sailors, confined much of the year to the land, [were] lacking the 
necessary gunnery practice and even the elementary navigational 
skills", and there was to be no improvement up to the Japanese War 
1904-0548 and not much even in the First World War. The Allies 
dominated the sea in the north as they did in the south, and harassed 
Russian trade on the sea. Ships sailing under the Russian flag were 
mainly Finnish, and the Crimean War was a serious blow to the 
Finnish merchant fleet, which lost more than one-third of its tonnage, 
partly through the action of British frigates, mainly through the 
consequent panic sales. Luckily, the war-time prices for ships were 
rather high, which made reconstruction easier after the war,49 but, 
nevertheless, the losses were long remembered in Finland, as will be 
shown later. 
An allied detachment under Admiral Plumridge sailed to the Gulf 
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	 of Bothnia, where they burned naval stores at Oulu and Raahe 
(Brahestad). Part of the stores were British property, i.e. purchased 
and paid for by British businessmen, only waiting to be exported. On 
the other hand, a British raid on Kokkola (Gamlakarleby) failed, 
because the landing boats could not be supported by artillery fire from 
the ships on the narrow and shallow approach to the town. A small 
Russian detachment with local Finnish volunteers succeeded in 
fending off the attack and capturing one of the boats, which is still 
proudly exhibited in the Kokkola museum, and a Finnish seal hunter's 
portrait was painted and hung in the Imperial palace in Helsinki.5o 
There was not much else the Allied navy could do in the absence 
of a naval enemy. There was a question in the British Parliament as 
to why Finns should be harassed if the Russian Emperor was the 
enemy. This was a time when the idea of protecting civilians from 
the terrors of war was being aired in Europe, and which led to various 
conventions to limit warfare. The questioners were perhaps more 
interested in causing a nuisance to the govenment than concerned 
about the native Finns. 
48 	 Kennedy, The rise and fall of British naval mastery, pp. 210-11. 
49 	 Kaukiainen, "Merenkulku". Suomen taloushistoria, vol. I, p. 458-74. (History of 
Finnish seafaring). 
50 	 Klinge, Kejsartiden, p. 171. Nowadays, the former Imperial palace is the official 
residence of the President of the Finnish Republic, but the portrait is still to be 
seen there. 
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"An English boat surrendering at Kokkola in 1854'. An insignificant loss for the British, but a 
cause of jubilation for the tiny town and its defenders. It was a sign of the success of the 
Imperial policy in Finland and made brothers-in-arms of the Russians and Finns. 
Photo: Suomen kansallismuseo 4388:44. 
Finns were subjects of the Russian Emperor in his quality of Grand 
Duke, and in international law Finns were Russians, legitimate objects 
of warfare. The admirals hardly knew the niceties of Finland's 
constitutional position in the Russian Empire, which was only slowly 
dawning on the Finns themselves. Killing Finns and stealing or 
destroying their property was sound military or naval strategy, because 
it also compelled the Emperor to defend his realm from attack on this 
side.51  
51 Greenhill & Giffard, The British Assault on Finland 1854-1855; A Forgotten 
Naval War. 
It is a very British point of view to call this war forgotten, but otherwise the 
authors discuss British naval policy in the Baltic region very well. 
Preparations against the menace 
As war seemed to be approaching, the Emperor at the end of 1853 
appointed a committee to inspect the coastal fortifications in Finland. 
It was found that during the long peace the defences had been 
neglected and the works were badly dilapidated. In January 1854 the 
committee gave instructions to put the coastal forts into defensive 
condition. Viipuri, Fort Slava at Ruotsinsalmi, Svartholma, Gangut, 
Bomarsund, and, most important of all, Sveaborg, had to be armed 
and supplied with shot, powder, and all necessary material, and their 
garrisons brought up to wartime strength.52 Navigation lights on the 
coasts were put out, mines were laid in the passages to the harbours 
of Kronstadt, Reval, Dünamunde and Sveaborg.53 
During the spring much work was done, but "because the works 




fortressess could be ready for defence in the time laid down".55 The 
fortifications received additional arms throughout the war years; 
previously, there had been 197 guns in all, but by the time the war 
ended the number had been increased to 689.56 
An optical telegraph was constructed along the coast to alert the 
defences when the enemy should approach. The navy soon replaced 
optical semaphores by an electric telegraph up to Kronstadt. The 
telegraph network was later extended to cover the whole of the Grand 
Duchy, and the system remained one of the few Russian institutions 
in the otherwise autonomous country.57 
The defence force was commanded by Platon Rokassovskii, the 
52 0 merakh k usileniiu oborone Vyborga, Svartgolmy, Ganguda, forte Slava, 
Sveaborga, i Alanda. Delo shtaba voisk, v Finliandii raspolozhennykh. Ven sot 
asiak 31, National Archives of Finland. Krenke, Oborona Baltiiskago priberezhia 
v 1854-1856 godakh is an informative book of memoirs by an engineer officer 
about the fortification of Kronstadt, Viipuri, Sveaborg and Turku. 
53 	 The primitive mines were equally dangerous for defenders and eventual enemies, 
says M. Borodkin, Voina 1854-1855 gg. na Finskom poberezh'e,; Istoricheskii 
ocherk, p. 62. 
54 	 Commander of artillery to the acting Governor-General (Rokassovski) 18. III 
1854. 0 merakh... 
55 	 Report of the commandant of the Viipuri fortress 16. III 1854. 0 merakh... p. 34. 
56 	 Seitkari, "Suomen sotalaitos Venäjän sotilashallinnon osana 1800-luvulla", p. 101. 
(The Finnish military as part of the Russian military administration in the 
nineteenth century). 
57 	 Nenonen, "Lennätinlaitos ja telefoni Suomessa" (Telegraph and telephone in 
Finland). 
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The defence of Finland in 1854-55 
The permanent garrison of Finland was positioned along the coasts to fend off Allied 
landings, and the Grenadier division defended the most exposed coast between Hanko and 
Helsinki. The organization of the Finnish indelta troops was only completed after the war had 
ended. 
Acting Governor-General. Menschikoff was rounding off his work as 
incompetent envoy to the Porte by conducting an unsuccessful defence 
of Sevastopol, where Nicholas had appointed him Commander-in-Chief. 
In addition to the fortifications, there were the field or line troops 
in the Grand Duchy. The Ministry of War instructed Rokassovskii to 
position the battalions of the 22nd Division to guard the most 
important points on the coasts. Two line battalions (1st, 4th) were sent 
to Kronstadt, two to Viipuri, one (6th) to the region of Hamina and 
Ruotsinsalmi, one to Hanko (8th) and one to Bomarsund (10th). Three 
battalions joined the garrison of Sveaborg (2nd, 3rd, 5th) and the 
land front was secured by one battalion (11th) in Helsinki. Three 
battalions (7th, 9th, 12th) guarded Pohjanmaa, strengthened by three 
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field batteries and three Cossack sotnii.58 
One grenadier division with its sapper battalion and artillery brigade 
as well as several cavalry regiments were sent from Russia to reinforce 
the defence of Finland.59 The Governor-General was instructed to post 
these troops close to the southern coast between Hanko and Helsinki,6o 
The headquarters of this division was situated in Helsinki with the 
second brigade of three regiments, the battalions of which were to 
take up positions in the coastal parishes of Siuntio (Sjundeå), Karjaa 
(Karis), Espoo (Esbo), Kirkkonummi (Kyrkslätt) and Helsinki. The 
first brigade of two regiments, with its headquarters staff at Tammi-
saari (Ekenäs), guarded the coastal parishes of Snappertuna, Lohja 
(Lojo), and Karjaa. The Grodno Hussars were garrisoned in Helsinki, 
and a detachment of guards cossacks at Nurmijärvi.61 One battery and 
one sapper company defended Turku.62 
About forty small gun-boats were constructed at Turku, Helsinki 
84 	 and Pori, armed with 24-pound cannons, for a coastal flotilla. They 
were maimed by sailors from the two Finnish naval battalions63 and 
840 additional sailors were transferred from the third fleet division at 
Sveaborg. The flotilla was commanded by Vice-Admiral Epantsin.64 
Rokassovskii was appointed Commander-in-Chief of all troops in 
Finland with the authority of the commander of a detached army corps. 
Lieutenant General Nordenstam (Governor of the province of 
Uusimaa, Vice-Chancellor of the University, who had served in the 
army in Caucasia) was appointed his chief of staff, and Ramsay was 
58 	 RGVIA, Fond 1019, opis' I, delo 283 shtaba voisk v Finliandii raspolozhennykh, 
Komanduiushchago voiskami v Finliandii raspolozhennykh raport Gospodinu 
Voennomu ministru 5/17. II. 1854. In Cossack cavalry, sotnia is the equivalent 
of squadron. 
59 	 RGVIA, Fond 1019, opis' 1, delo 283 shtaba voisk v Finliandii raspolozhennykh. 
Shtab ego imperatorskago vysochestva Naslednika Tsesarevicha, Glavnokoman-
duiushchago gvardeiskimi i grenaderskimi korpusami 4.I1.1854 Gospodine 
pomoshchniki General Gubematora Finliandii. 
60 	 Minister of War Dolgorukov to Rokassovski 1/13. III 1854. 0 razmeshchenii 
voisk v Finliandii v 1854 g dlia obshchei oboronu kraia, p. 1-14. Ven sot asiak 
62, National Archives of Finland. 
61 	 RGVIA, Fond 1019, opis 1, delo 283 shtaba voisk v Finliandii raspolozhennykh, 
Dislokatsiia 1  grenaderskoi divizii... s.d. (summer 1854). 
62 	 RGVIA, Fond 1019, opis' I, delo 283 shtaba voisk v Finliandii raspolozhennykh, 
Aboskago komendanta General-Leitenanta Derzhau raport 19.VIII 1854. 
63 	 The naval equipages were easily recruited as many sailors were unemployed 
because of the enemy blockade. 
64 	 RGAVMF fond 972, opis' 2, delo 30 o grebnoi flotilii v Finliandii 23. 1I1/2. IV 
1854 — 11. XII 1855. 
to command the grenadiers to the west of Helsinki, supposedly the 
most exposed sector on the coast. 
The fortress of Sveaborg was also under Rokassovskii's authority, 
under the direct command of Lieutenant General Sorokin.65 Sorokin 
had much to do to put his defences in order.66 
Rokassovskii proposed posting the 22th Division on the southern 
coast, not close to the shore but at a certain distance and in 
detachments of two to three battalions, reinforced by artillery and 
Cossacks. Thus they would be ready to fend off small landings, each 
detachment in its sector, and to march to combine forces against a 
major landing, according to what the enemy might attempt. 
Rokassovski also demanded that one battalion be sent from Pohjanmaa 
to Hämeenlinna to guard the government archives, maps, and treasury, 
which were transferred there from the more exposed Helsinki, as well 
as the numerous prisoners in the ancient castle in the town.67 
Prince Dolgorukov, the Minister of War, stressed that only Helsinki 	 85 
and Viipuri were important enough to be defended in earnest, and 
reminded the Governor-General that the available forces must not be 
scattered. An advance guard could be stationed at Hanko and 
Tammisaari. Only one battalion could be stationed in Turku, and its 
main task would not so much be to defend the town as to stand 
prepared for an attack against the left flank of an eventual enemy 
landing on the southern coast of Finland. "In any case you must 
organize your troops so that you can defend Helsinki and Sveaborg 
to the last".68 
August Schauman, a Finnish memoir writer, described the arrival 
of the Russian reinforcements: 
"First of all, Lieutenant General Güldenstubbe's 1st Grenadier 
65 0 podchinenii General-Leitenantu Rokasovskomu, vsekh voisk, imeiushchikh 
pribyt' v Finljandiiu, na prave komandira otdelnago korpusa, naznachenii v sii 
voiska nachalnika shtaba i usilenii v onom chisla chinov. RGVIA, Fond 1019, 
opis' 1, delo 283 shtaba voisk v Finliandii raspolozhennykh. 
66 	 There are innumerable accounts of the costs, none of which show clearly what 
exactly was done in 1854-55-56. RGVIA, Fond 1019, opis' 1, delo 48, 49, 50, 
51, 56, 57, smety, godovye otchety, shtaba voisk v Finliandii raspolozhennykh. 
67 	 Governor-General to Minister of War 16/28. III 1854. 0 razmeshchenii voisk v 
Finliandii v 1854 g dlia obshchei oboronu kraia, p. 14. Ven sot asiak 62, National 
Archives of Finland. 
68 	 Minister of War to the Governor-General 19. III 1854. 0 razmeshchenii voisk v 
Finliandii v 1854 g dlia obshchei oboronu kraia, p. 29. Ven sot asiak 62, National 
Archives of Finland. 
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'Grenadiers of the 1st Grenadier Division: an officer of the Regiment of the Prince of Prussia, 
a non-commissioned officer of the regiment of Prince Fredrik of the Netherlands, a private of 
the Samogitian Grenadiers, a drummer of the Grenadiers of Prince Barclay de Tolly." 
Regiments were numbered, but also known by the names of their honorary colonels, who 
were members of the domestic and foreign royalty or or of the aristocracy. 
Photo: Timo Syrjänen 1992, Museovirasto Neg 202606. 
Division had been ordered to defend Finland. His four beautiful 
regiments — the grenadiers of the King of Prussia, of Archduke Franz 
Charles, of Prince Fredric of the Netherlands, and the carabiniers of 
Prince Barclay de Tolly69 
— marched to Helsinki one after the other, 
69 It was quite usual to identify regiments not by numbers but by their honorary 
with a few days in between, in the middle of April... Soon after them 
we received the Grodno Hussar regiment with its graceful and 
epicurean officers. Cossack regiments, artillery batteries, sapper 
battalions and all kinds of troops then arrived... Forage, munitions, 
guns and other war materials were incessantly carried along the streets, 
giant amounts of hay were heaped up on the manoeuvre field, powder 
cellars and field bakeries were constructed...".70 
Viipuri belonged to the Grand Duchy and its administration was 
under the Governor-General, but its defence forces were under the 
"Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Guards and Grenadiers".71  
Thus Viipuri was part of the inner defence circle of St Petersburg, 
while Rokassovskii commanded the outer or forward defence. The 
peace-time garrison of Viipuri consisted of a couple of fortress 
artillery companies which belonged to the 4th Garrison Artillery 
Brigade.'' For wartime defence, the garrison was reinforced by two 
reserve battalions of the grenadier division.73 
On the opposite, southern, side of the Gulf of Finland, a Baltic 
army corps was organized to prevent the enemy from approaching the 
capital from the south-west. Under the command of General-of-
Cavalry Siewers were two infantry divisions and one reserve division, 
reinforced with men from the opoichenie, i.e. replacement or militia 
troops composed of raw recruits; there were very few reservists in 
Russia, on permanent leave after surviving 15 years of active service. 
The infantry was supported by artillery, one cavalry division and one 
cavalry brigade, and in addition by the 44th Don Cossack regiment 
and the 1st Bashkir regiment. 
Eventually the enemy carried out only one small landing on the 
coast of the Baltic provincces, which was easily fended off.74 
In the committee report or in the correspondence of the Minister 
of War with the Governor-General, only the stationing of troops in 
Colonels, who were members of the Russian aristocracy or the reigning monarchs 
of friendly powers or members of their families. 
70 	 Schauman, Kuudelta vuosikymmeneltä, vol. II, pp. 68-69. (memoirs of S.) 
71 	 Minister of War to the Governor General 4. V 1854. 0 razmeshchenii voisk v 
Finliandii v 1854 g dlia obshchei oboronu kraia, p. 42. Ven sot asiak 62, National 
Archives of Finland. 
72 	 "Vyborgskaia krepostnaia artilleriia", Voennaia entsyklopediia, vol. VII p. 98. 
73 	 RGVIA, Fond 1019, opis' 1, delo 313 shtaba voisk v Finliandii raspolozhennykh, 
0 sformirovanii rezervnykh polkov dlia rezervnoi divizii Grenaderskogo Korpusa 
20.11/3. III 1855. 
74 "Baltiiskii korpus 1853-1856", Voennaia Entsyklopediia, vol. IV, p. 
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various localities was discussed. No plans for action were recorded, 
but from the positioning of the troops it is evident that the enemy was 
expected to come from the sea to attack the southern coast of Finland. 
Helsinki was to be defended because it was an important naval base 
and capital of the border country, while Viipuri belonged to the glacis 
of the Imperial capital and secured the communications between the 
troops in Finland with Russia. 
The rather strong contingent in the surroundings of Vaasa, three 
battalions, three sotnias, and twelve guns, was evidently there to fend 
off an eventual Swedish landing. There was also another eventuality 
which had to be foreseen, because the region was inhabited by a 
Swedish-speaking population, but the Minister of War instructed the 
Governor-General: "you must not give the impression that the 
occupation indicates the government's distrust of the population, you 
must make it seem as if called forth by military considerations".75 
88 
	
	 The suspicion, if it did existed, was proved groundless, at least 
after the population saw that Russia's enemy was not Sweden but the 
Allied fleet which harassed their navigation, captured their ships, and 
destroyed coastal stores. Thus they took their hunting guns and joined 
the Russians in the coastal defence when possible. 
The enemy also advanced to the mouth of the Gulf of Finland and 
made a landing at Hanko, fought off its defenders and destroyed the 
small fort at Tammisaari. The Finnish poet, journalist and historian 
Topelius reproached the progressive westerners for having joined the 
anti-Christian Turks, and expressed the solidarity of the Russian and 
Finnish defenders, who had shed their blood for Finland.76 This was 
too much for a few pro-Western liberals in the country, but generally 
the Crimean War did strengthen Finnish loyalty to the Empire. 
Schauman recounts that it was the duty of the towns was to treat the 
marching troops to spirits, sandwiches and whatever they needed, 
which was done eagerly, until the mass of incoming troops made the 
duty rather burdensome. But "in the restaurants one could hear only 
sabres rattling, spurs jingling, champagne corks popping, and silver 
75 Minister of War to the commander of troops in Finland 4. II 1854. 0 
razmeshchenii voisk v Finliandii v 1854 g dlia obshchei oboronu kraia, p. 8. Ven 
sot asiak 62, National Archives of Finland. 
76 
	
	 "Den första blodsdroppen", Helsingfors Tidningar 24.V.1854. (The First Drop 
of Blood). 
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"The Crimean War, Tammisaari 20 May 1854. Coloured lithograph by Morel Fatio. The steam 
frigate Arrogant destroys a Russian battery on the coast, while the steam corvette Hecla 
captures a Russian ship". Defending troops dispersed at numerous exposed points on long 
coaslinets offered easy victories for naval raiders, and taught the Russians that it was better 
to concentrate troops in the principal fortresses and leave the minor forts undefended. 
Photo: Museovirasto Neg 116168. 
roubles rolling early and late..."77 Sometimes it was reported that the 
Finnish population spontaneously treated the marching troops to vodka 
or tobacco.78 Clearly, in the opinion of the Finns in general, the 
77 	 Schauman, Kuudelta vuosikymmeneltä, vol. II, p. 69. 
78 	 "Erään venäläisen joukko-osaston päällikön pyyntö, että Suomen virallisessa 
lehdessä julkaistaisiin kiitos Porin kaupungin asukkaille sen johdosta, että he 
mainitun joukko-osaston marssiessa kaupungin läpi kestitsivät sitä viinalla, oluella 
ja tupakalla sekä että samanlainen kiitos julkituotaisiin myös Kristiinankaupun-
gissa... " KKK 47/1865; "Helsingin kaupungin asukkaiden keisarin nimipäivän 
johdosta keskuudestaan keräämän 1800 markan suuruisen erän käyttäminen heidän 
toivomuksestaan mainittuna päivänä Helsingissä olevan venäläisen sotaväen 
Russian troops were not a foreign army of occupation, but soldiers of 
their own Emperor and denfenders of their country. 
Emperor Nicholas I himself visited Finland to inspect the defence 
organization and received a very good impression of his Finnish 
subjects.79 The loyalty of the Finnish subjects, which was manifested 
during the war, was to have important political consequences later. 
The most notable naval and military operation took place on Åland. 
The Allies attacked the fortress of Bomarsund in July-August 1854. 
The defending troops, forty-two officers, 1,942 garrison infantry and 
112 gunners, surrendered after a short defence, and after losing 
fifty-three dead and thirty-six wounded. They were taken prisoners of 
war, two Finnish grenadier companies among them. The fortress was 
then blown up.80 Afterwards, Emperor Alexander II exonerated 
Colonel Bodisco, commander of the fortress, from blame for 
surrendering it after so little loss of life.81 Probably, it was deemed 
90 
	
	 that, without any naval support, the unfinished fortress had been too 
difficult to defend effectively against the superior Allied force. 
A garrison battalion from Tver or the Novgorod guberniia local 
troops was ordered to be transformed into a line battalion and 
transferred to Finland. The march was long and difficult, because 
internal troops were strictly for local defence and lacked horses and 
carriages for movement. The battalion was given the number of the 
10th Line Battalion of Finland, to replace the one shattered at 
Bomarsund.82 The commander of the battalion was Major Kuznetsov, 
who had been decorated for valour after the defence of Kokkola 
against the British landing. 
During the war years, the troops in Finland were constantly 
replenished.ß3 In May 1855, there were 43,500 Russian soldiers in 
kestitsemieksi", KKK 47/1866, National Archives of Finland. (Official thanks for 
the gift of refreshments to Russian troops by the inhabitants of Pori and Helsinki). 
79 	 Borodkin, "Finskiia voiska pri Imperatore Nikolae I"; see also: Borodkin, Kriget 
vid Finlands kuster 1854-1855. Borodkin's intention was to stress the former 
Finnish loyalty towards the absolutist emperor, in contrast to the separatist feelings 
of Finns in his own times vis-a-vis the Russia of Nicholas I. 
80 	 RGAVMF, fond 19, opis' 4, delo 427, zaniatie Alanda nepriiatelskimi voiskami 
1854, Ob oborone Alandskikh ostrovov 1854 g. Ven sot asiak 32; 0 vziatii 
Alansdkoi kreposti 1854 g. Ven sot asiak 31. National Archives of Finland. 
81 	 "Bomarsund", Voennaia Entsyklopediia, vol. IV, p. 639. 
82 	 RGVIA, fond 1019, opis' 1, delo 303 shtaba voisk v Finliandii raspolozhennykh, 
O pereimenovanii Tverskago Vnutrennyi Garnizonnago bataliona v Finliandskii 
Lineinii bataljon No. 10. Raport Voennomu ministru 22.8/3.9.1854. 
Finland. The army was supported by about sixty rowed gun-boats in 
the coastal archipelago.84 
The native defenders of Finland 
After the situation in Åland had been resolved in the Allies' favour, 
the enemy was expected to attack Helsinki either directly from the 
sea or through a landing at Espoo (Esbo) and Porkkala.85 We have 
already seen the local population in Pohjanmaa with their hunting 
guns taking part in the defence of their homes together with the 
Russians. The Minister of War advised the Governor-General to make 
the Finns form partisan or guerilla detachments to operate in the 
enemy's rear and on his flanks in order at least to delay him.86 
A more regular participation of Finns was organized as quickly as 
possible. The Finnish grenadier battalion left two of its companies 
prisoners of war in Bomarsund with the Russian 10th Line Battalion, 
but the two others took part in the defence of Helsinki in 1855 with 
the Russian grenadiers. The Finnish naval contribution was reinforced 
by a second naval equipage for the duration of the war. The guards 
battalion operated with the Imperial army, not in the Crimea but on 
the Western border preparing against an eventual Austrian attack or 
Prussian treachery. 
Minister State Secretary Alexander Armfelt proposed raising more 
Finnish troops to defend the long coasts of the Grand Duchy, and 
Rokassovski agreed. After the Kokkola incident, the Finns, it was felt, 
would put up a strong defence of their homes against the enemy. 
Instead of resorting to enlistment, the ancient indelta military system 
of crofter soldiers, hired by a few peasants each, was revived. The 
Minister of War, Prince Dolgorukov, supported the idea and Nicholas 
I accepted the measure in the summer 1854. The peasants were 
persuaded to consent to the hiring of one soldier for every two 
83 RGVIA, fond 1019, opis' 1, delo 320 shtaba voisk v Finliandii raspolozhennykh, 
O pereimenovanii Novgorodskago garnizonnago batal'iona v finliandskim 
lineinym No l0i batal'ion, i raspredelenii sego bataliona v vse finliandskie 
lineinie batalioni (correspondence 8. VII. 1855 — 18. III. 1856). 
84 	 Tri veka rossiiskogo Hota, vol. I, pp. 196-199. 
85 	 Governor General to Minister of War 14/26. VII 1854. Ob oborone Alandskikh 
ostrov 1854 g. Ven sot asiak 32, National Archives of Finland. 
86 	 Minister of War to Governor General 19/31. VII 1854. Ob oborone Alandskikh 
ostrov. Ven sot asiak 32, National Archives of Finland. 
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"The Finnish indelta troops 1854-55". The indelta troops, or crofter soldiers hired by and 
from the peasantry, were an obsolete form of military force, and their officers were rather 
amateurish though eager fighters. 
Photo: Museovirasto Neg 7548. 
vacancies in the old system, i.e. nine battalions in all. Casimir von 
Kothen, who had been an aide-de-camp to Menschikoff in 1833-44 
and had thereafter served in administrative tasks and had organized 
the optical telegraph in 1854, aided Rokassovski and his successor 
Count Berg in organizing the indelta troops and was appointed their 
inspector in December 1855.87 Reviving the nearly forgotten 
organization took plenty of time and only six battalions were 
completed before the war ended. The soldiers were given crofts, but 
the officers were salaried, i.e. they did not receive estates as under 
the old system. Finnish-born officers from Finnish and Russian 
detachments were transferred to these battalions. 
In 1856, the battalion headquarter staffs were located at 
1. Turku (Åbo) 
2. Vaasa (renamed Nikolaistad in 1855) 
3. Oulu (Uleåborg) 
4. Kuopio 
5. Mikkeli (St Michels) 
6. Hämeenlinna (Tavastehus) 
7. Pori (Björneborg) 
8. Porvoo (Borgå) 
9. Lappeenranta (Villmandstrand) 
The 7th-9th battalions were organized later than the first six and 
were not completely formed before the war ended. 
After the war, the system was maintained but the soldiers were 
demobilized and sent to their crofts. The strength of the battalions 
was reduced from six hundred to three hundred and twenty men, and 
only local musterings were held for a few weeks each summer until 
1863, when a new war threatened, and a bigger parade was held and 
inspected by Alexander II. 
In all, about nine thousand Finns were under arms during, the 
Crimean War: 
Finnish troops during the war 




1st Naval Equipage 	 1,000 
2nd Naval Equipage 	 500 
indelta battalions 	 5,400.88 
87 	 "Casimir von Kothen", Kansallinen elämäkerrasto, vol. III, pp. 218-21. 
88 	 Palmen & Gripenberg, "Suomen kansan puolustustaakka eri aikoina" (The burden 
of defence in Finland at various times); Seitkari, "Piirteitä Suomen ruotuväen 
uudelleen järjestämisestä vv. 1854-1856" (The reorganization of the indelta 
military). The round numbers indicate the nominal battle strength, not the actual 
number of men in service. 
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"The Bombardment of Sveaborg. Lithograph F. Liewendahl 1855." The Allied fleet did not 
approach close enough to cause serious destruction in the fortress, although a few 
constructions were shattered and storehouses burned. It did not occur to the admiral to fire on 
the spectators; terror bombardments had not yet been brought back into use. 
Photo: Museovirasto Neg 67988. 
The penetration of the Gulf of Finland 
Napier's and Plumridge's war against civilians roused criticism in 
London and for the campaign of 1855 Vice-Admiral Sir Richard 
Dundas was sent to the Baltic. The Allies penetrated deeper into the 
Gulf of Finland and destroyed the weak, obsolete forts at Ruotsinsalmi 
and Svartholma.89 Thus, it was clearly demonstrated that small, 
isolated forts were useless against a naval enemy who was able to 
concentrate all his forces on an attack from the sea against any point 
on the coast. The exposed position at Hankoniemi was voluntarily 
abandoned by the Russians. 
In December 1854, von Berg, until then Military Governor of 
89 Airola—Harjunpää, "Ruotsinsalmen merilinnoitus 1790-1855" (The naval fortress 
of Ruotsinsalmi). About the defence and destruction of Svartholma: Ven sot asiak 
88, National Archives of Finland. 
Estonia, was appointed Governor-General and Commander-in-Chief 
in Finland, after Menschikoff, because he was deemed more energetic 
than the acting Governor-General, the popular but easy-going 
Rokassovskii.90 
The greatest show of force by the Allies was the bombardment of 
Sveaborg on 9-10 August 1855. The ships kept outside the range of 
the obsolete fortress guns; their own guns were able to reach the 
fortress, but from such a distance as to render the bombardment rather 
ineffectual. A few buildings were destroyed, but the hundred-year old 
90 	 Fredrik Wilhelm Remben von Berg, distinguished himself in the Turkish war of 
1828-29 and in the quelling of the Polish rebellion in 1831. After the Crimean 
War Berg favoured Finnish national ideas, but quarrelled with the liberals and 
with Minister State Secretary Armfelt. He was replaced by his predecessor 
Rokassovskii in 1861, fought against the Poles again in 1863, and was promoted 
Field Marshal in 1866. "Berg, von", Kansallinen elämäkerrasto, vol. I, pp. 204-08. 
stone walls withstood the bombardment rather well. The Russians lost 
fifty-five killed and 203 wounded. The attempted landing on the 
western flank of Helsinki at Lauttasaari was fended off by Ramsay's 
grenadiers, with thirty-three British casualties.91 The inhabitants of 
Helsinki admired the bombardment as a grand show of fireworks; it 
did not occur to the Admirals to fire upon the civilian spectators on 
the Kaivopuisto (Brunnsparken) cliffs.92 
The show had thus no immediate military importance. But, in fact, 
it was strategically menacing. Clearly, a naval threat was approaching 
Kronstadt and St Petersburg. When, a month later, in September 1855, 
Sevastopol surrendered, the Allied floating armoured and steam-
powered batteries, direct forefathers of monitors and indirect 
predecessors of all dreadnoughts, were free to be transferred to the 
Baltic for the following year's campaign.93 Then the stone walls of 
Sveaborg and Kronstadt, and even the quays of St Petersburg could 
96 	 have been bombarded with real effect. 
Considerations for an expected campaign of 1856 
Governor-General Berg, who was responsible for the defence plans 
for 1856, had to take the growing threat into account, because in the 
light of the previous years' experience it was probable that the enemy 
would again attack through the Baltic Sea. There also existed the 
danger of Denmark and Sweden "losing their head" and joining the 
enemy as Sardinia had done. It was true that the Swedish government 
had kept cool until then, but it would probably not be able to withstand 
revolutionary Scandinavianism and revanchist propaganda for the 
reconquest of Finland. 
Berg calculated that the enemy forces would amount to fifty 
thousand Frenchmen, ten thousand British soldiers, and thirty-five 
thousand Danes and Swedes, in all ninety-five thousand men. He did 
not expect that they would attack the Baltic provinces, i. e. Livonia 
or Estonia. It was true that there the enemy could destroy Reval and 
91 	 T., "Viaporin pommitus elokuussa 1855; eräs 75-vuotismuisto" (The 75-year 
memory of the bombardment of Sveaborg), Suomen sotilas 36-37/1930, pp. 
484-86. Official reports on the bombardment: Ven sot asiak 94, National Archives 
of Finland. 
92 	 Schauman, Kuudelta vuosikymmeneltä. vol. II, pp. 100-08. 
93 	 Treue, Der Krimkrieg und die Entstehung der modernen Flotten. 
Riga, but it would not be easy to advance further in the absence of 
Prussian support on the southern flank, nor could the enemy count on 
a Polish or Lithuanian rebellion against Russia. And an attack on the 
"limitless gubernii" of Russia was not feasible with even bigger 
armies, as the French had cause to remember from 1812. St Peters-
burg, in the north-east, was a first-class objective for such an attack, 
but it was so well protected that two hundred thousand men would 
be necessary for its conquest. Even such a force would need naval 
support from the Gulf of Finland. 
Thus an invasion of Finland was the most probable choice for the 
enemy, thought Berg, and the conquest of Finland in 1856 would be 
the first step towards an attack against St Petersburg in 1857. 
There were innumerable points on the fifteen-hundred-verst long 
Finnish coast where a landing could be carried out. Two-thirds of 
Finnish towns were situated within the reach of the enemy. The 
two-pronged configuration of the Gulfs of Bothnia and of Finland 	 97 
made it possible for the enemy to threaten the defenders from their 
southern front and western flank. 
The fifty-thousand men concentrated in Finland in 1855 were far 
from sufficient to fend off the expected attack. The Governor-General 
calculated that at least double the number would be necessary; he 
demanded 110 battalions, 43 sotnias, and 120 guns. Even with this 
force, Berg deemed it impossible to defend the whole country. The 
troops had to be concentrated to secure Helsinki and Sveaborg. 
The Governor-General assumed that the Sveaborg fortress would 
be able to fight off an assault from the sea and secure the Kruunu-
vuorenselkä fleet anchorage. But the fortress was defenceless on its 
land side, and Helsinki on its narrow peninsula was exposed to 
landings on either flank. That was why field troops were necessary 
to defend the Finnish capital. 
A second important consideration was securing the communications 
from Finland to Russia. The ancient fortifications on the eighteenth-
century border [i.e. close to the River Kymi] had fallen into 
decrepitude and the coastal road was exposed to enemy landings. Thus 
the field army had also to undertake responsibility for the road.94 
It is natural for a commanding officer to stress the needs of the 
94 	 0 voennykh deistviiakh vozmozhnykh na Severe, v kampaniiu budushchago 1856 
goda. Ven sot asiak 71, p. 52. National Archives of Finland. 
front for which he is responsible. But it is evident also that the military 
staff in St Petersburg understood the importance of Finland. By the 
end of 1855, there were about fifty battalions with eighteen sotnias 
and forty-eight field guns in Finland; Berg did not receive as many 
reinforcements as he had demanded, but in 1856 there were seventy-
one battalions and eighty-four field guns in the country. The numbers 
of cavalry had not been increased.95 
Berg knew or guessed the enemy's intention of weakening the 
Empire by detaching the Grand Duchy from it. He was especially 
apprehensive of an eventual Swedish attack, which he regarded as a 
substantial aid to the enemy, because the Swedes were familiar with 
Finland's terrain and climate. They also knew the language, the 
administration and conditions in general, while the Russian defenders 
were not so well acquainted with circumstances in Finland. 
The Governor-General supposed that the Swedes would invade the 
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	 'north-west' of Finland, i.e. Pohjanmaa (Österbotten). He knew that 
the population there was of ancient Swedish stock, and old memories 
might be revived by a Swedish landing. The enemy, he believed, 
would be helped by provisions and guides. They might then easily 
advance to the interior, to Hämeenlinna, Jyväskylä and Kuopio or 
even further to Heinola, Mikkeli and Savonlinna. It was true that large 
numbers of troops could not live in the interior because of the general 
poverty of the region, and movement was difficult because roads were 
bad and distant from each other. But even a small number of enemy 
troops would constitute a strategic threat to the Russian forces in the 
south of Finland.96 
Obviously, Berg remembered the operations of 1808, when the 
Russians in the interior had constituted a strategic threat to the 
Swedish army on the western coast of Finland. He proposed that 
special light troops and an inland lake flotilla should be established 
to secure this region. 
Berg wanted troops for Turku, too, more than the one battalion 
proposed by Rokassovskii in 1854. Berg declared that he did not doubt 
the loyalty of the Finns, who valued their welfare and understood that 
it was due to the constant fatherly benevolence of the Russian Emperor 
towards them. The Swedish democrats supposed that some sympathy 
95 	 Seitkari, "Suomen sotalaitos Venäjän sotilashallinnon osana 1800-luvulla", p. 98. 
96 	 0 voennykh deistviiakh vozmozhnykh na Severe, v kampaniiu budushchago 1856 
goda. Ven sot asiak 71, p. 52. National Archives of Finland. 
remained towards the ancient mother country among the population 
of the south-west Finland, but they were very much mistaken, argued 
Berg. 
But volatile and thoughtless youth might err, and the demagogues 
would contend that their pranks represented public opinion in Finland. 
Thus Turku could not be denuded of a Russian military presence.97 
This memorandum indicates Berg's general line of thought or 
policy in office. He favoured the Finnish movement, which was fast 
turning from being a romantic expression into a nationalistic force. In 
his time, Menschikoff had become suspicious of the 'Jacobin 
Fennomans', but Berg was more concerned about the Swedish-
speaking country population and the educated elite with its Western 
cultural orientation and separatist administrative inclinations. That was 
why he favoured the Finnish-speaking people; e.g., the leader of the 
national movement, Johan Vilhelm Snellman, was made a professor 
in 1856 and Senator in 1863. Berg fell foul of Minister State Secretary 	 99 
Alexander Armfelt, an eminent member of the governing aristocracy 
of the Grand Duchy. Berg "made himself intolerable" and had to leave 
office. It was, in fact, a general belief among Russia's governing 
circles that the common folk in the ethnically different border regions 
were loyal towards the Emperor and that only the educated elites in 
Poland, the Baltic provinces and Finland, with their alien Western 
ideas, were estranged from Russia. 
Berg's ideas are of interest because they give some idea of 
Finland's military importance as a glacis of St Petersburg, and the 
influence of military considerations on Russia's policy towards the 
border country. 
Berg had no intention of Russifying his Finnish wards. On the 
contrary, he believed that making the population Finnish instead of 
Swedish was the proper policy for the Imperial government. Russians 
welcomed the Finnish national poem 'Kalevala' because it signified 
that the Finns had found their eastern, Fenno-Ugric roots and had got 
rid of the sour Swedish leadership.98 There had been many upper-class 
Russian visitors in Helsinki in the 1830's and 1840's when foreign 
travel was forbidden, and also some interest in Russian culture among 
Finns. 
97 	 0 voennykh deistviiakh vozmozhnykh na Severe, v kampaniiu budushchago 1856 
goda. Ven sot asiak 71, p. 52. National Archives of Finland. 
98 	 Grot, Matka Suomessa 1846, p. 16. (A voyage in Finland). 
But, in fact, the Finns had no intention of moving closer to the 
Russians. Rather than that, some of them dreamed of rousing up the 
other Fenno-Ugric minorities in Russia to oppose the Imperial 
oppression; but even this remained the dream of a tiny minority. The 
Finnish movement aimed mainly at bringing up the Finns on the 
Western model and making them culturally and materially strong 
enough to withstand any future Russification, which the Fennoman 
leaders supposed was coming soon, but which, they hoped, might be 
put off for a while by unconditional loyalty towards the Emperor. 
The end of the war 
There was no campaign in 1856 or 1857, and it is not possible to tell 
whether the apprehensions of the Governor-General were well founded 
or not because Sweden did not join the war and peace soon followed. 
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	 Nicholas I died in February 1855,99 and was succeeded on the 
throne by his son Alexander II. After the fall of Sevastopol in 
September, Russia gave up the hopeless war. The Allies were quite 
ready to desist from further attack. With the war-time alliance, France 
had broken out of her isolation, and Napoleon III could not afford 
any more losses in his conscript army. Palmerston might have gone 
on, because Russia was far from being rendered harmless, but political 
opinion in London had grown disillusioned with the bloody events of 
the war. 
Peace was signed in Paris in 1856. 
Sweden-Norway had not taken part in the war and the country was 
left out of the peace treaty. The only reward for Scandinavian 
benevolent neutrality towards the Western allies was the guarantee of 
their territorial integrity, signed in the previous November, which 
simultaneously placed the United Kingdom of Sweden and Norway 
under a certain degree of tutelage of the Great Powers. 
The Swedes would have liked to see Russia deprived of both navy 
and fortresses on her Baltic coasts, parallel to the demilitarization of 
the Black Sea. The Western Powers thought that the demilitarization 
of the Åland archipelago was security enough for Sweden. Stockholm 
99 	 The council of Vaasa — named after the ancient Swedish dynasty — decided to 
adopt the name Nikolaistad for their town, a further profession of loyalty towards 
the Monarchy. The new name lost its attraction under Nicholas II and was 
officially changed back to Vaasa after the revolution in 1917. 
was thus freed from a strong Russian naval and military presence in 
its immediate vicinity. In fact, the demilitarization was in the interest 
of the Western victors, because it kept the Russian navy confined to 
its bases in the Gulf of Finland and left the Western Baltic Sea open 
for the Western navies, especially the British. 
Notwithstanding their difficult wartime experiences and especially 
their maritime losses, the Finns had reasons enough to be satisfied 
with their position at the end of the war. Alexander II, the new Russian 
Emperor, could see that the policy of his predecessors towards Finland 
had been successful. The local population had remained loyal during 
this difficult time, and had even taken part in preparations for the 
defence of their home country. And the secure possession of the border 
Grand Duchy guaranteed the safety of the Imperial capital against a 
naval attack.im  
REFORMS AND INTERRUPTIONS 
From defeat to reform 
After the Crimean War, the Russian army remained rather 
disorganized, what with the losses of men and material, while the 
Imperial finances were in an even worse condition. 
The war had revealed the backwardness of Russia's society and 
economy compared with the Western Powers. For centuries the army 
had been improved, developed, and enlarged to the detriment of all 
other functions of the government; and now the Russian state had 
proved incompetent in its main field of activity. Even the worst 
reactionaries understood that reforms were necessary; Russia needed 
railways and industry powered by steam if she wanted to survive in 
the competition between the Great Powers. During the next decade 
reforms were carried out, and for the rest of the century the economy 
and society developed with increasing speed, but unevenly, so that 
friction was created between sectors which were progressing rapidly 
100 There is no end of literature on the Åland War, e.g. Wallin; Schulman; Nervander 
& Estlander; Hannula; Tarle, Vostochnaia Voina 1853-56 godov; A.M. Zaionch-
kovskii. 
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and those which were stagnating. 
Reforming the army was a giant task and started slowly. Nicholas's 
last Minister of War Dolgorukov, redesigned uniforms, and Alexander 
II's first Minister of War, Sukhozanet, abolished the notorious military 
settlements, where part of the army had been living by their own 
agricultural work under a despotic military discipline. 
It was Dmitrii Alekseevich Miliutin who modernized the army 
during his period in the War Ministry from 1861-81, supported by 
his able aides, Fedor Logginovich Heiden and N.N. Obruchev. 
Nevertheless, the Emperor remained the supreme commander-in-
chief and all important orders had to be approved by him. The 
Emperors — Alexander II, Alexander III and Nicholas II — were always 
interested in military matters, especially in appointments to the senior 
posts. Grand Dukes of the Romanov family were often appointed to 
high commands or to be inspectors of the various military branches, 
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	 e.g., cavalry, artillery, schools, or to be Admiral-General of the navy. 
The Grand Dukes were notoriously indisciplined and incompetent at 
these tasks and often caused grave disorder in the military 
administration.' 01  
In 1863 new infantry regiments were established and old ones given 
numbers and locality names. The regiments in Finland got back their 
old town names and received new numbers: they were thereafter the 
85th Vyborgskii, the 86th Vil'manstrandskii, the 87th Neishlottskii and 
the 88th Petrovskii regiments. In the Empire, eight further regiments, 
organized into two new divisions, which we shall meet in Finland 
before long, were established in the neighbouring gubernii, and further 
new regiments were established in other regions, so that the 200th 
Kronshlottskii regiment was the last one in numerical order.102  
The military organization had grown rather confused; the field 
armies in Poland and in the South had been directly subordinated to 
the Emperor, while the regional infantry divisions had been under the 
Ministry of War, except in borderlands, where the Governor-Generals 
were also military commanders-in-chief; cavalry, artillery and 
engineers as well as military schools were under their own inspectors, 
and local troops under the guberniia governors. Instead of this chaotic 
lack of system, in 1864 the Empire was divided into military districts, 
101 Zaionchkovskii, P.A., Voennye reformy 1860-1870 godov, pp. 59, 86, 108. 
102 Kersnovskii, Istoriia russkoi armii, vol II, pp. 200-01. 
whose commanders were under the Minister's orders, and who in turn 
commanded all troops and army installations in their area. They were 
responsible for preparations for mobilization in case of a war, and the 
commanders and staffs of the military districts close to imperial 
borders (Odessa, Kiev, Warsaw, Vilna, St Petersburg) were to form 
field-army commands. The first military district was that of the Guards 
Troops and St Petersburg; it was commanded initially by Grand Duke 
Vladimir Aleksandrovich and then by Grand Duke Nicholas Nicholae-
vich; their chiefs of staff carried out the routine affairs of the district. 
Finland was the second military district, the 3rd consisted of the Baltic 
provinces, the 4th was Vilna, the 5th Warsaw, the 6th Kiev, the 7th 
Odessa, the 8th Moscow, the 9th Kharkov, the 10th Kazan, the 11th 
Saratov, the 12th Caucasia, the 13th Orenburg, the 14th Omsk, and 
the 15th Irkutsk; the Don Cossacks had their own military 
organization. There were a few changes later in the system: the Baltic 
district was abolished and divided between St.Petersburg and Vilna 	 103 
in 1870, so that the defence of the Baltic coast, Finland excepted until 
1905, was under the staff in the capital.103 After the conquest of 
Central Asia, Turkestan was under a military administration located 
at Tashkent. 
Miliutin energetically tried to improve the educational level of the 
army. Soldiers were taught to read in order to make further training 
more efficient. Cadet schools were transformed into military high 
schools and officers' schools (voennye gimnazii and voennye 
uchiliche). Only the Hamina Cadet School and the Corps of Pages in 
St Petersburg remained in their traditional form, but even their 
teaching was modernized. Lower-rank officers were trained in the 
yunker schools, where exceptionally even non-commissioned officers 
of peasant origins could start a career as an officer. Staff officers and 
specialists were schooled in the Nicholas (Nikolaevskii) Military 
Academy of the General Staff and in cavalry, artillery, engineering, 
judicial and medical academies. 
Battle training remained outside the Minister's competence, 
directed by the various arms inspectors, and tended to be conservative, 
ignoring the development of firearms. As late as the end of the century 
General Dragomirov, commander of the Kiev military district, stressed 
Suvorov's teaching that the bullet was a coward, and only the bayonet 
103 Bogdanovich, vol. IV, p. 51. 
was brave. The Guards were the model for the army troops, and their 
magnificent parade manoeuvres at the camp of Tsarskoe Selo 
maintained the importance of the ancient line formations. The 
inspector of the cavalry, Grand Duke Nicholas Nicholaevich, the 
future commander in chief in 1914-15, trained his men to turn in 
straight lines four kilometres long,104 if the stories are true. 
Russia's poverty slowed down the furnishing of the army with 
modern weapons. The old smooth-bore cannons started being replaced 
by rifled ones in the 1860's, but soon the new guns were made 
obsolete by breech-loading and quick-firing cannons of 7.62 cm 
calibre. Heavy guns were positioned mainly in the fortresses. The 
six-tenths-of-an-inch or six-line infantry handguns were replaced with 
the 4.2-line Berdan rifles in the 1870's, and by the end of the century 
they in turn were made obsolete by the three-line or 7.6 millimetre 
Mosin magazine rifles. To replace the millions of handguns and 
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	 thousands of cannons was both slow and expensive. Machine-guns 
were introduced at the beginning of the twentieth century, as was also 
the mortar, but their number increased slowly. 
Preparations against a Western intervention in 1863 
Military reforms were repeatedly disturbed by various international 
conflicts, actual or threatening. Four army corps were mobilized in 
1859 on the Austrian border to put pressure on the Habsburg 
government. This was in support of France, which was fighting with 
Sardinia to liberate Italy from the Austrians. The feeling in Russia 
towards the recent enemy had been somewhat improved because at 
the peace conference of Paris Napoleon III had behaved with more 
restraint than the British or the Austrians towards the vanquished. 
The unification of Italy did not, however, give rise to a great 
international conflict. No special defence efforts were necessary on 
the Baltic coasts. But the Polish rebellion of 1863 brought with it the 
danger of an international intervention, which menaced peace in the 
Baltic peace as well. The Poles had not been satisfied with their 
104 Linder, Keisarillisen kaartin upseerina, p. 126 (Memoirs of L. from Service in 
the Imperial Guards). Miliutin's reforms are ably described by P.A. 
Zaionchkovskii, and with even more detail, especially in the material questions, 
by Beskrovnyi, Russkaia armiia i flot v XIX veke; Voenno-ekonomicheskii 
potentsial Rossii. 
Kingdom in 1815, and even less with the reduced autonomy after their 
rebellion of 1830-31, and their dissatisfaction was only inflamed by 
partial concessions in 1861. 
With the new Polish rebellion, Napoleon III proved an unreliable 
friend for Russia. Together with British and Austrian leaders, he again 
sketched out new arrangements for Eastern and Central European 
areas and borders. St Petersburg received official messages which 
offered Western mediation between the Russian government and the 
rebels, and proposed reforms in Poland.'os 
At the worst moments it seemed that Russia might lose Poland, not 
only the kingdom created in 1815, but the ancient greater Poland 
which reached to the Black Sea.106 The Empress sighed: "I hope we 
could at least hold on to Lithuania".'07 
In reaction to the threat of losing the western provinces, Slavophile 
and Panslavist national feeling burst out into Greater Russian 
chauvinism. The former liberal, Mikhail Katkov, started to snarl in 	 105 
his newspaper Moskovskiia Vedomosti against the treacherous Slav 
brothers. The Polish demands for their ancient eastern regions shocked 
Katkov.108 Not only were the dynastic interests of the Romanov family 
endangered,109 but national Russian achievements, too, because the 
Empire was a creation of the people and must be preserved in its holy 
unity.10 Losing these provinces would be equivalent to suicide for 
Russia,'" which would thereby fall from its Great-Power position 
gained in the wars of 1812-15.112 The diplomatic intervention of the 
foreign Powers in Russia's internal affairs was especially demeaning; 
such intervention was usual when Turkey, Persia or China oppressed 
their Christian subjects.' 13 Russia had to resort to armed force to save 
its international position and prestige if the Western Powers were 
really demanding her compliance with their demands for Poland.14 
Katkov did not remain alone. A burst of national indignation swept 
105 Leslie, Reform and insurrection in Russian Poland 1856-1865, pp. 170-202. 
106 Murawjew, Der Diktator von Vilna, p. 19. 
107 Murawjew, Der Diktator von Vilna, p. 21. 
108 Moskovskiia Vedomosti 30. I 1863. 
109 Moskovskiia Vedomosti 27. III 1863. 
110 Moskovskiia Vedomosti 9. III 1863. 
111 Moskovskiia Vedomosti 29. III 1863. 
112 Moskovskiia Vedomosti 10. IV 1863. 
113 Moskovskiia Vedomosti 14. II, 24. II, 26. II, etc etc 1863. 
114 Moskovskiia Vedomosti 20. IV, 22. VIII 1863. 
Russia and affected even the court, government offices and military 
staffs. The subsequent development of ideas was felt in Imperial policy 
towards Finland, though a little later on. 
But military steps for defence against an eventual enemy attack were 
started immediately, even in Finland. After the Crimean War, the 
garrison in Finland had consisted of the 22nd Infantry Division, 
reduced, after two of its battalions had been transferred to Kronstadt 
in November 1856, to eight battalions and two batteries; and of the 
fortress troops at Sveaborg and Viipuri together with other local 
detachments of minimal fighting value. There had been plans for 
reducing the number of line battalions to three and stationing a 
grenadier division in Finland, with two regiments or four battalions at 
Sveaborg, and another two regiments with three battalions in Helsinki 
and one battalion in Viipuri. The peacetime strength of the troops would 
have been 9,800 men with 7,040 additional reservists to be mobilized 
106 
	
	 in wartime. For some — probably financial — reason the plan was 
abandoned.115 But the idea always was to reduce expenditure and with 
it the number of local troops who had little fighting value, and 
simultaneously to increase the "moral importance" of the stationing of 
Imperial troops in Finland, that is, by cultivating through their presence 
the loyalty of the population to the Empire and their respect towards 
the army."' Here the value of grenadier troops would have been great 
since they enjoyed a higher reputation than troops of the line. 
Now, in 1863, with a renewed enemy threat from the Baltic Sea, 
the garrison in Finland was reinforced, again with the 1st Grenadier 
Division, familiar from the days of the Crimean War. The two 
divisions were topped up to their wartime strength with eleven 
thousand 'prematurely discharged' soldiers, i.e. reservists who had not 
served their twenty-five years, and with 5,800 fresh recruits."' The 
wartime numbers were about double the peacetime strength. Cossacks, 
115 RGVIA, fond 1019, opis' 1, delo 343 o pereformirovanii Finliandskikh lineinykh 
batalionov i naznachenii v Finliandii odnoi divizii Grenaderskogo Korpusa, 1857; 
Ob otmene pereformirovanii 22 pekhotnoi divizii i predpolagayshaia zaniatiia 
Finliandii divizioneiu Grenaderskogo Korpusa 16. XI 1857. 
116 RGVIA, fond 1019, opis' 1, delo 381, ob uprazdnenii Neishlottskoi Invalidnoi 
Komandoi [...] Plan zaniatii Finliandii v mimoe vremia russkimi voiskami [...] 
Osnovaniia dlia organizatsii voisk. 
117 By the end of September 1863, 8,807 men had arrived and 2,255 were still 
expected. RGVIA, fond 1019, opis' I, delo 24 Delo ob uspekhakh priniatykh mer 
dlia privedeniia zapadnoi Finliandii v oboronitel'noe polozhenie 2. VIII — 8. IX 
1863; by the end of October 1,418 men had still not arrived. 
artillery, sappers, fortress infantry and fortress artillery were increased 
as well. The summer of 1863 was spent labouring on the improvement 
of fortresses, replenishing the troops, and acquiring materials. Even 
the Finnish indelta soldiers were again called to their battalions from 
their crofts. In all, the peacetime garrison of seventeen thousand men 
in Finland was increased to more than fifty thousand.18  
The old abandoned walls at Lappeenranta and Kymijoki were 
repaired in order to secure the road to Viipuri and Russia. Forts were 
added on the seaward front of the Viipuri fortress and field 
fortifications were erected along the road to St. Petersburg. There are 
scattered bits of information about small local detachments even 
elsewhere in Finland; seven officers and 412 soldiers were quartered 
at Rauma in 1863, ten officers and 700 men in 1864.19 An inland 
lake flotilla was again planned,120 and it is said that a barge called 
Hippopotam really did sail on Lake Näsijärvi, and a flotilla on Lake 
Päijänne was manned by the naval equipage.121 In Hämeenlinna, at 	 107 
the strategically important knot of road communications, barracks 
had been planned in the 1840s and had been constructed in 1848-51; 
the ancient castle was of no contemporary military value, but now in 
1863 large areas were acquired for new field fortifications which were 
armed with fifty-six guns, and a few ships were armed on Vanajavesi 
Lake.122 The castle was to serve as a refuge for the archives and money 
to be evacuated from the exposed capital, a function the castle had 
served during the Crimean War. 
Sveaborg was again the place where the most important work was 
done. Its dilapidated walls were repaired, its obsolete batteries were 
modernized and armed with more modem guns against ironclad ships.'23 
118 Otchet Voennomu Ministru o merakh priniatykh dlia privedeniia v oboronitelnoe 
polozhenie Finliandii, 1863-64. Ven sot asiak 152, pp. 80, 124-27. National 
Archives of Finland. 
119 Lähteenoja, Rauma 1809-1917. (History of Rauma). 
120 145,000 ruplan myöntämisestä Saimaalle, Päijänteelle ja Näsijärvelle soveliaitten 
sotalaivojen rakentamiseksi sisämaan turvaamiseksi vihollishyökkäyksen varalta. 
KKK 3 II/1863, National Archives of Finland. (granting 145,000 roubles for the 
construction of warships for Lakes Saimaa, Päijänne, and Näsijärvi to secure the 
interior in case of enemy attack). 
121 Mattila, "Suomen laivastovoimien vaiheita ennen itsenäisyyden aikaa", p. 42. 
122 Bogdanovich, vol. IV, pp. 348, 355; Lindeqvist, Hämeenlinnan kaupungin 
historia vuosina 1809-75, p. 220. (History of Hämeenlinna). 
123 Otchet Voennomu Ministru o merakh priniatykh dlia privedeniia v oboronitelnoe 
polozhenie Finliandii, 1863-64. Ven sot asiak 152, pp. 25-28. National Archives 
of Finland. 
Alexander II came to inspect the defence works. A parade was held 
at Parola, not far from Hämeenlinna. The Emperor also inspected the 
works at Sveaborg,'24 and it seems that he was satisfied with what he 
saw. 
The documents concerning the defence works are financial accounts 
and do not contain any of the military plans for the defence. But the 
works were concentrated at Sveaborg and in Viipuri and their mutual 
communications, especially through Hämeenlinna. It is easy to 
conclude that the defence plan was similar to that of the days of the 
Crimean War. The Western Powers were expected to attack from the 
Baltic Sea. The Swedes, if they should join the enemy, were expected 
to make a landing on the coast of the Gulf of Bothnia and advance 
to the rear of the Russian troops which were defending the southern 
coast. 
In the end, however, the Western Powers did not intervene with 
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	 more effective measures than their diplomatic notes and left the 
Russians to put down the rebellion in Poland. As a punishment, or in 
order to prevent future rebellions, all traces of autonomy were 
abolished in Poland and the territory of the Kingdom was organized 
into Russian "Vistula provinces" or gubernii. 
Political consequences in Finland 
During the period of reforms, Alexander II wanted all his Empire, 
Finland included, to develop in a modern direction. Because the border 
country had a self-government of proven loyalty, the Emperor, in 
1856, dictated a programme of reforms for Finland to be carried out 
by the Finnish Senate. A lively political discussion followed and it 
was soon concluded that to implement the reforms new laws and taxes 
were needed. In Finnish opinion, increasingly liberal since the 1840's, 
these could not be decreed without the consent of the people's 
representatives. 
Alexander first hesitated convening a Finnish parliament because 
Russia could not be given one. But when the Polish rebellion broke 
out, the blameless loyalty of the Finns made possible the concession, 
and the necessity of further securing their loyalty made the Emperor 
124 Seitkari, "Suomeen sijoitettujen joukkojen liikekannallepanon taustaa v. 1863", p. 
390. (Background to the Mobilization of the Troops Garrisoned in Finland). 
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"Military parade on the Senate Square in Helsinki, probably held during the Diet meeting of 
1863". Important public occasions were graced by military parades; while the Finns developed 
their constitutional life, the presence of the army reminded them of the loyalty due to the 
Emperor. 
Photo: Museovirasto Neg 60350 B. 
consent to their wishes. In 1863, representatives of the four Estates, 
the nobles, clergy, burghers, and peasants convened, and constitutional 
political life started. This was also a demonstration to the West that 
Russia knew how to deal humanely with loyal subjects; the barbarity 
with which the Poles were said to be visited was only reserved for 
rebellious lawbreakers. 
Finnish loyalty was symbolized by the Guards Battalion. After 
serving as guard of honour at the opening of the Diet, the battalion 
was shipped over the Gulf of Finland and marched on to quell the 
rebellious Poles. In the West, the Finns were reproached for their most 
obedient enthusiasm for their Emperor,'25 
 but a rebellion against the 
lawful and anointed monarch was incomprehensible to the majority 
of the Finnish people. 
In Western eyes, it seemed that the Polish rebellion was an uprising 
of a national minority against Tsarist oppression and for Western 
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	 ideals against oriental tyranny, and the Finns, too, were expected to 
join the rising.126 Among the student youth in Helsinki, there had been 
a few ideas about creating an armed secret society for Finland's 
liberation from the Empire in 1859-61 when it seemed that the 
Emperor was reluctant to consent to constitutional reforms.127 The 
so-called big programme of the liberal circles aimed at Finnish 
independence from Russia. But these ideas were generally understood 
to lie far beyond the sphere of what was politically attainable.t28 It is 
true that the liberal newspaper Helsingfors Dagblad wrote about the 
necessity of Finland remaining neutral in case the Western powers 
should resort to military measures against Russia.179 Of course, liberals 
could not feel very much sympathy towards Tsarist Russia. But it 
seems that the newspaper, though lacking in judgement, did not really 
mean treason. The liberals had close ties with businessmen and 
shipowners who were worried about the fate of the Finnish merchant 
125 Borodkin, Finskiia voiska pri Imperatore Nikolae I, pp. 151-53. 
126 Seitkari, "Suomeen sijoitettujen joukkojen liikekannallepanon taustaa v. 1863", 
pp. 383-85. 
127 Ohto Manninen, "Punainen Tasavalta (1859-1861); Leikkimielisestä salaseurasta 
kansallishengen ahjoksi." (The Red Republic; from a Playful Secret Society to 
Nationalist Strivings). 
128 Krusius-Ahrenbeg, Der Durchbruch des Nationalismus und Liberalismus im 
politischen Leben Finnlands 1856-1863. 
129 "Våra önskningar och fordringar vid närvarande tidpunkt", Helsingfors Dagblad 
7. IX. 1863 (Our wishes and demands at the present moment); Hyvämäki, 
Suomalaiset ja suurpolitiikka, (Finns and Great Power politics), pp. 154-66. 
fleet, which sailed under the Russian flag and was defenceless against 
the navies of the Western Powers, as had been proved during the 
Crimean War. Their concern was also demonstrated by a petition to 
the Russian Foreign Ministry for an international agreement or treaty 
to protect private property in naval war.'3°  
Katkov, in principle, did not like Finnish constitutional autonomy, 
although at first he pictured Finnish loyalty as a model to hold up to 
the rebellious Poles and shame them for their insurrection.131 But the 
proposal for neutrality provoked an angry answer from him, in which 
he stressed the sovereignty of Russia over Finland.132 In Katkov's 
view, loyalty towards the Emperor implied loyalty towards Russia and 
a will to be united with the Russian people. Finland was not the 
fatherland of Finns, there existed only one great fatherland for all 
subjects of the Emperor. Dreams of separatism were unnatural.'33 
This was the beginning of the chauvinist Russian propaganda 
against Finnish autonomy and separatism,t34 but for a time this quarrel 	 111 
was of no great importance; the Poles were the main object of Russian 
anger. 
There is no sign of military precautionary measures against any 
local expression of disloyalty in Finland. Finnish circumstances, 
different from those in Russia, caused a few practical problems, for 
instance, in military medicine because Finnish doctors could not speak 
Russian, or in billeting troops because the Finns had the odd way of 
living in scattered farms instead of in villages close to each other, as 
the Russians did.135 Simultaneously with the Dagblad — Moskovskiia 
polemics, the Russkii Invalid, the newspaper of the Ministry of War, 
130 Eräiden suomalisten kauppiaiden ja laivanvarustajien anomus, että Pariisissa 
kokoontuvassa kongressissa, johon suurin osa suurvaltoja osallistuu, nämä vallat 
sopisivat keskenään siitä, että v. 1856 pidetyssä Pariisin kongressissa esitetyt, 
puolueettomien valtojen laivoja ja näiden valtojen alamaisten omaisuutta koskevat 
periaatteet ulotettaisiin niinikään sotiviin valtoihin kuuluviin, yksityisten 
henkilöitten omistamiin laivoihin ja niissä olevaan yksityiseen omaisuuteen. KKK, 
delo 64/1860, National Archives of Finland. — Gorchakov naturally refused to 
take notice of the petition. 
131 Moskovskiia Vedomosti, 4. VI 1863. 
132 Moskovskiia Vedomosti, 27. XI 1863. 
133 Moskovskiia Vedomosti, 13. X, 2. XI, 11. XII 1863. 
134 Krusius-Ahrenberg, "Dagbladsseparatismen år 1863 och den begynnande 
panslavismen". 
135 Otchet Voennomu Ministru o merakh priniatykh dlia privedeniia v oboronitelnoe 
polozhenie Finliandii, 1863-64. Ven sot asiak 152, pp. 44, 152, National Archives 
of Finland. 
published a series of factual and very favourable articles on Finland.136 
Finland as a separate state had not as yet developed so far that a real 
ground for conflict or mutual distrust existed, neither had Russian 
chauvinism developed yet.137 
When the danger was over 
The Prussian wars against Denmark, Austria, and France in 1864, 
1866, and 1870-71, skilfully handled by Bismarck, did not give rise 
to any serious danger of Great-Power conflict. They had no immediate 
importance for Russian military policy, nor, in consequence, did they 
lead to any special defence measures in Finland. The military and 
naval importance of German reunification was to be seen only later. 
The grenadier division had marched from St Petersburg to Helsinki 




weeks and months before reaching the exposed border country. In 
1862, a railway had been constructed from Helsinki to Hämeenlinna, 
i.e. from the seaboard to the lake district, but the short line had not 
much military importance, except in making the evacuation of 
Helsinki easier in case of danger from the sea. Governor-General 
Adlerberg, who headed the Finnish administration from 1866 to 1881, 
warmly supported the idea of a railway from the first Finnish line via 
Viipuri to St Petersburg. There existed every reason for speeding up 
the arrival of reinforcements from the Empire if the number of troops 
in Finland was insufficient for the tasks ahead.138 Railway construction 
in such a poor country needed much time and it was only in 1870 
that this trunk line of the future Finnish railway network was 
completed. Because of the importance of military transports, the 
Finnish State Railways had to adopt the Russian gauge of 1,542 mm, 
instead of a narrow gauge which seemed more economical. 
Thus Hämeenlinna lost part of its strategic importance when road 
transport was replaced by rail. The castle remained the intended refuge 
of archives and treasuries, but the Riihimäki—Viipuri—St Petersburg 
136 Russkii Invalid, fourteen issues 3. X — 30. XI 1863. 
137 An introduction to the question of Russification, see: Thaden, "The Russian 
Government". 
138 Seitkari, "Suomen rautatiesantarmiston perustamisvaiheista" (Establishing the 
Railway Gendarmerie in Finland); Polvinen, Die finnischen Eisenbahnen in den 
militärischen und politischen Plänen Russlands vor dem ersten Weltkrieg, p. 45 
et seq. 
railway grew to be the most vitally important line of communications. 
The Finnish military district was created in 1864. The 
Governor-General was simultaneously commander of the military 
district, i.e., of all troops and military installations in the Grand Duchy, 
subordinated to the Minister of War, while in civil affairs he was 
directly under the Emperor. 
To recapitulate, the military district was garrisoned, first of all, by 
the Finnish Guards battalion. In peace-time the battalion numbered 
one general, eighteen officers, sixty non-commissioned officers, fifty-
nine musicians, 520 riflemen, two officials, and thirty-six non-
combatants. As we have seen, in wartime the battalion was usually 
sent to distant theatres of war to operate with the main Imperial armies. 
In 1864, the 1st Grenadier Division was still in Finland with its 
artillery brigade and artillery park, and the 16th Don Cossack 
regiment, in addition to the 22nd Division and 22nd Artillery Brigade. 
In all, there were 931 officers and 39,074 lower ranks in the country 
in January 1864. Two-thirds of the troops were billeted in 'villages' 
during the winter of 1863-64 because there were not enough barracks; 
during the summer they lived in camps at Uusikaupunki, in Turku, at 
Hämeenlinna, at Tapanila (Mosabacka), in Helsinki, at Hamina and 
in Viipuri. By the end of the year, their numbers were reduced by 
half because the Grenadier Division and sapper battalion had marched 
back to their peacetime quarters in Russia.139 
In 1864-65, the 22nd Division was transferred from Finland to 
Novgorod, where the Neishlotskii, Vil'manstrandskii and Vyborgskii 
regiments continued their existence, far from the Finnish towns they 
were named after, as did also the Petrovskii regiment. The Finns again 
believed that the reason for the transfer was the too strong an element 
of Finnish-born officers who had sought service in the division in 
their home country.'40 
The true explanation for the change may be sought in the discussion 
around the establishment of the military district. The idea was that in 
order to save expenditure, the line battalions were to be dissolved and 
Finland was to be garrisoned by only troops rotating from Russia; 
another idea was to leave three battalions, to be transformed from line 
139 RGVIA, fond 1338, opis' 1, delo 76, 0 stostavlenii vsepoddanneishikh godovykh 
otchetov o deistviiakh Finliandskago Voennago Okruga za 1865 g. RGVIA, fond 
1338, opis' 1, delo 77, Godovoi otchet komanduiushchago voiskami za 1864 g. 
140 Schauman, Kuudelta vuosikymmeneltä, vol. I, p. 105. 
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to infantry troops, to garrison Sveaborg, and one further battalion to 
station three companies in Viipuri and one company at Hamina; in 
either case, the Guards Battalion was to stay in Helsinki. The invalid 
and other costly detachments without fighting value were to be 
abolished.141 The troops were not, in fact, reduced to this minimum, 
because of the danger of enemy attack during the Polish rebellion, 
but the idea of rotation seems to have taken root, even if the rotation 
was not as frequent as originally planned. 
The 22nd Division was replaced from Novgorod by the 23rd 
Division, with its 89th Belomorskii, 90th Onezhkii, 91st Dvinskii and 
92nd Pechorskii regiments and 23rd Artillery brigade. 
In 1866-67 the 89th and 92nd Regiments were in Helsinki with 
two battalions in villages, the 90th at Hamina, in Viipuri, at Kymen-
kartano, Kouvola, and Loviisa (Lovisa), the 91st at Sveaborg and 
Hämeenlinna, with two companies billeted in villages. To a certain 
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	 degree, the regiments kept being moved to different regions, but by 
the end of the 1860s the 89th Belomorskii or White Sea infantry 
regiment was garrisoned at Hämeenlinna, the 90th Onezhkii or Onega 
Regiment in Viipuri, the 91st Dvinskii Regiment near Helsinki, and 
the 92nd Pechorskii Regiment in Turku, all quartered in barracks, only 
in Turku 'just tolerably'. The infantry was supported by the 23rd 
Artillery brigade with its rifled guns and 'flying artillery park' (i.e., 
mobile ammunition column) at Tuusula (Tusby); each of its four 
batteries had seven officers and 240 artillerymen. There were two 
regiments, the 8th and 53rd, of Don Cossacks. As before, the Cossacks 
were stationed in small detachments in various localities in the 
country. '42 
The fortress artillery of Sveaborg also belonged to the military 
district of Finland. After the Crimean War, during the Miliutin 
reforms, a three-battalion fortress infantry regiment had been formed 
and existed until 1878. In 1886, the administration of fortresses was 
reorganized, in Sveaborg as in other fortresses of the Empire. The 
141 Ob upraznenii Neishlottskoi Invalidnoi Komandoi i primenenii Kouvolskoi 
Invalidni Komandy do poloviny ravno ob upraznenii vo vsekh finliandskikh 
invalid. komand; o pereobrazovanii Finliandskikh Lineinykh batalionov v 
pekhotnykh batalionykh i upraznenii nekotorykh iz nikh vovse a ravno takzhe ob 
upraznenii Neishlottskago Plats-Adiutantskago Upravleniia 1861-1863. RGVIA, 
fond 1019, opis' 1, delo 381. 
142 Helsinki, Hämeenlinna, Turku, Kuopio, Mikkeli, Oulu, Tornio, Vaasa 
(Nikolaistad), Kivennapa, in 1866. 
fortress commander had his staff, and subordinate artillery, engineer 
and intendent directorates (upravlenie) established. In 1889, a fortress 
infantry battalion was formed, and it was increased into a 
two-battalion fortress infantry regiment in 1900. Specialists in mine 
warfare had been organized in 1881, a mine detachment was 
established in 1886 and transformed into a company in 1891.14' The 
artillery had eight-inch, twelve-pound and four-pound rifled guns and 
sixty-pound smooth-bore guns. The eight-inch guns were new and 
"difficult to install in position", probably because they were heavier 
than the previous models. In the fortress lived 3,215 people, of whom 
667 belonged to the field troops mentioned above, and 476 were wives 
and children.'44 There was also a penal company at Sveaborg. Since 
1874 the privates of the Russian army served five years and were no 
longer doomed to life-long service, and their women, if left at home, 
were not regarded as widows. Families of officers and non-
commissioned officers often lived in garrisons or close to them. 
The fortress of Viipuri had been regarded as having lost its 
strategical importance after Swedish Finland had been conquered in 
1808-09. Parts of the fortified walls were given over to the civilian 
town administration, while the old castle remained a military post. 
But, in 1819, it was realized that road (and later railway) 
communications from Finland to the Empire crossed the Bay of 
Viipuri and were easily approached from the sea. Then Viipuri was 
reclassified as a second-class fortress. During the following decades 
some measures were taken to modernize the fortress, but most of its 
five hundred guns were obsolete. In 1886, in addition to the fortress 
staff, artillery, engineer and intendent directorates (upravlenie) were 
established. In 1890 a mine company was formed from cadres 
transferred from Kronstadt, reflecting the growing importance of the 
Viipuri fortress and the technical development of that time. But with 
the main defence interest concentrated in reinforcing Sveaborg and 
the approaches to Kronstadt, really effective measures to strengthen 
Viipuri were taken only just before and during the Great War.145 
143 RGVIA, fond 16113 Sveaborgskoi krepost, introduction to the tile. 
144 RGVIA, fond 1338, opis' 1, delo 85, Svedeniia o chisle nizhnikh chinov 
Sveaborgskago garnizona 21. II 1866. Including the number of women and 
children in the report is a rare exception, I have not found any such information 
concerning the other garrisons. 
145 RGVIA, fond 13128 Vyborgskaia krepost' i podchinennye ei chasti i uchrezhdenii 
1710-1918 gg. 
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The guns were served by an artillery regiment of four battalions in 
Viipuri as well as at Sveaborg. The training of the fortress infantry 
companies was disturbed by their heavy guard duties, and both the 
fortress troops and special local detachments suffered from the low 
level of their officers' education (nishnago urovnia razvitiia ofitserov). 
The Viipuri fortress had only two hundred shells for training, the 
Sveaborg none, because the artillery administration had not sent 
ammunition for the new guns in 1869. 
The military district engineer office supervised fortification works 
in the fortresses, and the district intendent's office and medical office 
administered their respective spheres of activity. There were 
provisions magazines in several localities,146 and local commandants'47 
for local administration, and a district chief of gendarmes at Helsinki 
with gendarme posts in Helsinki, Turku and Viipuri. 
The Guards battalion took part in the summer camp in Tsarskoe 
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	 Selo, where they were transported by the Baltic fleet. This battalion 
lived in Helsinki in a spacious and clean barracks, had first-class 
officers and enjoyed efficient training, and was thereby distinguished 
from the rest of the army troops. 
The other troops suffered from a lack of training facilities, because 
of which only minimal training could be given in winter, and firing 
practice could be started only when good weather set in. On the other 
hand, training detachments for non-commissioned officers worked 
successfully. Because of the heavy guard duty with which the infantry 
regiments had been saddled, only two regiments were free for summer 
training in camps. 
Since tents and carriage and obtaining fields for manoevures were 
expensive, the military district established permanent camps. The 
troops were collected in summer camps at Parola, near Hämeenlinna, 
and at Lappeenranta.148 The localities chosen were level fields, suitable 
for formal drill. 
Of the Don Cossacks, the 8th Regiment was in a better shape than 
the 53rd. Acquiring sufficient fodder for the horses was always a 
146 2nd class in Helsinki, at Sveaborg, Tuusula, in Viipuri, 3rd class at Hämeenlinna, 
in Turku, 4th class at Hamina, Lappeenranta, Kymenkartano (Kymmenegård), 
Loviisa, Tornio, Oulu (Uleåborg), Mikkeli, Kyyrölä, and Kuopio. 
147 Sveaborg, Helsinki, Viipuri, Turku, Hamina, Kymenkartano, Lappeenranta, 
Hämeenlinna, Vaasa (Nikolaistad), Tornio, and a military official (nachal'nik) at 
Tuusula (Tusby). 
148 RGVIA, fond 1338, opis 1, delo 88, Ob uchrezhdenii postoiannykh lagerov. 
problem, and co-operative artels of cavalry soldiers were formed to 
gather hay. The officers were said to be in financial difficulties in 
what were, for them, alien conditions in Finland. 
The number of troops in the military district of Finland was reported 
to amount to 17,096 in 1867 and to 13,923 in 1869, of whom 9-13% 
were unfit for service.19 
The Governor-General's report indicates that there was no 
immediate military threat in sight, that the troops were not quite in 
fighting condition, and the fortresses even less so. It can also be seen 
that the army was trained for fair-weather and parade-ground 
conditions. It is true that an enemy landing was clearly impossible 
during wintertime, and that battle was expected to be joined on the 
southern coastal region, although even there open parade-ground 
terrain occurred only in a few places. 
The first Finnish naval equipage or training battalion, reduced to a 
company-strength cadre, always belonged to the Baltic fleet. The 	 117 
second had been dissolved after the Crimean War ended. 
There were only a little over one thousand Finns in active military 
service at this time, in the Guards battalion and in the naval cadre. 
After the review of 1863, the indelta soldiers were sent back to live 
on their crofts, until the ancient and totally obsolete system was 
abolished in 1867, which was a very difficult year for Finland because 
of climatic irregularities and consequent crop failure and the death 
from hunger of more than a hundred thousand people. 
The Finnish economy soon revived after the bad years. This 
stimulated a start on essential reforms. Exports to the Russian market 
of textiles and machines, and to Western markets of wood products, 
as well as agricultural production for the slowly-growing towns 
created a sound basis for a Finnish national economy. Rokassovskii 
helped the Finns to establish their own monetary system independent 
of the shaky paper rouble. 
In 1866 the Karakozov attempt on Alexander II's life marked an 
end of the reform period. In Finland a new governor general was 
appointed; Berg and Rokassovskii had favoured the Finnish 
movement, but now Count Adlerberg was more inclined towards the 
Swedish-speaking conservative bureaucratic elite. In tune with the 
149 RGVIA, fond 1338, opis' 1, delo 101, Vsepoddanneishii otchet komanduiushchago 
voiskami o sostoianii voisk i voennykh uchrezhdenii sego okruga za 1869 goda. 
more conservative spirit reigning in St Peterburg, Adlerberg governed 
the autonomous country in harmony with the Minister State Secretary 
Alexander Armfelt, thus preventing any intervention or ideas of 
unification on the part of Russian ministers. Local political life revived 
when the Diet started sitting regularly. Political discussion led to a 
lively party strife and an increasing participation in politics by broader 
circles of the population. The Finnish 'constitution', granted by 
Alexander I in 1809 and confirmed by Nicholas I in 1825 and 
Alexander II in 1855, implied mainly Estate privileges. These were 
threatened by the mobilization of the Finnish-speaking lower classes 
by the fennoman nationalist movement, which was opposed by the 
established leading families, who also more or less succesfully entered 
business life. Western ideas influenced Finnish art, literature and 
science direct, not through Stockholm or St Petersburg as they had 
done earlier. Germany was the main centre of importance for learning, 
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	 France for the arts, and England for commerce. The growth of 
population (from one million in 1812 to two millions in 1870 and 
three millions in 1912), caused overpopulation and pauperization in 
the countryside, which was only slowly eased by industrialization, 
urbanization, and modernization.150 This, in turn, brought with it new 
social problems in the 1880s. 
The Finns remained strictly loyal subjects of their Emperor, but 
they did not feel that they were Russians. There existed no serious 
separatism in regard to the international position of the Grand Duchy, 
but again no wish to grow closer to Russia, which was increasingly 
regarded as 'our eastern neighbour'. Adlerberg's attempts to 
strengthen the position of Russians in Finnish society and Russian 
culture in Finland did not produce many results. In Helsinki, the 
Alexander Theatre, completed in 1879, was patronized mainly by the 
Russian officers and officials, and their sons went to the Alexander 
gimnaziia or senior secondary school, but no Finnish boys; nor did 
artillery salutes on Imperial festival days 15 ' arouse much interest 
among the Finns. 
150 Between the 1880s and the First World War about 300,000 people emigrated to 
America and were not included in the number of three million inhabitants in 1912. 
151 Adlerberg to Miliutin 25. VIII/6. IX 1866 and the following correspondence. 
KKK, delo 52/1866, National Archives of Finland. 
National Conflicts 
NEW ENEMIES AND NEW IDEAS 
The War of 1877-78 and its consequences 
Miliutin was not allowed to carry out his reforms undisturbed. A new 
international crisis was due to Balkan problems. The local Ottoman 
administration opposed the Porte's feeble attempts at reforms in the 
peninsula, and the subject populations were dissatisfied with the 
greedy and ineffectual administration of their overlords, who in tum 
answered rebellions with massacres. European public opinion got 
somewhat irritated, and the Russian nationalists became interested in 
the fate of their Pan-Slavic brothers. General Cherniaev, the conqueror 
of Tashkent, and many other Russians joined the Serbs in 1876, but 
the Turkish army proved a more formidable opponent than the 
antiquated hordes of Central Asian emirates. 
The Russian government was rather reluctant to intervene, because 
the imperial finances had still not recovered from the Crimean War, 
the major reorganization of the army was far from complete, nor was 
the Emperor in any bellicose mood. But the prestige of the regime 
had to be maintained and Russia had to safeguard its international 
position and interests in the Balkans. A light flotilla was sent to the 
Danube Delta, where it stayed for a while without any clear purpose.' 
By a great effort, Miliutin mobilized a few army corps in 1877' and, 
under the command of the Grand Duke Nicholas Nicholaevich (the 
elder, the Emperor's brother), the troops crossed the Danube and 
1 	 The flotilla was commanded by the young Grand Dukes Konstantin 
Konstantinovich and Aleksei Aleksandrovich, the Emperor's nephew and son, so 
that they could be given St George crosses, as Miliutin sourly commented. Tri 
veka rossiiskogo Hota, vol. I, p. 243. 
2 	 P.A. Zaionchkovskii, Voennye reformy 1860-1870 godov v Rossii, pp. 336-40 
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marched through Rumania towards the Balkan mountains. The army 
was led with the usual incompetence and its provisioning was in a 
worse than normal state of chaos and corruption — for which Nicholas 
Nicholaevich was afterwards dismissed — but in the end the Turkish 
forts were taken, the mountain passes crossed, and numerous civilians 
massacred by both sides. In the negotiations at San Stefano, the 
Russian delegate, Count Ignat'ev, made the Turks submit to the loss 
of a Greater Bulgaria.' Austria and Britain could not consent to the 
immoderate growth of Russian influence in the peninsula and on the 
Mediterranean and threatened war. Bismarck invited the trouble-
makers to Berlin and Bulgaria was cut down to size and Russia's 
pretensions in the Balkans were deflated in the congress of 1878. 
The danger of Western intervention in the Balkan war made it 
necessary once again to tighten up the defence organization in the 
North against an eventual British attack. In 1875-76, the Ministry of 
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	 War, the Finnish Governor-General and their subordinate staffs 
planned that every infantry regiment in Finland should organize a 
reserve battalion with cadres and half the wartime numbers, i.e,. 644 
men — the war-time strength of a battalion was 1,322 men in all, or 
one thousand bayonets in the battle line. Each fortress battalion, at 
this time there were three of them at Sveaborg and one in Viipuri, 
numbered actually only 400-700 men, instead of the nominal wartime 
strength of 956 men. The fortress commandants reported that they did 
not have the necessary equipment for the mobilization of the wartime 
number of men, and could only acquire it if they received money to 
do so. Only the 19th Don Cossack regiment, with its headquarters in 
Turku and with 809 sabres plus thirty-seven non-combatants, was 
nearly up to its wartime strength of 816 sabres and forty-nine 
non-combatants. 
Additional men to reinforce the fortress garrisons were to be 
mobilized from the infantry troops of the St Petersburg military 
district, from 22nd, 24th, and 37th Divisions for Sveaborg and from 
the 23rd Division in Finland for Viipuri.4 
In 1876, when the conflict in the Balkans was growing ever more 
menacing, a committee was appointed by Imperial order under the 
chairmanship of Governor General Adlerberg to revise the defence 
3 	 Russko-turetskaia voina 1877-1878 gg. 
4 	 RGVIA, fond 1338, opis' 1, delo 123 po mobilizatsii voisk i krepostnykh 
batalionakh i Donskom kazach'em polki 1875-1877. 
plans of Finland.' 
The committee first stated the principle that the Grand Duchy had 
to be defended because of its importance in protecting St Petersburg 
from the north-west. 
The wartime nominal strength of the garrison in Finland amounted 
to 24,311 men and 597 horses.' The committee stated that this force 
was insufficient for an effective defence of the country. Fortresss 
troops had to be increased, and at least thirty-two battalions of field 
troops were necessary, reinforced with artillery and cavalry. Sveaborg 
needed twelve fortress and eight field battalions, Viipuri eight fortress 
and four field battalions. A battalion in each was necessary for 
Hamina, Kymenkartano (Kymmenegård), Turku, and Tammisaari. A 
reserve of eleven battalions was to be stationed at Hämeenlinna.' 
No operations were expected to take place in the north, as had 
happened in 1808-09 and had been feared in 1854-56 or 1863. Only 
raids to entice the Russians to disperse their defences were expected, 	 121 
and the defenders were under strict instructions not to be falsely lured 
by any such raids. The south-west of Finland was without strategic 
importance to Russia, but for political reasons it could not be left 
totally denuded of troops. Turku, at least, had to be protected against 
enemy plundering, because of the Crichton shipyard and other 
industrial establishments.8 
5 	 0 merakh, imeiushchikh byt' priniatym dlia oborona kraia. Ven sot asiak 173, p. 
9 et seq., National Archives of Finland. 
6 	 NOMINAL STRENGTH OF RUSSIAN TROOPS IN FINLAND 
non-commissioned 	 musicians soldiers 	 non-combatants in all 	 horses 
officers 
23rd Inf div 	 480 	 112 	 4,800 	 195 	 5,587 	 510 
23rd Art br 	 20 	 400 	 53 	 573 	 75 
23rd Art park 	 10 	 3 	 188 	 il 	 212 	 12 
Sveaborg and Viipuri fortress infantry 
	
1,312 224 	 12,800 364 	 14,700 
Sveaborg and Viipuri fortress artillery 
335 	 10 	 2.850 	 104 	 3.299 
totals 	 2,197 349 	 21,038 727 	 24,311 597 
RGVIA, fond 1338, opis' 1, delo 41 o predostavlenii Voennomu Ministru 
soobrazhenii ha sluchai privedeniia voisk okruga na voennoe polozhenie 1875. 
7 
	 0 merakh, imeiushchikh byt' priniatym dlia oborona kraia. Ven sot asiak 173, p. 
18, National Archives of Finland. 
8 	 Zapiska otnositelno znachenii Iugozapadnoi chasti Finliandii v sluchae voiny s 
morskoiu derzhavoiu. Ven sot asiak 173, p. 326 e.seq., National Archives of 
Hankoniemi was the outermost point of Finland in the South-West, 
where the ice-bound period was shorter than anywhere else. With its 
good anchorage, it would have been a good base for a powerful Baltic 
fleet which might be constructed by Russia. But an effective defence 
of the peninsula would have necessitated extensive, expensive and 
prolonged fortification works. That was why it was considered best 
to leave it without any defence,' with only the battalion at Tammisaari 
ready to slow down an enemy advance towards the interior. 
The Kymijoki valley was even more important than before because 
of the railway bridge which had been constructed over the river.10  
But considerations similar to those pertaining for Hanko were valid 
for the small fort of Kymenkartano at the mouth of the river. Thus 
the railway communication from Finland to the Empire had to be 
secured by field troops." 
In another memorandum, it was explained that during the Crimean 
122 
	
	 War too many troops had been tied down to guard the Baltic coasts, 
instead of being sent to the theatre of war where they would have 
been more usefully engaged. To minimize the need for field troops it 
was necessary to modernize Viipuri and to fortify Sveaborg—Helsinki 
from the land side. Other towns exposed to bombardment from the 
sea could be left without garrisons, because trying to defend them 
would only have tied down too many troops. Guarding the coasts, it 
was maintained, was not a task for the army; it was the duty of the 
navy. 12 
Of course, it was a sound idea to employ the navy for coastal 
defence. But the Russian navy does not seem to have been up to its 
task throughout the whole century. Ships had been constructed to 
replace those destroyed during the Crimean War, but without any clear 
idea about their use. Occasionally, gunboats and monitors had been 
built for coastal defence, and at other times cruisers for a commercial 
war against the British merchant fleet. Some very odd ideas 
Finland. 
9 	 0 merakh, imeiushchikh byt' priniatym dlia oborona kraia. Ven sot asiak 173, p. 
9, National Archives of Finland. 
10 	 Adlerberg to Major General Berens 11/23. VI 1878. Ven sot asiak 173, p. 266. 
National Archives of Finland. 
11 	 0 merakh, imeiushchikh byt' priniatym dlia oborona kraia. Ven sot asiak 173, p. 
10, National Archives of Finland. 
12 	 Zapiska ob oborone Finliandii, sostavil Gen. Maior Berens 1878. Ven sot asiak 
202, pp. 209-10. National Archives of Finland. 
materialized, like the round gunboats of Admiral Popov. Shipyards at 
St Petersburg and at the Black Sea ports had difficulties in following 
the progress of technology in the West.13 
There really was no war plan for the navy in 1876-78. The main 
forces were kept at Kronstadt, and a detachment was at Sveaborg tied 
down as a floating battery to contribute with their artillery to the 
defence of the fortress. Only a coastal flotilla had a more active role 
in patrolling the eastern passages in the Gulf of Finland and in mining 
the approaches to them.14 Thus the navy was not of much use against 
eventual enemy landings or plundering raids in the south-west of 
Finland. 
Work was started as the committee had directed. Even after the 
extensive works undertaken in 1854-55 and 1863-65 to strengthen 
the batteries of Sveaborg, much remained to be done. Arming the 
fortress with contemporary guns was expensive and proceeded slowly. 
The plans called for twenty-eight eleven-inch and seventy-one 	 123 
nine-inch guns, but there were only five and twenty-five of each 
calibre, and even a few of them remained unmounted.15 Similar 
problems existed everywhere in the Empire, whose borders were 
extensive and exposed to numerous enemies, whose industry was 
obsolete and economy undeveloped. The equipment of the army, the 
fortresses, and the navy always dragged behind the level of the more 
industrialized and richer Western rivals.16 
Building sites for the landward defence of Sveaborg were bought on 
the neighbouring islands and on the mainland to the north of Helsinki." 
The fortress of Viipuri remained in a hopelessly obsolete and dilapidated 
condition. The augmented and more modern artillery would have 
necessitated a new circle of forts being constructed with a radius of six 
versts18 from the town, for which task no means existed.19 
13 	 M. Petrov, Podgotovka Rossii k mirovoi voine na more, pp. 23-24. 
14 	 M. Petrov, Podgotovka Rossii k mirovoi voine na more, p. 43. 
15 	 Adlerberg to Miliutin 6. V 1878. Ven sot asiak 173, p. 199. National Archives 
of Finland. 
16 	 P.A. Zaionchkovskii, Voennye reformy 1860-1870 godov v Rossii, p. 139; P.A. 
Zaionchkovskii, Samoderzhavie i russkaia armiia na rubezhe XIX—XX stoletii, 
1881-1903, p. 80. 
17 	 0 merakh, imeiushchikh byt' priniatym dlia oborona kraia. Ven sot asiak 173, p. 
11, National Archives of Finland. 
18 	 Six kilometres; a Russian verst = 1066 metres. 
19 	 0 merakh, imeiushchikh byt' priniatym dlia oborona kraia. Ven sot asiak 173, p. 
13, National Archives of Finland. 
"General Ramsay returning with his men from the Turkish war (1878). The boy in the centre 
is the future conductor of the Guards military band, Apostol. The boy was an orphan adopted 
and educated by Sergeant- Major Ekman (sitting in front of the boy), as recounted by his 
grandson Torsten Ekman, a journalist on the staff of Hufvudstadsbladet". 
Photo: Museovirasto Neg 94352. 
Finns did not much participate in the preparations for the defence 
of their country. The Finnish Guards battalion marched together with 
the Russian Imperial Guards to the Balkans. Many Finns adopted this 
distant war as Finland's own, because it was waged by their own 
Emperor and by their own battalion and in order to liberate Christians 
from the infidel Mahomedans. In small boys' games "Russians" and 
"Turks" — led by the heroic Osman Pasha — fought with fisticuffs. 
Finnish-born officers took part in the fighting, as they had done since 
the Russian intervention in the Greek War of Liberation and in all 
Russia's wars since then. The Finnish battalion took part in the 
conquest of Gornyi Dubniak, and marched over the Balkan mountains 
suffering from cold and hunger. In the summer of 1878, waiting for 
repatriation in their camp in Thrace, many men died from typhus and 
other typical campaign epidemics." The war made obvious the 
20 	 Two popular histories of the battalion's campaign: Tapio Hiisivaara, 'Tuhannenpa 
dangers involved in such expeditions: "In the last days of the winter 
of 1878 we stood wondering at our sorrily reduced Guards marching 
back to town. I remember well those grey, worn-out troops, the rumble 
of steps, the ragged flags. The frightening picture remained forever 
in my mind." 71 For their bravery, and for the repeatedly proved loyalty 
of the Finns towards their Emperor, the Guards Battalion was 
promoted from their status of Young Guards (since 1829) to the rank 
of Old Guards. 
Tension had also risen rather high at home in the north. With the 
Russian army at the walls of Constantinople and the Royal Navy on 
the Marmara Sea, the danger of war seemed fairly close in the spring 
of 1878. In March 1878 the order was received in Finland to be 
prepared for mobilization, which intensified the preparations for 
defence.22 
To gather more men for defence, and to demonstrate Finnish loyalty 
towards the Emperor, some Finnish political leaders proposed 	 125 
recruiting four enlisted sharpshooter battalions, once again, though it 
was also pointed out that enlisted troops were usually recruited from 
the worst or most destitute elements and would thus not represent the 
Finnish nation with any honour. But the danger passed with the Berlin 
Congress, and no mobilization and no recruitment was necessary.23 
As a conclusion, in the summer of 1878, Governor-General 
Adlerberg summed up the idea of the defence of Finland in a few 
words: because it was impossible to defend the entire long coast, 
forces had to be concentrated on the most important points, i.e. 
Helsinki, Viipuri, and the railway line from Helsinki to St Petersburg.24 
verran poikia läksi...', Suomen kaarti Balkanin sodassa 1877-1878, (The Finnish 
Guards in the Balkan War), and: Keijo Kylävaara, Balkanin santaa. (The Balkan 
Sands, a collection diaries, letters and memoirs from the the Finnish Guards in 
the Balkan War). 
21 	 Eva Mannerheim, cited by Jägerskiöld, Nuori Mannerheim (Young Mannerheim), 
pp. 40-41. In 1938 the Bulgarian King decorated 22 survivors of the battalion 
for their contribution to the liberation of his country: Talas, Muistelmia 
itsenäisyyssenaattorina ja lähettiläänä kymmenessä maassa, p. 22. (Memoirs of 
T. as Senator and Diplomatic Envoy in Ten Countries). 
22 	 Order of the Military District of Finland 4. III 1878. Ven sot asiak 173, p. 87, 
National Archives of Finland. 
23 KKK, Delo 39/1878, National Archives of Finland, 'koskee neljän 
tarkk'ampujapataljoonan perustamista Suomeen tarpeen vaatiessa värväyksen 
avulla'. 
24 	 Adlerberg to Major General Berens 11/23. VI 1878. Ven sot asiak 173, p. 266. 
National Archives of Finland. 
National military service 
Miliutin's great reform of the Imperial army was still not complete. 
The Minister of War argued that Russia needed more men in its army 
than could be recruited by the ancient system based on serfdom. On 
the western border there were two mighty enemies, Germany and 
Austria, and the Empire had long defenceless coasts and disloyal 
populations within its own borderlands. The problem was how to 
reduce the peacetime strength of the army and at the same time make 
possible a rapid increase in numbers in case of war. 
At first, Miliutin increased the number of soldiers discharged before 
the completion of their period of service (dosrochny otpusknykh); the 
period, in law twenty-five years, had already been shortened to fifteen 
years, but the Minister started discharging soldiers even earlier and 
in greater numbers, in order to have a trained reserve of 750,000 men 
126 	 after seven or eight years. 
This was only a temporary solution; military service could not be 
left to be the duty of the lowest class only. Patriotism was a cause 
for all the nation. An important practical consideration was the training 
of reserve officers, which remained a problem until the upper-layers 
of society were included in the system. 
Conservatives opposed such an all-class military service, as they 
opposed all Miliutin's reforms. National service had been established 
by the French in 1792 and the taint of revolution remained in the 
idea; and for many critics it was unthinkable that gentry youth should 
serve together with peasants' sons. But the victories of Prussia's 
national service army in 1864 against Denmark, in 1866 against 
Austria, and especially in 1870-71 over France, were an incontestable 
proof of the military effectiveness of the system; and Prussia was 
irreproachably conservative. 
The opposition of the conservatives was broken down by the 
Emperor's order. General national service was established from 1 
January 1874. 
The army was never able to conscript the total annual cohort of 
twenty-year old men until the days of the First World War. Men were 
freed from military service on numerous grounds — being an only son, 
the breadwinner of a family, a younger brother of a conscript, and, 
of course, the medically unfit. The period of active service was five 
years, shorter for men with education, and for university students only 
one year (which made the system palatable for the upper classes). 
After concluding their active service, the men were sent home, but 
were liable to be called up in case of war. Untrained men, elderly 
reservists and young boys over seventeen were counted as opolchenie, 
i.e. as militia or replacement troops, to be called to arms only by a 
special decision of the Emperor. 
In time of peace, active army troops had about one half of their 
wartime numbers in service, and reserve and replacement units had 
only a small cadre in continuous service. Troops stationed close to 
the borders were kept at about two thirds of their war-time strength. 
They were recruited from the central parts of the Empire, because the 
national minorities were not trusted; only 25% of any detachment was 
allowed to consist of men from the local population. Cavalry 
detachments close to the borders were maintained at their complete 
wartime strength. 
The Polish rebellion in 1863 and the war in the Balkans in 1875-78 
complicated the reorganization of the army, but in 1880 the national 
military service system was working satisfactorily. The nominal 
wartime strength of the army was forty-eight divisions or 2,350,000 	 127 
men including the supporting cavalry, artillery and sappers. The 
Cossacks were excempt from the general national service, because 
they continued their hereditary life-long military service. 
Miliutin opposed all attempts to weaken the unity of the Empire; 
for example, he held the self-government of the Baltic German barons 
to be a dangerous separatism.25 He wanted to modernize Russia and 
create out of the Romanov dynastic Empire a modern, rationally 
bureaucratic and centralized, nationally unified state. The aim of 
general military service was, in addition to making the army more 
effective, also to educate the various ethnic populations into a united 
imperial Russian nation.26 
However, Caucasian mountain tribes, Turkestan nomads, and 
Siberian native peoples went free "because of their low level of 
national development". According to the law of 1874, the inhabitants 
of Finland, too, were exempt "on the strength of the special 
governmental organization of the region".2' 
25 	 Dnevnik D.A. Miliutina 1873-1881, vol. II, p. 14 (20. I 1876), p. 32 (22. III 1876). 
26 Novoi povorot v nashikh voennykh reformakh. (Miliutin's notes from 1870). 
Gosudarstvennaia Ordena Lenina Biblioteka Imeni V.I. Lenina/Microfilm NL 218, 
pp. 90, 100, National Archives of Finland. 
27 	 P.A. Zaionchkovski, Voennye reformy 1860-1870h godov v Rossii, pp. 50-54, 
305, 328-31, 340-52; P.A. Zaionchkovskii, Samoderzhavie i russkaia armiia na 
rubezhe XIX - XX stoletii, 1881-1903, pp. 126, 131-32. 
A national Finnish army 
The transfer from Sweden to the Russian Empire brought with it for 
the Finns an essential lightening of the military burden, as we have 
seen above. The War of 1808-09 could not be compared with previous 
wars in destructiveness, and the war of 1854-55 even less so. Finnish 
peasants had been spared Russian compulsory recruitment, and the 
Finnish military contribution of enlisted men, materiel and money had 
been of small importance.28 Finnish local histories usually pass over 
the years 1808-09 with the remark only that the local population in 
their everyday life did not notice the change in the sovereign power 
at all. Perhaps historians do not always realize how extraordinary this 
absence of upheaval in fact was. It certainly contributed to the 
economic development and national formation of the country during 




In time, people in Russia noticed the intolerable fact that Finns 
contributed very little to Imperial defence. For example, General 
Zalesov of the General Staff explained that Finns could not continue 
shirking their duties. Recruitment for military service and other 
military obligations, e.g. paying the costs for housing troops, had to 
be organized on an equal basis to that endured by the other subjects 
of the Emperor. Military service had to be more sensibly organized 
in order to put Finns in the position they owed to the Empire.29 
Even Finns started thinking that one Guards battalion and one naval 
equipage was an insignificant contribution from the border country to 
Imperial defence. The discussion started in Helsinki in the sixties; 
national service was regarded as a school for citizens, as a means of 
making a modern nation out of the population. For Finnish-born 
generals of the Imperial army it was only natural that the Finns should 
contribute more, because no self-respecting people could expect others 
to defend them.3o 
In fact, an Imperial rescript on general national service for Finland 
had been issued on 31 December 1870/12 January 1871.31 A 
28 	 As noted e.g. by Lundin, "Finland", p. 365. 
29 	 Zapiska General-Maiora Zalesova. (s.1., s.a., but included in the file pertaining to 
the reform of military system in Finland). Ven sot asiak 202, National Archives 
of Finland. 
30 	 C. 0-B., Kort öfversigt af Försvarskrafternas organisation i närvarande tid, pp. 
110-114. 
31 	 Imperial rescript 31. XII 1870/12. I 1871; Istoricheskaia spravka ob Ustave o 
committee chaired by General Indrenius was then appointed to prepare 
the national-service bill for the Diet. 
Miliutin would have preferred to carry out the reform in Finland 
without the participation of the Finnish Diet; although Finland had its 
special administration he believed it could not have all the attributes 
of an independent country. His thinking was that the unity of the 
Empire was expressed by its monarch, by its foreign policy and by 
its military establishment. No part of the Empire could have a separate 
foreign or military policy. Or, if the Grand Duchy were to be allowed 
to make its own law of military service for its citizens, its military 
forces must be placed under the command of the Russian Ministry of 
War and of the local military district, and had to be identical to other 
Imperial troops in language of command, equipment, and training. 
Finnish troops had to be freely disposable anywhere in the Empire 
and in foreign campaigns, and the Emperor had to have the authority 
to appoint Russian officers to the Finnish forces.32 
For Miliutin, Finland was part of the indivisible Russian Empire. 
It had no need for a military force of its own, because this could not 
be strong enough to defend the Grand Duchy alone; the defence of 
the border country would always remain the responsibility of the 
Imperial army.33 
Miliutin protested in vain. The Balkan rebellions and wars of 
1875-78 prevented him from concentrating on the Finnish question. 
After all, the Finnish question was not of any great importance for 
Miliutin; he mentioned it only a couple of times in his diary, while 
for example the transfer of the military medical academy from his 
ministry to that of popular education was a quarrel which covered 
tens of pages in the diary. 
The Minister of War, who favoured reforms, had lost part of his 
voinskoi povinnosti Finliandii 1878 goda. Akter, handlingar och protokoll från 
Komiten under K.P. Pobedonostseffs' ordförande; Om behandlingen af 
Vämepligts-frågorna, på urtima landtagen 1899, p. 1. V. Procopen kokoelma, 
National Archives of Finland. 
32 Notes by Miliutin 12. II 1871, referred to in: Doklad po glavnomy shtabu 29. 
VIII 1891 o perestroistve Ustava o voinskoi povinnosti v Finliandii i ob 
organizatsii s ikh upravleniiam. Akter, handlingar och... Procopen kokoelma, p. 
1-, National Archives of Finland. 
Borodkin, Istoriia Finliandii; Vremia Imperatora Aleksandra II, gives a similar 




Miliutin to Adlerberg 21. VIII 1876. VSV (Office of the Minister State Secretary) 
1/1878, pp. 56-88, National Archives of Finland. 
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influence at court as Alexander II turned more conservative or fearful 
of revolution. In any case, Governor-General Adlerberg adopted the 
Finnish constitutional point of view, because he, a conservative, 
believed that concessions to Finnish self-government — carried on by 
the aristocratic Swedish-speaking bureaucrats whom Adlerberg 
favoured — were the best means of maintaining and strengthening their 
loyalty towards the Empire. Also the Finnish Minister State Secretary 
C.E.K. Stjernvall-Walleen enjoyed the complete confidence of 
Alexander II; in their youth they had been comrades-in-arms in the 
Imperial Guards. 
Miliutin found comfort in the fact that Finns intended to revise 
their military law after ten years' time. Nevertheless, he was somewhat 
angered with the Finnish politicians, finliandskie deiateli, who had 
succeeded in carrying out their scheme, taking advantage of Russia's 
difficulties in the Balkan conflict.34 That is why the Minister of War 
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	 demonstratively kept a distance from Finnish affairs lest he should 
have to accept de facto what had happened.35 
Governor-General Adlerberg persuaded the Emperor to agree with 
the Finnish wish to comply with what was regarded in Finland as the 
constitutionally correct procedure.36 Laws, taxes and military burdens 
had always been appropriated by the Swedish Diet, not by royal order, 
and the Finns regarded the ancient Swedish constitution as binding 
and confirmed by the Emperors in 1809, 1825, and 1855. The proposal 
of the Finnish committee received imperial sanction on 7 December 
1876 and was thus made into a 'Most Gracious Proposal' from the 
Emperor to the Finnish Diet 37 
The military law was debated and adopted by the Diet of 1877-78 
and signed by the Emperor on 6 December 1878.38 According to the 
34 	 Dnevnik D. A. Miliutina 1873-1881, vol. II, 11876. 
35 	 Dnevnik D. A. Miliutina 1873-1881, vol. VI, 12. II 1881. 
36 	 Istoricheskaia spravka ob Ustave o voinskoi povinnosti Finliandii 1878 goda. 
Akter, handlingar och protokoll från Komitbn under K.P. Pobedonostseffs 
ordförande; Om behandlingen af Värnepligts-frågorna, på urtima landtagen 1899, 
p. 2. V. Procopen kokoelma, National Archives of Finland. 
37 	 Seitkari, Vuoden 1878 asevelvollisuuslain syntyvaiheet, pp. 157, 257-60, 395. (The 
Origins of the National Service Law) 
38 	 Asevelvollisuuslaki Suomen Suuriruhtinaanmaassa, Suomenmaan Waltiosäätyjen 
hyväksymä 1877-1878 vuosien valtiopäivillä ja Hänen Keisarillisen Majesteettinsä 
Armossa vahvistama 6/18 päivänä Joulukuuta 1878. Annettu Helsingissä, 27. p:nä 
Joulukuuta w. 1878. Suomen Suuriruhtinaanmaan AsetusKokous, No 26, 1878. 
(Official publication of laws and decrees for Finland). 
new law, the Governor-General was to be the Commander-in-Chief 
of the Finnish army. The Minister of War, aided by the official 
concerned with Finnish affairs at the Ministry, was to submit purely 
military questions to the Emperor, while economic and legislative 
affairs concerning the army were to be handled by the Finnish Senate 
and submitted to the Emperor for decision by the Minister State 
Secretary. The Governor-General was to have a staff for the Finnish 
army, and under his orders there was a Commander of Finnish troops 
with the rights of a divisional commander and with a small staff of 
his own.39 Major General, from 1886 Lieutenant General, Georg 
Edvard Ramsay, son of the grenadier General Anders Edvard Ramsay, 
mentioned earlier, commanded the Finnish army as long as it existed, 
from 1880 to 1901. 
Russians were not to be admitted to serve as officers in the Finnish 
army, nor were the national service troops to be ordered to operate 
outside the borders of the Grand Duchy, excepting the Guards 	 131 
Battalion, which was recruited from volunteers among the national 
service soldiers. In the Imperial proposal, the task of the army was 
said to be to defend the realm, but the Diet substituted the word 
'fatherland', because 'realm' (valtakunta, riket) might also mean the 
Empire and not the Grand Duchy only. 
The substitution of 'fatherland' for 'realm' was based on the 
argument that a national service army could only be made to fight in 
wars whose importance for the interests of their native country was 
comprehensible even to the common people. In the opinion of the 
members of the Diet, the peoples of Russia and Finland were bound 
by strong friendship, but the holy feeling of patriotism could only 
cover the home country. Finland might with sympathy observe the 
work of spreading civilization among savage peoples, but the union 
of the country with Russia could not oblige the Finnish army to 
participate in such distant campaigns.40 The Finnish parliamentarians 
were not interested in carrying the white man's burden. 
Thus, every Finnish man between twenty-one and forty years of 
39 	 Doklad po Glavnomu shtabu 22. V 1898; Istoriia sostavleniia i utverzhdeniia 
Finliandskago Ustava of voinskoi povinnosti. (signed by Kuropatkin). Akter, 
handlingar... Procopen kokoelma, p. 17. National Archives of Finland. 
40 	 Asevelvollisuus-valiokunnan mietintö N:o 1, joka koskee Keisarillisen Majesteetin 
armollista esitystä yleisen asevelvollisuuden toimeenpanemisesta. Esit. N:o 40. 
Asiakirjat Valtiopäiviltä Helsingissä vuosina 1877-1878, Kolmas osa, Helsinki 
1878, p. 5. (Protocols of the parliamentary committee for national service). 
age was obliged to defend the throne and the home country. In annual 
call-ups 40-60% of the youths were exempted because of bad health 
(which was an indication the poverty of the country, and made the 
public and authorities aware of the necessity of improvied sanitation, 
sick care and public health). Of the men found fit, about 1,800 or 
20% were chosen by drawing lots to serve for three years in the regular 
army, and eight years in the reserve thereafter. The rest of the 
age-group were trained in reserve companies for three summers for 
ninety days in all. 
It was also submitted to the Emperor that after ten years it might 
be necessary and useful to amend the law, if experience should bring 
out defects in the system 41 
The Finnish army consisted of eight national service battalions of 
five hundred men each in peacetime; wartime numbers would have 
amounted to one thousand rifles. Because the barracks of the ancient 
132 
	
	 enlisted regiments of 1812-30 were occupied by Russian troops, new 
barracks for the new rifle battalions had to be constructed between 
1881-85 at Vaasa, Oulu, Kuopio, Mikkeli, in Viipuri, Helsinki, Turku, 
and at Hämeenlinna. The ninth battalion was the Guards battalion, 
recruited from national service men who volunteered to serve in it; 
acceptance as a guardsman was generally regarded as a special 
honour. There were thirty-two reserve companies, scattered all around 
the country, where the reserve company cadres lived and the reservists 
trained. In wartime the reserve was to form eight battalions.42 
During the existence of the national Finnish troops from 1881-1901 
about thirty-nine thousand men served in the regular rifle battalions 
and ninety-three thousand men received the reserve training.43  
41 	 Asevelvollisuus-Valiokunnan mietintö 1878 N:o 1, p. 94. (Memorandum of the 
Diet committee on national service). 
42 	 Asevelvollisuuslaki 1878, luku II: Palvelus-ajasta vakinaisessa väessä ja reservissä, 
IV luku: Nostoväestä, V luku: Erinäisistä helpotuksista asevelvollisuuden 
suorittamisessa, XIX luku: Suomen sotaväestön kokoonpanosta ja ylläpidosta. (II: 
period of service, IV: militia, V: grounds for exemption from service, XIX: 
organization and costs); Keisarillisen Majesteetin Esitys Säädyille, koskeva 
rahavarain osoittamista kustannusten suorittamisesta yleisen asevelvollisuuden 
toimeenpanemiseksi maassa. Asiakirjat Valtiopäiviltä 1877-78, N:o 41, liite III, 
s. 9. (Imperial proposal to the Diet for financing national service). 
43 	 R. F., "Den finska militärens resery 1883-1903"; C. F. W., "Kortfattad öfversikt 
af den vämepliktiga finska militärens utbildning under åren 1881-1901"; J. 0. 
Hannula, "1800-luvun asevelvollinen armeija" (The National Service Army of the 
19th Century). 
A thorough and admirable work on the rifle battalions is: Screen, The Finnish 
The Diet had discussed national infantry service, but the word 
'infantry' was left out of the wording of the law in order not to prevent 
the Finnish army from having also artillery, cavalry, engineers and a 
coastal service.44 But constructing barracks for the eight new battalions 
and thirty-two reserve companies proved more expensive than 
expected. Consequently, only a cavalry regiment, the Finnish 
Dragoon Regiment of eight hundred sabres, was established in 1889 
and garrisoned at Lappeenranta. The even more expensive artillery 
was not even discussed 45 
The enlisted naval equipage was disbanded. A committee convened 
by the Senate, under the chairmanship of Lieutenant Commander Carl 
Tudeer, discussed having a national naval service of about four 
hundred men and a fleet of two gunboats, six torpedo boats and one 
auxiliary, but nothing came of the idea. The civilian pilot and 
lighthouse service employed a few officers of the dissolved equipage.46 
The nominal strength of the Finnish troops was 5,600 men, but, of 	 133 
course, the actual number varied greatly. 
FINNISH UNITS IN JUNE 1898 
Guards Battalion 505 








Dragoon Regiment 803 
total 529647 
The rules about accepting Finns only into the army and of the army 
operating inside the Finnish borders only were explained as having 
army, 1881-1901; training the rifle battalions. 
44 	 Asevelvollisuus-Valiokunnan mietintö 1878 N:o 1, p. 11. 
45 	 Delo o formirovanii kavaleriiskikh polkov finskikh voisk 1887. RGVIA, fond 29, 
opis' 15, delo 39. 
46 	 Mattila," Suomen laivastovoimien vaiheita ennen itsenäisyyden aikaa", pp. 42-43. 
(The Finnish Navy before Independence). 
47 	 Vedomost' lichnago sostava finskikh voisk 1897. RGVIA, fond 1343, opis' 2, 
delo 135. 
'the character of constitutional decrees'48 according to the old Swedish 
Constitution of 1772 and 1789, which, the Finns maintained, were 
also Finland's Constitution. Changing these paragraphs demanded the 
exceptional procedure of a unanimous decision of all four Estates of 
the Diet, instead of the minimum majority of three to one. When the 
Emperor signed the national military-service law, he also confirmed 
the constitutional character of these paragraphs, according to the 
interpretation of Finnish political opinion. 
It seems that by the end of the century the officers commanding 
the Finnish troops were living in relative isolation, socially and 
professionally, from their Russian colleagues,49 which reflected the 
growing national consciousness and increasing political autonomy of 
the country. In inspections, the Finns behaved satisfactorily, and they 
were good marksmen, but their skill was destined never to be tested 
in real war.5o 
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	 Contrary to the earlier system of having ethnically Finnish troops 
as an organic part of the Imperial army, the debate in the Diet revealed 
the new view of Finland as a separate state in union with Russia, 
whose 'political independence' and 'striving to maintain its position 
among other nations' national military service was intended to 
guarantee.5 
The hope was also expressed that the establishment of Finland's 
own military forces would result in the Russian military forces leaving 
the Grand Duchy, which would make possible a decrease in Finnish 
military expenditure for the housing of the Russian troops. It was 
admitted that at a few strategic points, for example at Sveaborg and 
in Viipuri, Russian troops might still be necessary, but the idea was 
that Finnish troops should be able to satisfy all garrisoning and guard 
duties in the country, and the necessity for the presence of Russian 
troops would correspondingly decrease.5' 
48 	 Keisarillisen Majesteetin Armollinen Ilmoituskirja siitä, että useat §§ Suomen 
Suuriruhtinaanmaalle wahvwistetussa asewelwollisuus-laissa owat perustuslain-
säännöksinä pidettäwät. Annettu Pietarissa 6/18 p:nä Joulukuuta 1878. Suomen 
Suuriruhtinaanmaan Asetus-Kokous, N.o 26, 1878 (Manifesto of the constitutional 
character of the paragraphs) 
49 	 Screen, The Finnish Army, p. 72. 
50 	 Screen, The Finnish Army, p. 159. 
51 	 Asevelvollisuus-Valiokunnan mietintö 1878 N:o 1, p. 2. 
52 	 Asevelvollisuus-Valiokunnan mietintö 1878, N:o 2, joka koskee Keisarillisen 
Majesteetin armollista esitystä rahavarain osoittamisesta kustannusten suoritta-
miseksi yleisen asevelvollisuuden toimeen-panemisesta maassa. Asiakirjat valtio- 
In the discussions about national service, much bigger numbers 
had been mentioned. For example, Major General Christian Theodor 
Oker-Blom53  had planned to form a full division of fifteen thousand 
men, with infantry, cavalry, artillery, and engineers. The Russian 
Ministry of War had also hoped for more soldiers, about twenty 
battalions.54 But, always concerned with reducing the financial burden 
on the taxpayer, the Diet had reduced the army to only eight rifle 
battalions and one Guards battalion and later one Dragoon regiment. 
The members of the Diet understood that their proposal was rather 
modest, but in their 'most loyal' response to the Imperial proposal 
they comforted the Emperor: it was not probable that an enemy would 
attack Finland with large forces, because the geographical position of 
Finland made possible an attack only from the sea, and the sparse 
population, the backwardness of the culture, the arid land and the hard 
climate caused insurmountable difficulties for the supply and 
maintenance of an enemy army. That was why, they argued, it was 
possible to believe that the proposed army of nine battalions was 
sufficient, not only for any requirements of Finnish national defence, 
but also for the successful prevention of any military operations that 
might be attempted through Finland against the Russian Empire or its 
capital.55 
The Diet thus recognized Finland's role in Russian defence and 
was willing, in principle, to undertake the task of guaranteeing the 
security of St Petersburg from an attack from the north-west. 
Finland was fast developing from a self-governing province into a 
separate national state, and its own army was one of the symbols of 
this development. The Finnish economy was growing, industry was 
being established to export wood products and paper, the population 
reached the number of two million in the 1870's, the towns were 
expanding, railways were being built, education was being organized 
for the lower classes, local government was set up to look after the 
ever growing pauper population, the popular press was emerging, and 
political life was being stimulated due to the regular sittings of the 
päiviltä 1877-1878, Es. N:o 41, s. 3-4, 12-13 (committee statement concerning 




Chief of Staff of the Russian troops in Finland in 1861, governor of the Viipuri 
province 1866-82, Senator for military affairs in 1882, member of the Committee 
for Finnish affairs in St Petersburg 1888-91, General in 1889. 
54 Seitkari, Vuoden 1878 asevelvollisuuslain syntyvaiheet, p. 149. 
55 Asevelvollisuus-Valiokunnan mietintö 1878, N:o 1, pp. 18-19. 
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Diet. Finnish-speaking people were awakening to demand their share 
of political power, which was opposed by the Swedish party — they, 
too, were Finns, although Swedish-speaking (the idea of 'an Eastern 
Swedish nation' never found much support either in Sweden or in 
Finland). Leo Mechelin, Professor of International Law in the 
University of Helsinki, and leader of the liberal opinion in the country, 
wrote a Précis du droit publique du Grand-duche de Finlande56 where 
he expressed the Finnish belief that there existed a separate Finnish 
state, in union with the Russian Empire, and that the monarch, who 
was the autocratic Emperor of Russia, was also the constitutional 
Grand Duke of Finland. The Swedish-Norwegian Union and the Dual 
Monarchy of Austria-Hungary were comparable political formations. 
The national Finnish army and the ideas expressed in the debates 
in the Diet were later taken by chauvinists in Russia as a proof of the 
existence of separatism in Finland and were used as a pretext for an 
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	 attempt to abolish Finnish autonomy. Then it was realized in Finland 
that the success in establishing the army may have been a Pyrrhic 
victory.57 But, of course, the chauvinists might have found or invented 
other pretexts, as they did in border regions where neither separate 
army nor even autonomy existed. 
Troop rotation 
In 1882 the staff of the 23rd Division in Finland complained that 
during the division's stay of many years in Finland it had been 
deprived of the possibility of taking part in summer camps and even 
in any military training, because it had to carry out unreasonably heavy 
guard duties, and because there were no proper camp sites and 
shooting ranges in the Grand Duchy. 
This seemed to be the reason for an Imperial order in October 1882 
to replace the 23rd Division in Finland by the 24th Division. The 23rd 
was transferred from Finland to the first army corps in the Baltic 
provinces, the 89th and 90th Regiments to Reval, the 91st to lamburg, 
and the 92nd to Narva. 
The exchange took much correspondence and probably even more 
work to carry out. The artillery brigades were changed too, but each 
56 	 Mechelin, Précis du droit publique du Grand-duche de Finlande. 
57 	 Seitkari, Vuoden 1878 asevelvollisuuslain syntyvaiheet, p. 405. 
brigade left its guns to the other, in order to be spared the heavy 
transport of the materiel.58 
Finland was thus garrisoned with new regiments. A few years later, 
as the 24th Division had settled down, its headquarters staff was 
quartered in Helsinki, the 93rd Irkutsk Infantry Regiment of four 
battalions was at Hamina, Lappeenranta and Kyminlinna, the 94th 
Enisei Regiment in Viipuri, the 95th Krasnoiarsk Regiment in 
Helsinki, and the 96th Omsk Regiment in Turku (1 battalion) and at 
Hämeenlinna (2 battalions). The 24th Artillery Brigade was garrisoned 
in Helsinki and Viipuri, with artillery stores at Hämeenlinna and in 
Viipuri.59 
With the eight Finnish rifle battalions, the Governor-General, 
commander of the military district of Finland, had twenty-four 
battalions of infantry, one regiment of artillery and one dragoon 
regiment plus the Cossacks at his disposal for the defence of the Grand 
Duchy. 
War plans for armed peace 
The Russian chain of border fortresses extended from the distant Asian 
and Caucasian forts to Kerch and Ochakov on the Black Sea coast, 
then to Kiev and the Polish fortresses on the Vistula. On the Baltic 
coast, there were fortresses at Dünamunde, Kronstadt and Sveaborg.6° 
This catalogue shows Finland's importance in the general scheme of 
Russian defence in the 1870-80s, on the right wing of the front, 
securing the approaches from the Baltic Sea to the Imperial capital, 
St Petersburg. 
In 1881 a twenty-year programme of naval construction was drawn 
up. In case of a war against Turkey, a land battle on the Caucasian 
front and a landing in the Bosphorus were planned, and the Black 
Sea fleet was strengthened in order to transport the troops for the 
landing and to protect the Bosphorus bridgehead. At times, a flotilla 
was maintained in the Mediterranean against the Turks. 
The Baltic fleet was to protect the Russian coasts by offensive 
58 RGVIA, fond 1338, opis' 1, delo 156, 0 vzaimnoi smene 23 i 24 pekhotnykh 
divizii s ikh artilleriiam. 
59 RGVIA, fond 1338, opis' 1, delo 902, 0 dislokatsii voisk okruga v sluchae 
mobilizatsii po rospisanii No 12, 13, 14. 
60 	 P.A. Zaionchkovskii, Voennye reformy 1860-1870 godov, p. 62. 
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action on the open sea. The intention was to construct a sufficient 
number of armoured ships to ensure Russian supremacy over the 
combined German and Swedish navies. Against Britain only cruiser 
war was deemed possible.61  
The danger of a landing from the Baltic Sea was not deemed 
serious, because the German navy was rather weak in the 1880s, and 
Russia seemed easily able to keep her lead on the sea. Sweden seemed 
even weaker than she had been in 1875-78.62 
At the beginning of the 1880's, the international situation seemed 
calm enough for a while, and the financial chaos caused by the war 
of 1877-78 made the Minister of Finance, Ivan Khristianovich Bunge, 
demand a reduction in military strength, and the naval programme, 
too, fell short of the hopes of the Admirals. Bunge and the Emperor 
understood that Russia, aspiring to a Great Power status, needed not 
only military and naval forces, but also sound finances. First, the 
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	 defeat in Turkmenistan in 1879 and then the conquest of Geok Tepe 
by Skobelev's troops in 1881, followed by the advance of the army 
via Mery towards Herat in 1884-85 rendered Bunge's attempts void. 
After this, the Bulgarian imbroglio in 1885-86 definitely upset his 
financial policies and he left office. The programme was carried out 
at a slower tempo.63 
No direct consequences of these financial problems were seen in 
Finland, but they may in part explain why the military reform to be 
discussed later on was only undertaken in 1898 and not earlier. The 
differences between the military and financial points of view within 
the Russian government continued till the outbreak of the World War 
in 1914.64 
61 	 Tri veka rossiiskogo flata, vol. I, pp. 256_60. 
62 	 Suni, "0 meste Finliandii v voenno-strategicheskikh planakh tsarizma v 80-e gg. 
XIX v.", p. 109. 
63 	 Capital ships were constructed in St Petersburg and in the Black Sea bases, while 
many smaller modem ships were ordered from Germany, Britain, and France. In 
Finland, Crichton in Turku and Sandvikens Skeppsdocka in Helsinki built a few 
torpedo craft and gunboats. Boats may have been named the Vyborg, Abo, 
Sveaborg, Ekenes, Borgo, Rochensalm, Kotka, Seskar, Sestroretsk, Gogland, Finn 
(sister ship of the Emir Bukharskii), without any relation to Finland or Finns, or 
to where they had been constructed. Conway's all the world's fighting ships 
1860-1905, pp. 200-15. 
64 	 Witte succeeded in balancing the finances, but the Far East adventure, which he 
opposed but was not able to prevent, led to his dismissal in 1903; the Japanese 
War again destroyed the finances of the Empire, which were only saved by 
massive French credits in 1906. The reorganization of the army under Vladimir 
Britain, at earlier times Russia's teacher in naval matters and an 
ally in many wars, but then an increasingly bitter rival and enemy, 
was once more seen to be a serious rival in 1885 because of the 
quarrel about the Afghanistan borders. The general staff of the Russian 
army had to consider the defence of the Baltic coasts, because the 
traditional 'naval enemy' seemed to be about to threaten St Petersburg 
again. In British naval bases a "Particular Service Squadron" was 
speedily prepared for a campaign on the Baltic Sea,65 while the 
mighty Russian navy as yet existed mainly on paper. 
General Obruchev, the chief of the General Staff, supposed that the 
enemy might come to Finland either in order to draw Russian forces 
away from other fronts, or, more seriously, in order to take Finland 
and to threaten St Petersburg from there. A comforting fact was that 
in 1854-55 the enemy had not been able to cause any serious harm. 
It was true that it was difficult to prevent a surprise landing on the 
Finnish coast, but the interior of the country was easy to defend. In 	 139 
the worst case, Russian forces would be occupied in Central Asia or 
on the mainland front against Germany and Austria, while a naval 
enemy attacked from the Baltic Sea. Then the situation in Finland 
would be difficult, especially if the Swedes should join the enemy, 
because they knew the inhabitants, whose sympathy would also be on 
the invader's side. But Swedish participation was not very probable, 
nor could Germany attack Finland without the support of the naval 
Powers. Now there existed a railway connection between Finland and 
St Petersburg, which made possible a speedy strengthening of troops 
in Finland. Comforting also was the fact that the summer season was 
short and the enemy would be compelled to retreat by the approach 
of winter weather.66 
Sveaborg was the most important factor in the defence of Finland, 
because it was a big fortress and naval base. In Obruchev's opinion, 
the fortress was to be strengthened so that it would be able to fend 
Aleksandrovich Sukhomlinov, to be discussed later, caused interminable quarrels 
with the Minister of Finances Vladimir Nikolaevich Kokovtsov, who was accused 
by the army of allowing insufficient funds for vital rearmament, but who 
contended that the army had been given more money than they knew how to 
spend; which was true to a certain degree, because Russian industry was unable 
to supply all that was ordered from them. 
65 	 Watts, Pictorial History of the Royal Navy, vol. II, p. 78-79. 
66 	 Zapiska ob oborone Finliandii, pp. 50-61. Delo o merakh na sluchai voiny 1885. 
Ven sot asiak 201, National Archives of Finland. 
off even the most serious attack of the enemy. Helsinki had also to 
be secured, because it was politically important as the capital of the 
Grand Duchy, and in enemy hands it would paralyse Sveaborg's 
defence. The strategic position of the town was precarious on its 
peninsula, which could easily be cut off from the mainland by landings 
on the flanks. Because Helsinki and Sveaborg could not possibly be 
permanently fortified on the northern side, field troops would be 
responsible for the landward defence. 
Viipuri at 280 versts and Turku at 210 versts from Helsinki were 
outside the defence area of Sveaborg. The fortifications of Viipuri 
were to be reinforced sufficiently to guarantee communications from 
the Grand Duchy to the Empire. Turku, the ancient capital and a 
commercially and industrial centre, would have been worth defending, 
but no force for its effective defence existed. Thus only small 
detachments could be left to guard Turku, as well as Ruotsinsalmi, 
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	 Svartholma, Porvoo, Loviisa, Hamina, and the coasts, to comfort the 
population and perhaps prevent the small cruiser raids of the enemy. 
Cossack cavalry could be used for this purpose. The coast of the Gulf 
of Bothnia could be guarded by local Finnish detachments. Russian 
troops should not be sent there, because, isolated and at the distance 
of eight hundred versts from nearest support, they could only too 
easily become encircled, and would be powerless to prevent the local 
inhabitants from joining the enemy. The experience of 1854-55 
showed that an eventual loss of an undefended town was of no 
permanent importance, while a weak defence only presented the 
enemy with an easy victory. 
Obruchev estimated that he would need 55,000 men or sixty 
battalions of local garrison troops for the defence of St Petersburg, 
ten of the battalions in Sveaborg-Helsinki, three in Viipuri, and three 
in Turku. In addition, an army of field troops of 80,000 men was 
necessary between Viipuri and St Petersburg, a similar army in the 
region of Helsinki and Sveaborg, a detached army corps of 20,000 in 
Estonia, and 40,000 men in Courland. In all, the forces amounted to 
220,000 men, "an immense number but vitally necessary" in 
Obruchev's words.°  
General Petr Semenovich Vannovskii, Miliutin's successor in the 
67 	 Doklad 15. II 1885, Obruchev. 0 merakh na sluchai voine 1885. Ven sot asiak 
201, National Archives of Finland. 
War Ministry in 1881-98, explained this plan to the Emperor. He 
calculated that for the defence of the Baltic coasts four hundred 
battalions were necessary, supported by three hundred sotnias and 
seven hundred guns, which forces could be mobilized in the military 
districts of St Petersburg, Finland and Vilna. The coasts were to be 
observed by small detachments and the mass of troops would be 
concentrated on defending the most important objectives from the 
attacks of the enemy fleet: Kronstadt, Sveaborg, Viipuri, and 
Dünamunde. Small towns and even Libau, Windau, Baltischport, 
Reval, Turku and Nikolaistad would be left undefended.68 Obruchev 
even thought about blowing up Riga and Reval in order not to let the 
enemy plunder them.69 
The 1885 crisis made the navy reconsider their construction 
programme. The planned armoured ships were far from completed 
and the construction of the heavy ships could not be speeded up. Thus 
the programme of 1881 was stopped for a while, and instead, 
construction of minelayers and torpedo craft for coastal defence was 
started. 
While the army had planned to leave Libau undefended, the navy 
regarded it as a useful base for fleet operations. Fortifying access to 
the Gulf of Riga and the Moon Sound was considered too expensive 
and it was decided to leave the defence of these narrow waters to 
coastal flotillas. Riga and Reval were not necessary for the navy, and 
the sailors also agreed with the soldiers on the importance of 
strengthening Kronstadt, Sveaborg and Viipuri." 
Kronstadt was the main rear base, vital for repairing and equipping 
ships, as well as for training the crews, and was accordingly 
strengthened. But it was too far from the battle front, which is why 
a forward base was needed for naval operations. Sveaborg was 
believed to be too small for the planned new big ship fleet. 
Fortifying Libau was again discussed in 1886. Now even the army 
found it a useful protection for their right flank, but a few generals, 
Aleksei Nikolaevich Kuropatkin among them, opposed the idea; they 
68 Vsepoddanneishchii doklad 22. 11885, Vannovskii. 0 merakh na sluchai voine 
1885. Ven sot asiak 201, pp. 105-19. National Archives of Finland. 
69 Doklad 15. II 1885, Obruchev. 0 merah na sluchai voine 1885. Ven sot asiak 
201, p. 33 National Archives of Finland. 
70 Petrov, Podgotovka Rossii k mirovoi voine na more, p. 30. 
71 	 Petrov, Podgotovka Rossii k mirovoi voine na more, p. 37. 
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thought that Libau was only fit for a base of an armoured open sea 
fleet, which was useless in the confined waters of the Baltic. They 
would have preferred fortifying the Moon Sound strongly enough to 
be a base for light coastal craft, but they were left in a minority. These 
discussions about a future naval base continued, in which a base on 
the Arctic Murmansk coast was also proposed, but the idea was set 
aside — for thirty years — and in 1890 Libau was chosen and 
fortification work was started there the next year. The strategic 
intention was to have the base close to the German coast in order to 
attack the German navy with overwhelming force. In 1894 it was 
renamed Port Imperator Aleksandr III.72 
These decisions were late for the crisis of 1885, of course. During 
the critical phase, the existing fleet was concentrated at Sveaborg to 
attack the flank of an eventual enemy fleet on its advance towards 
St. Petersburg. Another squadron waited at Kronstadt to defend the 
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	 line Oranienbaum-Siestarjoki. Two cruisers with a few torpedo and 
mining craft sailed to the Gulf of Riga, preparing to operate either in 
the Baltic Sea or in the Gulf of Finland. For active war on the oceans, 
a couple clippers were armed as privateers.73 
The 1881 programme of naval construction had not been carried 
out and the rapid development of technology soon made even the few 
completed warships obsolete. In 1890, only two armoured ships were 
in service and two were being constructed; during the next few years 
more heavy ships were constructed and in 1895 there were eight 
armoured ships in service. But then the Baltic fleet had to start sending 
its newest ships to the Pacific squadron because the expansionist 
policy of Russia was mainly directed towards the Far East after the 
advance down the Balkans and in Central Asia had ceased.74 
German naval construction started in earnest in 1897, and thus the 
threat from the Baltic Sea grew again. In response, the Russian 
government drew up an increased naval programme, according to 
which thirty-five battleships and hundreds of lighter ships were to be 
constructed over twenty years and enter service between the years 
1903-23. Because the necessary thousands of millions of roubles did 
not exist, a smaller programme of nine battleships to be ready between 
1904-14 was substituted. Nevertheless, the most modern ships were 
72 	 Tri veka rossiiskogo flora, vol. I, p. 307-08. 
73 	 Petrov, Podgotovka Rossii k mirovoi voine na more, pp. 24-36. 
74 	 Petrov, Podgotovka Rossii k mirovoi voine na more, pp. 24-36. 
still being transferred to the Far East, of which policy the Emperor's 
cousin, the German Kaiser, thoroughly approved. The Russian 
Admirals comforted themselves with the hope that Germany's colonial 
adventures would draw her naval forces away from the Baltic.75 
General Fedor Logginovich Heiden, Governor-General of Finland 
1881-97, considered Finland, as his predecessors had done, important 
as a glacis for the defence of St Petersburg. He believed that the naval 
Powers would only stage demonstrations on the coast in order to make 
Russia disperse her forces, but, in his opinion, the situation would 
grow dangerous if Sweden joined the enemy. The Russian troops had 
to be prepared to fend off landings on the southern coast and also an 
attack from the north through the interior towards the Karelian 
Isthmus.76 Heiden thought that fortifying the towns of Tampere, 
Hämeenlinna, Hyvinkää (Hyvinge) and Riihimäki might be useful for 
cutting the routes into the interior of the country.77 
Finnish staff officers of the Finland Military District believed that 	 143 
the naval Powers would only blockade and bombard the Finnish 
coasts, but if Germany joined the war, the Baltic Sea would become 
a theatre of war of first-rate importance, and then even Sweden would 
probably join the war.78 But Swedish bases were distant from Sveaborg 
and Helsinki, while Russian reinforcements from St Petersburg could 
be rapidly transported to fend off the invaders. And, after the short 
sailing season, the invaders would be cut off by the winter ice and 
the Russian forces would be left supreme. It was probable that even 
Swedish-speaking Finns would join the Russians after the enemy's 
violence was perceived.79 The officers obviously meant the coastal 
population, which had opposed the British raids in 1854 but whose 
loyalty the Russian staffs, unable to discern between language and 
nationality, were apt to suspect. 
After much discussion, much work was done, and hundreds of 
pages of accounts heaped up in the offices.80 However, it seems that 
75 	 Petrov, Podgotovka Rossii k mirovoi voine na more, pp. 45-49,51-53,58,62-63. 
76 	 Finnish military district to the War Ministry 2. XII 1886. 0 merakh po oborone 
Finliandii 1886 g. Ven sot asiak 202, p. 85. National Archives of Finland. 
77 	 Suni, "O meste Finliandii v voenno-strategicheskikh planakh tsarizma v 80-e gg. 
XIX v.", p. 107. 
78 	 Oker-Blom, o zashchite Finliandii na sluchai obshcheevropeiskoi voiny. 0 merakh 
po oborone Finliandii 1885 g. Ven sot asiak 202, pp. 280-312. 
79 	 Zapiska podpolkovnika Blafielda. 0 merakh po oborone Finliandii 1886 g. Ven 
sot asiak 202, pp. 280-312, National Archives of Finland. 
even now neither Sveaborg nor Viipuri were adequately armed. In 
1887 it was stated that Viipuri was not at all fit for defence, the 
landward front of Sveaborg was still defenceless, and the flanks of 
Helsinki remained outside the fortification system.81 The town was 
growing, the possibility of a landward attack was increasing, and with 
the advance of technology the range of the guns had extended from 
a few hundred yards to miles, and thus the outer line of defence was 
becoming more distant at a faster rate than the defence works 
themselves could be expanded. 
In addition to the major military preparations, telephone and 
telegraph communications were constructed, and the navy planned to 
position sailors in the archipelago to communicate an early warning 
of the eventual approach of the enemy. Lighthouses and beacons were 
camouflaged, and the evacuation of the coastal villages was planned, 
in order to prevent the enemy from recruiting pilots from them. The 
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	 Finnish Senate asked the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to warn 
shipowners of the danger of privateers.82 
The plans of the years 1885-87 were not applied because, happily, 
no great war did break out. The plans, nevertheless, are of interest as 
they show the way of thinking of the military staffs concerned with 
defence, a varied picture in detail but constant in its main features. 
Finland was worth defending not because of its own importance, but 
because of its position as a shield for St Petersburg against the naval 
Powers. 
Chauvinists in Russia were already writing of the danger of a 
non-Russian, separatist Finland, but it does not seem to have caused 
any worry for the military planners in 1885. Alexander III visited 
Finland in 1881 and 1885 to review his Finnish and Russian troops 
there. The Emperor was very much satisfied with the parades, thanked 
each of the Finnish battalion commanders and proposed a toast to his 
Finnish army. The magnificent reception of the Emperor by the Finns 
did not leave any doubt of their loyalty, in the words of Baron Budberg 
80 	 Part of the accounts in: Ven sot asiak 202, National Archives of Finland. 
81 Izvlechenie iz zakliucheniia komissii 1887 goda o podgotovka Baltiiskago 
poberezhia dlia deistvii Hota. Ven sot asiak 7070, National Archives of Finland. 
82 	 Governor-General to the Minister of War 2. XII 1886. 0 merakh po oborone 
Finliandii 1886 g. Ven sot asiak 202, National Archives of Finland; 
Governor-General to Minister State Secretary 10/22. IV 1885. 0 rasporiazhenii 
po Finliandii na sluchai voiny s Anglieiu. KKK 16/1885, National Archives of 
Finland. 
"The arrival of the Emperor at Lappeenranta (1885?)'. Alexander Ill inspected the military 
camp at Lappeenranta in 1885 and 1891; he and his Empress, Maria Feodorovna, were 
impressed by the loyal enthusiasm of the local population. After 1870, the railway speeded up 
the transfer of troops from the Empire to the Grand Duchy when a military threat arose from 
the Baltic Sea. 
Photo: Museovirasto Neg 147507. 
who accompanied the Emperor in the review.83 In the general staff's 
plans for a continental war, it was stated that the fact that the 
population in Armenia, Caucasia and Poland was disloyal had to be 
83 	 Juva, Suomen kansan aikakirjat, vol. VIII, pp. 478-79 (A History of the Finnish 
people); Budberg to Sol'skii 2. IV 1906. 0 poriadka rasmotrenii i gudaniia izdaniia 
uzakonenii obshchikh dlia Imperii i Finliandii. KKK, IV jaosto, 36/1906, National 
Archives of Finland. 
°The Finnish Guards on manoeuvres at Lappeenranta in the presence of Alexander Ill in 
1891. Lieutenant G.Brunow, Lieutenant N. Mexmontan, Major-General G. Gyllenberg.' The 
camps acquired for military manoeuvres were large level areas and the tactics resembled the 
line formations of past centuries, although the Russian-style uniforms adopted in Alexander 
Ill's reign were a bit more practical than the previous reigns' Prussian models. 
Photo: Museovirasto Neg 98884. 
taken into account in military planning.84 No such lack of trust in the 
population was mentioned in the Baltic provinces nor in Finland at 
this time. 
In 1886 staff officers from St Petersburg visited Finland and 
deplored the fact of the divided command of the Baltic coast caused 
by the existence of the two military districts of Finland and St 
Petersburg, but as yet no steps were taken to unite the two districts. 
The visit had political and propaganda consequences, however, as will 
be discussed later. 
84 A.M. Zaionchkovskii, Plany voiny; pp. 28, 107. 
The danger from Germany 
In the War Ministry as reorganized by Miliutin, the general staff was 
a sub-department of the 'Main administration of the central staff'. 
General Heiden was its chief until he was appointed Finnish 
Governor-General in 1881, and, after him, General Obruchev was the 
main architect of the war plans. 
After the Afghanistan crisis in 1885, there followed fresh 
complications in the Balkans. Bulgaria, liberated by the Russians in 
1877, soon began to chafe under Russian tutelage, and without asking 
permission from St Petersburg in 1885 annexed Eastern Rumelia. A 
jealous Serbia then declared war and was soundly beaten so that 
Austria had to intervene in order to save Serbia. Alexander III 
suspected Austro-German influence behind these conflicts. Now it 
seemed that it was not only England but also the two German Empires 
that were threatening Russia's vital interests. 
In the war plans drawn up during the Afghanistan crisis in 1885, 
no thought was given to the problem of the main continental front 
should a land war have broken out simultaneously with the expected 
naval war. In the contemporary regular plans for mobilization and 
concentration against Germany and Austria only 185 battalions, 107 
squadrons or sotnias, and 376 cannons would have been left to defend 
St Petersburg,85 less than half the number considered necessary above. 
In the plan of 1887, the main army was positioned in Poland, 
supported by a southern army on the Ukrainian-Austrian border, and 
one army corps on the Black Sea coast. The right flank was to be 
covered by a northern army, commanded by Grand Duke Vladimir at 
Vilna, with Nikolai Ivanovich Bobrikov as his chief of staff. A 
German landing was expected on Courland, and hence Vladimir's 
army was comparatively strong, with four corps on the East Prussian 
border and one corps at Riga. 
The approach to St Petersburg through the Gulf of Finland was to 
be defended by the detached Ist Army Corps, with its 23rd Division 
in Estonia and 37th in St Petersburg, and the 24th Division in Finland 
with the Finnish rifle battalions. 
The following year, in 1888, two further army corps were added 
to the Russian army. Consequently, the field armies were strengthened, 
85 	 A.M. Zaionchkovskii, Planv vorm•, p. 43. 
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and the plan provided for two alternatives, each with the centre of 
gravity in Poland, one turned towards the south-west and the other to 
the north-west, according to whether the war was to be waged against 
Austria, or Germany, or both. Reserve troops were positioned behind 
the principal front either in the Ukraine or White Russia. The First 
Army Corps was still positioned to guard the Imperial capital against 
a naval attack from the Baltic Sea. 
The Balkan crisis of 1885-87 passed, but the Alliance of the three 
Emperors was not renewed in 1887, and the secret Reinsurance Treaty 
lasted only three years to 1890. The Anglo-German exchange of 
Heligoland for Zanzibar seemed to bring together Russia's old rival 
and recently lost friend into the same alliance. 
Instead, France and Russia, both of which felt humiliated and 
threatened by Germany, made a diplomatic agreement and a treaty of 
mutual defence between the years 1891-94. Alone, France or Russia 
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	 were weaker than the Austro-German-Italian Triple Alliance, but 
together the Dual Alliance could withstand the rival force. 
New military railways were constructed by French capital from the 
interior of Russia towards the German border, the numbers of Russian 
recruits and reservists grew, and the mobilization plan was improved, 
speeding up the mobilization and concentration as much as possible, 
in order to be able to start a war in conjunction with the French. 
In the 1890's, the strategy and the plans of the Russian general 
staff remained unchanged in their general features. A Niemen army 
was to be positioned on the right flank, a strong Vistula army was 
either to defend Poland against the Germans or to attack the Austrians, 
a Bug army operated on the left flank in Poland, and a South-Western 
army was to attack from the Ukraine through Galitsia to Budapest 
and Vienna. One army corps guarded the Rumanian border because 
the kingdom had joined the Triple Alliance, and another army corps 
was always waiting at Odessa and Sevastopol for the chance of a 
landing at the Bosphorus. The French did not like the Russians 
dividing their forces facing their main enemy, Germany, but for the 
Russians Austria was the main enemy and the Balkans and the Turkish 
Straits the main goal. 
Finland as a secondary theatre of war 
The military district of Finland was still deemed a theatre of war of 
secondary importance. In 1891-92, the 24th Division was transferred 
back to its garrison in the military district of St Petersburg, to the 
region of Pskov, in order to be ready to mobilize against the Germans 
on the main continental front in case of war.S6 According to the 
Karelian historian Leo Suni, the progress of naval construction and 
the Libau fortress as well as Sweden's weakness made possible the 
transfer of troops from the Baltic coast to the main front.87 The transfer 
reflected the growing German menace on the land front. 
Instead of the 24th Division, four reserve or cadre battalions were 
stationed in Finland, the Izborskii, the Orovaiskii, the Volkhovskii and 
the Borovitskii battalions, with additional reserve companies from the 
military district of Kazan. The Russian nationalist press protested 
against leaving the defence of the north-western front of St Petersburg 
to the Finnish battalions, supported only by second-rate reserve 
battalions. The absence of first-class troops was deemed fatal for 
Russian prestige in the border country and apt to slow down the 
Russification of the population.88 
But, in fact, the intention of the War Ministry was to establish a 	 149 
new first-class rifle brigade in the Grand Duchy, with half wartime 
numbers in peacetime service. A war theatre of secondary importance 
does not mean that it was without any importance. The rifle troops 
were originally meant as sharpshooters, but by the end of the century 
there was no longer any tactical difference between them and the 
infantry. The rifle troops were only the first to be armed with the 
most modern weapons, and the rifle brigades consisted of four 
two-battalion regiments, instead of the two four-battalion regiments 
in the infantry; thus there was an equal number of battalions in both 
kinds of brigade. 
The Izborskii cadre battalion was transformed into the First Finland 
Rifle Regiment of two battalions, with the regimental staff in Helsinki; 
the Orovaiskii battalion into the Second Regiment at Hämeenlinna; 
the Volkhovskii into the Third Regiment at Hamina; and the Borovitskii 
into the Fourth Regiment in Viipuri. The peace-time strength of each 
regiment was about 1,100 bayonets. The 24th Artillery Brigade, 
transferred to Pskov, had left two batteries, the 7th and 8th, in Finland, 
86 RGVIA, fond 1338, opis' 1, delo 217, 0 vyvode iz predelov okruga 24-i 
pekhotnoi divizii 1891; RGVIA, fond 1338, opis 1, delo 223, Perepiska s glavnym 
shtabom o vyvode iz predelov okruga 24-i pekhotnoi divizii 1892. 
87 	 Suni, "0 meste Finliandii v voenno-strategicheskikh planakh tsarizma v 80-e gg. 
XIX v.", p. 104-07. 
88 	 Moskovskiia Vedomosti 27. IX 1891. 
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The Rifle Troops in the 1890s 
The Russian Rifle troops were garrisoned in the southern part of the Grand Duchy to fend off 
an enemy landing or to deny it access to the Imperial Capital, while the Finnish battalions 
were positioned in administrative centres of the counties (gubemiia, lääni, Iän in Russian, 
Finnish and Swedish). 
and these two batteries were doubled to form the Finland Artillery 
Regiment of four batteries, with its staff and one battery in Helsinki, 
two batteries at Tuusula, and one at Hämeenlinna. At times, the 
regiments in Hamina and Hämeenlinna sent half of their battalions to 
garrison Sveaborg.89 
With the eight Finnish rifle battalions and the eight Russian Finland 
rifle battalions, the Governor-General had at his disposal sixteen 
89 	 RGVIA, fond 1338, opis 1, delo 223, 0 vyvode iz predelov okruga 24-i pekhotnoi 
divizii 1892, glavnyi shtab 5. I 1892, 5. II 1892. , RGVIA, fond 1343, opis' 2, 
delo 135, Vedomost lichnago sostava finskikh voisk 1897. 
battalions, about 4,500 Russians and 4,000 Finns. In addition, there 
was one regiment of Finnish dragoons, 800 sabres, one brigade of 
Russian Finland artillery, and the permanent fortress infantry, 885 at 
Sveaborg and 576 in Viipuri, fortress artillery, 1,770 at Sveaborg and 
'more than' 1,500 in Viipuri, as well as mine companies, 208 men at 
Sveaborg and 99 in Viipuri. The Finnish desire to get rid of Russian 
troops in the country in consequence of the establishement of Finnish 
national troops was thus not fulfilled. 
The full wartime strength of the field troops was 23,125 bayonets, 
1,133 sabres, and thirty-two field cannons; and the total wartime 
numbers, with the fortress and non-combatant troops included, were 
1,293 generals and officers, and 49,126 other ranks. 
These numbers were far from sufficient, in the opinion of the staff 
of the military district of Finland. Every year they demanded more 
troops. In their opinion, the rifle brigade ought to have been doubled, 
and in addition an infantry division and a cavalry division (of three 	 151 
Cossack regiments together with the Finnish dragoons) was necessary. 
Artillery should also have been increased in proportion. 
Here, even as on the main front, the slowness of mobilization 
caused much headache to the planners. An enemy landing could be 
expected by the end of the first week of war, but the reservists of the 
Russian Finland troops lived in distant Russia, (in St Petersburg and 
in Dorpat, but also in Pereiaslavl', Suzdal', Riazan', etc.), where their 
mobilization would take about ten or eleven days, after which they 
had to be transported to Finland, and would be ready to fight only 
after two or three weeks. Finnish troops could be mobilized in a week 
ready to march to their battle stations. The Lappeenranta Dragoon 
regiment would be ready on time, i.e. in three days.90 Supply troops 
with their thousands of horses, and fortress detachments, with heavy 
materiel to be replenished, would take two to four weeks to reach full 
war-time strength.91  
90 
	 0 mobilizatsii finskikh voisk. KKK 32/1889, National Archives of Finland. 
91 	 Sostav i chislennost' voisk 1896, Ven sot asiak 7928 I; Sostav i chislennost' voisk 
1897, Ven sot asiak 7982II; Sroki gotovnosti voisk dlia oborony 1896, Ven sot 
asiak 7929 I; Sroki gotovnosti voisk k oborone 1897, Ven sot asiak 7929 II; Sroki 
gotovnosti voisk dlia oborony 1898, Ven so asiak 7929 III; 0 sredotochenii voisk 
v otriady, po okonchanii mobilizatsii 1896, Ven sot. asiak 7934; Sostav i 
chislennost' voisk Okruga po shtatami voennago vremeni. Ven sot asiak 7942; 
Gotovnost' voisk Finliandskago voennago Okruga v vystuplenii v pokhod 1899, 
Ven sot asiak 7943 I; Gotovnost' voisk Finliandskago voennago Okruga v 
The fortresses were always in a deplorable state. Their garrisons 
were slow to mobilize and prepare for battle, and they were not safe 
against a sudden attack, although seaboard fortresses ought to have 
been in war-time state of preparedness all the time, because a naval 
attack could take place quite suddenly. 
In spite of the repeated instructions to make improvements, 
Sveaborg remained in a wretched condition, its garrison was 
insufficient and the fortress was unable to fend off an enemy armed 
with modern naval artillery. The stone walls were obsolete and the 
parapets dilapidated, only half the nominal number of heavy guns had 
been received, and a few of them were in store without carriages, and 
there were no quick-firing guns at all. Sveaborg was able to defend 
the naval anchorage only against an improbable frontal attack from 
the open sea, while an attack against the always defenceless flanks at 
Lauttasaari and Laajasalo or the northward land front could easily 
152 	 paralyse the fortress and render the defence purposeless.92 
Viipuri was not prepared for battle either landwards or seawards; 
it did not deserve to be called a fortress. Several guns were only of 
historical value, obsolete works had no tactical unity or capacity for 
cross-fire, and neither ammunition stores nor barracks were protected 
against enemy fire.93 
The staff of the military district of Finland stated that two divisions 
or one army corps was necessary to fend off the enemy from the 
country, but with only half the force available, the staff had to try to 
guess the most probable direction of the attack and to position the 
tiny forces accordingly. Happily, the military district of St Petersburg 
was responsible for the coast from Viipuri to the Imperial capital; if 
the enemy had attempted a landing in the Viipuri district, he would 
have been counter-attacked from St Petersburg and from Helsinki. 
Thus Viipuri was in fact better protected than was apparent from its 
dilapidated condition. 
The main body of field troops was to be stationed between Helsinki 
and Hyvinkää. A western vanguard would be positioned at the station 
vystuplenie v pokhod 1900, Ven sot asiak 7943 II; Kratkoe kvartimoe rospisanie 
voisk Finliandskago voennago okruga 1.9. 1899. Ven sot asiak 7947, National 
Archives of Finland. 
92 	 Shtab kreposti Sveaborga 17. II/1. III 1897. Ven sot asiak 5959; 0 gotovnosti 
kreposti Sveaborga 1899. Ven sot asiak 7944, National Archives of Finland. 
93 	 V shtabe Vyborgskoi kreposti 5/17. III 1897. Ven sot asiak 5959; o gotovnosti k 
oborone kreposti Vyborga. Ven sot asiak 7944, National Archives of Finland. 
of Nummela, and Kouvola would be occupied by an eastern rearguard. 
A system of coastal guards was planned, and ships and trains were 
scheduled for the rapid transfer of troops. 
By the end of the 1890s, summer manoeuvres were no longer 
merely camp parades. The defence plan was tried out in practice, for 
instance in 1899 a landing of an 'enemy', consisting of two Russian 
and three Finnish battalions under Major General Procope, was 
supposed to have taken place at Hamina, against which another 
detachment tried to defend the railway station and bridges at Kouvola. 
The umpire group was commanded by Lieutenant General von 
Brincken, the successor of Bobrikov in the military district staff in St 
Petersburg. Staff manoeuvres were also held to test the plans, for 
example, in the summer of 1900, led by Major General Olkhovskii 
and Lieutenant General Glazov from the staff of the military district 
of Finland. 
Lieutenant General Schauman (who had been officer responsible 
for Finnish military affairs in the Ministry of War and then Governor 
of Viipuri) was, in 1898, appointed Senator for Military Affairs, i.e. 
the Finnish Minister for War. He accepted the view that only the 
southern coastal belt in Finland could be thought of as a theatre of 
war, and that the coast of the Gulf of Bothnia was not worth defending. 
Sweden might attack the north-western coast, but in Schauman's 
opinion, Sweden would have nothing to gain from a war against 
Russia, and in any case Swedish forces were too small to have any 
importance. 
Schauman also shared the view that a great power would not attack 
Finland in order to conquer some part of the country, but to attack 
St Petersburg. The defence of the Karelian Isthmus was the 
responsibility of the St Petersburg military district, and the troops in 
Finland should be responsible for Helsinki and Sveaborg only. No 
troops should be dispersed for the defence of minor localities.94 
Significantly, neither General Schauman nor the staff officers of 
the military district cited above, who were Finns, differed from the 
opinion of Russian planners in their strategic views about the defence 
of Finland. 
Ten years earlier Vannovskii and Obruchev had planned the 
94 Soobrazheniia otnositel'no oborony Finliandii. Sost. Gen. Maior Schauman. 0 
sredotochenii... Ven sot asiak 7934, National Archives of Finland. 
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defence of the Imperial capital with considerable forces in the Baltic 
provinces and in Finland. But then the expected 'naval enemy' had 
been England, whose forces and attention were now engaged 
elsewhere, first in Fashoda in 1898 and then in the Boer War. For 
the Russian general staff, the principal enemies were now Austria 
and Germany, and the battle against them would be decided on the 
continental front. The Emperor's and his Admirals' interest was 
turning towards an advance in the Far East, to the open ocean through 
Vladivostok and Port Arthur. Thus the military district of Finland was 
left to carry on with its own resources alone, and its demands for 
reinforcements were left unheeded. The complacent assessment of the 
situation was soon to change, however. 
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The Russo-Finnish Conflict 
THE REFORM OF FINNISH 
MILITARY SERVICE 
Irritation and provocation 
For ninety years, Finland's position in the Russian Empire had not 
caused any problems. Then, with the emergence of national ideas in 
Russia and in Finland, Finns started emphasizing their distinctiveness 
from Russia, while Russians began to resent the increasingly bolder 
Finnish "separatism". The Finnish idea of being loyal subjects of their 
own constitutional Grand Duke but not of the absolutist Russian 
Emperor was incomprehensible to the Russian chauvinists. It seemed 
an alien idea, and corruptive of the unity of the Empire: "Oh voyez-
vous, la Finlande, c'etait un etat dans un etat, — cela ne va pas!"' 
As early as 1863, Katkov complained that Finland had not 
contributed anything to imperial defence. Everybody knew that it was 
very cheap to live in Finland, which was supposed to be due to the 
good laws and well-ordered administration of the country. But the real 
reason was, in Katkov's opinion, that for fifty years taxation had not 
been increased in Finland, because no money had been spent on 
defence. The border country flourished at the expense of the Empire.2 
Poland was the principal problem in 1863, and Katkov only 
mentioned Finland a few times as another example of the harmful 
consequences of too lenient a policy towards the national minorities. 
It was only in the 1880's that the Finnish question started to be 
discussed more thoroughly. The nationalist press deemed that the 
defence of St Petersburg could only be guaranteed if Finland were 
1 	 A phrase by a Russian, heard in a train in France 24 March 1899. Kallas, 
Päiväkirja vuosilta 1897-1906, p. 160. 
2 	 Moskovskiia Vedomosti 4. VI 1863, 26. IX 1863. 
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totally dominated by the Imperial government. If the local population 
was disloyal, the Russian troops in the border country, isolated and 
far from home, would be in danger, surrounded by thousands of rebels. 
The Germans were known to expect that the Poles, the Armenians, 
and the Finns would join them in a future war against Russia. That 
was why Russia should not tolerate the autonomy of the border 
country. The Empire must be united and unanimous; Imperial 
patriotism must be substituted for the provincial myopia of the Poles, 
the Balts, and the Finns. Of course, any Finnish rebellion would be 
quelled, but it was better for all concernd to start the necessary 
unifying measures at once. If the Russians really wanted their Empire 
to be strong, great and mighty, they had to crush the separatist and 
treasonable schemes and utter the mighty words: Russia for the Russians!' 
At first government and high society in St Petersburg did not adopt 
these populist slogans, which were contrary to the Imperial idea of 
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	 many peoples united as a family under the common monarch. But, 
over time, nationalism gained an influence in government offices, 
parallel to the attempt to develop the Empire into a bureaucratically 
unified, rationally administered modem state. National singularities 
and Estate privileges were deemed as destructive of Imperial unity as 
were the novel ideas of parliamentary or democratic limitations on 
the Emperor's absolute power. The existence of a Finnish separate 
national service army seemed to be the culmination of a devious policy 
aiming at the complete autonomy of the border country. The disloyal 
subjects had achieved a separation from Russia and transformed a 
unity based on the right of conquest into a merely dynastic tie. 
A few Finnish bureaucrats who knew Russia, for example Minister 
State Secretary Woldemar von Daehn,4 were worried at the direction 
in which opinion was developing. But disregarding warnings, many 
Finnish constitutionalist nationalists impatiently wanted to underline 
their separate nationhood: "In the end, we must speak out that we 
want to keep as distant from the Russians as possible".5 
3 	 Finliandskaia okraina v Rossii, pp. 194, 224, 406-07, 553, 580. The discussion 
has been thoroughly studied by Sinkko, Venäläis-suomalainen lehdistöpolemiikki 
1890-1894. (Russo-Finnis press polemics). 
4 	 von Daehn was Minister State Secretary 1891-98, after Alexander Armfelt 
1841-76, Stjernvall-Walleen 1876-81, Th. Bruun 1881-88, Casimir Ehrnrooth 
1888-91. 
5 	 Recorded by their opponent Meurman, Muistelmia (Memoirs of M.), vol. I, p. 
218. 
In international law the Grand Duchy was still regarded as an 
integral part of the Russian Empire. During the threatening conflict 
of 1885, the British ambassador in St Petersburg explained that in a 
war between Britain and Russia, Finland could not be spared because 
she contributed men, materiel and money to the Russian war effort.6 
The French, after making the treaty of alliance with Russia, hoped 
that she was becoming more solid, and her problems in Poland, in 
the Baltic provinces and in Finland were to be solved by a firm policy. 
The German scientist Rudolph Wirchow, who had studied Finnish 
craniology, stated to his Finnish students "you are all Russians".8 
General Heiden, Governor-General of Finland from 1881-98, 
wanted to bring the Grand Duchy closer to the Empire. Alexander III 
approved the policy in principle, but did not want to provoke a 
constitutional conflict in the border country. Thus, only the Finnish 
post office was subordinated to the Russian Ministry of 
Communications, but the Finnish customs offices and monetary 
system, which had also been targeted, remained autonomous. 
Military separatism discussed 
The inspection of Finnish coastal defences by staff officers in 1886, 
mentioned above, was led by General Bobrikov, chief of staff of the 
St Petersburg military district. In his report he explained that, for 
example, Viipuri was unable to protect St Petersburg from the north 
or to support the naval defence of Kronstadt, because no concentrated 
plan existed for the defence of the Baltic coasts. He argued further 
that unified command was the principle of all military science. The 
defence of the Imperial capital was possible only if all military and 
naval forces in the region, both in Finland and in the Baltic Provinces, 
were commanded by the St Petersburg military district. 
But, Bobrikov went on, the Finns, instead of striving for this unity, 
had transformed their provincial self-government into a political 
autonomy. Imperial consent to local legislation in Finland had resulted 
in a completely isolated military organization. Even the Finnish 
lighthouse and pilot organization served only Finnish interests, not the 
6 	 Maude, 'Venäjän integraalinen osa'; Suomi brittiläisestä näkökulmasta 1856-
1899, (Finland from the British point of view), p. 105. 
7 	 "Russie", La Grande Encyclopedie, vol. 28, p. 1171. 
8 	 Sorry, I have lost the source. 
157 
Imperial navy. 
In addition to the demand for centralizing the command structure, 
Bobrikov proposed that half the cost of the defence of the Baltic coasts 
ought to be paid by the Finns, because their security was guaranteed 
in conjunction with that of the Imperial capital. And twenty rifle 
battalions and four naval battalions should be demanded of the Grand 
Duchy instead of the nine existing battalions, and they must be 
assimilated into the Russian troops.' 
Bobrikov clearly had sound military reasons for his complaints, 
though his accusations against the Finnish scheming for political 
autonomy were nearly identical with those of the chauvinist 
journalists. In time, it came to be seen that Bobrikov was not alone 
in his thinking, although he had to wait for a few years before being 
allowed to start his work for reform.10  
General Obruchev, the chief architect of the war plans had, as late 
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	 as 1890, been of the opinion that no dramatic changes were necessary 
in the military organization in Finland. Miliutin had comforted himself 
with the knowledge that the Finnish law on national service was to 
be amended in ten years' time," but, in the words of a Finnish 
historian, it was a foolish mistake to suppose that it would be amended 
to please the Russian military authorities.12  
Meanwhile, Russo-Finnish polemics continued. Many Finns 
suspected that articles concerning the separate Finnish army in the 
chauvinist Russian press were inspired by the War Ministry.13 
The following year, in 1891, the ten-year period was up. In a 
memorandum, the War Ministry repeated that a separate army was 
contrary to the principle of the unity of all Imperial military forces, 
9 	 Otchet o polevoi poezdke ofitserov general'nogo shtaba S. Peterburgskago i 
Finliandskago voennykh okrugov v 1886 godu. Ven sot asiak 202, pp. 23-28, 
National Archives of Finland. 
10 	 For an exhaustive study on Bobrikov, see: Polvinen, Valtakunta ja rajamaa, 
published also in English: Polvinen, Imperial Borderland; Bobrikov and Attempted 
Russification of Finland, 1898-1904. 
1 1 	 Materialy po voennym deistviiam. Proekt. Manuscript page n:r 21, edinenie 6, 
fond 169, Gosudarstvennaja Ordena Lenina Biblioteka SSSR imeni V.I. 
Lenina/Microfilm NL 218, National Archives of Finland. 
12 	 Palmen, "Asevelvollisuudesta", p. 178 (National Service). 
13 	 For example: "Finliandskaia armiia i eia osobennosti", Moskovskiia Vedomosti 13. 
Il 1890; "Istoricheskaia spravka ob izdanii Ustava o voinskoi povinnosti v 
Velikom Kniazhestve Finliandii", Moskovskiia Vedomosti 10. III 1890; "Finskaia 
kavaleriia", Moskovskiia Vedomosti 11. IX 1890; "Vopros ob ob"edineii finskoi 
armii s russkoiu". Moskovskiia Vedomosti 6. X 1890. 
and that dubious paragraphs in the Finnish military law had been given 
a special constitutional status. The experience of ten years proved that 
Miliutin had been right in his opposition to the local military system. 
In the opinion of the Ministry, the Finnish army had to be 
transformed into Russian troops, elated by a Russian spirit. Finnish 
soldiers had to take their military oath to the Emperor, not to any 
local 'constitution'. Improper paragraphs had to be removed from the 
military law, the period of service had to be equally long for Finns 
and Russians, and the system of reserve training abolished because it 
threatened to turn the Finns into a nation in arms. Finnish troops had 
to be freely available anywhere they were needed, their operations 
not restricted to Finland only. 
The military burden was to be made fairer. Only nine Finns out of 
every thousand served in the army, while 35 out of 1,000 of Russians 
were recruited.14 The statistics were calculated many times and in 
various ways, and the results differed in detail, but they always showed 	 159 
that the burden had been much lighter on the Finns. 
Alexander III approved the principle of levelling up the military 
burden and uniting the military service of both countries on 2 
November 1891.15 
Two committees were appointed by the Main Staff to work out the 
details of the problem. The half-Finnish16 Russian Colonel Mikhail 
Borodkin from the Warsaw military district was ordered to come and 
to study the history of the military establishment in Finland. Borodkin 
acquired quite a good knowledge of this theme; in time, he produced 
many volumes of Finnish history, criticizing the Finnish separatist 
standpoint.'' 
In the committees, the Finnish point of view was represented by 
General Schauman and Colonel Blåfield, who stressed both the right 
of Finland to maintain an army of its own and the legislative authority 
14 Doklad po glavnomu shtabu 29. VIII 1891 o peresmotre Ustava o voinskoi 
povinnosti v Finliandii i ob organizatsii voisk s ikh upravleniem, signed by 
Vannovskii. Akter, handlingar och... Procope collection, National Archives of 
Finland. 
15 	 A memorandum of the Main Staff 31. 11902, historical review. Materialy o 
vvedenie v Finliandii novogo ustava o voinskoi povinnosti 1900-1901/Tsentral'nyi 
Gosudarstvennyi Istoricheskii Arkhiv SSSR, fond 286/Microfilm NL 172, National 
Archives of Finland. 
16 	 His father was a Russian captain in Bomarsund, his mother a Finn from Åland. 
17 	 Thaden, "The Russian Government", p. 81; Borodkin's texts, see Bibliography. 
of the Finnish Diet. They were always left in a minority by the Russian 
members.18 
In 1893 a high-level meeting was held to give instructions to these 
committees. The upkeep of the Finnish military was to be paid for by 
the Finnish state, and the Senate was to have a role comparable to 
the Russian Ministry of Finance in military questions. Finnish troops 
were to be completely similar to Russian troops, but any increase of 
the number of the 5,600 Finns under arms seemed undesirable; 
instead, for levelling up the military burden, it was preferable to make 
Finns pay a financial contribution, the amount of which was to be 
calculated later.19 
However, these discussions brought out the fact that Finnish 
legislation limited Russia's sovereign rights in the border country. 
Finnish opinion was that no Russian could have any power in Finland, 
the Emperor excepted, and even he only in his capacity of Finland's 
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	 constitutional Grand Duke. The Imperial authorities admitted that the 
Finnish constitution gave the Finns the right to decide on their own 
taxation, but questions of Imperial defence were outside their 
competence. 
The post-office reform, referred to above, alarmed the Finns, until 
Alexander III assured his Finnish subjects that he had no intention of 
infringing their constitution. The problem of legislation in matters of 
an all-Imperial interest was referred to yet another committee, chaired 
by the former Minister of Finance Nikolai Khristianovich Bunge. By 
these measures Alexander III demonstrated his ability to defend 
Imperial interests in Finland, as a response to chauvinist criticism, but 
he did not wish to harm the fiscal and commercial interests of his 
Finnish subjects for reasons of mere nationalist prestige.20 Ordering 
18 	 Otdel'noe mnenine predstavitelia finliandskoi administratsii, General-Leitenanta 
Shaumana; Ob"iasneniia, Komissiia po peresmotru ustava o voinskoi povinnosti 
v Finliandii, o neobkhodimosti vydeleniia iz oznachennago ustava tekh paragrafov, 
koim prisvoen kharakter osnovnykh zakonov; Otdel'noe mnenie General-
Leitenanta Shaumana, Zakliuchenie, Vysochaishe uchrezhdennoi Komissii po 
peresmotru ustava o voinskoi povinnosti v Finliandii po uravneniiu tiagosti 
voinskoi v Finliandii s takoiu zhe v Imperii. Akter, Handlingar och... Procope 
collection, National Archives of Finland. 
19 	 Doklad po glavnomu shtabu 12. iiunia 1893 goda po ob'edinenie finskikh voisk 
s prochimi voiskami Imperii. Ob"iasneniia..., Akter, handlingar och... Procope 
collection, National Archives of Finland. 
20 Schweizer, Autonomie und Autokratie; Die Stellung des Grossfürstentums 
Finnland im russischen Reich 1863-1899. 
the committees to take up the Finnish question proved that it was 
taken seriously, but the conflict between Imperial prestige and local 
constitutionalism was put off for a while. 
Heiden, too, concluded that the Finnish constitution should not be 
violated, because the consequence would be an unnecessary and 
unending quarrel. In his opinion, it was better to let Finland have a 
military law of its own.21 For Alexander III, the principal factor was 
the loyalty of his Finnish subjects; in the Finnish archipelago he was 
able to take summer cruises without police protection, and he was 
always received with enthusiam by the local population. For the 
military security of St Petersburg, Finland's loyalty was of the first 
importance, and the Finnish political leaders took care to express their 
conviction that being good Finns made them good imperial subjects, 
too. But the inclination to look to the West for inspiration for their 
liberal ideas made the Swedish-speaking Finns seem suspicious in 
Russian eyes, because they stressed their reluctance to become Russians. 
Several Russian officers expressed their opinions in a brusque form. 
General Zolotarev, teacher of statistics in the General Staff Academy, 
said that only a little ink had been spilled when Finns had been given 
their rights, but plenty of Russian blood would be shed before Finland 
could be transformed back into a normal Russian province!' 
Zolotarev stated that a few nationalities in the Empire were so 
unreliable that they had been freed from military service, but it was 
due to an amazing lack of wisdom that so many concessions had been 
made to conquered peoples, aliens who with all their efforts opposed 
the absolute power of the state. While 4.14% of Russians of working 
age served in the army, the percentage was 3.9-4.0 for Lithuanians 
and Poles, 2.83 for Jews, and 2.81 for other populations, but only 
0.92% for Finns. Zolotarev demanded that when a primitive 
population developed enough to be fit for military service, their men 
had to be conscripted not into any local troops but into the Russian 
army. There they would be Russified and, after having completed their 
period of service, would in tum contribute to the Russification of their 
21 	 Doklad po glavnomu shtabu 12 iiunia 1893 goda po ob"edinenie finskikh voisk 
s prochimi voiskami Imperii. Ob"iasneniia..., Akter, handlingar och... Procope 
collection, National Archives of Finland. 
22 	 Ignatius, Sortovuosista itsenäisyyteen; muistelmia (Memoirs o I.), p. 26. Ignatius 
studied in the Military Academy in 1896-99, and was later a general in the army 
of independent Finland. 
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home regions.23 
In 1895 Franz Seyn, a lieutenant colonel on the staff of the military 
district of Finland, led the summer manoeuvres. He found that the 
artillery was useless in the interior of the country where rocks, forests, 
and lakes made the finding, occupying, and guarding of positions 
problematic. A cavalry attack was also unthinkable, at least with 
anything bigger than one squadron. But the Finnish dragoons were 
able to achieve 'brilliant results' even in the thickets, and small 
infantry detachments, led with skill, were useful in a guerilla war even 
against superior numbers 24 The report implied that the impenetrable 
interior of the country, where large-scale operations were supposed to 
be impossible?' might become dangerous for the Imperial army if 
Finns took arms against them. Another problem was noticed by 
General von Brincken: in the manoeuvres of 1899, vital information 
had been lost or retarded because Finnish troops did not know the 
162 	 Russian language 26 
A report by the chief of the gendarme upravlenie or directorate 
responsible for political intelligence in Finland, for the year 1899 
throws light on another aspect of the Finnish military problem. 
Officers of the Finnish army had adopted the separatist point of view, 
and there were so few Russian troops in the country that it was outright 
dangerous. But, in additon, the morale of the humble Russian riflemen 
suffered, not only in comparison with the splendidly armed and 
uniformed Finnish Guards Battalion, but also with the Finnish rifle 
battalions, who were always nicely turned out and lived in spacious 
barracks. The Russian garrisons of Sveaborg and Viipuri were in an 
exceptionally deplorable condition.27 
At the beginning of his reign, in 1894, Nicholas II had thought that 
there was no need for new legislation on the Finnish military question, 
he would decide it on his own authority.28 But he was not able to 
23 	 A.M. Zolotarev, "Materialy po voennoi statistike Rossii; Naselenie Rossii, kak 
istochnik komplektovaniia eia armiia, — na osnovanii dannykh za pervoe 
desiatiletie otbyvaniia obshcheob"iazatel'noi voennoi povinnosti." Voennyi 
Sbornik, vol. V I 1889, pp. 98-143, vol. VI / 1889, pp. 325-59. 
24 	 Seyn, "Podvizhnyi sbor voisk finliandskago voennago okruga v 1895 g." 
25 	 Alftan, Voennoe obozrenie finliandskago voennago okruga. 
26 	 RGVIA, delo 1338, opis' I, delo 291, otchet o podvizhnom sbore i bol'shom 
manevre voisk okruga 1899 goda, p. 48. 
27 	 Political survey 1899, Nachal'nik Finliandskago Zhandarmskago Upravleniia. Ven 
sot asiak 14243, National Archives of Finland. 
28 	 Materialy po delu o kodifikatsii finliandskikh osnovnykh zakonov a takzhe o 
withstand the ever stronger nationalist current of opinion at court and 
in the high administration. Soon military reform, and with it the 
constitutional problem of Imperial military legislation for Finland, 
took on an increasing urgency. The committees of the War Ministry 
were revived in 1896. They repeated their opinion that leaving the 
military system to be legislated for by a local organ had caused 
disorder, and the Finnish Diet would certainly not correct the mistakes 
made. The only way out of the difficulty was through the normal 
procedure of Imperial legislation. 
Nicholas II was neither a chauvinist nor a modernist. For him and 
his conservative circle, revolution was the main danger threatening 
the Empire. And revolution threatened not only from the violent Left, 
but even more dangerously from the liberal, constitutionalist current. 
Separatist strivings among the national minorities were also symptoms 
of the ever-present revolution. Nicholas and his mentor Konstantin 
Pobedonostsev believed that revolution was inspired by foreign 	 163 
agitators among the national elites, while the peasant masses remained 
loyal to the Tsar in the border countries as well as in Russia.29 
Nicholas signed on 12 June 1897 his approval of the conclusions 
of the 1891 and 1893 committees for the reform of the Finnish military 
establishment. The military burden of the Finns, personal as well as 
monetary, was to be made equal to that of the Russians.3° 
The reform carried out 
The Finnish military question was given more urgency by General 
Kuropatkin, who succeeded the decrepit Vannovskii in the War 
Ministry in 1898. Kuropatkin joined the chorus which demanded 
"Russia for the Russians!"31 On Kuropatkin's proposal, Nicholas II 
appointed Bobrikov to the post of Governor-General in Finland to 
carry out the military reform. A civilian official, Deutrich, was 
appointed Deputy Governor-General, and in military affairs he was 
poriadke izdanii i obnarodovanii zakonov obshchikh dlia vsei imperii s 
vkliucheniem Velikago Kniazhestava Finliandskago, 1891-1898. KKK 1908, II 
jaosto, akti 51, p. 100, National Archives of Finland. 
29 	 Chemiaysky, Tsar and People. 
30 Ministerstvo Voennoe, Glavnyi Shtab 31. I 1900; Materialy o vvedenie v 
Finliandii novogo ustava o voinskoi povinnosti 1900-1901. TsGVIA SSSR/ 
Microfilm NL 172, National Archives of Finland. 
31 	 Kuropatkin, Zadachi russkoi armii. Rossiia dlia russkikh. 
assisted first by Lieutenant General S.O. Goncharov, then N.N. Shipov 
and, after he proved too delicate for the task, General N.M. Turbin. 
Lieutenant Colonel Seyn was appointed chief of the Governor-
General's Chancery, with special responsibility for military and 
security matters. Seyn made a thorough study of the Finnish military 
problem and restated the conclusions of the Moscow nationalists and 
of the previous committees, and the opinions of the Minister of War.32 
Kuropatkin pointed out that for decades there had existed a 
comradeship-in-arms with the Finnish officers, but everything had 
changed during the last twenty years when the idea spread in Finland 
that a separate army and Finnish state existed.33 The Finnish acting 
Minister State Secretary, General Victor Procope34 answered that for 
the participants in the battles mentioned by Kuropatkin, the recent 
hatred and suspicion of the representatives of the Russian army was 
incomprehensible and insulting.35 Public opinion in Finland did not 
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	 comprehend the reasons for the military reform; they believed that the 
hatred had been instigated by the chauvinist Fennophagi in the 
Empire.36 Of course, Kuropatkin and his aides did not change their 
views. 
To ease the threatening armaments race, Nicholas II proposed 
disarmament to the Powers in 1898. Kuropatkin supported the 
initiative, because he knew that Russia could not afford to compete 
with Austria and Germany, which were re-equipping their artillery 
32 	 Seyn was commanded to read his study to various groups and clubs of officers, 
and it was also printed in Russkii Invalid, the newspaper of the War Ministry: 
Voinskaia povinnosti v Finliandii po sravneniiu s obshcheobiazatelnoiu voinskoiu 
povinnostiu v Imperii; soobshchenie general'nago shtaba podpolkovnika Zeina, 
sostavlennoe po ofitsialnym istochnikam i prochitannoe 10-go i 11-go dekabria v 
Gel'singforskom voennym sobranii 1898 g. KKK 1906, 2. dept., n:o 1-1, National 
Archives of Finland; Russkii Invalid n:o 275, 276, 278/1898, 2, 5/1899; and also 
as a brochure in Finnish: Suomen asevelvollisuus verrattuna keisarikunnan 
yleiseen asevelvollisuuteen; esitelmä jonka piti yleisesikunnan överstiluutnantti 
Seyn, suomennos venäjän kielestä, Helsingissä 1899. 
33 	 Kuropatkin to Procope, cited in "Iz moikh vospominaniiakh", p. 38, Procope 
collection, National Archives of Finland. 
34 	 Chief of the Finnish Guards battalion in the War of 1877, governor of Vaasa in 
1884, Senator for military affairs in 1888, deputy Minister State Secretary 1891, 
acting Minister State Secretary 1898-99, General of Infantry in 1900. 
35 	 Procope to Kuropatkin, cited in "Iz moikh vospominaniiakh", p. 41, Procope 
collection, National Archives of Finland. 
36 	 Haminan Sanomat n:o 64, 14. VIII 1894. KKK 61/1893, National Archives of 
Finland (a newspaper cutting of Hamina News, annexed to the archive of the 
governor general). 
with expensive quick-firing and heavy guns. The proposal was 
privately ridiculed by all responsible statesmen, but the Tsar could 
not be snubbed, and an international disarmament conference was 
convened at the Hague in 1899. 
Levelling up the military burden in Finland meant increasing the 
number of troops, and the measure had to be introduced before the 
Conference began. Above, we have seen how the number of troops 
in Finland had been reduced from twenty-four infantry battalions to 
eight Finnish and eight Russian rifle battalions, too few for effectively 
securing the border country. 
Kuropatkin adopted Miliutin's and Vannovskii's views and 
maintained that Alexander II and Alexander III had already accepted 
the reform in Finland. Nicholas II agreed that no further reasoning 
was necessary, because the principle of unification had been approved 
by his two predecessors." 
Kuropatkin differed from the committees in his demand that in 	 165 
addition to a financial contribution, the personal military burden in 
Finland was to be raised equal to that in Russia. Conscripts who were 
not needed for the Finnish battalions were to be taken into Russian 
units either in Finland or in the neighbouring Russian provinces. The 
Minister hoped that serving in Russian units would draw the two 
peoples closer to each other, make easier the learning of the Russian 
language, which until then had been totally incomprehensible to most 
Finns, and would develop the spirit of one unified army among them. 
Kuropatkin would have preferred not to give the proposal to the 
Finnish Diet, because he assumed they would not adopt it, and in any 
case it was inconceivable that important questions of Imperial defence 
should be decided by a provincial meeting. Finland's real interests 
could not possibly be hurt if strategic questions were decided in St 
Petersburg, because it was the Imperial army that protected Finland, 
not the Finnish mini-army.38 
In June 1898 Nicholas II ordered his ministers to tarry no longer 
with the project for Finnish national service.39 An extraordinary Diet 
37 	 An untitled memorandum, signed by Kuropatkin 29. VIII 1898, Akter, Handlingar 
och... Procope collection, National Archives of Finland. 
38 	 Doklad po glavnomu shtabu 22. V 1898. Istoriia sostavleniia i utverzhdeniia 
Finliandskago Ustava o voinskoi povinnosti, p. 24-25. Akter, Handlingar. och... 
Procope collection, National Archives of Finland. 
39 Kuropatkin to Governor-General Bobrikov 8. VII 1898, KKK 1893, delo 69, 
National Archives of Finland. 
was ordered to convene the following January, but only to give a 
statement or opinion on how the proposed levelling up of the military 
burden could best be adjusted to Finnish circumstances. The principle 
of the reform was not to be discussed.40 It was planned that, instead 
of the Finnish military commissariat, thirteen Russian conscription 
districts were to be organized in Finland, to examine the tens of 
thousands of Finnish youths of military age!' 
The constitutional conflict 
The Diet convened but the members of the Estates decided to ignore 
the Imperial proposal, because it had been made unconstitutionally, 
through the Minister of War, not through the Minister State Secretary 
and the Finnish Senate, the constitutionally competent instances.42 
In order not to take a merely negative attitude, the Diet prepared 
166 
	
	 on their own initiative a new proposal for a military law which, in 
their opinion, would correspond to the military interests set forth in 
the Imperial proposal. Twenty battalions and increased military taxes 
were too heavy a burden, in their opinion, but the Diet were willing 
to increase the existing number from 5,600 to 12,500 men. But, 
ignoring the essential point of the imperial reform proposal, the Diet 
insisted that the Finnish army was not to be sent outside the borders 
of the Grand Duchy, and that Russians should not be admitted to 
officer vacancies. To counter-balance this refusal, the Diet promised 
40 Zhumal Vysochaishe uchrezhdennago Osobago Soveshchaniia po sostavleniiu 
redaktsii Vysochaishago predlozheniia chrezhvychainomu seimu zemskikh chinov 
Velikago Kniazhestva Finliandskago, sozyvaemago v Gel'singforse na 7-e 
Ianvaria 1899 dlia razmotreniia Ustava o voinskoi povinnosti; Zasedaniia 2-go 
Avgusta 1898 goda. Akter, Handlingar och... Procope collection, National 
Archives of Finland. 
	
41 	 1. Uusimaa 2,274 	 conscripts 8. Kuopio I 	 1,523 
2. Turku I 	 1,502 	 9. Kuopio II 	 1,276 
3. Turku II 2,094 	 10. Mikkeli 	 1,569 
4. Vaasa I 	 1,797 	 11. Hämeenlinna 	 2,537 
5. Vaasa II 	 1,771 	 12. Viipuri I 	 1,969 
6. Oulu I 	 983 	 13. Viipuri II 	 1,370 
7. Oulu II 	 1,070 
RGVIA, fond 1338, opis' 1, delo 712, soobrazheniia ob uprazdnenii Finskikh 
voisk 1901. 
42 Suomen Suuriruhtinaanmaan Valtiosäätyjen päätös, joka tehtiin ja annettiin 
väliaikaisilla valtiopäivillä Helsingissä 29. päivänä Toukokuuta 1899. Asiakirjat 
väliaikaisilta valtiopäiviltä Helsingissä 1899. (Decision by the Finnish Diet). 
to give up the right of Finns to serve in the Empire. The concessions 
were made on condition that the procedure of the constitutionally-
confirmed right of the Finnish people to legislate on their military 
service and taxation would be respected. 
The aim of the War Ministry was to annul the constitutional 
character of the Finnish military law;4' the numbers to be recruited 
and the sums to be paid were to depend on Imperial needs, not on 
the deliberations of local institutions. The Diet only needed to procure 
the necessary monies, not to criticize military policy.44 
Thus the military question was definitely caught up with the basic 
question of Finnish autonomy: who had the authority to legislate for 
Finland in matters which had an all-Imperial importance. On 
Kuropatkin's proposal, Nicholas ordered a manifesto to be composed 
to clear up the problem. It was made public on 3/15 February 1899 
and stressed that, in questions of Imperial interest, the opinion of the 
Finnish Senate and Diet would be asked, after which the matter would 
be discussed and decided in St Petersburg by the Imperial Council, 
and then definitely sanctioned by the Emperor. 
This February Manifesto, as it was thereafter called in Finland, was 
quite understandable from the Imperial point of view, but was 
regarded in Finland as a coup d'etat and as a breach of the Imperial 
oath to respect Finland's constitution. The 'perjurer Emperor's' 
portrait was removed from the walls of Finnish homes. 
Next, the matter was taken up in the Imperial Council in March—
May 1901. The conservative councillors disliked many of the 
proposals of the War Ministry, for example those concerning the 
number of Finns to be recruited and their recruiting into Russian units, 
or the taking of Finnish troops outside the Grand Duchy. The Minister 
of Finance, Witte, did not believe that the Finns were separatists, and 
for him the doctrine of an autonomous Finnish state did not prove 
any lack of loyalty towards Russia, because the existence of such a 
state had been confirmed by all the previous Emperors. The 
expenditure on the Russian troops in Finland did not imply any loss 
43 Seyn, Suomen asevelvollisuus verrattuna keisarikunnan yleiseen asevelvollisuu-




Ob"iasneniia, Komissiia po peresmotru ustava o voinskoi povinnosti v Finliandii, 
o neobkhodimosti vydeleniia iz oznachennago ustava tekh paragrafov, koim 
prisvoenny kharakter osnovnykh zakonov. Izvlechenie iz zhurnala komissii ot 28 
Marta 1897 goda. Akter, Handlingar och... Procope collection, National Archives 
of Finland. 
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for Russia because the money was spent on the defence of the Empire, 
not only of the border country. Nor was it correct to say, in his 
opinion, that Finland flourished at Russia's expense; on the contrary, 
Finland was the one and only border country where no expenditure 
had ever been necessary for quelling rebellion. Finnish self-
government did not harm Russia but saved her from unnecessary 
expenditure and trouble in administering local affairs. Nor was force 
the right means for assimilating Finland; it was better to make the 
Finns understand their own interest in assimilation. And if the Finns 
should really be rebellious, was it sensible to train them in the use of 
arms? If forced to serve in Russian units, the Finns would be definitely 
alienated from the Empire 45 
Nicholas II ignored conservative opinion and even the advice of 
his mother, the Dowager Empress Maria Fedorovna.46 To his consort, 
Empress Alexandra Fedorovna, he said he was sorry, but he had to 
168 	 support his military advisers in Russia's interest. 
Because the discussion in the Imperial Council did not run 
satisfactorily, a secret committee47 in the War Ministry replaced the 
original proposal by a new Imperial decree dissolving the Finnish 
national-service rifle battalions and the reserve-training companies. 
The procedure was not what had been laid down in the manifesto of 
15 February 1899, but, of course, it was completely in accordance 
with the principle of absolutism. The new law was published on 12 
July 1901. For the needs of the Guards Battalion and the Dragoon 
Regiment, only a few hundred men were to be conscripted annually. 
All the rest of the recruits were to be taken by Russian units in Finland 
or in the neighbouring gubernii of the St. Petersburg military district. 
Soon the officers of the Dragoon Regiment in Lappeenranta proved 
to be dangerously constitutionally minded — they resigned in protest 
against a public reprimand of their commander, Colonel Schauman, 
by Bobrikov — and in consequence, or on this pretext, even this 
regiment was dissolved. For a while, Bobrikov planned to let the 
45 	 Witte's statement 14. I 1901 on the national service proposal of the War Ministry. 
Materialy o vvedenie v Finliandii novogo ustava o voinskoi povinnosti 1900-1901. 
TsGVIA SSSR/Microfilm NL 172, National Archives of Finland. 
46 	 Torvinen, Suomen puolustusta Kööpenhaminassa; Ina Langen salainen toiminta 
Danielson-Kalmarin asiamiehenä 1890-luvun alussa. (Defence of Finland in 
Copenhagen). 
47 	 Osoboe soveschanie 9 iiunia 1901, attended by Grand Duke Mikhail Nikolaevich, 
P.S. Vannovskii, N.I. Bobrikov, A.N. Kuropatkin, D.S. Sipiagin, V.K. von Plehwe. 
Hamina Cadet Corps survive, only transforming it into a school where 
Russian officer aspirants could be taught local languages and customs, 
in order to be employed later in the Russified administration of 
Finland. But it was soon found that the Cadet Corps was tainted with 
the dogma of a Finnish separate state and would not serve Russian 
interests; it was dissolved in 1903. The office of the Finnish official 
in the War Ministry was abolished, too.4S For a while, only the Finnish 
Guards Battalion survived the reform. 
Lieutenant General Glazov, the chief of staff of the Finnish military 
district, was greatly satisfied with the reform. In his opinion, the Finns 
still were infected by the spirit of separatism, sympathetic to Sweden, 
and without any feeling of brotherhood-in-arms towards the Russians. 
Ending Finnish military service might, it was hoped, ease the antipathy 
with which the population received the constitutional and military 
reforms. At least, it would deprive the Finnish 'state' of its 'army', 
which had lent material support to the false teaching about the political 	 169 
situation of Finland. The leaders of this local separatism would lose 
their confidence and boldness, an attitude of mind which derived from 
the existence of Finnish armed forces. Dissolving these troops, and 
taking instead tribute for the Imperial treasury, would also go well 
with the Russian position on the question of disarmament in the Peace 
Conference at the Hague. 
In referring to the Hague Conference Glazov was certainly a 
hypocrite, but otherwise his conclusion was sincere: in view of the 
opposition of the Finns to the will of the Monarch, disbanding their 
troops was a vindication of the All-Highest sovereignty.49 
During the nineteenth century, the Russian Emperors, advised by 
their Finnish aides, had allowed the development of the Grand Duchy 
into a separate state in union with the Empire. The policy had 
guaranteed the security of St Petersburg, and one of Russia's provinces 
had flourished under the protection of its privileges, without any 
material loss to the Empire. In the absence of legal or constitutional 
guarantees, the position of Finland depended on the personal will of 
the Emperor. Nicholas II, though an absolute ruler, was not 
inaccessible to the ever more nationalist or great Russian opinion, 
48 	 RGVIA, fond 29, opis' 15, Kantseliariia Vocnnogo Ministerstva, Prikaz 435, 24. 
VII 1904. 
49 	 RGVIA, fond 1338, opis' 1, delo 712, soobrazheniia vyzyvaiushchiia uprazdnenie 
finskikh voisk, General Leitenant Glazov, 25. IV 1901. 
especially when his teacher, Pobedonostsev, stressed the traditional 
role of the Tsar and taught him to suspect all alien, Western ideas as 
disruptive. This drew the Tsar to support the policy of Kuropatkin 
and Bobrikov. The generals did not strive so much for outright ethnic 
Russification as for the unity of the Empire and its army, for which 
Finland's autonomous position and semi-independent army seemed 
dangerous in the light of the nationalist ideas with which they had 
been imbued. 
Opposition silenced 
The Finns immediately responded to the February Manifesto by an 
address to the Emperor, signed by more than half a million people. 
Another petition was signed by more than one thousand well-known 
European scientists, artists and authors. Of course, Nicholas did not 
170 	 accept such protests.5°  
The opposition was organized by a committee of constitutionalists, 
called the kagaali after the Jewish qahal, which the Russians first 
used pejoratively but which the constitutionalists adopted. Their idea 
was to disobey all illegal decrees in order not to acknowledge the 
Tsar's right to legislate for Finland without the consent of the Diet, 
or the right of his administrators to give orders based on unconsti-
tutional laws. 
The main task of the kagaali was to organize a strike against the 
Russian-ordered conscriptions in 1902-04. In this they succeeded 
rather well in 1902, aided by the field organization of the Social 
Democratic Party. Very few Finnish youths were eager to enter the 
Russian army, and even fewer Finns were able to understand Russian 
military and security interests. In 1903 and 1904 the strike did not 
succeed so well, because of threats by the Governor-General. 
The constitutionalists were opposed by the older wing of the 
Finnish national party, the Old Finns, as they were called, who 
preferred to obey lest all national achievements be lost. When 
constitutionalist officials were dismissed by Bobrikov, the Old Finns 
replaced them, whereby the Finnish language conquered new 
positions. The strike of the conscripts demonstrated that the spirit of 
50 	 Pro Finlandia 1899; Les adresses internationales å S.M. L'Empereur Grand Duc 
Nicolas II. 1899. 
separatism was supported not only by the few educated elites but by 
the broad layers of Finnish society; in fact, it was an important 
occasion for a general popular mobilization of national politics, though 
the party leadership remained upper-class and the Socialist labour 
leaders were mostly ignored.51 The old division into a Finnish and a 
Swedish party was replaced by a new one of Constitutionalist and 
Compliant parties. 
Bobrikov also tried to Russify the higher echelons of the Finnish 
administration, but he found few men who knew the local languages 
and customs, and those who did were not of the best ability. That is 
why he had to resort to the Old Finns even though he could not trust 
them. The work of the Finnish government was restricted almost 
exclusively to security matters during Bobrikov's governor-
generalship, with very little attention paid to purely civilian matters." 
Bobrikov believed that he had right and might on his side, which 
the Finns were bound to recognize before long. Even when entering 	 171 
office he had foreseen that during the reforms he inaugurated evil 
opposition would come forth and would have to be crushed at any 
price.53 To counter the opposition, the Governor-General introduced 
Tsarist police methods. "Because of the unreliability of the local 
administration" the gendarme corps in Finland was strengthened and 
informers hired "to reveal disorders and to take countermeasures".54 
Plenty of information was received by the Governor-General, 
because the informers were well paid by the gendarmes. It became 
known that criminal separatists boldly denied the rights of the Russian 
Monarch in Finland, and were agitating for passive and even active 
opposition: "there is no doubt that a very influential secret 
organization, centred in Helsinki, has spread throughout the country, 
trying to terrorize both the authorities and private citizens".55 It was 
51 	 The workers' party had been established in 1899 and renamed Social Democratic 
party in 1903. 
52 	 My colleague Pertti Haapala has drawn my attention to the fact that the collection 
of Finnish laws and decrees from the period 1901-05 contains legislation almost 
exclusively on military and police matters. 
53 	 Estlander, Elva årtionden ur Finlands historia, vol. III: 1898-1908, p. 26; 
Borodkin, Generalguvernör Bobrikoffs minne, p. 9. 
54 8/21. VIII 1902, Elenev, starshii chinovnik dlia osobykh poruchenii pri 
Finliandskom General-Gubernatora. KKK 1906, I department, n:o I-3, National 
Archives of Finland. 
55 	 Kratkii obzor protivopravitel'stvennogo dvizheniia v Finliandii s kontsa 1898 
goda; Zein, 5. II 1901. KKK, Hd 80, n:o 1. National Archives of Finland. 
said that 40,000 rifles had been smuggled into the country from abroad 
in boxes labelled 'fried pork', or that Finnish emigrants were being 
trained in England, thence to return home to lead a popular rising 
against Russia.56 There was no end of denouncements of secret 
meetings and preparations.57 Bobrikov stated: "It is hard to live and 
work here surrounded by open and secret enemies."58 
Probably the Governor-General did not believe the wildest stories, 
but he used them to persuade the government in St Petersburg to 
increase his authority. Kuropatkin had other worries after the Finnish 
battalions had been dissolved in 1901, and Plehwe mainly used his 
tenure of the office of Minister State Secretary to further his own 
career and lost interest in Finland when, in 1902, he was appointed 
Minister of the Interior instead of the murdered Sipiagin. But the 
unceasing flow of alarming information could not be ignored, and in 
1903 Bobrikov was given the authority decreed in the 1881 
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	 'temporary' emergency laws. Disobedient officials could thereafter be 
dismissed and expelled from the country, and newspapers censored 
and suppressed. The opposition was easily silenced because they did 
not have much skill in conspiratorial activity, but many of the emigres 
continued their anti-Russian propaganda in Stockholm and other 
western capitals. 
Bobrikov met many difficulties in the course of his reforms and 
much was left incomplete, but the main goal was achieved. "The 
dissolution of the Finnish troops saved Holy Russia from the danger 
of complications in Finland".59 
Military plans for civil war 
Instead of strengthening the imperial defence in the north-west, the 
reform of the Finnish military system left only one brigade of eight 
56 	 Special department 104/1901, n:o 220, Special department 38/1902, spravka o 
vvoze oruzhiia v Finliandiiu, KKK, National Archives of Finland. 
57 	 Special department 69/1900, 101/1901, 172/1901, KKK, National Archives of 
Finland. 
58 	 Borodkin, Generalguvernör Bobrikoffs minne, p. 27. 
59 	 Borodkin, Iz noveishei istorn Finliandii; vremia upravleniia N. I. Bobrikova, p. 
97. 
battalions of Russian rifles in the border country.60 
Against eventual civil disorder, two sotnii of Orenburg Cossacks 
were transferred to Finland, the staff of the detachment and the 5th 
sotnia to Helsinki, and the 6th sotnia to Turku, in all 245 Cossacks» 
There was not much police work for the Cossacks, but in 1902 they 
were needed with their whips and sabres to dispel a demonstration 
against conscription held in the central square of Helsinki.62 
The local police force was "not yet reorganized to cooperate with 
the military", i.e. they still obeyed the Finnish law. In order to avoid 
incidents between the civilian population and the military, due to the 
army's ignorance of the local languages and administrative customs, 
a detachment of the 6th squadron of field gendarmes was formed and 
stationed in Helsinki.63 It is not quite clear how much the gendarmes 
60 RUSSIAN TROOPS IN FINLAND IN 1902-03 
Finland Rifle Brigade staff in Helsinki 
1st Regiment of eight companies in Helsinki 	 1,157 	 men 
2nd Regiment at Hämeenlinna, 	 1,091 
3rd Regiment at Turku 	 1,105 
4th Regiment, staff and one battalion at Nikolaistad 
second battalion at Oulu 	 1,196 
military hospital in Helsinki 
Viipuri fortress garrison: 
fortress artillery 
fortress mine company 	 101 
fortress infantry battalion 	 643 
military hospital 
Sveaborg fortress, headquarters troops 	 51 
gendarme detachment 	 19 
supply magazine 	 11 
military hospital 	 35 
fortress infantry regiment of 10 companies 	 1,422 
fortress artillery 	 1,233 
mine company 	 155 
military telegraph 	 41 
quartermaster's detachment 	 15 
(Sveaborg total 	 2,882) 
RGVIA, fond 1338, opis' 1, delo 327 po chasti stroevoi shtaba Finliandskago 
voennago okruga o kvartimom rospisanii voisk okruga 1902-1903. 
61 	 RGVIA, fond 1338, opis' 1, delo 327 po chasti stroevoi shtaba Finliandskago 




The violent conflict was provoked by Finnish activists in order to 	 acquire more 
support for their irreconcible opposition, in Klinge's opinion, v. Kejsartiden pp. 
381-82. 
63 	 RGVIA, fond 1338, opis' 1, delo 296 o grazhdanskoi i voennoi politsii v voennoe 
vremia, o sformirovanii polevogo zhandarmskogo eskadrona, signed by Lieutenant 
Colonel Zein, Lieutenant General Glazov, 24. IV 1899. 
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"Helsinki, Market square 18. April (?) 1902." Military measures being taken against the 
demonstration of the Finns on the occasion of the first call-up according to the Russian 
national service law of 1901, unconstitutional in the Finnish view. The conflict subsequently 
provoked a few Finns to behave like terrorists in reaction to seeing their fellow-countrymen 
treated as Russian mobs were. 
Photo: Museovirasto Neg 101978. 
possessed the necessary knowledge. 
Bobrikov thought that one rifle brigade was not a sufficient force 
against a Finnish rebellion and demanded more troops. "They are 
necessary as a concrete threat against disorders and an efficient means 
of Russification".64 
64 Bobrikov to v. Plehwe 28. IX 1903, KKK Hd 80, n:o 5, National Archives of 
Finland. 
The War Ministry agreed and doubled the Russian Finland 
sharpshooter or rifle brigade 65 Doubling the staff took a little time 
because of the lack of officers, but arming the augmented troops was 
easy with the rifles of the disbanded Finnish battalions, 1,321 Mosin 
rifles and twenty-five Smith & Wesson revolvers for each battalion. 
The Finnish barracks were also taken over by the Russian state for 
the Russian sharpshooters. 
The staff of the Second Rifle Brigade was stationed at Viipuri and 
the troops mainly in the eastern half of the country.67 In all, the brigade 
strength was 4,902 soldiers, the numbers in the battalions being between 
578 and 751 men, the full wartime number 960 bayonets for each bat-
talion or 240 each company, and 103 non-combatants for each brigade. 
To replace the Finnish Dragoons, the 55th Finland Dragoon regi-
ment was hastily formed and garrisoned at Lappeenranta. It consisted 
of six squadrons, in all 940 men. The artillery battalion also was doub-
led, so that the Finland artillery regiment numbered 717 men with 
thirty-two guns, and the mobile ammunition column eighty-eight men. 
The military district supply administration looked after the supply ma-
gazines.68 Except for the Viipuri fortress artillery and a few staffs, 
which were not accounted for in detail, there were on 1 January 1903 
in all 15,669 Russian soldiers in Finland 69 A few hundred officers 
65 	 RGVIA, fond 1338, opis' 1, delo 319 po formirovaniiu 2i Finliandskoi strel'kovoi 
brigada 1902. 
66 RGVIA, fond 1338, opis' 1, delo 712, Ob"iasnitel'naia zapiska po voprosu o 
preobrazovaniiakh, vyzyvaemykh Vysochaishem Manifestom 29 iiunia 1901 g. 
67 	 the 5th Finland Rifle Regiment staff in Viipuri 
— a battalion at Mikkeli 
— another battalion at Kuopio 
the 6th Finland Rifle Regiment staff at Hamina 
— second battalion at Hamina 
— two companies/first battalion at Kymenkartano 
two companies/first battalion at Tuusula. 
the 7th Finland Rifle Regiment staff in Viipuri 
— two battalions in Viipuri, in the summer of 1903 temporarily at Kuopio and 
Hämeenlinna 
the 8th Finland Rifle Regiment staff in Viipuri 
— two battalions in Viipuri. 
68 	 There were magazines at Sveaborg, in Viipuri, at Hämeenlinna, Lappeenranta, in 
Turku, at Tuusula and Hamina, each guarded by eleven men, and a commandant's 
office at Lappeenranta with nine soldiers. 
69 RGVIA, fond 1338, opis' 1, delo 327 po chasti stroevoi shtaba Finliandskago 
voennago okruga o kvartirnom rospisanii voisk okruga 1902-1903; RGVIA, fond 
1338, opis' 1, delo 924 o dislokatsii voisk okruga po sluchae mobilizatsii 1896-
1900; raskvartirovaniia Igo Finliandskago strel'kovago polka v period mobilizatsii 
i do vystuplenii v voennoi pokhod. 
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"Helsinki, the Northern Quay in 1902". A Cossack detachment ready to restore order. The 
Cossacks were perhaps obsolete as a cavalry force, but useful as a police force in the many 
internal conflicts in the Empire. Proud of their privileged status, they remained loyal to the old 
regime longer than any other troops in 1917. 
Photo: Museovirasto, sign. 26.6.79. 
were not included in this number, because the housing lists, kvartinoe 
rospisanie, only counted 'other ranks'. 
Simultaneously with the reform of the Finnish military service, the 
financial levelling up of the military burden was attended to. In 1899, 
a sum of ten million marks (one Finnish mark was equal to one French 
franc) had been proposed to the extraordinary Diet, the sum roughly 
counted as the difference between Russian and Finnish military 
expenditure in relation to the numbers of the population.70 
70 	 Ob uravnenii voenno-finansovoi tiagosti voinskoi povinnosti Finliandii s takovoiu 
zhe v Imperii. KKK 1905, 2. department, n:o 13, National Archives of Finland; 
Keisarillisen Majesteetin Armollinen Esitys Suomenmaan Valtiosäädyille rahal- 
The Diet did not consent to the payment, but Bobrikov thought that 
it was only fair to make the Finnish state pay the cost of the military 
reform into the Russian treasury. In 1902, the Senate paid two million 
marks for acquiring housing for the increase in Russian troops and 
officers (who were no longer able to lease rooms from the recalcitrant 
Finns). In 1903 and 1904, an additional eight million marks were 
taken as an advance payment for the sums which Finland was to pay 
into the Imperial Treasury for military purposes. The exact amount to 
be compensated could never be counted, because it was difficult to 
define which expenditure was military or civil, local or imperial, but 
all the Russian authorities were unanimous that ten million marks was 
far below the sum which Finland was saved by its exemption from 
military service." 
Bobrikov complained that even two brigades were not sufficient 
for the defence of the country and keeping order there, but Kuropatkin 
explained that no more forces were available, because the army had 	 177 
to guard the immensely long borders of the Empire, where many other 
places were much more endangered than Finland.'' The Main Staff 
promised to send reinforcements if the situation should grow really 
dangerous. A detachment of divisional strength from the Guards Corps 
was in readiness to be sent to Finland, with thirty guns and a brigade 
of cavalry. These troops were to be stationed in the Eastern part of 
the country to secure communications with the Empire" and, probably, 
to prevent disorder from spreading to the Imperial capital. 
The two brigades garrisoned in Finland, well acquainted with local 
circumstances, could thus concentrate on quelling the rebellion. The 
lisen asevelvollisuusrasituksen tasoittamisessa Suomessa ja Keisarikunnassa. Asia-
kirjat väliaikaisilta valtiopäiviltä vuonna 1899. (Imperial proposal for the financial 
levelling of military burden). 
71 	 Ob"iasnitelnaia zapiska k proektu Polozheniia o poriadke proisvodstva raskhodov 
na voennyia nadobnosti, otnosimykh na schet Finliandskoi kazny; Vedomosti 
primernago raskhoda kotorym trebovalsa-by soderzhanie Finskikh voisk v tom 
sluchae, esli khodataistvo seima 1899 goda ob uvelichenii sikh voisk s 5600 do 
12000 chelovek raznykh rodov oruzhii odostoili-by (signed by Seyn). KKK 1905, 
2. department, n:o 13, National Archives of Finland. 
72 	 0 priniatii mer na sluchai usileniia voisk, v krae kvartiruiushchikh, 1899. Ven 
sot asiak 14 242, National Archives of Finland; Mery na sluchai oslozhneniia 
politicheskikh obstoiatelstv. KKK, II otdel, delo 7 XIV 7, National Archives of 
Finland. 
73 Mesures de precaution contre l'eventualite de troubles en Finlande, French 
Military Attaché Moulin to the French War Ministry 4. IV 1899, EMATSH 7 N 
1475. 
security of Helsinki—Sveaborg was always the most important concern. 
The garrison there had to be strong enough to guarantee order in the 
town, supported by the garrisons of Tuusula at twenty-seven versts 
from Helsinki, and of Hämeenlinna at one hundred versts. The 
unreliable population of Turku was to be watched by a garrison of 
two infantry battalions and one Cossack sotnia.74 
The staff of the military district remembered the danger of an 
enemy landing, too. The defence planning for Finland had been based 
on co-operation between Russian and Finnish troops and on the 
sympathy or at least neutrality of the local population. Now the 
situation had changed. The plans had to be redrawn in case the Russian 
troops, in mobilized strength, had to operate against an enemy invasion 
and a popular rising that would join forces with the enemy; or 
non-mobilized Russian troops would have to act against a popular 
rising during a threatening conflict with an external enemy; or they 
178 	 could have to act against independent disorders in Finland. 
The precautionary measures taken during the Crimean War were 
reviewed. The troops had been charged with the task of guarding 
government offices and the treasury, archives, churches, bridges, and 
communications, with the additional tasks of keeping an eye on 
suspected persons, and of preparing demolitions to impede enemy 
movements. Civilian authorities had been charged with the task of 
housing, transporting, and supplying the army, and of organizing 
coastal guards and preventing the capture of ships by the enemy. Most 
of the measures reviewed were found necessary even in 1901, and 
also in case of a rebellion.75 
Were the planned military measures to be found necessary, 
imperial regulations for a state of war or martial law were declared 
to be valid also in Finland.76 Thereby the Governor-General would 
have been authorized to dismiss officials, forbid meetings, expel 
people, suppress publications, set up courts martial, arrest suspects, 
and confiscate property. In the Finnish view, the citizens' rights were 
74 	 0 priniatii mer na sluchai usileniia voisk, v krae kvartiruiushchikh. Ven sot asiak 
14242, National Archives of Finland. 
75 Mery na sluchai oslozhneniia politicheskikh obstoiatelstv. KKK 1904, 2. 
department, n:o 7 XIV 7, National Archives of Finland. 
76 	 Armollinen Asetus siitä, että sotajoukkojen hallinnosta sodassa 26. II 1890 ja 
linnoitusten hoidosta 15. IX 1901 annettujen Asetusten sekä sotatilaan julistettuja 
paikkakuntia koskevain Säännösten 1892 vaikutus ulotetaan Suomenmaahan. 
Asetuskokoelma (published laws and decrees) 1904, n:o 76/35 20. V/2. VI 1904. 
involved and, consequently, the regulations ought to have been 
enacted through the correct constitutional procedure. Their publication 
as Imperial decrees was therefore added to the list of Bobrikov's 
illegal acts. 
The Cossack charge against a lawful demonstration in 1902 was 
for many previously loyal Finnish subjects of the Emperor the definite 
threshold from passive constitutional opposition to acceptance of 
violent action. Bobrikov was murdered in June 1904 by Eugen 
Schauman, a young official, influenced by the disturbed political 
climate.77 
Bobrikov had compared his task to that of Count Murav'ev, who, 
in 1863, had been appointed Governor-General in Vilna, but Witte 
countered that Murav'ev had quelled a rebellion, while Bobrikov 
seemed intent on provoking one. For a while, Bobrikov had succeeded 
in silencing the opposition he had provoked, but in fact he utterly 
failed in bringing the Finns closer to the Empire or to the Russian 	 179 
people. Instead of a loyal population, a rebellious nation had been 
created in the immediate vicinity of the Imperial capital. The rapid 
change of opinion from one generation to another was illustrated by 
the fact that a mother had the picture of Tsarevich Aleksei hanging 
in her room, while her daughters preferred the portrait of Eugen 
Schauman in theirs.78 
Should the enemy attempt a landing 
While not neglecting to take into account the Governor-General's 
concern to help maintain internal order, the main task of the garrison 
in Finland remained the defence of the Grand Duchy. As always, it 
was supposed that a naval enemy would invade Finland in order to 
defeat the Russian forces there, cut off Finland from the Empire, and 
then advance towards St Petersburg. 
The task of the Sveaborg fortress in the defence was to guard the 
fleet anchorage. The commander of the the fortress demanded that the 
local districts or parishes of Helsinki, Espoo (Esbo) and Sipoo (Sibbo) 
should be included in his fortress district or espalanade; it was 
necessary for preventing undesirable elements from settling close to 
77 	 Seppo Zetterberg, Viisi laukausta Senaatissa. (Five shots in the Senate). 
78 	 Halsti, Muistelmat, vol. I. pp. 25. 59. (Memoirs of H.). 
the fortress. Also, according to the Russian rules for fortress 
administration, the inhabitants of a fortress district could be ordered 
to perform construction work and to supply victuals, transport 
vehicles, and building materials for the garrison. 
Field troops were needed to guard the landward front and the flanks 
of the fortress, the 1st Rifle Battalion in Laajasalo and the 9th Rifle 
Battalion in Lauttasaari, under the commander of the fortress.79 The 
commander of the 2nd Brigade complained that, in case of war, he 
also had to send detachments to guard railway bridges at Lahti and 
Kouvola, and thus he would not have a sufficient number of men left 
to carry out the mobilization of the brigade. The Sveaborg and Viipuri 
fortresses had similar difficulties because of the slow arrival of their 
reservists, 3,016 men from the interior of Russia for the two fortresses, 
and the simultaneous necessity of guarding the coast against a sudden 
attack from the sea. 
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	 The threat, of course, was Japan and Britain, her ally since 1902. 
The Far Eastern War broke out in February 1904, and although the 
theatre of war was distant, it deeply influenced the political and 
military situation in the Baltic Sea and its coastal regions. At the very 
beginning of the navigation season in 1904, when the ice had broken, 
measures were taken to keep a duty battery at the fortresses always 
ready to open fire against enemy ships. The Sveaborg anchorage was 
guarded until the end of the navigation season in October. Trial 
mobilization was also undertaken by a few detachments, for example, 
by the Viipuri fortress artillery.80 
79 	 RGVIA, fond 1338, opis' 1, delo 959 k planu oborony Finliandii 1904; shtab 
Sveaborgskoi kreposti 18. II 1904, 24. II 1904 to the commander of the military 
district of Finland, the commander of the Viipuri fortress to General Olkhovskii 
21. VI 1904, correspondence between the brigade staffs and the staff of the 
military district 8.-12. IV 1904. 
80 RGVIA, fond 1338, opis' 1, delo 959, Sveaborg staff to military district 
commander 18. XI 1904; RGVIA, fond 1338, delo 950 k planu oborona Finlandii 
1900-1901, Mobilisatsionnaia boevaia gotovnost' (of the Viipuri fortress). 
IMPERIAL SECURITY THREATENED 
Temporary measures 
The Minister of the Interior von Plehwe was murdered a few weeks 
after Bobrikov's death and Prince Sviatopolk-Mirskii was appointed 
to the vacant post. The Prince proposed to make government policy 
more acceptable to majority opinion, but because the Emperor kept 
his absolute power, popular dissatisfaction grew, and the war in the 
Far East grew more unpopular with each defeat of the Russian army 
there. After the Bloody Sunday in St Petersburg in January 1905, 
Sviatopolk-Mirskii, who was too liberal and soft for Nicholas II, was 
replaced by Bulygin, which did not quell the popular agitation. 
Prince Ivan Obolenskii, who had succesfully suppressed the 
Kharkov peasant disorders in 1902, was appointed to the post of 
Governor-General of Finland after Bobrikov. The murder of his 
predecessor was carefully investigated, no conspiracy could be 
discovered, but the authorities believed in the existence of secret 
Finnish preparations for a rising against the Imperial power. 
Obolenskii persuaded the Emperor to convene the Estates to a Diet 
at the end of 1904. The session did not lead to the loyal submission 
which the Governor-General had hoped for. The Diet unanimously 
declared all unificatory measures unconstitutional. 
In the list of illegal decrees was the national service 'law' from 
1901. As a matter of fact, the Imperial officials themselves were 
beginning to have doubts about this law. The Deputy Governor-
General Deutrich, Bobrikov's and Obolenskii's closest aide, explained 
that Finnish national service did not enhance the military power of 
the Empire. One needed only to remember the role of the separate 
Polish army in the rebellion of 1830, and the expressed wish of the 
Finns to separate from the Russians, he said. It was no security but 
a danger for St Petersburg if a hostile army of twenty thousand armed 
men and hundred thousand trained reservists existed in its vicinity. 
The Finns ought to be compelled to pay a financial contribution to 
the imperial military needs instead.81  
81 Zakliuchenie Pomoshchnika Finliandskago General-Gubernatora Tainago 
Sovetnika Deitrikha po vozbuzhdennomu v petitsii zemskikh tsinov seima 1904 
i 1905 goda voprosu o voinskoi povinnosti. KKK 1906 goda, 2. department, delo 
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The War Ministry had already demanded a payment of twelve or 
fifteen million marks from the Finnish state for the training of Finnish 
youths in the imperial anny,82 but the Senate estimated that the sum 
should amount to only a couple of millions. Leaving the definite 
calculation of the sum to a mixed committee, Obolenskii had made 
the Firms pay 4.23 millions by the end of 1904.83 
Now, a proposed payment of nine million marks in lieu of personal 
service, not in addition to it, was to be laid before the Diet, 7,800,000 
marks to be paid from the regular military revenue of the Finnish 
state, and 1,200,000 marks from increased taxes. The proposed sum 
was then increased to round ten million marks when the Guards 
battalion was disbanded at the end of the summer of 1905. The ten 
million marks were paid in August 1905.84 
This payment was intended only as a temporary measure, because 
the military problem was proposed for discussion in a mixed 
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	 Russo-Finnish committee,85 convened to demarcate local questions 
from all-Imperial matters. 
The Estates accepted the payment of the tribute as a temporary 
measure for 1905 but, because the Diet was prematurely dissolved, 
no regular budget for the next three-year period, 1905-07, was set. 
The Finnish Senate declared that there would be no difficulties in the 
payment of a further ten million marks for 1906 and another instalment 
for 1907, if only the population could be reassured that their 
constitutional rights were to be respected.86 Obolenskii showed no 
great enthusiasm for meeting Finnish wishes; the experience of the 
1 - 1. National Archives of Finland. 
82 Pamiatnaia zapiska po voprosu uplati finliandskoi kazny v 
obshchegosudarstvennykh raskhodakh na voennyia nadobnosti. KKK 1905, 2. 
department, delo 13, National Archives of Finland. 
83 	 Doklad po kantseliarii General'nogo Gubernatora 10/23. VII 1908. KKK 1908, II 
department, delo 44, National Archives of Finland. 
84 	 Senate to the Governor-General 23. VIII 1905. KKK 1905, IV department, delo 
13-3-t, National Archives of Finland. 
85 Vysochaishe Ego Imperatorskago Velichestva predlozhenie Zemskim Chinam 
Finliandii o posobii na voennyia nuzhdy, uplachivaemoi finliandskoiu kaznoiu v 
Gosudarstvennoe kaznacheistvo; Vysochaishe utverzhden 16/29. III 1905. KKK 
1905, 2. department, delo 7 . III, National Archives of Finland. 
86 Valtiovaliokunnan mietintö n:o 10, Asiakirjat Valtiopäiviltä Helsingissä 
1904-1905; Senaatin kaikkeinalamaisin esitys 6. VI 1905. KKK 1905, 4. 
department, delo 13-3-t, National Archives of Finland (Committee report and 
Senate proposal). 
previous Diet made it probable that they would fall into politicking,87 
i. e. discussing constitutional principles. 
The military reform was continued. In the summer of 1905 the 
military district of Finland was abolished and the area annexed to the 
military district of St Petersburg, as Bobrikov had proposed in his 
report of 1886. Thus, Obolenskii was the first Governor-General who 
was not simultaneously commander-in-chief of the troops in Finland. 
Instead, a new army corps staff, the 22nd, was established by order 
of the War Ministry on 10 June 1905.88 Under its command were the 
two rifle brigades, the artillery and the dragoons in the country. The 
army corps as well as the Sveaborg and Viipuri garrisons were under 
the command of the military district staff in St Petersburg. 
Secret enemies 
Eugen Schauman was a loner, but there were other more or less 
organized Activists, who had started publishing an uncensored 
newspaper Fria Ord or Vapaita Sanoja (Free Words) in Stockholm 
and smuggling it into Finland. Amateurish attempts to imitate Russian 
terrorists led to a few assassinations and other attacks. For the 
Activists, it was clear that Finland could not withstand the Imperial 
pressure alone, and therefore they sought contact with Russian 
revolutionaries, especially with the Socialist Revolutionaries, as well 
as similar national-revolutionary groups among Russia's minority 
populations. Their publications the Finnish Activists carried into 
Russia from abroad. In secret meetings, in Paris 1904 and Geneva in 
1905, the end of Tsarism and the liberation of the oppressed peoples 
were discussed. Russian affairs were to go through a Constituent 
Assembly, and Polish and Finnish affairs by assemblies of their own. 
Under the leadership of Konni Zilliacus, a journalist, the Activists 
organized a small party among themselves because the Constitutio-
nalists did not approve of their illegal methods. 
The Finnish workers' party had been established in 1899 and had 
adopted the Social Democrat programme from Germany in 1903. In 
principle, the Socialists were internationalists, but in practice they had 
to work within the limits of Finnish autonomy, increasingly 
87 Obolenskii to the Minister State Secretary 7/20. VI 1905. KKK 1905, IV 
department, delo 13-3-t, National Archives of Finland. 
88 RGVIA, fond 2222, opis' 1, fond Shtaba 22go armeiskago korpusa. 
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contaminated by Finnish national teaching. Among them there existed 
no unanimity on the question of whether the main enemy of the 
Finnish proletariat was the Finnish bourgeoisie, or whether Tsarism 
was the common enemy of all Finns. The party was internally divided 
into groups along these lines, and there were also a few worker activist 
groups, just as amateurish as the student activists. 
For a while, the Activists remained hidden from the authorities, but 
soon the gendarmes received reports that rifle clubs had been 
established for training Finns to defend the country and its rights.89 It 
seemed to the Russians that Finland was secretly arming.90 
There was some truth the reports after the Russo-Japansese War 
had broken out. Colonel Motojiro Akashi, the Japanese military 
attaché in Stockholm, proposed to the General Staff in Tokio that the 
Russian war effort might be seriously harmed if a revolutionary 
movement could be instigated in the Tsar's empire. Zilliacus contacted 
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	 Akashi and with Japanese money he acquired old Swiss Vetterli rifles 
and shipped them from Copenhagen on the steamship John Grafton 
to Finnish Activists and Russian Socialist Revolutionaries. At the 
beginning of September 1905, a few hundred rifles were successfully 
unloaded on the coast of the Gulf of Bothnia, but the ship then ran 
aground and had to be blown up. The remains were discovered by 
the Imperial customs yacht Aziia and sixteen thousand rifles were 
seized. The Russian revolutionaries never received any rifles, nor does 
it seem that they were organized well enough for the task, under their 
provocateur leaders Father Gapon and Azev.91  
The rifles were concrete evidence that the alarming gendarme 
reports were not groundless, nor was it certain that other shiploads of 
arms had not arrived undetected in Finland. In their planning, the 
military staffs had to pay attention to the potential existence of a secret 
Finnish army and to its reported plans to kill all Russians in the 
country. 92 
89 	 Kotitarkastuksissa löydettyä aineistoa, F.W. Schauman, n:o 1 & n:o 3, KKK Hg 
16, National Archives of Finland. (confiscated materials). 
90 	 Rumiantsev, Finliandiia vooruzhaetsia , pp. 5-7. 
91 	 For the connection with the Socialist Revolutionaries and the Japanese, see: Antti 
Kujala, "March separately _ strike together; the Paris and Geneva Conferences 
held by Russian and Minority Nationalities' Revolutionary and Opposition Parties, 
1904-1905", Akashi. Rakka Ryusui, pp. 88-167. 
92 	 Tolki o vozstanii i pogolovnom izbienii vsekh russkikh, Special Department n:o 
299 0 vozmozhnosti vosstaniia, delo 104/1901; Sviaz finskikh separatistov s 
Russia's diplomats in Copenhagen and Stockholm were instructed 
to ask the Scandinavian governments to prevent the arms traffic on 
"almost every ship" leaving for Finland.93 
In the troubled year of 1905 on a few occasions military force was 
called to suppress workers' meetings or demonstrations. Nobody was 
killed, the soldiers used rifle butts only, but the repressive methods 
sufficed to provoke the workers into resorting to violent measures —
a few attempts on the life of Russian officials — and caused mutual 
ethnic antipathy if not outright hatred between the Russian soldiers 
and Finnish workers.' 
This alarming disloyalty led the Emperor also to part with his 
Finnish Life Guards. When the Third Finnish Rifle Battalion of the 
Imperial Life Guards concluded their 1905 summer camp training at 
Tsarskoe Selo, they were disarmed and after returning to Helsinki the 
battalion was disbanded.9s 
It has been said that Obolenskii imagined that seventy-five thousand 
armed Finns were only waiting for the return of the battalion before 
rising in rebellion 96 The Ministry of the Interior informed the Minister 
of War Roediger that a rebellion was being prepared in Finland,97 and 
at the beginning of October Obolenskii, in a newspaper interview, 
warned the Finns that the government was preparing to send a division 
from St Petersburg to Finland.98 
In fact, measures were taken to increase the number of troops in 
Finland to their full wartime strength where necessary. At first, a few 
men were sent to each regiment in Finland to top up the peacetime 
revoliutsionnoi Rossiei, Special Department n:o 2299, delo 104/1901; o pomoshchi 
inostrannykh gosudarstv Finliandii, ob ukrepleniiakh i voruzheniiakh Svetsii, 
department IV, Special Department, delo 104/1901; Seyn's report for the years 
1904-1905, Hd 80, KKK, National Archives of Finland. 
93 AVPR, fond kantseliariia 1905 g, delo 35 & 111, fond kantseliariia 1906 g, delo 
40 & 128. 
94 	 A detailed study: Kujala, Venäjän hallitus ja Suomen työväenliike 1899-1905. 
(Russian government and Finnish labour movement) 
95 On the history of the Guards Battalion, see: Gripenberg, Lifgardets 3 finska 
ska rpskyttebataljon. 
96 	 Estlander, Elva årtionden... vol. III p. 312. 
97 RGVIA, fond 400, opis' 6, delo 792, Min. Vnutrennykh del zavedyvaiushchaia 
politsiei, to Roediger 27. VIII 1905. 
98 	 Novoe Vremia 6. X 1905; the interview has been cited by Juhani Tasihin, Venäjän 
kieli Venäjän Suomen-politiikassa vuosina 1905-1909; Suomen historian 
lisensiaattityö Helsingin yliopistossa 1979, p. 51. (Russian language in Russian 
policy in Finland; a licenciate study of the University of Helsinki). 
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numbers.99 Further reinforcements were to be sent from the Guards, 
the 1st and the 16th Army Corps, but, if possible, without disturbing 
the mobilization of the detachments which were preparing for the Far 
Eastern war. 
The first echelon of troops to be sent to Finland would have 
consisted of eight battalions, one sapper battalion, twelve guns, and 
seventeen cavalry squadrons or Cossack sotnias with six horse artillery 
guns, and one company of railway troops. In the second echelon, the 
41st Infantry Division, with their artillery, and the staff of the 16th 
Army Corps to lead these troops, would have been transferred to 
Viipuri, while a further division was preparing in Reval to be 
transshipped over the Gulf to Helsinki. The task of these troops would 
have been to occupy the country and to put an end to the expected 
disorders. The troops transferred to the Karelian Isthmus were to take 
the line Viipuri—Käkisalmi and to secure the railway from Viipuri to 
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	 St Petersburg, as well as to take possession of Koivisto (Björkö) where 
a naval station was to be established.100 
Reinforcements were also ordered from the regions of Vilna and 
Archangel to the Sveaborg, Viipuri, Mikkeli and Hamina garrisons,101 
but it seems that there was no time to execute these long-distance 
transfers before further developments took place. 
The war in Manchuria increased the necessity for precautionary 
measures in Finland, although at the same time a number of 
detachments and volunteer officers were sent to the theatre of war 
from here, too.102 If the Japanese torpedo boats were able to simulate 
innocent English fishing boats on the North Sea, as the Russians 
thought, they were probably able to attempt something even on the 
99 	 RGVIA, fond 400, opis' 6, delo 792 ob usilenii voisk v Finliandii 29. VIII- 17. 
IX 1905. 
100 RGVIA, fond 1338, opis' 1, delo 332, Instruktsiia nachalnikam chastei Karelskago 
otriada v sviazi obiavleniem Finliandii na voennom polozhenii. (s.d., but not 
earlier than 1905). 
101 RGVIA, fond 400, opis' 6, delo 792, popolneniia Finliandskikh voisk, spravka 9. 
IX 1905. 
102 RGVIA, fond 1338, opis' 1, delo 960 ob otpravlenii voinskikh chastei na Dal'nyi 
Vostok 1904, delo 962 Svedeniia o boevoi gotovnosti voisk okruga, delo 963 delo 
ob ukreplenii oboronosposobnosti krepostei i voisk okruga na sluchai voennykh 
deistvii 1904, delo 967 ob ukomplektovanii lichnogo sostava voinskikh chastei, 
otpravlennykh na Dal'nyi Vostok 1905, delo 969 o privedenii v boevuiu 
gotovnost' voisk okruga v sviazi o voennykh deistviiakh na Dal'nem Vostoke 
1905. 
Baltic Sea. Coastal guards were stationed in fishers' cottages in the 
islands, and Viipuri and Sveaborg were guarded by boats and yachts. 
Guarding the coasts and protecting the ports was particularly important 
because the Baltic had been denuded of Russian naval forces when 
Rozhdestvenskii, at the end of 1904, had left with his squadron on 
the voyage halfway round the world to join battle in the Far East, 
more exactly in the Tsushima Sound.'o3 
The Finnish usurpation of power 
All the precautionary measures proved futile. By the end of October 
1905 a general strike and almost a revolution took place in Russia. 
Witte, who had succeeded in reaching a tolerable peace in the Far 
East, consented to take responsibility for the government on condition 
that Nicholas II desisted from absolute power. Instead of the haphazard 
governmental system, a cabinet was established under the leadership 
of the prime minister, and on 17/30 October an Imperial manifesto 
promised the population civil rights and participation in legislation. 
Modern responsible unified government and parliamentarism seemed 
to be at hand, but foreign policy, the armed forces, and appointments 
were to remain Imperial prerogatives. 
The majority of the politically active Russian population were 
satisfied with the change, the general strike ended, the leaders of the 
St Petersburg Workers' Soviet were arrested, an uprising in Moscow 
in December was put down, the Siberian railway was cleared of rebels, 
and the army was transferred home from Manchuria. 
During the disorders, Witte had stressed the importance of Finland 
remaining peaceful, among other reasons, to provide a place of asylum 
for Nicholas II if he should be compelled to escape from the capital. 
But on 29 October, the Finnish railways joined the general strike and 
the next day all offices, businesses, and factories in the country ceased 
working. 
Finnish Constitutionalists, Socialists, and Activists joined the 
general strike, but for different ends of their own. The Constitu-
tionalists wanted to make the Imperial government desist from their 
unconstitutional measures of unification. The workers aimed at social 
103 RGVIA, fond 1338, opis' 1, delo 968 o merakh gotovnosti vyzvannykh voinoi s 
Iaponiei 1905. 
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reforms, equal voting rights in the first instance. The Activists saw 
the strike as a rising against Tsarism. 
These events in Finland were typical of the Russian revolution of 
1905, which was not unified nor centrally led, and had everywhere 
local features and contradictory aims. 
Imperial sovereignty was for a while shattered in the border 
country. 
The army had been preparing measures against a Finnish rebellion, 
but a general strike had not been foreseen. The army was blinded and 
paralysed by the cessation of railway, telegraph and telephone 
communications. No reports and no orders could be sent or received. 
Strike committees took over the administration in towns from the 
official authorities, a few Russian officials were chased away, many 
gendarme offices were closed and their papers strewn in the streets 
and the men themselves ordered to disappear, never to return; and 
188 	 one of them was killed. 
Russian families were not threatened, but they moved from Helsinki 
to Sveaborg to be safe in case of Finnish disorders or Russian 
countermeasures; "zee Finns perhaps like to kill us Russians to be 
free [...] Tonight perhaps zey make a revolutzia and some bad men 
come to zee house and cut our throats", a lady explained to her English 
guest.104 
The Helsinki garrison cautiously kept to their barracks. The 
gendarme reports of the existence of tens of thousands of armed 
Finnish rebels, who were only waiting for the soldiers to appear on 
the streets to attack and massacre them, were 'confirmed' by rumours 
of an approaching rebel army from Tampere. 
In fact, in Tampere a manifesto was drafted and accepted at a 
popular meeting, which demanded for Finland the status of an 
autonomous state with completely independent internal legislation and 
administration. The manifesto, on red paper, was brought to Helsinki 
by a delegation — this may have been the cause for the rumour of a 
rebel army — and it was confirmed, and a popular government elected 
by a crowd in the Railway Square on 3 November. 
The crowd then stormed the Governor-General's office, demanding 
the dismissal of Obolenskii and the Old Finnish Senate. The Governor-
General was powerless and unable to ask for military help from 
104 Fraser, The House by the Dvina; A Russian Childhood, pp. 103-05. 
barracks which lay a couple of street corners away. Remembering the 
popular violence in 1902 in Kharkov,105 he was frightened and hastily 
tried to pacify the mob. To his question "Is this war?", an Activist 
answered: "Yes, in a way, although as yet without arms". Obolenskii 
tried to calm down the mob with promises. 
In St Petersburg the Imperial government had already mastered the 
situation, and by using the military telegraph at Sveaborg Obolenskii 
succeeded in calling from Kronstadt the recently completed battleship 
Slava with a couple of old armoured ships to save the situation. 
However, Obolenskii did not let the ships bombard the town but 
opened negotiations with the Constitutionalists, who, for their part, 
had seen that the strike was degenerating from a patriotic demonstra-
tion into mob rule. An understanding was reached that the incident 
was not a coup d'etat. Obolenskii promised the restitution of Finland's 
rights, and pressed the Constitutionalists to pacify the common people 
by the promise of general and equal suffrage. 
Witte had never approved of Bobrikov's forceful policy of 
Russification, and although annoyed at the Finnish strike, he favoured 
a return to the style of regime of Alexander III. Nicholas II consented, 
promising not to apply the manifesto of February 1899 until the 
constitutional problems had been solved in a legal way. Furnished 
with the Imperial signature, the new manifesto (the November 
Manifesto) was returned to Helsinki on 4 November and received with 
joy by the constitutionalists. They believed that the 'legal way' 
implied Finnish constitutional procedure, while Nicholas, of course, 
meant Russian law. 
The workers understood that the Finnish oligarchy had had its rights 
resuscitated, but that the poor people had been left to wait for theirs. 
News of the failure of the Russian revolution were difficult to believe, 
and the manifesto was said to be a lie. The hidden division of Finnish 
society was thus revealed during a strike which had begun unanimously. 
The gendarme reports notwithstanding, the Finns, of course, had 
no army nor arms, and if Obolenskii had chosen to bombard Helsinki, 
nothing could have prevented it. A citizens' guard had been 
established in the first days to replace the striking police force, and 
by the end of the strike it had been divided into workers' Red Guard 
and a National Guard mainly manned by students, but neither of the 
105 Explanation given to me by Professor K.F. Shatsillo in 1982. 
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guards had any military importance. The general strike was stopped 
on 5 November, and the threatening guns of Slava and her consorts 
compelled the cessation of open protest even from the radical left. 
A military pacification may have been closer than the Finns 
guessed. Rumours had been circulating in St Petersburg that 
Obolenskii had been arrested by Finnish rebels, that a republic had 
been declared, and that fifty thousand armed Finns were marching 
towards Helsinki. Afterwards, it was reported that the General Staff 
had started mobilizing troops for Finland, and a Finn in St Petersburg 
"with his own eyes saw artillery troops being embarked".106 However, 
the War Minister, Roediger, in the end believed that military 
intervention was unnecessary because confirmation was received that 
the Finns had been pacified by the Imperial manifesto. 
Leo Mechelin, previously regarded as a 'criminal separatist' by the 
local Russian authorities, was appointed chairman of a Constitutio- 
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	 nalist Senate, and all Bobrikovian governors and other higher admi- 
nistrators were replaced by Constitutionalists. Finnish courts of justice 
'politicked' by sentencing collaborators and acquitting anti-govern-
mental (i.e. anti-Tsarist) Constitutionalists. The law on general and 
equal suffrage for a single-chamber parliament was unanimously 
approved by the last Diet of four Estates and the Emperor signed it 
in June 1906.107 
The collapse of the Imperial authority in the Grand Duchy was blamed 
on the Governor-General. The Commander of the 22nd Army Corps, 
Baron Saltza, and Obolenskii accused each other of cowardice during 
the strike. Saltza explained that he could not have acted on his own 
initiative because no state of war had been declared. Obolenskii answered 
that the General ought to have understood without declarations that a 
warlike situation existed. Saltza replied by accusing Obolenskii of a lack 
of firmness when facing the Finnish mob and of cowardice because he 
had escaped to the warships but had not let Helsinki be bombarded and 
had surrendered the town to the Finnish Red Guard.108 
106 Törngren, Från Finlands strid för rätt och frihet; Personliga upplevelser åren 
1901-1914, p. 224. Hultin, Päiväkirjani kertoo, vol. I, p. 322. (The diary of H.). 
Törngren had travelled to Russia to contact the liberals there and discussed with 
Witte, and Hultin's brother Captain Eelis Hultin served in St. Petersburg. 
107 Sudebnaia volokita, KKK Hd 105, n:o 21, National Archives of Finland. 
(numerous examples of Russian complaints). 
108 Numerous reports on the Finnish general strike, by Obolenskii and by Saltza: 
KKK Hd 80 n:o 9, 11, National Archives of Finland. 
Obolenskii lost the battle of the reports, and his defeat was greeted 
with satisfaction by the ancient collaborators of Bobrikov. They had 
not liked Obolenskii's conciliatory measures even before the strike, 
and they had had to leave Finland when the country was taken over 
by the 'separatists' and all Russian authority had ceased.109 For 
Colonel Seyn, a position of Governor was found in Grodno, also a 
region with national problems. Borodkin and a few others continued 
their literary or journalist activity against Finnish separatism. But most 
of the Bobrikovian were left unemployed and embittered, their 
careers in ruins and their nationalist and patriotic work annulled. In 
Moscow they found companions in misfortune who had been expelled 
from the Caucasus. 
Witte had Nikolai Gerard, a jurist and member of the Imperial 
Council, appointed Governor-General of Finland. The first civilian in 
the office, Gerard believed in reinforcing the Imperial authority in 
Finland by applying the policy developed by the three Alexanders, 	 191 
not by using Bobrikovian police methods. 
It seemed to the expelled chauvinists that the Mechelin regime was 
not satisfied with its political victory; it also wanted to destroy the 
military achievements of the previous years. Among the first measures 
of the constitutionalist Senate was the proposal to re-establish the 
Finnish military force on the basis of the 1878 law of national service. 
The Senate explained that it was urgently necessary to convene the 
recently disbanded Guards Battalion to form cadres for a new Finnish 
army.10 Even in the critical internal situation, the Imperial government 
was able to fend off this attempt, which was "without any serious 
basis and only political in character: an attempt to return to the military 
system before 1901, which had been condemned from the throne of 
the All-Highest, because it was against the principle of unity of all 
the Imperial armed forces"."' 
A detailed story from the contemporary Finnish point of view: Roos, Suomen 
kansallislakko,. 
The Russian view is explained by: Jussila, "Vuoden 1905 suurlakko Suomessa 
venäläisten silmin" (Russian view on the general strike in Finland). 
109 Borodkin, Generalguvernör N. Bobrikoffs minne. Vladimirovich, Revoliutsiia v 
Finliandii pri kniaze 'vane Obolenskom. (Vladimirovich = A. A. Rheinboth, a 
Bobrikovian official in Finland, later police chief in Moscow, dismissed for 
corruption). 
110 A most loyal proposal of the Senate 21. XII. 1905. 0 vozstanovlenii finskikh 
voisk, KKK, 2. department D-2/1906, National Archives of Finland. 
I 1 1 Governor General to Minister State Secretary 30. XII 1905/12. I 1906; Minister 
The Senate was also reluctant to pay the financial tribute which 
was meant to replace personal military service. The government in St 
Petersburg proposed a mixed committee to calculate the exact amount 
of the payment, but the Senate answered that the military measures 
had been taken without the co-operation of the proper constitutional 
Finnish authorities, and thus no reason for any Finnish payment 
existed, nor would any committee with Russian members have any 
authority in Finnish financial or budget questions. In the Imperial 
view, this was wrong, because Finland was part of the Empire and 
thus protected by its armed forces,"Z but in 1906 the government in 
St Petersburg had other, more urgent problems to worry about, because 
of the peasant risings, industrial strikes, and military revolts 
everywhere in the Empire. 
In Finland, a serious incident took place in Sveaborg. A few 
detachments of the garrison revolted on 30 July 1906 and seized a 
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	 couple of islands, from where they bombarded the main fortress. The 
Tsesarevich and the Bogatyr arrived from Kronstadt and together with 
the loyal part of the garrison easily compelled the rebels to surrender 
on 2 August. 
The revolt was a symptom of the general dissatisfaction in the 
Empire, but the authorities saw it only as a problem of the prevention 
of revolutionary agitation, not as a proof that radical reforms were 
necessary. They thought that the common people, i. e. peasants and 
soldiers conscripted from peasants, were natural monarchists, and that 
only industrial workers and technical troops recruited from the towns 
were under the influence of alien imported ideas spread by agitators. 
Generally, in military plans the obedience of the troops was not 
questioned. It is true that General A.V. Kaulbars, commander of the 
Odessa military district, pointed out that reserve troops were not as 
reliable as they had previously been and were not fit for operations.13  
But usually only the eventual animosity of the local non-Russian 
population was taken into consideration. 
State Secretary to Governor General 5. II 1906. 0 vozstanovlenii finskikh voisk, 
KKK 2. department D 2-1/1906, National Archives of Finland. 
112 Minister State Secretary to Governor General 23. XI/6. XII 1905; Senate to 
Governor General 6. II 1906; Spravka, by starschii deloproizvoditel' Levenstem. 
KKK 1906, 2. department, delo 7-III, National Archives of Finland. 
113 RGVIA, fond 400, opis' 6, delo 821, Komanduiushchii voiskami Odesskago 
voennago okruga Baron Aleksandr Vasil'evich Kaulbars 14. 11906 (to General 
Polivanov). 
The Finnish Voima 
At the beginning of 1906, the Finnish Activists formed a sports 
association, called Voima or the Force, with numerous local clubs. Its 
professed aim was physical training and patriotic education, and its 
secret aim was to acquire weapons and train members in their use to 
defend the Finnish society — whether against Russian oppressors or 
Finnish Reds was not quite clear. They tried again to smuggle weapons 
into the country, but the 3,500 rifles were accidentally discovered by 
the Russians. For their part, the Red Guards formed in 1905 continued 
their semi-independent existence on the left wing of the Social 
Democratic party. In connection with the military revolt in Sveaborg, 
the Helsinki Red Guard tried once again to proclaim a general strike 
so as to compel the party to join the revolution. A mini-conflict 
between the Red Guards and the National Guards was suppressed by 
Russian soldiers. Part of the Red Guard then joined the rebels in the 
fortress. The Senate therefore ordered the Red Guard to be dissolved, 
and the party convention of the Social Democrats consented, so that 
only a few semi-criminal underground groups continued their 
activity.14 The Voima, after the Russians had pointed out the suspicious 
character of the organization, was also prohibited by the Senate. 
It was difficult for the Imperial authorities to distinguish between 
the different Finnish guards, as it was also difficult to know the 
difference between loyal opposition and revolutionary or criminal 
activity. Thus Constitutionalist, Activist and Red Guard organizations 
and activities were all regarded as expressions of the same united 
treasonable opposition.15 It was difficult to believe that the Voima 
existed only for the maintenance of law and order, as its leaders said, 
and difficult also to see the difference between Constitutionalists and 
Activists, which even the Old Finns were apt to see as expressions 
of the same dogmatic inflexibility.i16 
In the absence of any reliable military organization, the Mechelin 
Senate tried to increase the numbers of the Finnish police force and 
to acquire military rifles for them. The weapons were intended for 
114 Kujala, "Suomalaiset vallankumousjärjestöt ja poliittinen rikollisuus 1906-1908". 
(Finnish Revolutionary Organizations and Political Crime). 
115 Spravka o voime, KKK Hd 87 n:o 1; Perepiska ob obshchestve 'Sila', KKK I 
department, delo XX/1906 
116 Gendarme Directorate to Governor-General 25. I 1905. KKK I department, delo 
IX 2, 1905. 
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maintaining law and order against the restless Leftists, because the 
outbreak of any disorder would have threatened social harmony and 
would have given the Russian government a pretext to intervene."' 
The defence-line for St Petersburg is shifted 
After the war and defeat in the Far East, the Russian military system 
was changed. The General Staff was made independent of the Ministry 
on the German model which was believed to be more efficient than 
the previous system. It took four years to reorganize the troops after 
the chaos left by the incoherent mobilisation for the distant war and 
the hundreds of punitive expeditions and small revolts of 1906-07. 
The debacle of Tsushima had left Russia with practically no navy, 
except the Black Sea fleet in its protected but closed theatre of activity. 
A Council of Imperial Defence was appointed under the chairmanship 
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	 of Grand Duke Nicholas Nicholaevich, the Emperor's uncle, to bring 
unity to the military an naval planning. 
An indication of the feeling of helpless exhaustion was the fact 
that at first it was thought that Kronstadt would be the front-line 
defence for St Petersburg. Then, in 1906, the main position was 
pushed a little westward, but only to the Kotka — Suursaari (Hogland) 
— Narva line. The Slava and the Tsesarevich, with the obsolete remains 
of earlier naval construction programmes, could not be called a navy, 
and the revolutionary spirit was exceptionally strong among the 
sailors, recruited mainly from among industrial workers; "the navy is 
not a source of strength, it is a threat", the Minister of War, Roediger, 
stated. The naval position in the eastern end the Gulf of Finland was 
to be defended by mines, torpedo boats and coastal batteries on either 
side of the Gulf in support of Kronstadt, but the main responsibility 
for the defence of St Petersburg rested on the land army. 
In the light of this lack of naval force the fright caused by gendarme 
information on the armed preparations in Finland and the subsequent 
general strike there are easy to comprehend. Grand Duke Sergei 
Mikhailovich, the inspector of artillery, pointed out that Finland was 
Russia's most dangerous enemy because she was closest to the 
Imperial capital."$ A collection of old ships and light craft were sent 
117 Jussila, Nationalismi ja vallankumous venäläis-suomalaisissa suhteissa 1899-1 
914. (Nationalism and Revolution in Russo-Finnish Relations), passim. 
118 Marine-Attaché fir die Nordischen Reiche v. Hintze, an Seine Majestät den Kaiser 
during the sailing season of 1906 to patrol the Finnish coasts to 
prevent further attempts at arms smuggling. The coastal waters of 
Finland were divided into three districts, the first one from Koivisto 
to Hanko, the second one consisting of Åland, the third one along the 
coast of the Golf of Bothnia, while the fourth district was the Moon 
Sound on the Estonian side. In case of a popular rising, the first district 
was to support the advance of the first army corps from Viipuri 
towards Helsinki. About twenty minelayers, more than fifty torpedo 
boats, and numerous auxiliaries were available for guarding duties, 
while the two battleships and one cruiser formed a heavy detachment 
In reserve.' '9  
Many of the patrol ships were based in the bay near Bomarsund 
and one battalion of infantry was positioned on Prästö,12Ö ignoring the 
demilitarized status of the Åland archipelago. It was probably a penal 
battalion, but the purpose was to observe the Finns; foreign informants 
spoke about Russians constructing a Zwingburg on the island.12 ' 
The list of prohibited contraband included arms, explosives, marine 
engines and parts, mines, barbed wire, fortification tools, field 
kitchens, telephone and telegraph materials, harnesses, corn and bread 
and conserves.' 22 
The plan was to declare the whole of the Gulf of Finland to be 
Russian territorial waters in order to have the right to stop and search 
any ship sailing there. This caused the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
much difficulty, for they had to listen to ironic remarks about a 
blockade of one's own coasts, and in the end Izvol'skii succeeded in 
making the military desist from their plan.123 As Russia regained 
und König, 13. II 1908. Politisches Archiv, Auswärtiges Amt, Abt. I A, Russland 
63, Akten betreffend die Aalandsinseln, Bd 2. von Hintze did not explain how 
he had acquired the protocol of the meeting. 
119 RGAVMF, fond 418, opis' 2, delo 213 o sosredotochenii B. flota na sluchai 
mobilizachii po planu n. 1, vooruzhennoe vosstanie v Finliandii. — The shipping 
lists and contraband lists were completed from to year, and it is not quite clear 
what exactly were included into them in 1906, 1907 and 1908. 
120 RGAVMF, fond 418, opis' 1, delo 131, Strategicheskoe opisanie chasti 
Olandskikh shkher — Lumpanfierda i tablitsa rasstoianii mezhdu portami i 
lotsmanskami stantsiiami v Finskom i Botnicheskom zalivakh 27. XI — 1. XII 
1906. 
121 Shtab voisk Gvard. i S. Peterburgskago voennago okruga 19. V/ 1. VI 1906. KKK 
Da 215, n:o 3309, National Archives of Finland. A Zwingburg is a fortress or 
castle from which the surrounding hostile population can be dominated. 
122 RGAVMF, fond 418, opis' 2, delo 213 o sosredotochenii B. flota na sluchai 
mobilizachii po planu n. 1, vooruzhennoe vosstanie v Finliandii. 
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self-confidence, the navy started to plan flanking positions in Åland 
and in the Moon Sound. To their consternation, the Russians were 
reminded, by a loud protest from Stockholm, of the Paris Treaty of 
1856, according to which the Åland archipelago was to remain 
demilitarized. Long and difficult diplomatic negotiations followed, 
involving not only Russia and Sweden, but also Germany, Britain, 
France, Denmark, Norway and the Netherlands, with practically no 
result, except that of frightening the Danes and Swedes and bringing 
them closer to the Germans. It was only when real war made treaties 
void that Russia could start fortifying the islands in 1915.'24 
Britain and Japan were the enemies of Russia at sea. The Dual 
Alliance was directed against a German attack on either member, and 
also contained a guarantee against Russia being left alone to face a 
British naval attack, but the Anglo-French entente of 1904 made this 
aspect void. The renewal of the Anglo-Japanese alliance in 1905 
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	 caused another outburst of alarm in Russia and drove Nicholas II to 
sign a 'continental coalition' with William II of Germany. His 
signature was only with difficulty annulled by the united efforts of 
Witte and the Minister of Foreign Affairs Count Lambsdorff, who did 
not wish to antagonize France. 
Germany continued her naval programmes, and Britain responded 
by building up a dreadnought fleet. British attention was now turning 
from the distant oceans to the North Sea. The British retained a 
theoretical interest in the Baltic, with a plan for a pre-emptive strike 
at Kiel or a landing on the Pomeranian coast followed by a march on 
Berlin, but in fact the Royal Navy soon realized that the Baltic would 
be a trap for them if Germany were able to close the Danish Straits. 
From the beginning, the British army planned to send their 
Expeditionary Corps to the French front. 
After the defeat in Manchuria in 1905, Russia had to desist from 
further plans of expansion in Asia. Consequently, in 1907, the French 
succeeded in mediating an entente between Russia, Japan and Britain. 
The German army had been perceived as the main opponent of the 
Russian land forces since the unification of the German principalities 
123 Izvol'skii to Benckendorff 22. VI/ 5. VII 1906: Alexandre Isvolsky, Au service 
de la Russie: Correspondance diplomatique, recueillie par Helene Isvolsky. Paris 
1937. 
124 see: Luntinen, The Baltic Question 1903-1908; Luntinen, "The Åland Question 
during the last years of the Russian Empire". 
in 1871, but the German fleet had not played a great role in Russian 
naval calculations. And, in fact, the Germans were unable to undertake 
anything serious against the Russians on the Baltic Sea as long as the 
French fleet remained unbeaten. On the contrary, it was a Russian 
landing that was apprehended on the German coast, or a Russian 
demonstration in Danish waters, or an attack in the rear of the German 
North Sea fleet. Only after the French fleet had been destroyed could 
the Germans turn against the Russians, and even in a victorious battle 
they expected to lose approximately 30% of their strength; the only 
possible conclusion to be drawn was that the fleet should be 
constructed so powerful that the 70% left from the first battle would 
be strong enough for a duel with the Tsar's fleet. Then, after the 
entente of 1904, it was believed that the British would join the French, 
which meant that even fewer German forces could be left for the 
Baltic. The only chance was to pressure Denmark to close its Straits 
with mines, or to occupy the small neighbour and let the German 	 197 
navy carry out the mining. In the military plans for the Eastern front, 
the German army did not count on any naval support on the left flank, 
and was even ready to accept the destruction of small coastal towns 
like Wismar, Rostock, Lübeck or Stralsund by the Russian Baltic fleet. 
The transfer of the Russian fleet to the Far East in 1904-05 made 
the German position on the Baltic Sea easier. Then the obsolete coastal 
battleships of the Siegfried class could be trusted to defend the coast, 
though Libau remained a threat, because from there Russian torpedo 
boats could raid the German coasts. 
These realistic views were so unpleasant to the staff of the German 
Baltic fleet that they drew up wishful plans for a battle against Russia 
alone. In them, a big German fleet could be concentrated in the Gulf 
of Finland, with a detachment to close the Gulf of Riga on the right 
flank. It was supposed that the Russians would passively retire behind 
the walls of their fortresses, but by disturbing their mobilization, 
destroying their merchant ships, and raiding their ports — Libau, 
Windau, Dünamunde, Pernau, Reval — the Germans should be able to 
provoke them into steaming into the open sea to be destroyed in a 
battle with the superior German fleet. The Finns could also be starved 
out by a naval blockade, or Helsinki could be bombarded and burnt 
— only 786 of its 4,960 houses were constructed of stone, the staff 
knew — so that public opinion would compel the Tsar's fleet to come 
out. After the battle, the German fleet could be dispersed in every 
necessary direction, to destroy Dünamunde, Riga, Libau, Reval, to 
prevent Russian commerce in the Gulf of Bothnia, to attack Turku, 
Pori, Vaasa, Pietarsaari, Kokkola, and Oulu, to mine waterways, to 
capture Russian merchant ships, to destroy lighthouses, quays, and 
docks, to burn timber stores, to blow up railway bridges on coastal 
lines, and to cut the telegraph cables to Sweden.'25 But these remained 
sweet dreams, because Great-Power politics made impossible an 
isolated duel between the two Empires. Of course, no thought was 
given to the fact that all 'Russians' in the list to be destroyed were, 
in fact, Finns. In spite of all their efforts to increase their autonomy, 
in international law Finns remained the Tsar's subjects. 
198 
125 Operationspläne gegen Russland, vom Februar 1896 bis Aug. 1897, Bundesarchiv-
Marinearchiv [BA-MA] RM 5/v 1628; Operationspläne gegen Russland in Europa 
vom März 1903 bis Juni 1913, BA-MA RM 5/v 1629; Russland, März 1882 — 
Juni 1883, BA-MA R/v1 5/v 1631; Vorarbeiten zu den Operations-Plänen gegen 
Russland, vom 15. Dezember 1892 bis Nov 1908, BA-MA RM 5/v 1632. 
Preparing for a Great War 
REVIVAL AND RENEWED 
REPRESSION 
Tsarism revived 
The Tsarist regime in Russia was badly shattered but not definitely 
destroyed by defeat and revolution in 1905-06. 
After the Imperial Manifesto of on October 1905, order was 
restored, but the government remained on a narrow basis. Witte could 
not make the liberals join his government nor was he able to quell 
the continuing disorder in the provinces. Nor could he ever gain the 
trust of Nicholas II, who suspected him of an ambition to become the 
first president of a Russian republic. In 1906, Witte was replaced first 
by the hopeless Goremykin and then by Petr Stolypin, who succeeded 
in pacifying the country by punitive expeditions and expulsions to 
Siberia. 
Stolypin, however, understood that the regime could not be based 
on force alone. The two first Duma elections in 1906 showed that 
neither Socialists nor dogmatic liberals nor national minorities were 
eager to make the existing Russia strong and united. Stolypin changed 
the election rules and succeeded in creating a majority of moderate 
Liberals and Nationalists in the third Duma of 1907-12, which was 
willing to support the government in its policy of modernizing, 
unifying and reforming the country. 
For internal reforms, external peace was necessary. Plans for 
expansion were given up and Russia joined the entente in 1907, as 
shown above. A disturbing consequence was the German suspicion 
of a Franco-Anglo-Russian Einkreisung or encirclement.' 
I 	 To counter this suspicion Russia proposed closing the Baltic against the British 
— and freeing Åland from the demilitarization servitude — but Germany could not 
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Stolypin detested the nationalities in Finland, the Baltic Provinces, 
Poland, the Ukraine, the Caucasus and Central Asia, probably not so 
much for nationalistic reasons but because their demands contradicted 
the idea of a united and centralized modern Russia. The problem was 
that half the population of the Empire was non-Russian and reacted 
to government policy, which was seen as Russification, with growing 
antipathy and hatred of Tsarism, of government, and, in the end, of 
anything Russian. Stolypin followed his nationalist policy in order 
also to appease the rightist and chauvinistic opposition in the Duma 
and to win the confidence of the Emperor. 
Stolypin strongly objected to the Finnish idea of a separate 
statehood. After putting Russian affairs in order, in 1907 he turned 
his attention to the border country. A solution for the Finnish problem 
was urgently necessary because revolutionaries were hiding in Finland 
in the vicinity of the Imperial capital. Finnish law did not recognize 
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	 revolutionary plotting as a crime, the Finnish police force did not want 
to co-operate with the Russian security forces, and Finnish Activists 
and the Left aided the revolutionaries. 
The constitutionalist Mechelin Senate and their governors and 
courts of justice were not useful tools of central government policy. 
August Langhoff, a general of Finnish origin,2 in the office of Minister 
State Secretary always tried to represent the constitutionalist point of 
view to the Emperor, and even Governor-General Gerard was apt to 
believe the reports of Finnish officials that no plots against the 
Imperial power existed in the country. 
Stolypin had no experience of Finnish affairs and that is why he 
appointed a committee of experts in Finnish affairs to advise him. 
Thus old Bobrikovians like Deutrich, Borodkin, Sergeevskii and others 
regained some influence. These men were apt to see in Finnish 
separatism a mortal danger for Russian unity and the Russian political 
system, as well as for the dominant position of Russians in Russia. 
The absence of Russian administration in Finland was harmful also 
from a military point of view. 
be convinced; see: Luntinen, The Baltic Question 1903-1908. 
2 
	
	 Langhoff commanded the Finnish Guards Battalion in 1897, the Semenov 
Regiment in 1899 and a brigade in 1904, and was Minister State Secretary 
1906-1913. 
Quarrels about money and rules for the military 
First, there were military-financial problems. The Finns were reluctant 
to pay for the costs of the conscription authorities and the gendarmerie 
in the country, regarding them as Imperial institutions which had no 
legal existence in Finland. In revenge, the army did not pay for the 
barracks and other property taken over from the disbanded Finnish 
battalions. These sums ranged from several hundred thousand to even 
a few million Finnish marks. 
A bigger financial problem was the payment for 1906 and 1907 of 
ten million marks a year in lieu of the personal military service from 
which the Finns had been freed. After a long discussion on whether 
the millions were to be paid at all, the Finnish Parliament consented 
to the demand, because these sums had been promised in 1905. 
Parliament consented to pay 20 million marks, thus stretching its 
budgetary competence to cover the regular military revenue which 
had been disposed of by the monarch even in Swedish times before 
1809, although it had been asked only for 3.6 millions from 
extraordinary tax revenues. 
The Minister of War, Roediger, and the Minister of Finance, 
Vladimir Kokovtsov, favoured accepting the payment, because in their 
opinion a few million marks were not worth a constitutional conflict, 
while the Bobrikovians opposed this kind of appeasement of the Finns. 
The Council of Ministers decided to accept the money, because the 
3.6 millions were included in the decision, and the 16.4 millions could 
be regarded as taken from the funds at the monarch's disposal. At 
this stage, the Council of Ministers tried to avoid a conflict with public 
opinion in Finland.3 
Then there were problems with the railways. The Finnish railways 
were of light construction, although of the identical 1.524 mm gauge 
of the Russian railways. For military transport, light rails had to be 
replaced with heavier material, bridges strengthened, and rolling stock 
prepared. The Finnish treasury had to pay for the improvements, one 
million marks for bridges, half a million for rolling stock, and three 
3 	 All documents are in KKK 1907, II department, delo 8_2 C II, National Archives 
of Finland, especially: Zhurnal vysochaishe uchrezhdennago osobago 
soveshchaniia dlia obsuzhdeniia nekotorykh voprosov kasaiushchisia Velikago 
Kniazhestva Finliandskago; Zasedaniia 24 Noiabria i 21 Dekabria 1907 goda, ob 
uplate finliandskoiu kaznoiu gosudarstvennomu kaznacheistvu posobiia dlia 
voennyia nuzhdy za 1906 i 1907 gody. 
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million for heavier rails .4 
The railway line from Hämeenlinna and Tampere northwards to 
Vaasa and Oulu had been opposed by the military authorities because 
they deemed that the Swedes might use it for an advance southward 
from the border to the rear of the Russian troops in Finland. 
Nevertheless, thanks to their autonomy, the Finns had succeeded in 
obtaining the Emperor's signature to their proposal, and eventually 
the line had been constructed, in 1883 to Vaasa, in 1886 to Oulu, and 
in 1903 to Tornio. In fact, in 1914-17 the railway proved useful for 
the Russian army. 
The eastern branch line to Karelia, to Joensuu in 1894 and further 
on to Nurmes in 1911, also called forth apprehensions, because it 
strengthened Finnish economic and cultural influence in the region 
close to the Finnish—Russian border, and even increased a supposed 
Pan-Finnish danger in Russian Karelia.' 
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	 The gravest military problem was the fact that the Finnish trunk 
railway lay too close to the southern coast; in particular the railway 
bridges over the great waterways at Kymijoki and Viipuri could easily 
be cut by an enemy raid. The military authorities demanded another 
transverse line to be constructed in the interior, out of enemy reach. 
Finns deemed such a line to be of little economic sense, but under 
military pressure a line from St Petersburg via Elisenvaara, Pieksämäki 
and Haapamäki to Vaasa slowly took form. The last link was 
completed in 1917, at the end of the Russian period in Finnish history.6 
Further problems were created by the question of local 
administration in the vicinity of the fortresses, because the reach of 
modem guns made necessary extending the fortress esplanades from 
a few hundred feet to several miles, covering inhabited areas 
especially around Sveaborg and Viipuri. 
The Imperial rules for the administration of fortress districts and 
of areas under martial law, giving the fortress commandant or military 
4 	 Spravka o raskhodakh finliandskoi kazny na soedinitelnuiu vety mezhdu 
finliandskimi i imperskimi zheleznymi dorogami a takzhe na pereustroistvo dorog 
dlia propuska imperskago podvizhnago sostava. KKK 1914, II department, delo 
91, National Archives of Finland. 
5 	 Therefore crossing the border between Finland and the East Karelian gubernii 
was limited, and primary schools and libraries, established by a Finnish-Karelian 
society, were closed down by order of Imperial authorities. 
6 	 For railway questions, see: Polvinen, Die finnischen Eisenbahnen in den 
militärischen und politischen Plänen Russlands vor den ersten Weltkrieg. 
commander extraordinary administrative authority, which had also 
been been extended by Bobrikov to cover Finland, were ignored by 
the Finns. Grand Duke Nicholas Nicholaevich, commander of the 
Guards troops and of the St Petersburg military district, chairman of 
the Committee of Imperial Defence, asked the Governor-General, in 
1906, to make public the rules in due order and thus make them legally 
binding.' 
Mechelin's Senate declared that Bobrikov's order had been 
annulled together with all other illegal decrees by the Manifesto of 
November 1905. The right of Finnish citizens to live and build houses 
anywhere in the country could not be limited by any orders or decrees 
without due constitutional legislation. 
Governor-General Gerard explained to the military authorities that 
it would be preferable to desist from an immediate proclamation of 
the rules because it would provoke agitation in a country only 
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matter was one of all-Imperial military concern, but this did not mean 
that local circumstances should be totally ignored, said Gerard. 
The Grand Duke answered angrily that it was the non-proclamation 
of the rules that was illegal, and that he could not allow defence needs 
to be submitted to the decision of the local Senate. He was responsible 
for the security of the fortresses and of the Imperial capital and had 
to insist on the proclamation.8 
The Minister of War, Roediger, declared that imperial laws did not 
require any adaptation to local rules and that the Emperor's military 
authority must be in force everywhere in the Empire, Finland included, 
because the border country was an indivisible part of the realm.' 
Thus the question of fortress districts or esplanades led into the 
7 	 Instruktsiia opredeliaiushchaia otnosheniia gorodskikh i selskikh poselenii 
Sveaborgskago krepostnago raiona, a takzhe politsii onykh, k komendantu 
Sveaborgskoi kreposti; Sveaborg commandant to the Governor-General 9/22. IX 
1904, 28. III/10. IV 1905; Viipuri commandant to Governor General 28. XII 
1904/10. 11905, KKK 1905, II department, delo 7.XIV 4; Governor-General 
Gerard to the Senate 14. III/I. III 1906 (_ncludes the Grand Ducal order), KKK 
1906, 2. department, delo XIV G(B), National Archives of Finland. 
8 	 Zapiska po delu ob utverzhdenii plan granits krepostnykh raionov Sveaborgskoi 
i Vyborgskoi krepostei 15. XI 1906; correspondece between Gerard and Nicholas 
Nicholaevich in June — December 1906, KKK 1906, 2. department, delo XIV 
G(B), National Archives of Finland. 
9 	 Correspondence between the Senate and Minister State Secretary 1907-1908: 
KKK 1907, I department, delo 45, National Archives of Finland. 
major problem of legislating for Finland in questions of an all-imperial 
interest. Contemporary Finns were well aware of the forces grouping 
against them: "Anti-Finnish feeling is being fomented in military 
circles close to the Grand Duke Nicholas. The statement of the Senate 
on the fortress esplanade question has made the Grand Duke angry."10 
A similar problem, important mainly from a standpoint of principle, 
but also with a practical aspect, was the question of military assistance 
to civilian authorities in keeping order. Earlier, in the extremely rare 
cases where such assistance had been necessary, the civilian authority 
in question had asked for it from the nearest garrison. During the 
general strike of 1905, the disadvantage of the system had been 
demonstrated: in the absence of civilian demand, the military had been 
unable, though, in fact, also afraid, to intervene in the disorder. The 
constitutionalist Senate would have liked to keep to the old rules, but 
Russian commanders wanted the authority to intervene on their own 
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	 initiative. They did not trust the constitutionalist governors nor the 
police officers, who might use the Imperial army for their own party 
purposes, or, on the other hand, they might be reluctant to resort to 
military assistance, and the army would again be compelled to remain 
a bystander in the midst of grave revolutionary disorder. 
In February 1906, new rules for military assistance in keeping order 
had been issued in Russia (and applied on thousands of occasions). 
Nicholas Nicholaevich and Roediger demanded similar rules for 
Finland, too, and again the Senate resorted to delaying tactics. It was 
only in 1909 that they answered that the rules of 1906 could not be 
applied in Finland, because all-Imperial legislation for Finland had 
been annulled in 1905; if necessary, they explained, the rules should 
be approved by the Finnish Parliament in due constitutional order.' 
Of course, this opinion was not accepted by the government; the 
Imperial army could not follow different rules in different corners of 
the Empire. In 1913, when the 'separatist' regime in Finland had been 
replaced by a collaborationist one, a problem still remained: 
proclaiming the rules would imply that they had not been in force 
from the very beginning in 1906, while without a proclamation Finns 
would not know the law. In the end, the Russian law of 1906 was 
10 	 Hultin, Päiväkirjani kertoo, vol. I, s. 412. (Diary of H.). 
11 	 For the correspondence on this, see: KKK 1906, I department, delo 46_07, KKK 
1907, I department, delo 46-07, National Archives of Finland. 
published in the Finnish official collection of decrees and laws.'-
Together, these questions made a strong case against Finnish 
self-government from the military point of view. There were plenty 
of practical security considerations, too. 
Security problems and constitutional pretexts 
According to gendarme reports, only a completely naive person could 
believe that the Voima, the armed Activist organization, had ceased 
to exist when ordered to be dissolved by the Mechelin Senate. 
Informers knew that arms smuggling continued, machine guns were 
hidden, fire brigades and police detachments were secretly receiving 
military training in shooting, skiing, and orienteering, a boy-scout 
organization was being established in the country to foster physical 
and patriotic training. Even the Salvation Army aroused suspicions; 
at least a report on it was drawn up in conjunction with other security 
problems. 
The gendarme informants even knew the war plan of the rebels: 
the rising was to start in the north, the front was to be on the Tampere—
Kuopio—Joensuu line, with Vaasa, Oulu and Kemi as rear bases, and 
the headquarters in Tampere. The rebels had already contacted the 
Socialist Revolutionaries to co-ordinate common action. When foreign 
danger or internal disorder drew Russia's attention and forces 
elsewhere, Russia was to be presented with an ultimatum for greater 
rights for Finland. The Russian garrisons, dispersed far from each 
other in the country, were to be disarmed, and then a two-pronged 
attack would be launched in the Viipuri—St Petersburg direction and 
towards the south coast, where the garrison of Sveaborg would rise 
in revolt.13 
The informers calculated that the old Finnish army had trained 
12 	 Zhurnal Vysochaishe uchrezhdennago Osobago Soveshchaniia po delam Velikago 
Kniazhestva Finliandskago 4. III 1913, po proektu pravil o prizyve voisk dlia 
sodeistviia grazhdanskim vlastiam; Spravka k vsepoddanneishemu predstavleniiu 
Imperatorskago Finliandskago Senata s proektom ob izmenenii deistvuiushchikh 
pravil o prizyve voisk dlia sodeistviia grazhdanskim vlastiam, KKK 1912, I 
department, delo 17-6; Osobyi Zhurnal Soveta Ministrov 22. VIII 1913, I 
department, delo 17-3. National Archives of Finland. 
13 KKK Hd 79, n:o 2, Politicheskoe polozhenie v krae i vyzvannyia im mery dlia 
okhranenie gosudarstvennago poriadka i obshchestvennago poriadka; KKK Hd 87, 
n:o 1, delo Voimy; KKK hd 103 n:o 103, sovershenno sekretnaia zapiska o 
vooruzhenii Finliandii 1911-1912 gg. National Archives of Finland. 
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33,000 men in active service and 160,000 men in the reserve, and in 
addition there were the men trained by the Voima. If the age classes 
of the twenty to forty year olds consisted of 390,000 men, and if half 
of them could be supposed to be fit for fighting, the Finnish forces 
would be 200,000 strong. Some of the writers saw these forces as a 
united army, others discerned a Red and a White Guard, a few 
informants invented even a Blue Guard.14  
The danger of a domino effect also haunted the keepers of order. 
If the Finns should acquire their 'rights', nothing would prevent 
Georgians, Poles, Armenians and who knows what Karakalpachians 
from demanding similar privileges. If the Finns were allowed their 
separate army, then Estonian-Livonian, Polish-Lithuanian and 
Khokholian15 armies would be formed. Instead of the one and 
indivisible Russian Empire, a "Disunited States of East Europe" would 
be born. The danger might be even greater: on all Finnish maps the 
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	 St Petersburg guberniia was called Inkeri (Ingria), Pan-Finnish propa- 
ganda was being spread into neighbouring regions, and fraternization 
with the Estonians took place at song festivals. Plans for a Pan-Fennic 
empire from the Gulf of Bothnia to the Pacific Ocean were only 
waiting for the emergence of a Finnish Alexander the Great for their 
realization.16 These fears were probably held only by the most nervous 
of Russian chauvinists, but even serious officials were apprehensive 
of the Finnish belief that they were chosen by God to teach and unite 
other Fenno-Ugric peoples." 
The gendarme reports led to an interpellation in the Imperial Duma 
in the spring of 1908. Rightist and Nationalist deputies asked what 
the government knew of these plans and what it was doing to avoid 
the danger. Was it true that the Finnish Voima was arming in order 
to separate the border country from the Empire, and that revolutiona-
ries were protected in Finland, all with the knowledge of local officials?18 
Questions of security and Imperial integrity were of essential 
concern for Stolypin, even if he was not directly responsible for 
14 Kamenskii, Sovremennoe polozhenie v Finliandii s tochski zreniia oborony 
gosudarstva; Rumiantsev, Finliandiia vooruzhaetsia; Borodkin, Itogi stoletiia. 
15 	 A pet or pejorative name for Ukrainians. 
16 	 Kamenskii, Sovremennoe polozhenie v Finliandii... p. 31, 52, 63. 
17 	 Gerard to the Ministry of Interior 27. XII 1907/9. I 1908, KKK Dd 5, National 
Archives of Finland. 
18 	 Gosudarstvennaia Duma, Tretii sozyv, Sessiia 1, chast' 2, zasedanie shestidesiatoe. 
Stenograficheskii otchet 5. V 1908, p. 2913-18. 
military matters. In order to maintain or to regain the confidence of 
the Emperor and the court, he also had to take into account the 
Emperor's annoyance at the careless Finnish attitude towards the 
Russian revolutionaries and the restrictive interpretation of Nicholas's 
Imperial authority in the Grand Duchy. The military point of view 
was expressed at the highest level by Nicholas Nicholaevich.19 
Anti-Finnish opinions were echoed by the chauvinist publications and 
organizations of the extreme Right, for example, the "United Nobility 
of Russia" and the "Society of the Russian People", which contempo-
rary Finns suspected of close ties with the police, army leadership, 
and the court.20 Policy towards Finland was not formed independently 
of internal Russian politics; it reflected the varying strengths of 
authoritarian and moderate liberal tendencies,21 but this fact did not 
invalidate the security cares of the military staffs. 
Stolypin concluded that Finland really was a problem, from the 
point of view of Imperial unity and Russian national domination. The 	 207 
Finnish administration could not be trusted because they were 
separatists and blind to legitimate Imperial interests. 
Military plans could not be made against foreign enemies alone in 
these revolutionary times. Admiral Shcheglov declared that the first 
task of the armed forces was to keep the Baltic and Finnish provinces 
peaceful in order to secure the Imperial capital. According to a hastily 
sketched plan in 1906, similar to that of the autumn of 1905, in case 
of a rebellion, the troops in Finland were to be reinforced to their full 
wartime strength, and an expeditionary detachment from the Guards 
units in peacetime strength was to be sent to the Isthmus.22 
Because of the reported existence and growth of the Finnish Voima, 
more detailed military plans were necessary for putting down a 
rising.23 In January and February 1907, high-level meetings were held 
to discuss the necessary measures. In case of trouble, a state of war 
19 	 Boeckmann to Gerard 31. I 1907, KKK 1907, I department, delo XX, National 
Archives of Finland. 
20 	 Adolf Törngren (a semi-official Constitutionalist observer in St Petersburg) to the 
Senate 12. IV 1907, p. 290-96. 
21 	 Kujala, Venäjän hallituksen suunnitelmat Suomen palauttamisesta järjestykseen 
vuosina 1907-1914. (The Plans of the Russian government for the Restoration of 
Order in Finland). 
22 	 Mery po obezpechenii gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti. Sovershenno sekretno. Hd 
14, n:o 6, KKK, National Archives of Finland. 
23 	 Shatsillo, Russkii imperializm i razvitie flota 1906-1914, pp. 87-88. 
was to be declared in Finland. A commander-in-chief was to be 
appointed to command all troops, ships, border guards, the pilot and 
lighthouse organization and the customs services in the country. All 
contact between Finns and foreign countries were to be cut and 
wireless stations were to be controlled by the military. Russian courts 
martial, acting according to Russian laws, were to take over juridicial 
tasks in the country.24 
In April 1907, a Finnish observer25 in St Petersburg informed the 
Finnish Senate of rumours according to which many military 
commanders were talking about a forthcoming reconquest of Finland, 
with the purpose of returning to the Bobrikov regime. The first 
necessity was to replace Gerard with a more accommodating man, 
and Deutrich had suggested inviting Seyn back from Grodno to the 
post. The Emperor believed that a victory of the conciliatory Old 
Finnish party in the forthcoming first democratic elections (in the 
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	 summer 1907) would prove that the common people favoured Tsarism, 
after which Mechelin and Gerard could be dismissed.26 
There is no hint in the available documents of the reason why no 
steps were taken in the spring of 1907. Törngren, the observer cited 
above, explained that the Senate sent a report of 150 pages denying 
the existence of the Voima, and with its aid the Minister State 
Secretary Langhoff was able to calm the Emperor down. 
To counter this, in the summer of 1907 the Emperor received fresh 
information about preparations for a Finnish revolution, and the result 
of the elections was no confirmation of the dogma of a popular 
monarchism. It is true that the Old Finns, the party of appeasement, 
won 59 seats, while the Constitutionalists were left with 50 (26 Young 
Finns, 24 Swedish), and 9 Agrarian deputies. It is also true that the 
common people voted eagerly, but they voted for the Social 
Democrats, who got 80 deputies in the Diet or Parliament, with even 
women among them. 
Thus, in the autumn, it seemed that the planned military measures 
had to be taken. Now, the plan was to declare martial law only in the 
county or guberniia of Viipuri, the worst infected by the 
24 	 Nicholas II to Stolypin 30. I 1907 (invitation to the meeting). Krasnyi Arkhiv 
V/1924, p. 107; Zhurnal Vysochaishe uchrezhdennago osobago soveshchaniia 1. 
II 1907. Hd 14, n:o 6, KKK, National Archives of Finland. 
25 	 See supra, Törngren. 
26 	 Nicholas II to Stolypin in the letters cited below. 
revolutionaries. The commander of the 22nd Army Corps Vladimir 
Boeckmann was to be appointed commander-in-chief of the operation, 
and Seyn was to be called back from Grodno to the post of Deputy 
Governor-General. The idea was that when Gerard learned of this 
unwanted aide, he would be offended and would demand permission 
to leave his post. Seyn would then govern the country, while 
Boeckmann pacified the Viipuri region and purged it of revolution-
aries. 
Nicholas II was very much annoyed when the plan was leaked to 
the press. The revolutionaries hiding in Finland took the warning and 
escaped abroad. Perhaps also the measures which the Mechelin Senate 
was frightened enough finally to take against the Russian revolution-
aries weakened the pretext for military measures. Perhaps Stolypin 
was afraid of difficulties with the moderate Duma majority.' No 
state of war was declared but Seyn was appointed Deputy 
Governor-General, Gerard was humiliated and asked to resign, and 
was replaced by Boeckmann in February 1908. Lieutenant General 
Olkhovskii was then appointed to be Boeckmann's successor as 
commander of the 22nd Army Corps. 
The planning for martial law for Finland went on as well as 
preparations for transferring additional troops to the Viipuri region.8 
Stolypin stressed the fact that the Emperor had decided that if the 
Finns should go on breaking the law, measures would be taken manu 
militari, but he hoped that things were turning out for the better.29 
They did not. In February 1908, Stolypin had to remind Edvard 
Hjelt, a Finnish politician, that the government could not allow Finns 
to go on granting asylum to Russian revolutionaries; if this was not 
stopped, the whole country would be put under a state of siege.'0 
Mechelin prepared another unpleasant surprise for Stolypin. In 
paying the twenty million marks for 1906 and 1907 in lieu of Finnish 
military service, the Senate reminded the Imperial Government of the 
necessity of ending the unconstitutional situation. The Senate 
27 	 Kujala, Venäjän hallituksen suunnitelmat Suomen palauttamisesta järjestykseen 
vuosina 1907-1914, p. 292. 
28 	 Nicholas II to Stolypin 11. XI, 12. XI, 1. XII 1907, Krasnyi Arkhiv 5/1924 — It 
is a pity that only one half of the correspondence was published by the editors 
of Krasnyi Arkhiv, but Nicholas's letters are clear enough as to the main points 
of the plot. 
29 Stolypin to Nicholas II 22. XII 1907, Krasnyi Arkhiv V(XXX)/1928 p. 80. 
30 Hjelt, Finlands självständighet, pp. 199-200. 
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understood that some all-Imperial points of view had to be taken into 
account, but in their opinion Finns could well serve in an army of 
their own as decreed in 1878, if only it were to be organized, trained 
and armed identically with the Russian army.31  
Both Governor-General Boeckmann and Prime Minister Stolypin 
were ignorant of this initiative and learned of it only from the 
newspapers32 - of course, because according to the Finnish constitu-
tion the matter did not fall within their competence. On the other 
hand, the Council of Ministers stated that military matters were not 
included in the authority of the local Senate or Diet or any local 
institution; and the Emperor had already, in 1906, decided that the 
separate Finnish army was not to be restored?' 
The Senate's proposal was another reason for the interpellation of 
the Rightist and Nationalist groups in the Imperial Duma in May 1908. 




Finnish army, and that when those schemes had been negatived in 
1901, he and his party had resorted to passive resistance, while the 
Voima had started preparing armed resistance under the protection of 
the Finnish administration.34 
Stolypin, to whom the interpellation was not unpleasant, and 
probably not unexpected, answered that Finland was indeed a problem. 
Strict measures against the recalcitrant and indolent administration were 
necessary, but the problem went deeper. The Finns believed that 
Finland was a separate state, although in fact it was a Russian province, 
admittedly with its own internal laws and administration. He was not 
going to reduce Finland's legal rights but only to extend the authority 
of the Imperial Government to this border country, in which task he 
hoped for the support of the patriotic elements in the Duma.35 
31 	 Senate to the Governor General 11. V 1908, further to Stolyin 9/22. V 1908. 
KKK 1908, II department, Delo 38/1908, National Archives of Finland. 
32 	 Stolypin to Boeckmann 23. IV 1908, Boeckman to the Senate 21. IV/4. V 1908. 
KKK 1908, 2. department, delo 38, National Archives of Finland. 
33 Osobyi Zhurnal Soveta Ministrov 11. VI 1908 po vsepoddanneishemu 
predstavleniiu Imperatorskago Finliandskago Senata o priniatii Ego Imperatorskim 
Velichestvom pochina k razresheniiu, v ustanovlennom osnovnomi zakonami 
poriadke, voprose o vozstanovlenii finskikh voisk i o predostanovlenii Senatu 
vyrabotat', v vide podgotovlennykh mer, vsepoddanneishii po semu predmetu 
proekt. KKK 1908, II department, delo 38/1908, National Archives of Finland. 
34 	 Gosudarstvennaia Duma, tretii sozyv, sessiia 1, chast 2, zasedanie 5. V 1908, 
Stenograficheskii otchet pp. 2913-18, 2945-58. 
35 	 Gosudarstvennaia Duma, pp. 2923-39. 
The first step was to prevent the Senate from transgressing its 
authority. In June 1908, an order was given to submit all Finnish 
affairs to the Council of Ministers, instead of only to the Finnish 
Minister State Secretary, before referring them to the Emperor. 
Mechelin saw that no chance existed of making the Russian 
government respect the Finnish constitution and asked to be allowed 
to resign, a request to which the Emperor graciously consented. 
Mechelin was replaced with the more moderate Edvard Hjelt. 
The necessity for military intervention still remained. When, in 
1870, the Finnish railway trunk line had been brought to St Petersburg, 
no connecting line over the River Neva had been constructed. 
Bobrikov had stressed the importance of avoiding the costly and 
time-consuming detraining in the Nikolaev station in the capital, the 
march through the city, and boarding another train in the Finland 
station. The money had been promised by the Senate, but not paid. 
In 1907, Stolypin reminded the Finns of the railway bridge over the 	 211 
Neva,36 and a year later, the Ministry of Finance demanded the Finnish 
financial contribution for the project. In August 1908, the Senate asked 
for an Imperial proposal for including the Neva bridge millions in the 
budget for the year 1909. Stolypin was angry at this move, because 
the Senate was evidently trying to divert another question of Imperial 
military importance into the sphere of Finnish legislation. He ordered 
the payment, without any further constitutional pretexts, of 2.5 million 
roubles or 6.67 million marks to the Imperial treasury.37 
Hjelt and his Senate did not obey, and the Diet took the matter 
under consideration without a due Imperial proposal. The Constitutio-
nalists declared that no Finnish public money could be spent without 
being included in the budget and approved by the Diet.38 The 
conciliatory Old Finns explained that the matter should not be made 
a cause of a constitutional conflict, because the money had been 
36 	 Osobyi zhurnal Soveta Ministrov 27. III 1907. KKK 1908, IV department, delo 
4-1, National Archives of Finland. 
37 	 Kokovtsov to Langhoff 6. III 1908, Stolypin to Boeckmann 12. VII 1908, Stolypin 
to Boeckmann 21. VIII 1908, Boeckmann to Stolypin 25. VIII 1908, Stolypin to 
Boeckmann 12. IX 1908, Stolypin to Langhoff 12. IX 1908, Boeckmann to 
Stolypin 19. IX/2. X 1908, Stolypin to Boeckmann 29. IX 1908, Langhoff to 
Boeckmann 27. IX/10. X 1908. KKK 1908, IV department, delo 4-1, National 
Archives of Finland. 
38 	 Toiset valtiopäivät 1908, Asiakirjat I, n:o 8, Valtiovarainvaliokunnan mietintö, 
Vastalauseita. (Parliamentary documents). 
promised in 1904, nor should the question be officially taken up 
without the Imperial consent. The Social Democrats declared that they 
opposed any military expenditure, but desisted from the official 
discussion — they always tried to avoid provoking the Imperial 
authorities to take measures such as were taken in Russia against the 
Labour movement. As a result of the way the Old Finns and Socialists 
voted, the matter was not put on the official agenda, the 
Constitutionalists were defeated, and the conflict was thus avoided 
this time.'9 The millions for the Neva bridge were paid in December 
1908,4° and the bridge was completed in 1913, nowadays called 
Finliandskii zheleznodorozhnyi most. 
Professor Behrendts, a member of Stolypin's advisory committee 
on Finnish questions, explained that until 1878 the Finns had paid 
military expenditure as ordered by the Emperor. Thereafter the Diet 
had tried to reduce the Imperial prerogatives especially in financial 
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	 questions, resorting to a reinterpretation of ancient Swedish 
constitutions in order to establish parliamentarism, leaving with very 
little power to the Emperor or the Russian govemment.41  
Before the decision of the Diet, Governor-General Boeckmann had 
been nervous and stayed up until five o'clock in the morning at which 
point he was happy to learn of the Diet's decision to desist from 
conflict. Stolypin had said to Hjelt that the Finns would be regarded 
as rebels should they not pay the Neva millions, and had threatened 
"we have the military force and the fortresses".42 Hjelt concluded that 
the 'dark forces', i.e. the Bobrikovian counsellors of Stolypin, had 
been eager to regard refusal as a rebellion and a pretext for military 
measures to make an end of Finnish autonomy and separatism.43  
The Finnish military tribute regulated 
As yet the question of Finnish military service remained without a 
definite solution. Several Imperial institutions declared that the Finns 
should be made to serve in the Imperial army and navy but, because 
39 	 Toiset valtiopäivät 1908, Pöytäkirjat, pp. 2164-2258. (Parliamentary protocols). 
40 	 Senate to Boeckmann 2. XI 1908. KKK 1908, IV department, delo 4-1, National 
Archives of Finland. 
41 	 Berendts, Kratkii Ocherk biudzhetnago prava Finliandii. 
42 	 Hjelt, Vaiherikkailta vuosilta , vol. I, pp. 199-200 (memoirs of H.). 
43 	 Hjelt, Vaiherikkailta vuosilta, vol. I, pp. 199-200, 228-29. 
it was not yet timely, they were to continue paying the ten million 
annual marks instead. 
Stolypin, Kokovtsov and Roediger agreed," only remarking that 
the sum of ten millions was much less than the benefit to the Finns 
by their freedom from personal military service. In addition, the Finns 
ought to have contributed as well to the Imperial financial burden for 
defence, though it was difficult to calculate the total amount of benefit 
which Finland enjoyed as part of the Empire, for instance, its share 
in the costs of the court, diplomatic representation, navy, etc. The 
levelling up of the financial military burden was still being assessed 
in detail and no definite sum was ever agreed on, but, for example, 
General Zolotarev of the statistical department of the General Staff, 
calculated that Finland ought to have participated in Imperial military 
expenditure to the extent of 45,413,000 roubles or more than 
100,000,000 marks.45 
Now, in 1909, no proposal for the military millions were presented 	 213 
to the Finnish Diet, the payment was simply to be taken from the 
regular income of the Finnish state.46 The Senate had lost all hope for 
a separate Finnish army, but they still wished to be allowed to pay 
the money in due constitutional form. In March, they asked for an 
Imperial proposal to be put before the Diet concerning the annual 
payments, but the only answer was that an Imperial decision was soon 
to be given on the question.47 The Council of Ministers once more 
explained that military matters did not fall within the jurisdiction of 
local authorities, that the Emperor had ordered the payment of ten 
million marks for each of the years 1908 and 1909 to be taken from 
44 	 Stolypin to Kokovtsov 30. VII 1907, Roediger to Langhoff 7. VIII 1907, Stolypin 
to Roediger 17. VIII 1907. KKK 1907, II department, delo 8-2 C II, National 
Archives of Finland. 
45 	 Zapiska general-leitenanta Zolotareva o finansovoi polozhenie Finliandii 30. IV 
1910. Tsentralnyi Gosudarstvennyi Voenno-Istoricheskii Arkhiv SSSR, fond 
586/Microfilm NL 172, National Archives of Finland. 
46 	 Zhurnal Vysochaishe uchrezhdennago Osobago Soveshchaniia po delam Velikago 
Kniazhestva Finliandskago 20. VI i 30. X 1908. KKK 1908, IV department, delo 
37, National Archives of Finland. — Gendarme spies reported from Finland that 
the monetary tribute would not cause insuperable difficulties, while compulsory 
personal military service in the Russian army could lead to serious agitation. It 
seems that they always reported what was asked of them. Svodka svedeniia iz 
Finliandii 5. I 1909. KKK 1909, I department, delo XXII-2, National Archives 
of Finland. 
47 	 Senaatin talousosaston pöytäkirja 2. III 1909. (Senate protocol, translated into 
Russian). KKK 1910, II department, delo 12 — B, National Archives of Finland. 
the regular income in 1910, and that, for later years, a sum growing 
annually by one million was to be collected by taxation. Nicholas II 
signed a manifesto decreeing all this on 7 October 1909.48 
Nevertheless, the Senate still discussed the military question. They 
did not deny the duty of Finns to participate Imperial defence; they 
only stressed that the decision belonged to the Diet, without whose 
consent the payment would be illegal. The Diet also protested; 
questions of military service and taxation could only be regulated 
through a decision of Parliament, which would then be approved by 
the monarch. The unilateral Imperial manifesto had no constitutional 
existence, and no money could be legally transferred on its basis. 
Because the protest had no effect, the Finnish senators, in the end 
even the most conciliatory ones, resigned.49 The protesting Diet was 
dissolved.5o 
Thus the military question led to an irreparable constitutional 
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	 conflict. Finnish self-government was not totally abolished, however, 
because administering the innumerable minute details of local life 
would have caused too much trouble to the government in St 
Petersburg. Because no responsible Finnish politicians wanted to 
collaborate with the Imperial government, and an insufficient number 
of Russian officials knew the circumstances and languages of the 
border country, Finnish-born but Russified officials, most of them 
admirals and generals, were collected from all over the Empire51 and 
appointed Senators in Helsinki, initially under the chairmanship of 
Lieutenant General Vladimir Markov. 
A reliable Governor-General, at last 
However, the situation was not a satisfactory one. Gendarme informa-
tion on the Voima was being transmitted in ever growing frequency 
48 	 Langhoff to Governor-General 29. IX/12. X 1909, Governor-General to Stolypin 
12/21. X 1909, Langhoff to Governor-General 17. X/1. XI 1909, KKK 1909, IV 
department, delo 8 — 2, 26; National Archives of Finland. The manifest published 
in Asetuskokoelma 1909 n:o 59 (Collection of published laws and decrees). 
49 	 Senate to the Emperor 25. IX 1909, Stolypin to Governor-General 21. IX 1909. 
KKK 1909, IV department, delo 8 — 2, National Archives of Finland. 
50 Toiset valtiopäivät 1909, Pöytäkirjat p. 1297, 1315, 1844, Asiakirjat, 
perustuslakivaliokunnan mietintö n:o 3, Vastalauseet (Parliamentary protocols, 
committee documents). 
51 	 Polivanov, Memuary, p. 80. 
and was of an ever more alarming content. Japanese spies were 
reported travelling in Finland, Mechelin was visiting the Japanese 
legation in Stockholm, an unknown Japanese took part in a meeting 
of the Voima, and maps of Kronstadt had been stolen for the Japanese. 
The Emperor wrote in the margin of the report: "The Finnish 
Governor-General should be informed of the Japanese espionage".52 
Boeckmann answered that without any doubt the information was 
correct since it had been deemed worthy of being brought to the 
Emperor's knowledge, but Finnish courts demanded evidence before 
passing any sentences' Quite clearly the General did not believe the 
reports, and to the Finns he declared that as far as he was concerned, 
their constitution would be honoured.54 
Thus Boeckmann, who with fire and sword had put down the 
rebellion in the Baltic provinces, proved an unsatisfactory Governor-
General in Finland. He did not perceive any danger of rebellion in 
the country, but only a people striving to preserve their constitutional 
rights, which the Emperor had sworn to uphold. He did not want to 
provoke a conflict nor to resort to extraordinary measures against his 
peaceful wards.55  The General thus turned out to be no improvement 
on Gerard, at least in the light cast by the spies, and Finns were 
convinced that "Seyn's intrigues with the gendarmes against Gerard 
and Boeckman... were the principal reason for the fall" of the two 
governor-generals.56 Later, Boeckmann said to Hjelt that Seyn's 
schemes had caused his dismissal.57 Seyn's complicity in the gendarme 
reports cannot be proved, but he referred them to the Council of 
Ministers without protest, though it is difficult to believe that he did 
not know that most of them were imaginary. Provocation and false 
denouncements were normal methods in the Russian security service. 
Seyn was appointed Governor-General of Finland on 11 November 
1909. Now, at last, the border country was taken firmly into the hands 
52 	 Chief of the General Staff to Boeckmann 16. X 1909. KKK 1910, I department, 
delo XLVI, National Archives of Finland. 
53 Boeckmann to Stolypin 25. X/5. XI 1909. KKK 1910, I department, delo XLVI, 
National Archives of Finland. 
54 	 The Governor-General's answer to an address of the Kotka town councillors 21. 
VI/4. VII 1909. KKK 1909, II department, n:o 11 b, National Archives of Finland. 
55 	 Boeckmann to Stolypin 28. XII 1908/2. I 1909, 11. II 1909, 20. II/5. III 1909, I 
department, delo XLVI, National Archives of Finland. 
56 	 Suomalainen Kansa 1.11 1909. (a newspaper cutting in KKK 1908, I department, 
delo XVIII-7, National Archives of Finland). 
57 Hjelt, Finlands självständighet, vol. I, p. 275. 
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of the central government. As distinct from the previous Governors-
Generals, who were the Emperor's personal representatives, Seyn 
served on a lower level, as a tool of the Council of Ministers. In time, 
he succeeded in purging the local administration of the most recalci-
trant constitutionalists; after the Senators, Governors were replaced by 
Russians or Russified Finns. Seyn had difficulties similar to those of 
Bobrikov in finding collaborators for lower offices, and in particular 
the courts of justice were able to continue their 'politicking', which 
they called constitutional passive resistance. However, for a while, no 
mass opposition movement emerged comparable to that which had 
produced the addresses of 1899-1901 or the strike of 1902-04 against 
conscription because Seyn was cautious enough to avoid measures 
which would have provoked such general dissatisfaction in Finland, 
though he had to be strict enough in order not to lose the confidence 
of the Emperor and the support of the radical reactionaries. 
Imperial interests secured 
The next step on the way to bringing the border country closer to the 
other parts of the Empire was taken in 1910, when a procedure for 
legislation in Finland in matters of Imperial interest was re-introduced, 
recalling the policy of 1899.58 Such laws were to be initiated by the 
Imperial government, never by the Finns. The Finnish Senate and Diet 
were to be consulted, and then the proposal was to be discussed and 
decided by the Imperial Duma and Imperial Council, and finally 
accepted or vetoed by the Emperor. Finns were given two seats in the 
Imperial Council and four in the Duma, but the seats were never 
occupied because the Imperial legislative authorities had no existence 
in the Finnish constitution. 
Stolypin and the majority of the Council of Ministers were of the 
opinion that Finnish autonomy was not reduced by the reform. What 
was curbed was the Finnish tendency to usurp authority in Imperial 
questions. The proposal was intended to strengthen the Russian state, 
and desisting from it would imply weakness and would diminish 
respect for Russia abroad.59 
58 Seyn's view on the Finnish question is in a report entitled: Politicheskoe 
polozhenie v krae i vyzvannyia im mery dlia gosudarstvennogo spokoistviia. KKK 
Hd 99, National Archives of Finland. 
59 Osobyi Zhurnal Soveta Ministrov 22. II 1910. KKK 1910, I department, delo 18 
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Nicholas II explained to Langhoff that he was sorry to annoy his 
Finnish subjects, but he had to take the interest of the whole Empire 
into account.6°  
Finns never acknowledged the diktat; they only saw that their 
constitution was being broken, and they felt they were living under 
oppression. Seyn explained that they were already so full of hatred 
that the new law could not increase their animosity any more.61  
Again, first in the list of matters of Imperial concern was Finnish 
military service.62 In 1910, the re-elected Diet tried to obstruct a 
further transfer of Finnish money for military purposes by budgeting 
more money for education and communications. The Russified Senate 
prohibited such waste and sent the eleven millions then due to the 
Imperial treasury. 
To make an end of such repeated obstruction, the Council of 
Ministers decided to regulate the military payment by the new 
procedure decreed in 1910. Thus the Emperor and the Council of 	 217 
Ministers could be spared the trouble of a special manifesto each 
year.63 
It was again declared that Finnish personal military service was 
inopportune, because the percentage of 'alien races' in the army 
already surpassed 25% and there was no reason to increase it by 
drafting ill-disposed men, who, after their service, would enter the 
reserve of the Voima. Because of the separatist tendencies in the 
border country and its vicinity close to the Imperial capital, it was 
best for Russia to be content with a financial contribution instead of 
military service. 
According to the proposal, the Finnish state was to pay 12 million 
for 1911 and then one million more for every year until in 1919 the 
I, National Archives of Finland. 
60 	 Langhoff, Seitsemän vuotta Suomen edustajana valtaistuimen edessä, pp. 302, 
308. (Memoirs of L. as Minister State Secretary). 
61 	 Osobyi Zhumal Soveta Ministrov 22. II 1910. KKK 1910, I department, delo 18 
I, National Archives of Finland. 
62 Zhumal Vysochaishe uchrezhdennoi Komissii dlia vyrabotki proekta pravil o 
pordiadka izdaniia kazaiushchikhsia Finliandii zakonov obshchegosudarstvennogo 
snachenii. KKK 1910, I department, delo 18-1. National Archives of Finland. 
63 	 0 nekotorykh merakh, sviazannykh s izdaniem zakona 17 iiulia 1910 goda ob 
obshchegosudarstvennym zakonodatelstve; 0 proizvodstve finliandskoiu kaznoiu 
denezhnykh platezhakh Gosudarstv. kaznacheistvu vzamen otbyvaniia 
finliandtsami lichnoi povinnosti. KKK 1910, II department, delo 81-1, National 
Archives of Finland. 
sum amounted to 20 million marks. The Council of Ministers removed 
from the proposal the words "until personal military service can be 
restored", because the Finns could have interpreted it as a promise. 
Twenty million marks was not to be a definite maximum and after 
ten years the sum would be reconsidered. 
Again, as in 1899, the Finnish Diet refused to give any statement 
because the Council of Ministers was not a constitutionally authorized 
organ for Finnish affairs.` This protest was comfortably ignored by 
the Imperial government; the Finns had been asked for a statement 
as decreed in the law of 1910, and now the question could be discussed 
in the Duma in November 1911.65 
Kokovtsov, the Minister of Finance, appointed Prime Minister after 
Stolypin had been murdered in September 1911, spoke for the 
government in the Duma. According to his words, the honest Finnish 
people had been led astray by their leaders, who regarded the proposal 
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	 as oppression, but in fact the new law was unavoidable, because 
Finland could not be allowed a separate army nor could Finns be 
accepted into the Imperial army. And it was fair, because each Russian 
subject paid about 4.5 roubles for military purposes every year, in 
addition to personal military service, while every Finn was to pay 
1.5-2.5 roubles only and still be exempt from service 66 
The tone of Kokovtsov's speech was designed to please the 
Rightists, the Nationalists, and the court, who were dissatisfied with 
the Finnish situation. They were delighted at the Prime Minister's 
truly Russian words.67 
On the Left, the Constitutionalist Democrat or Kadet party remark-
ed that the Duma did not represent all the Russian people; the military 
conflict had been originated by Kuropatkin, who had led Russia to 
defeat, and Bobrikov, who had polluted the pages of Russian history.68 
The Leftists pointed out that it was the government's policy that had 
made Finns hostile to Russia, and all honest citizens could only oppose 
the government both in the Empire and in the Grand Duchy.69 
64 	 Eduskunnan alamainen adressi 23. IX 1910. KKK 1910, II department, delo 81-1, 
National Archives of Finland (a Most Loyal Address of the Parliament). 
65 	 osudarstvennaia Duma, tretii sozyv, stenograficheskie otchety 1911, tom I, pp. 
681-89. 
66 	 Gosudarstvennaia Duma 1911, pp. 690-700. 
67 	 Gosudarstvennaia Duma 1911, p. 701. 
68 	 Gosudarstvennaia Duma 1911, pp. 710-19. 
69 	 Gosudarstvennaia Duma 1911, p. 3. 
The parties both on the Right and on the Left thus used the occasion 
for their own political purposes, the Rightists to declare the national 
and political unity of the Empire, the Left to criticize the government 
and the political system. 
No Finnish views were expressed. In fact, Kokovtsov's speech was 
reasonable and the proposal well argued, if the idea of Finland as a 
border province of Russia, not a separate constitutional state, was 
accepted. But Finns did not accept this fact of life, and their 
dissatisfaction only grew because of the new law. 
The Governor-General's newspaper, Finliandskaia Gazeta, 
disapproved of the tone of Finnish protests and hoped that in the future 
Finns would be impregnated with love and respect for the great 
Empire. Then they could be allowed the honour of serving under the 
Imperial banners in glorious brotherhood-in-arms with Russians.70 
Such views were regarded by the Finns as mere hypocrisy; they could 
not take them in earnest. 
For the Rightist newspaper Novoe Vremia, the proposal implied a 
new advantage for the Finns. A few million marks instead of personal 
military service was a ridiculous compensation if one remembered 
that buying exemption for a serf from conscription had cost about 
25,000 — 30,000 roubles; for 30,000 men the payment should thus 
have been 750,000,000 roubles." 
The Duma accepted the proposal first by 224 votes to 107, and in 
the decisive reading by 142 votes to 89.72 The Imperial Council also 
accepted the proposal, and after Imperial confirmation, it was 
promulgated as a law for Finland on 9 February 1912.7' The Senate 
continued paying the money, the annual amount of which grew to 17 
million marks in 1916. 
70 Finliandskaia Gazeta 17/30. I 1912. 
71 	 Novoe Vremia 17/39. XII 1911. 
72 Gosudarstvennaia Duma 1911, pp. 749, 3264. 
73 	 Suomen asetuskokoelma 1912, n:o 2, 27. I/9. II 1912. 
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MILITARY REFORM AFTER THE 
FAR EASTERN DEBACLE 
Problems of the weakened Imperial army 
The military-constitutional problems in Finland, important for the 
Finns, were only a minor factor in the Tsarist regime's general 
endeavour of making the Imperial army fit for the expected and 
planned great war in the West. 
It took a long time for the army to revive after the defeat in the 
Far East. In 1905-06, there were military revolts in several garrisons 
in the Empire, for example the one mentioned above in Sveaborg in 
the summer of 1906. The majority of troops remained disciplined, 




soldiers, who were apt to revolt against the hesitancy of weak 
superiors, obeyed orders when they perceived that the authorities were 
strong and determined.74 Hundreds of military expeditions against 
peasant revolts took place in 1906-07. These operations gravely 
disturbed the reorganization of the detachments left in disorder by the 
badly regulated mobilization for the previous war, and also prevented 
their regular training. 
At this time, the Imperial field army nominally consisted of 
forty-eight infantry divisions and twenty-two army corps, which, 
reinforced with reserve divisions, were to be united into armies in 
case of a war on the western frontier. The Niemen and the Narev 
armies were to face the Germans in Lithuania and Poland, the Bug 
and the South-West armies the Austrians in Galitsia and the Ukraine, 
and a Vth Army was planned to join in the fight either against the 
Germans or the Austrians, as the case might be. A detached army 
corps guarded the Rumanian border and another corps prepared for 
landing in the Turkish Straits; later, these corps were transformed into 
the VIIth and the VIIIth Armies. 
The VIth Army, with its staff in St. Petersburg, was to defend the 
Baltic coasts to secure the Imperial capital. Under it, in the Baltic 
provinces the 18th Army Corps guarded the approaches from Prussia 
towards St Petersburg, and in the Imperial capital the Guards Corps 
74 	 Bushnell, "Peasants in Uniform; the Tsarist Army as a Peasant Society", Journal 
of Social History 9/1980. 
was stationed, the two corps consisting in all of 203 battalions and 
71 squadrons.75 
The military planners only slowly comprehended what the entente 
of 1907 implied, and the war plan of 1908 still counted Britain among 
Russia's supposed enemies. However, the more probable enemies 
were supposed to be Turkey and Austria in the south and south-west, 
in the north-west Germany and Sweden, very probably these two 
together, less probably joined by Norway. They were calculated as 
being able to send an invasion force of 24,000 Germans, 82,000 
Swedes, and 19,000 Norwegians over the Baltic Sea, supported by 
sixteen coastal battleships, or sixteen first-rate battleships if Germany 
were not fighting against England simultaneously.76 
The danger from the north-west 
Sweden was expected to invade Finland, supported by a population 
dissatisfied with Russian rule, and to advance through the country 
towards St Petersburg. The Germans were expected to join the attack 
on the northern coast of the Gulf of Finland. This operation was 
envisaged as diverting as many of the Russian forces as possible away 
from the main front.77 The Swedes were expected to land somewhere 
on the western coast of Finland, at Hanko, in Turku, at Rauma, Pori, 
Vaasa, or Pietarsaari, or to march around the Gulf of Bothnia via 
Tornio. The invading force was presumed to consist of six divisions 
or 72 battalions, 40 squadrons and 228 guns.78 
The Russian 22nd Army Corps in Finland was to operate as the 
right flank of the VIth Army. The corps was given detailed instructions 
to protect Helsinki during the first days of mobilization, to protect the 
Sveaborg and Viipuri fortresses from the land side, and to defend 
Tammisaari, Kotka, Loviisa, and Hamina against small landings, to 
prevent the enemy from cutting the trunk railway line, and to maintain 
contact with the army commander and the commandant of Kronstadt. 
After mobilizing, the army corps was to be divided into two 
75 	 RGVIA, fond 400 opis 6, delo 1007, Staff of St. Petersburg military district to 
Main Staff 8. X 1908. 
76 	 A.M. Zaionchkovskii, Plany voiny, pp. 157-68, 189, 196-97, 203, 211, 215, 220, 
247, 262; Petrov, Podgotovka Rossii k mirovoi voine na more, pp. 202, 207. 
77 Petrov, Podgotovka Rossii k mirovoi voine na more, p. 202. 
78 RGVIA, fond 2262, opis 1, delo 28, Doklad Shtaba Peterburgskago voennago 
okruga 8. XI 1910. 
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detachments. One of them was to be positioned in the Helsinki—
Riihimäki region, with vanguards at Tammisaari, Kirkkonummi, 
Sipoo, and Loviisa, while the second detachment was to be positioned 
in the Kymijoki—Viipuri region, with vanguards at Kotka, Hamina, 
Säkkijärvi, and Koivisto.79 
Guarding the coasts caused a great deal of headache. There was 
the problem of the communications necessary for a speedy alarm in 
case of the expected enemy landing. In the absence of a navy, guards 
had to be posted on the coast to keep an eye open for smoke, fires, 
signals, and any movement at sea, to make clear whether it was a 
battle fleet or a landing fleet that was approaching, to report on the 
activity of the local population, and to prevent them from contacting 
the enemy. Any landing attempt had to be signalled to the vanguards, 
which with all means at their disposal were to delay the enemy from 
advancing to the east.80 
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	 If the enemy should carry out a major landing in the west of 
Finland, the 22nd Army Corps was to act as vanguard until the main 
body of the VIth Army could reach the theatre of war from St 
Petersburg. With small detachments against the enemy front and 
flanks, by guarding the railway from Helsinki and Hämeenlinna to St. 
Petersburg, and by strictly guarding the coasts, communication with 
the army could be maintained. 
The commander of the 22nd Army Corps, Lieutenant General 
Olkhovskii, who succeeded Boeckmann, declared that if the lines of 
communication should be threatened by Finnish guerilla detachments 
led by enemy agents, it might prove impossible to mobilize some of 
the troops in western Finland. The brigade in Helsinki was certainly 
not able to secure order in the interior at the same time as it was fully 
occupied with its own mobilization, and the brigade in Viipuri would 
be able to prevent the movement of rebels only in the coastal region 
in the immediate vicinity of the town. 
The situation might be even more difficult were the enemy to 
attempt a major landing to the east of Helsinki. The enemy could cut 
the trunk railway soon after landing, and the Helsinki brigade could 
then escape from encirclement only by a long and difficult march 
79 Shtab voisk gvardii i Peterburgskago Voennago Okruga, Instruktsiia oborony 




Instruktsiia voisk dlia okhrany poberezhia Finliandii, 23. VIII 1908. Ven sot asiak 
2175, National Archives of Finland. 
through the lake region. It would be better for the brigade to remain 
immobile, to secure Sveaborg from the land side and to guard the 
stores at Hämeenlinna. The VIth Army should then open the commu-
nications starting from St Petersburg and the Karelian Isthmus.81  
Along with these troubles, there existed the problem of military 
action for internal political reasons in Finland, as shown above. For 
example, in case of a war against Japan, the 1st Army Corps was to 
be sent to the Far East, but only if it was not involved in a campaign 
against Finnish guerrillas. In that case, the 20th Army Corps was to 
be sent to fight the Japanese, but if Britain should join the enemies, 
this corps was also to join the corps destined for Finland instead of 
being sent to the Far East.82 
On the basis of police and gendarme information, the 22nd Army 
Corps regarded their position as rather difficult: "We must face the 
worst and deplorably enough also the most probable case that 
Germany and Sweden will declare war on us, and that Finland will 	 223 
rise in rebellion... The situation of the two brigades in the country 
will be hopeless, positioned as they are far from each other, and 
because they ought simultaneously to mobilize, to fend off the enemy 
landing, and quell the rebellion."83 
In time, the memory of 1905, when the rebellion took the form of 
a general strike, grew ever more threatening and the army corps staff 
deemed the situation ever more dangerous as the plans were thought 
out and details worked in. The first problem was getting the 
mobilization order to the garrisons, because "all means of communica-
tions will be useless in case of a rebellion"84 as "the population, hostile 
to us, will cut railway, telegraph and telephone lines".85 
The way out of this impasse was to deposit mobilization orders in 
the safes of the local commanders. If the communications were cut, 
they would have the authority to open the envelope, and to act either 
81 	 Soobrazheniia po obeszpecheniiu soedineniia voisk korpusa s glav. silami.s.d. 
Ven sot asiak 6071, p. 33. National Archives of Finland. 
82 	 RGVIA, fond 400, opis 6, delo 1006, 0 sostavlenii mobilizatsionnago rospisaniia 
3. IV 1908. 
83 	 Commander of the 22nd army corps Olkhovskii to the St. Petersburg Military 
District 6. XII 1908. Ven sot asiak 6071, National Archives of Finland. 
84 	 A memorandum by the 22nd army corps staff I. X 1908, Ven sot asiak 6071, 
National Archives of Finland 
85 	 22nd army corps staff 1. X 1908. Ven sot asiak 6071, National Archives of 
Finland. 
according to the general mobilization plan n:o 18, against an external 
enemy, or according to the special plan against internal rebellion. 
Clear indicators had to be defined to enable the commanders to 
conclude whether decisive action was necessary.ß6 
But the problem remained that the local population could rise either 
in a spontaneous rebellion or be provoked to rise by an enemy landing, 
and the local commanders had no possibility of knowing which of the 
two was taking place, because communications would be cut and they 
would only see the local rebels. Thus they could not know which 
envelope to slit open, the different garrisons, isolated from each other, 
would not act in concert, and carrying out two different mobilization 
plans would end in confusion. The army corps staff repeated that it 
was very much to be feared that any mobilization would be 
impossible, and there was no hope at all for a timely mobilization.87 
The higher military authorities were reluctant to disperse their 
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	 forces on the basis of uncertain information or for political reasons.88 
The Main Staff (Glavnyi Shtab) in St. Petersburg promised to send 
reinforcements to Finland if the popular rising were serious enough, 
and if the external situation allowed it. If something really did happen, 
the 22nd Army Corps would be reinforced up to wartime strength, as 
also the 1st and 18th Corps in St.Petersburg and Estonia, and in 
addition two rifle brigades from the Warsaw military district, one rifle 
brigade from Kiev and one grenadier division from Moscow, with 
Cossack, cavalry, and artillery detachments (ninety-six guns from the 
1st Corps, forty-eight from the 18th Corps, twenty-four from Kiev, 
and twenty-four from Moscow), sapper battalions, a field telegraph 
company, four railway companies and two railway gendarme 
squadrons would be mobilized. 
There is no clear indication of how the troops eventually to be 
transferred to Finland were to be replaced in Moscow, Kiev and 
Warsaw, but in St Petersburg the 50th and 67th Reserve Divisions 
were to be brought up to their full wartime strength, with twenty-four 
batteries of artillery. The St Petersburg military district staff was to 
86 	 Staff of the St.Petersburg Military District to the 22nd army corps staff 24. X 
1908. Ven sot asiak 6071, National Archives of Finland. 
87 	 22nd Army Corps staff, a memoir (doklad) 24. XI 1908 Ven sot asiak 6071, 
National Archives of Finland. 
88 	 Kujala, Venäjän hallituksen suunnitelmat Suomen palauttamisesta järjestykseen 
vuosina 1907-1914, p. 295. 
be reinforced sufficiently to be able to direct the operations.89 
This mighty force was to be sent against the Finns if necessary and 
only if other, continental enemies kept out of the conflict. But a 
permanent strengthening of the garrison in Finland seemed so urgently 
necessary that, in spite of reluctance of the War Ministry, in 1908 the 
order was given to form a third rifle brigade in the border country, 
while elsewhere in the Empire the army began to be reinforced in 
1909. Of course, it took time to carry out the order, and barracks for 
the third brigade were not under construction till 1910, partly at the 
cost of the Finnish state. The additional troops were positioned "for 
strategic and political reasons [...] mainly on the St Petersburg—
Helsinki railway line in order to secure eventual mobilization."" 
The cadres for the third brigade were formed from the 221st 
Troitsko-Sergiev Reserve regiment for the 9th Rifle Regiment in 
Finland, from the 1st Artillery Battalion of Kovel for the 10th 
Regiment, from the 237th Reserve Battalion and 2nd Grodno Fortress 	 225 
Battalion for the 11th Regiment, and from the Vyborg Fortress 
Infantry Battalion for the 12th Rifle Regiment 91 The first and second 
regiments of each brigade in Finland had numbered more men than 
was normal in peacetime, and the supernumerary men were now 
ordered to the third brigade, but because the barracks were only being 
constructed slowly, the order could not be carried out until, at the 
beginning of 1914, the barracks were completed.92 
In the autumn of 1909, in connection with the purge of the Finnish 
Senate, Stolypin believed that an open conflict could break out and 
asked for additional troops to be transferred to Finland. The War 
Ministry and the staff of the Military District opposed this, perceiving 
no immediate military or political necessity for the increase. Reinforce-
ments were to be sent only in case of real difficulties with the Finns 93 
89 RGVIA, fond 400, opis 6, delo 1006, Boevoe rospisanie voisk, prednaz-
nadchennykh k mobilizatsiiu v sluchae vooruzhennago vozstaniia v Finliandii, 3. 
IV 1908. 
90 	 Nicholas Nicholaevich to Roediger 19. XII 1908, KKK 1910, II department, delo 
12 A, National Archives of Finland. 
91 	 RGVIA fond 1343, opis 3, delo 12, Perepiska s glavnom shtabom, s okruzhnym 
dezhurnym generalom, s okruzhnym intendantskom pravleniem i so shtabom 
armeiskikh korpusakh o reorganizatsii armii 1908-1910; Main Staff to 
St.Petersburg Military District staff 18. II 1909. 
92 	 RGVIA fond 29 opis 3 delo 1498, 0 shtatakh polkov 1, 2 i 3 Finliandskikh 
strelkovykh brigad 22. IV— 4. VI 1914. 
93 	 Kujala, forthcoming. 
After the military district of Finland had been abolished in 1905, 
the Governor-General — Obolenskii and after him Gerard — had lost 
the position of commander in chief of the troops in the country. This 
contributed to the paralysis of Russian power during the general strike 
of 1905. In 1908 the new, reliable Governor-General Boeckmann was 
authorized to call for military help in restoring order, in order to avoid 
a repetition of the experience of 1905.94 This regulation pertained only 
to peacetime, while in time of war, according to the Russian rules, 
the Governor-General was to be subordinated to the respective army 
commander-in-chief, i. e. the VIth Army in St Petersburg. If communi-
cations with the Imperial capital should be cut by the enemy or rebels, 
the commander of the 22nd Army Corps was temporarily to have the 
authority of an army commander.95 Thus he would be the Governor-
General's superior and there would be no confusion as to who was 
to be in charge; and Finnish politicking authorities would have no 
226 	 chance of abusing military help in their internal quarrels. 
Confidence restored 
In 1909 the Minister of War, Roediger, confessed that his army was 
incapable of securing Russia's interests in the Balkan crisis; he had 
been unable to organize and train the army after the defeat and 
revolution of 1905-06. He was replaced by General Vladimir 
Aleksandrovich Sukhomlinov and a major reorganization of the armed 
forces took place. It was made easier by the revival of the Russian 
economy in 1909-13 after the disturbances of 1901-06 (famine, war, 
revolution). The Committee of Imperial Defence was abolished and 
all military authority was again concentrated in the War Ministry. 
Grand Duke Nicholas Nicholaevich remained commander of the 
Guards troops and the St Petersburg Military District, and he was 
supposed and destined to be the supreme commander-in-chief in a 
future war, although no definite order existed to this end. 
Sukhomlinov undertook a reorganization and modernization of the 
army. There had existed several different kinds of infantry — guards, 
94 	 Prikaz po voiskam Gvardii i Peterburgskago Voennago Okruga 3. II 1908; St. 
Petersburg military district to Seyn 3. XII 1909. KKK 1908, II department, delo 
30, National Archives of Finland. 
95 	 St. Petersburg Military District Chief of Staff von Brincken to the Commander 
of the 22nd army corps Olkhovskii 5. X 1909. KKK 1909, I department, delo L, 
National Archives of Finland. 
grenadiers, rifles, army infantry, local and fortress troops, with 
different numbers for full wartime, enhanced peacetime and normal 
peacetime strength, or cadres only for the reserve divisions. Sukhom-
linov organized all infantry into normal mobile infantry divisions, the 
number of which was increased from 48 to 70. By his reforms, 
Sukhomlinov succeeded in cutting military expenditure and at the 
same time in obtaining additional appropriations from the Duma and 
the Ministry of Finance, viz. 81 million roubles for artillery, 114 
millions for improved roads, railways, and communications, about 250 
millions for different smaller items, and 373 millions for new 
fortifications, in all 715 million roubles. Nevertheless, in firepower 
the Russian army remained weaker than its opponents; while a German 
army corps had 144 field guns and an Austrian corps 128, a Russian 
army corps had 96 or 112 guns. In heavy guns the ration remained 
even worse, especially as most of the heavy pieces were installed in 
fortresses. 
After the Far Eastern defeat and the revolution at home, the bulk 
of the army had been drawn back from the western forward border 
positions to the Niemen — Bug — Dniester line, with only fortress 
troops in Miliutin's fortresses in Poland. Sukhomlinov did not approve 
of the forward position, which could easily be encircled by the 
Germans and Austrians. He preferred transforming the temporary 
withdrawal into a permanent defence-line, where the peacetime army 
could wait until the reserves were mobilized and concentrated, 
protected by fortresses at Kovno (Kaunas) — Grodno — Brest(-Litovsk). 
However, he was not able to maintain this "Plan no. 19", because it 
implied surrendering Russia's richest provinces to the enemy, and 
giving up the principal idea of the Dual Alliance, the simultaneous 
attack by the Russians and the French in order to prevent the Germans 
from dealing with their enemies one by one. But for a while the plan 
existed. In the north, it implied drawing the main defence-line at the 
Narva — Suursaari — Kymijoki level. 
As to the navy, only a few old ships and light craft had survived 
the war with Japan, together with a few modern ships from the pre-war 
programmes completed by and after the end of the war.96 By 1906 
96 Battleships: Petr Velikii from 1872, Imperator Alexander II 1887, Tsesarevich 
1901, Slava 1903 (completed 1905), Andrei Pervozvannyi 1906, Imperator Pavel 
1 1907; armoured cruisers: Pamiat Azova 1888, Rossiia 1896, Gromoboi 1896, 
Admiral Makarov 1906, Baian 1907, Pallada 1906, Rurik 1906; cruisers Aurora 
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the British Dreadnought had made all earlier battleships obsolete. For 
a few years no serious naval force existed in Russia for defending the 
provinces close to the Imperial capital and thus all the burden of 
defence fell on the land army. 
In the depression of 1905-06, the navy doubted their ability to deny 
any enemy access to the Gulf of Finland; Kronstadt was the frontal 
position for St Petersburg's seaward defence. The Admirals also 
doubted the ability of the army to defend the Helsinki—Hämeenlinna 
position; they believed that the army would retire from western Finland 
behind the Kymijoki River. In 1908, a little bolder already, the navy 
advanced their defence position to the Kymijoki—Suursaari— Narva 
level, where the defence was based on minefields and light patrol crafts. 
Of course, this suited well Sukhomlinov's planning for the next few 
years. Independently of the plans to withdrawal to the Kymijoki line, 
Sveaborg was maintained as a naval fortress. It was garrisoned by five 
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	 fortress battalions and two battalions of fortress artillery. After the 
revolt of 1906, martial law was still in force there in 1908.97 
But all the time, these positions close to the eastern end of the Gulf 
of Finland were regarded as temporary only. Immediately after losing 
their fleet in the Far East, the Admirals, in 1906-07, had sketched a 
construction programme for a mighty ocean-going fleet of two 
eight-ship battle squadrons for the Far East, two for the Baltic Sea, 
and one for the Black Sea, each squadron consisting of eight 
dreadnoughts of 21,000 tons, and in addition cruisers, destroyers and 
submarines were needed to support the battleship squadrons.98 
The generals wanted naval support for the defence of the Gulf of 
Finland, for a landing at the Bosphorus, and in the Far East for the 
guarding of the coast, but the navy was not satisfied with such a 
humble role. Russia's historic mission in the Near East and Far East, 
once dominion over the Baltic Sea were secured, could only be 
fulfilled if a sufficient naval force were built. The army commanders 
were aghast at these plans for spending thousands of millions roubles, 
because they had to beg for mere hundreds of millions. Nicholas II, 
1900, Diana 1899, Bogatyr 1901, Oleg 1903; 49 big and 29 small torpedo boats, 
13 submarines and six minelayers. Conway's All the World's Fighting Ships 1906 
- 1921, pp. 294-97. RGAVMF, fond 418, opis' 2, delo 199, plan voiny Rossii i 
konspekt plana voiny na Baltiiskom more 1907 g. 
97 	 Fortress commandant to Governor-General 2. IX 1908. KKK 1906, I department, 
delo XXVI, National Archives of Finland. 
98 	 Petrov, Podgotovka Rossii... pp. 103-19. 
in his admiral's uniform, said "let us naval officers decide naval 
questions 
Of course, no money for such a giant fleet existed. But the navy 
was reorganized. In 1905, a Navy Ministry was established instead of 
the Grand Ducal office of a General-Admiral, and, in 1906, a Naval 
General Staff was organized. In 1908 the Admirals asked for a reduced 
fleet of only four dreadnoughts, fourteen destroyers, and three 
submarines, but the Duma refused, distrusting the notoriously corrupt 
naval authorities. 
In the absence of the future fleet, the waterway to the Imperial 
capital had to be defended by other means. In 1909 the reconstruction 
of St Petersburg's seaward defences started. To protect the flanks of 
Kronstadt, coastal forts were constructed at Ino in the Finnish area on 
the northern coast of the bay of Kronstadt, and at Krasnaia Gorka on 
the opposite side. Viipuri was maintained in the status of a fortress 
with a garrison of five fortress battalions and one-and-a-half fortress 	 229 
artillery battalions. 
In the estimates of the St Petersburg staffs, the situation in the 
Baltic Sea depended on whether the Germans would strike first to the 
east or to the west. If the French were to be the first victim, only a 
minor landing was to be expected on the Baltic coasts, perhaps 
somewhere in the region of Libau or Riga, from where the Germans 
could advance towards the rear of the Russian armies on the main 
front. But if they should attack Russia first, a major landing could be 
expected, because German forces would then be overwhelming and 
they could easily detach four divisions for the landing operation, 
which would probably be strengthened by six Swedish divisions. The 
enemy had more than sufficient means of transport for this force.'0°  
In a military-geographical review of possible theatres of war, the 
area of the St Petersburg military district was divided into three defence 
zones. The first in importance was the capital itself, but no enemy 
landing was expected directly on St Petersburg, because Kronstadt 
closed the passages leading there. Between Narva and Viipuri, the only 
possible beach for a serious landing was at Koivisto, which also had 
a good anchorage. Viipuri was well fortified and it was felt that the 
enemy probably would want to destroy it before his landing force could 
99 	 Shatsillo, Razvitie flota... pp. 50-51. 
100 A.M. Zaionchkovskii, Plany voiny, pp. 189, 196-97, 215. 
feel safe. On the road from Koivisto to St Petersburg, there were no 
natural defence-lines, but the small rivers at Vammelsuu and 
Siestarjoki (Sestroretsk) might be of some tactical use. 
To defend the Imperial capital there was first a strong Guards corps, 
which consisted of the first and second Guards Infantry Divisions, the 
Guards rifle brigade, the first and second Guards Cavalry Divisions, 
and the Guards artillery brigades, two on foot and one mounted. Then 
there was the 1st Army Corps, which consisted of the 22nd division 
with its Vyborgskii, Vil'manstrandskii, Neishlottskii and Petrovskii 
regiment garrisoned in the region of Novgorod, and of the 37th 
Division with its Tsaritsyn, Samara, and Kazan regiments in Ingerman-
land. 
The Baltic provinces formed another main region of the military 
district. Reval and Baltischport were probable objectives for enemy 
action, but the Livonian coast was too distant from anything vital for 
230 	 a useful landing, nor were there any towns important enough to be 
occupied. The Estonian islands Dagö (Hiidenmaa) and Ösel (Saaren-
maa) were deemed impossible to defend in the absence of a navy. 
The Estonian and Livonian coasts were to be guarded against 
enemy raids by detachments of a few battalions each, and a certain 
force was to be kept in reserve in case of a major attack. The defence 
of the provinces was the task of the 18th Army Corps, with its 23rd 
Division at Reval and Narva and the 24th Division at Pskov, with 
their northern-named Belomorskii, Onezhkii, Dvinskii, Pechorskii, and 
Irkutskii, Eniseiskii, Krasnoiarskii, Omskii regiments, to us now 
well-known from their period of garrisoning Finland. 
Several reserve regiments, the 197th-200th, 213th-216th, and 219th, 
were to be mobilized in northern and central Russia to be then sent 
to reinforce the VIth Army in the defence of the capital.10' 
Naval manoeuvres proved that the existing couple of armoured 
ships were not of much use, and the Suursaari position was too wide 
from coast to coast for effective defence. A better position was the 
narrowest point of the Gulf between Porkkala on the Finnish coast 
and Naissaari (Nargen) on the Estonian coast. The Åland archipelago 
and the Moon Sound would be ideally suited to be bases of light 
torpedo and mine forces to attack the flanks of an enemy trying to 
IOI RGVIA, fond 1343, opis' 3, delo 13, o novykh formirovaniiakh, pereformirova- 
niiakh i rasformirovaniiakh, v sviazi s rasporiazeheniem mobilizatsionnago 
otdeleniia, po mobilizatsionnomu rospisaniia 1909 i 1910 godu. 
force access to the Gulf of Finland. Access to the Gulf of Bothnia 
could be guarded from the Åland Islands.102 
Finland in the defence plans for the Baltic coasts 
In the plans for the defence of St Petersburg, Finland, like the Baltic 
provinces, was a region second in importance only to the capital itself. 
The enemy was expected to invade Finland, cut the country off from 
Russia, and advance from there towards its main goal. There was a 
dense road network close to the coasts, but also a few transverse roads 
from the Gulf Bothnia towards the south-east (which the Russians had 
used in 1808). The defender could avail himself of the river lines of 
Tornio, Kemi, Oulu, Kyrö, and Kymijoki, and, in the interior, of the 
lake system of Saimaa. The country was sparsely inhabited, towns 
were small, the lake district was difficult to traverse and from there 
the enemy flanks could be threatened (as the Finnish guerillas had 
shown in 1808 and again in the manoeuvres in the 1890s). The dense 
telephone network could be useful, but the defence would be 
complicated by the hostile population and made impossible by a 
popular rising, the Russians thought.10' 
If the forces of the military district should not be needed on the 
main front, the Guards could concentrate against the landing forty 
battalions, twenty-four squadrons, forty machine guns and ninety-six 
guns, the 18th Corps its 23rd and 24th Divisions of thirty-two 
battalions, thirty-six machine guns and ninety-six guns, and of course 
the 22nd Army Corps in Finland. If only Finland were invaded, the 
18th Army Corps troops would be transshipped from Reval to Helsinki 
at night, protected by darkness, and the Guards units would arrive by 
train. The 18th Corps would be ready to march on the 14th day, and 
the Guards on the 17th day after the declaration of mobilization. 
102 RGAVMF, fond 418, opis' 1, delo 127, materialy k voenno-statisticheskomu 
opisaniiu Baltiiskogo moria, 29. V 1906-17. XI 1909; delo 131, strategicheskoe 
opisanie chasti Olandskikh sher_Lumpafierda i tablitsa rasstoianii mezhdu portami 
i lotsmanskami stantsiiami v Finskom i Botnicheskom zalivakh, 27. XI-I. XII 
1906 g.; delo 141, svedeniia o Revelskom Imperatora Petra Velikago porte 11. 
VIII 1906 - 30. X 1913 gg.; delo 201, zakliucheniia posrednikov o rezultatov 
boevykh manevrov Baltiiskogo flota 1908 g.; delo 338, zapiska kap. 2 r. V.N. 
Altfatera o zadachakh Baltiiskogo flota na sluchai evropeiskoi voiny 17. IV 1914. 
103 RGVIA, fond 1343, opis' 3, delo 91, obozrenii Peterbugskago voennago okruga, 
kratkii voenno-geograficheskii ocherk mestnosti veroiatnykh voennykh deistvii. 
S.Peterburg 1911. 
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Swedish mobilization was supposed to take two weeks. In case of 
a Swedish attack, the defending troops would be formed into a 
Northern Army, whose task would be to defeat the enemy in the north 
of Finland. It would be advantageous if the navy could secure the 
Åland Islands before the Swedes occupied them. With a strong and 
quick riposte, the Swedes would be defeated and compelled to leave 
the Triple Alliance, after which the Russians would be able to leave 
only a force of limited numbers to occupy Finland.104 
In 1910, the 22nd Army Corps in Finland received revised 
instructions. It was assumed that the enemy would easily be able to 
advance from Helsinki to Viipuri and on to St Petersburg, because 
the enemy navy, dominant on the Baltic Sea, would secure the right 
flank, and the rebellious Finns the left flank in the interior. 
A minor German landing or a purely Swedish landing might take 
place somewhere in the west, in Turku, at Hanko, Lappohja (Lappvik), 
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	 Tammisaari or Porkkala, in order to avoid being isolated between the 
22nd Army Corps and the main forces of the VIth Army. 
A major German landing would probably take place at Koivisto, 
the closest convenient landing beach to the Imperial capital. It would 
consist of four to eight German divisions and six Swedish divisions, 
in all 178,000 bayonets, 10,000 sabres, and 828 guns. The enemy 
would arrive at Koivisto two or three weeks after the declaration of 
war.105 On the 23rd day, about fifty battalions would be advancing 
towards St Petersburg and a further seventy-three battalions would be 
disembarking at Koivisto.106 
The mobilization of the Russian troops in Finland was calculated 
to take place in nine to eleven days — it had not been essentially 
speeded up from the beginning of the century — and the concentration 
of the main fighting forces in twenty days, with the last Cossack troops 
from the Don arriving on the 30th day and supply detachments on 
the 40th day. The transport of the troops and detachments destined 
for Finland would be slowed down by the march through St 
Petersburg; the bridge over the Neva was still unfinished, completed 
104 RGVIA, fond 2262, opis I, delo 28, Doklad shtaba S.Peterburgskago Voennago 
Okruga 8. XI 1910, signed by v. Brincken, chief of staff. 
105 St. Petersburg Military District staff to the 22nd army corps staff 7. IX 1910; 
deistviia voisk korpusa v Finliandii v sluchae vneshnykh oslozhnenii. Ven sot 
asiak 11309, National Archives of Finland. 
106 A.M. Zaionchkovski, Plany voiny, pp. 189, 196-97, 215. 
only in 1913. 
The 22nd Army Corps now consisted of the three rifle brigades or 
twenty-four battalions, with four Dragoon squadrons and two Cossack 
sotnii, one battalion of sappers, and an artillery brigade of seventy-two 
cannons and twelve mortars. The fortressess of Sveaborg and Viipuri 
were, as always, garrisoned by five infantry battalions each, and by 
four and three artillery batteries respectively. 
A new infantry division, the 50th, made up from the previous 
reserve troops, of the 197th, 198th, 199th and 200th Regiments and 
the 50th Artillery Brigade, was stationed partly in Vologda, partly on 
the Karelian Isthmus under the 22nd Corps, sometimes partly at 
Kronstadt, under the command of the St Petersburg military district 
staff.107 
The plan for the concentration of the corps followed the previous 
plans in its main lines, with details varied from year to year. The 
western group was to be stationed in Helsinki (3 1/2 battalions), at 	 233 
Riihimäki (4 battalions), and Hämeenlinna (2 battalions), with 
vanguards in Turku (2 battalions) and at Tammisaari (2 battalions), 
with small cavalry guards at Kirkkonummi, Sipoo and Loviisa. The 
eastern group was ordered to station its main forces in Viipuri (4 
battalions), at Mikkeli (2 battalions) and Kouvola (2 battalions), with 
a vanguard at Hamina (1 1/2 battalions), and a guard post at Kotka. 
Detachments of the 50th Division were stationend under the respective 
commandants at Sveaborg (3 battalions), in Viipuri (5 battalions), at 
Koivisto (4 battalions), and a detachment at Säkkijärvi.108 
The commander of the 2nd Rifle Regiment was ordered to consider 
stationing one of his battalions at Kuopio and another at Vaasa 
(Nikolaistad), but he answered that this force was too weak to close 
the transverse road from Tornio via Sortavala to St Petersburg or to 
fend off a Swedish landing on the coast of the Gulf of Bothnia. On 
the contrary, the isolated battalions would provoke the local rebels to 
act against them, and the other troops of the army corps would be 
107 RGVIA fond 1343, opis 3, delo 100, Razvertyvanie po rospisanie 1910 goda (for 
the VIth Army); delo 12, Perepiska s glavnom shtabom, s okruzhnym dezhurnym 
generalom, s okruzhnym intendantskim pravleniem i so shtabom armeiskikh 
korpusakh o reorganizatsii armii 1908-1910; Main Staff to the St Petersburg 
Military District staff 18. II 1909. 
108 St. Petersburg Military District staff to 22nd Army Corps staff 7. IX 1910; 
deistviia voisk korpusa v Finliandii v sluchae vneshnykh oslozhnenii. Ven sot 
asiak 11309, National Archives of Finland. 
unable to aid these distant detachments.'o9 
If a major enemy landing were to take place at Koivisto, the eastern 
group was instructed to act under the orders of the Viipuri fortress 
commandant in repelling the invasion. The western group would fend 
off small landings or raids on the coast between Turku and Porkkala, 
secure Helsinki, and guard Turku, Tammisaari, Loviisa and Kotka 
with small detachments. Further, the corps was to defend the landward 
side of Sveaborg, closely guard the coast, maintain contact with the 
Baltic fleet, with the army staff, and with the Viipuri, Sveaborg and 
Kronstadt fortresses. In view of the disloyalty of the Finnish 
population and its tendency to favour the Swedes, the western group 
also had to maintain absolute order and peace in the country, not 
shying away even from the most extreme measures.1' 
The instructions given by the military district staff were detailed, 
an attempt to comprehend all eventualities. General Olkhovskii was 
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	 angered by the tasks given him, because, in fact, he had been ordered 
to be prepared for all possibilities and to carry out all thinkable actions 
simultaneously. In his opinion, keeping order and controlling the 
population was only possible in places which were actually occupied 
by his troops. Preparing to defend Turku, Kotka or other coastal 
localities implied a dispersal of his troops, contrary to the dictates of 
the situation. Protecting the landward side of Sveaborg meant 
defending Helsinki and transforming the army corps into an immobile 
garrison. Guarding every point on the coast had been proved 
impossible during the manoeuvres, and, with the telephone system 
operated by Finns, communications would be so unreliable that the 
vanguards could not be alerted speedily enough. No support could be 
expected from the Baltic fleet for the left flank of the corps, and its 
unprotected right flank of 400 versts between Riihimäki and St 
Petersburg would be threatened by Finnish guerillas. 
Olkhovskii complained "what can be expected of me under such 
conditions?" He proposed that his task should be reduced, that the 
Baltic fleet should be ordered to cover his left flank, that he should 
be free from the liability of keeping order, and that he should be 
109 2nd Finland Brigade to the 22nd Army Corps 23. II 1911. Ven sot asiak 11309, 
p. 53 e. seq., National Archives of Finland. 
110 St Petersburg Military District staff to the 22nd Army Corps staff 7. IX 1910; 
deistviia voisk korpusa v Finliandii v sluchae vneshnykh oslozhnenii. Ven sot 
asiak 11309, National Archives of Finland. 
given means for protecting the rear and flanks, i. e. more troops, a 
fourth brigade. The idea of dividing the army corps into two 
detachments distant from each other was in Olkhovskii's opinion 
against the military principles and had to be discarded; he proposed 
concentrating all of his corps in the region of Koria — Kaipiainen — 
Anjala, i.e. along the Kymijoki line."' 
This idea of dividing the army corps into two parts may have been 
inherited from the war plan against the Voima, which, according to 
gendarme information, was going to attack two objectives, Helsinki 
and Viipuri; or it may have reflected the timid cautious prudence of 
the military district staff, reluctant to give up any objective. On the 
other hand, the concentration along the Kymijoki concurred with 
Sukhomlinov's plan to give up the indefensible western regions and 
to prepare for a defence in protected positions more to the east, and 
also fit in well with to the naval plan of defending the Kotka — 
Suursaari — Narva position. 
Cutting Finland down to size 
The military planners preparing the defence of St Petersburg, had 
reason to regret the restoration of the Viipuri guberniia to Finland by 
Alexander I in 1812. 
There was the problem of Imperial regulations for fortress districts, 
which the constituionalist Senate had opposed, as related above. 
Finnish obstruction impeded preparations for the defence even of 
Kronstadt when the construction of a flanking fort at Ino on the 
Finnish coast was started in 1909. The military district staff 
complained that, under Finnish law, Finns could not be prevented 
from living and causing disturbances in the Ino fortress district."' 
Grand Duke Nicholas Nicholaevich declared that the meddling of 
Finnish authorities in the affairs of the fortress district was intolerable. 
The conclusion was that the Ino region should be annexed to the St 
Petersburg guberniia.13 The police wanted the annexation, too, to 
111 Zapiska po voprosam, sviazannym s sostavleniem operativnago plana 22 
armeiskago korpusa na sluchai voiny s derzhavami troistvennago soiuza. Ven sot 
asiak 11309, p. 135 e. seq., National Archives of Finland. 
112 Staff of the St.Petersburg Military District to Boeckmann 31. I 1909. KKK II 
department, delo 34; Seyn to Governor of Viipuri 31. VIII 1910. KKK Dd 8; 0 
forte Ino, ogranicheniia v prave zastroiki mestnosti prilegaiushchaia k forte. KKK 
1910, I department, delo LXXXI-II, National Archives of Finland. 
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make it easier to flush out the revolutionaries from their hiding places, 
which had been a problem since 1905, as seen above. 
The Council of Ministers, advised by Stolypin's Bobrikovian 
experts,14 decided, in 1911, to set up a committee to clear up the 
practical and legal problems of transferring the fortress region, i.e. the 
two border parishes Kivennapa and Uusikirkko, from the Viipuri 
guberniia to the St. Petersburg guberniia. 
This decision provoked stormy protests in the Finnish press and 
Diet, but the Council of Ministers decided that these had no formal 
importance.15  
The government decision was favourably commented by the 
Russian nationalist press. The Novoe Vremia was indignant at the 
cynical refusal of the Finns to acknowledge Russia's sovereign rights 
in its Finnish gubernii, and at their idea that Finland was a separate 
state.16 For the Finns, the measure seemed one further step in the 
236 	 programme of the Russification of their country. 
The forward defence-line of St. Petersburg had been set to the River 
Kymijoki, as noted above, so that soon planning the annexation of 
the two parishes only proved insufficient. The fortress esplanade of 
Viipuri had to be enlarged, and a flotilla on Lake Saimaa was planned; 
these measures necessitated the annexation of a larger area. To secure 
the defence of the Imperial capital from the north, the military 
authorities demanded that the whole of the Viipuri guberniia be 
transferred from the Finnish administration to the St. Petersburg 
guberniia.' ,7 
Seyn favoured the annexation with the argument that the Orthodox 
Karelian population and monasteries would be better protected from 
113 0 forte Ino, o tainom prodazhe spirtnykh napitkov v mestnosti prilegaiushchikh 
forte i o merakh borbe s etim zlom; Commandant of Kronstadt to commander of 
the Military District 30. IV 1910, Stolypin to Sukhomlinov 5. VII 1910, Nicholas 
Nicholaevich to Sukhomlinov 5. VIII 1910, Sukhomlinov to Seyn 9. VIII 1910, 
Seyn to Governor of Viipuri 11/24. XI and 11./24. XII 1910, KKK 1910, I 
department, delo LXXXI — I and IV. National Archives of Finland. 
114 Osoboe soveshchanie po delam Velikago Kniazhestva Finliandskago 13. XI 1910. 
KKK He 6, National Archives of Finland. 
115 Petitsiia Seima po povodu zakliucheniia v Vyborgskomu tiurma deputata Airola. 
KKK 1912, II department, delo 14-12. National Archives of Finland. 
116 Novoe Vremia 17/30. VIII 1911. (Newspaper cutting in: KKK 1911, I department, 
delo 18-1, National Archives of Finland). 
117 Nicholas Nicholaevich to Sukhomlinov 28. III 1913; memorandum "o 
neobkhodimosti otdeleniia Vyborgskoi gubemii", KKK 1913, I department, delo 
1-7, National Archives of Finland. 
Lutheran oppression and Finnish hooligans. The government's 
Bobrikovian advisers added that Finnish schemes in Russian Karelia 
and Ingria would thereby be blocked, and the battle against spies and 
revolutionaries made more effective.11' 
The Council of Ministers agreed. In their opinion, there were many 
and intolerable difficulties in carrying out the necessary military 
measures in Finland, because the population was hostile, the police 
did not support the legal authorities, the judges politicked against 
governmental interests, and Russia had no authorities in Finland to 
safeguard military secrets and interests, while the railways, telephone 
and telegraph were operated by disloyal Finns who did not understand 
Russian, and the country was full of hatred and rebelliousness. 
The committee for annexation was given the new task of preparing 
legislation for extending the Imperial administration, judiciary, voting 
rights, military service and other duties and rights over the Viipuri 
guberniia.119 
This decision was reached in the autumn of 1914 when the war 
had already started and had no immediate importance, because no 
measures apt to provoke disorder were taken during the war, but the 
arguments for the annexation demonstrate the difficulties which 
Finland's special position caused Russian military security after, and 
partly due to, the reform work of Bobrikov and Seyn. 
A quick solution for the Ino fortress problem was brought about 
when, in 1912, renewed revolutionary activity in the Kronstadt 
garrison was discovered. A state of war was declared for the fortress, 
Ino naturally included in the order. At least, the selling of vodka could 
then be controlled.'20 
118 Zhumal osobago soveshchaniia po delam V. K. Finliandskago 21. IV 1914, II 
department, delo 104, National Archives of Finland. 
119 Osobyi zhumal Soveta Ministrov 29. VIII 1914, signed by Nicholas II 16. IX 
1914. KKK 1914, II department, delo 104, National Archives of Finland. 
120 Prikaz po Kronstadtskomu kreposti 5. VIII 1912, 9. VIII 1912, 1. IX 1912, 10. 
XI 1912. KKK 1912, I department, delo 1-11, National Archives of Finland. — 
The first order, after proclaiming a state of war, forbade smoking on the stairs of 
the fortress; sometimes it is difficult for the historian to take these military worries 
seriously. 
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Martial law discussed again 
Dissatisfaction in Finland grew because of the unificatory measures 
taken by the Imperial government after 1908; dissatisfaction increased 
in 1910 because of the all-Imperial legislation in the Duma and the 
military millions, but, as explained earlier, Seyn had been cautious 
enough to avoid provoking the Finns to mass protests. But now the 
intended annexation of the Karelian Isthmus caused an agitation 
comparable to that of 1899-1901. 
In March 1911 the gendarme chief Colonel Utgof reported that 
Finland was preparing to repeat the events of 1905, and was only 
waiting for some external support.'2' The Voima was to start 
operations in winter, when the guerilla detachments could move on 
skis and isolate the Russian garrisons. Leaders for the Voima would 




well as from voluntary fire brigades. Specialists for the artillery and 
sappers could be recruited among Russian reservists infected by the 
revolutionary spirit, especially Jews and Poles.'22 The whole history 
of the Finnish Voima, real and imaginary — the training of 200,000 
reservists by the separate Finnish army, activism in 1904-05, Red 
Guards and the Sveaborg revolt of 1906, the smuggling of arms, 
contacts with the Russian Socialist Revolutionaries, the secret 
equipping of 70,000 or 200,000 men with rifles, machine guns and 
artillery, war plans to conquer Helsinki and attack St Petersburg _ 
was reviewed and revived.'23 
Of course, the Finns were not the only minority to cause difficulties 
in the Empire. French allies deplored the fact that the other 
Fenno-Ugric peoples, the Caucasian and Central Asian tribes, the 
Moldavians, the Tatars, the Baltic Germans, the Pan-Islamists, the 
Armenians, and, perhaps worst of all, the Poles hated and despised 
Russians but respected Germans and loved Austrians.'24 
121 	 Report of the gendarme chief 24. III 1911, KKK Hd 103, n:o 1, National Archives 
of Finland. 
122 Svodka svedeniia po Finliandii 16. XII 1910. KKK 1911, I department, delo 17-1, 
National Archives of Finland. 
123 Sovershenno sekretnaia zapiska o vooruzhenii Finliandii 1911-1912. KKK Hd 
103, n:o 14, National Archives of Finland. 
124 Conference sur l'armee Russe; EMATSH 7 N 1506; Rapport du capitaine Marchal, 
stagiaire dans l'armee Russe en 1912. EMATSH 7 N 1486 II; Beaucaire from 
Copenhague to Poincare 12. VI 1912. EMATSH 7 N 1544. 
But the Finns caused disproportionate problems for Imperial 
defence. A Finnish rebellion was perhaps not really dangerous if 
isolated, but in connection with the expected Swedish attack on 
Finland in support of Germany it was dangerous enough to make even 
Russia's French allies seriously worried and Russia's generals really 
angry. "Finnish affairs cause much worry... The country is agitated 
because of the two parishes, and, in case of a war, two army corps 
will be needed to keep the Grand Duchy subjected. A general of the 
Guards said to the French Colonel Janin that Finnish blood was to be 
let first, and only then Austrian blood".'25 
Seyn had already purged the higher administration of Finland, but 
the lower administration and judiciary remained unreformed. In the 
autumn of 1911 the Governor-General proposed declaring martial law 
in the country, or at least threatening that martial law would be 
declared for the smallest act of terrorism or indiscipline. General von 
Brincken, the chief of staff of the St Peterburg Military District, 	 239 
supported the proposal; he did not believe that the Voima only existed 
in the imagination of the gendarmes, though the General Staff and 
War Ministry may have been less credulous.126 
Accordingly, plans for military intervention were further detailed. 
Grand Duke Nicholas Nicholaevich was designated the Most August 
Commander-in-Chief for the duration of martial law in Finland. 
Troops in the west of the country were to operate under the 22th 
Army Corps staff, while the reinforcements in the Karelian Isthmus 
were to be led by the 13th Corps staff, transferred from the 
Smolensk-Orel region to Viipuri. Reinforcements were to arrive from 
Reval to Helsinki and from St Petersburg to the Isthmus. Helsinki was 
to be occupied by four Guards rifle battalions and four battalions from 
the 1st Infantry Division, Viipuri by eight battalions from the 36th 
Infantry Division. The close defence of St. Petersburg from the 
Isthmus side was to be the task of the 1st Guards Cavalry Division 
and the 37th Infantry Division. 
Had only the guberniia of Viipuri been put under martial law, the 
37th Infantry Division with its artillery brigade, the 4th Regiment of 
the 1st Guards Cavalry Division, one Guards Ural Cossacks sotnia, 
125 Colonel Janin, at the Nicholas Academy of the General Staff, to General Vignal 
15/28. IX 1911. EMATSH 7 N 1485. 
126 Kujala, Venäjän hallituksen suunnitelmat Suomen palauttamisesta järjestykseen 
vuosina 1907-1914, pp. 294-95. 
one battery of horse artillery, one Guards sapper battalion and one 
railway company would have occupied the Isthmus. In a serious case, 
the 41st Infantry Division and 41st Artillery Brigade, led by the 16th 
Corps staff, would have been transferred there.127 
The navy detailed guards for the coast and designated the transports 
Anadyr, Riga and Lakhta for shuttling troops from Reval to Helsinki 
in fourteen trips starting from the 11th to the 25th day from 
mobilization.128 
Now, the plan was that the reinforcements would march to Finland 
in their peacetime complement, because their reservists were mainly 
'comrades', industrial workers of the capital, who could not be trusted 
to put down a rebellion. 
Martial law was to be declared in Finland at the first sign of 
disturbance, and the 22nd Army Corps had to take decisive measures 
from the very beginning against any disorder, without waiting for 
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	 specific orders. The experience of 1905 proved that inactivity was 
fatal, not overstepping one's authority.129 
A declaration or manifesto to explain the situation to the population 
was prepared. The troops were said to be in the country to bring back 
into the fold those inhabitants who had criminally risen in revolt, and 
loyal inhabitants were warned against showing solidarity with the rebels. 
In the declaration printed in 1911 the loyal inhabitants were assured 
of their "religion, citizens' rights, life, honour, and property in all their 
integrity", but in the second version of 1912, only "religion, honour 
and property" were to be respected.130 Nothing was to be promised 
that might bind the government; it was well remembered that Finns 
had used the manifesto of November 1905 as a pretext when they 
had sought to oust Russian influence from the country under 
Mechelin's leadership.131 Planning for war against the Finns continued 
127 RGVIA, fond 1343, opis' II, delo 376a, Shtab Voisk Gvardii i Peterbugskago 
Voennago okruga 2. IV 1910. 
128 RGAVMF, fond 418, opis' 2, delo 213 o sosredotochenii B. flota na sluchai 
moblizatsii po plan N. 1 (vooruzhennoe vosstanie v Finliandii), Raschet 
perevozki voisk morem po chastnoi mobilizatsionnoi plan n:o 1., p. 330. 
129 Zhumal soveshchaniia po voprosam, sviazannymi s obiavleniem Finliandii na 
voennom polozhenii 11. & 12. XI 1911. Ven sot asiak 11310, National Archives 
of Finland. 
130 "Julistus Suomen asukkaille" (declaration to the inhabitants of Finland, two 
different issues from 1911 and 1912), KKK 1911, I department, delo 58_5a, 
National Archives of Finland. 
131 "Luettelo sellaisista rikosjutuista, jotka sotatilalle asetettuja seutuja koskevan 
during the following years, but few changes were planned in the 
scheme, except that instead of a Commander-in-Chief, in 1914 the 
troops in Finland would have been under the commander of the 22nd 
Army Corps.132 
The first phase in carrying out the occupation of Finland was to 
be the securing of the railways. As early as the summer of 1906, when 
the revolt in Sveaborg seemed to be auguring a new rebellion, Stolypin 
had ordered a declaration printed ready to be posted up when 
necessary. In it, all meetings in a railway area were forbidden, as were 
railwaymen leaving work, sending telegrams without authorization, or 
spreading rumours. The section of the Finnish railways from St 
Petersburg to Viipuri was to be immediately taken over by the 
military.133 
Normally, the Finnish railways were under the observation of 
seventy-four railway gendarmes; for the period of martial law, 289 
gendarmes were to be sent to guard 2,421 kilometres of railway lines.134 
The Finnish railways would have been run by the chief of military 
communications of the St Petersburg Military District, aided by 
section chiefs with the wartime powers of fortress commandants. They 
were authorized to punish railwaymen for neglecting technical and 
other regulations, for lack of caution, or unauthorized moving of 
rolling stock, while courts martial were to deal with manslaughter, 
robbery, violence, sabotage, distribution of illegal literature, 
disobeying officials and disturbing soldiers or gendarmes. A 
declaration for this purpose was also printed and kept ready to be 
posted up with the other declarations.135 
asetuksen 17 ja 19 pykälän nojalla ovat vedettävät pois paikallisten tuomioistuinten 
toimivallasta ja lykättävät sotatuomioistuinten ratkaistavaksi sotalakien mukaan". 
(Catalogue of matters to be submitted to military courts of justice). KKK 1911, 
I department, delo 58-5a, National Archives of Finland. 
132 0 razrabotke novago plana obiavleniia Finliandii na voennom polozhenii. Proekt 
3. VI 1914. KKK 1914, I department, delo 1-16, National Archives of Finland. 
133 Zhumal predvaritel'nago soveshchaniia chlenov osobago komissiia pri pravleniia 
I uchastka S.Peterburg-Beloostrov Finliandskikh kazennykh zheleznykh dorog. 
KKK 1907, I department, delo XV; Spravka o meropriiatiiakh na sluchai 
ob"iavleniia Finliandii na voennom polozhenii, 17. I 1910. KKK 1910, I 
department, delo 1-4, National Archives of Finland. 
134 Ob"iavlenie mobilizatsii i voennago polozheniia, deiatelnost' chinov 
zhandarmskago policheiskago upravlenii Finliand. zhel. dor. v mimago vrema, a 
ravno pri ob"iavlenii mobilizatsii iii voennago polozheniia. KKK 1914, I 
department, delo 1_13, National Archives of Finland. 
135 Osobyi Zhumal Soveta Ministrov 19. X 1910 & 3. II 1911. KKK 1911, I 
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It was soon found that papering walls was not enough. In addition 
to the army railway battalions, Russian railwaymen were also needed 
to replace striking Finns. The Ministry of Communications listed 
volunteers and in 1913 it reported that 5,770 railwaymen were ready 
to leave in three or four days.136 
A similar manning of the Finnish telegraph was also found 
necessary; the department of posts and telegraph selected personnel 
to secure communications in Finland.137 
The telephone network remained a problem, because it was owned 
by small local telephone companies. Seyn wished to put them under 
the administration of the Imperial Treasury, because the telephone 
network was vital for receiving the alarm that something serious was 
going to take place, and it would be too difficult and too late to replace 
the Finnish personnel only in conjunction with the declaration of 
martial law.138 But there was no solution to this problem, because 
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	 private property could not be sequestered in peacetime, and there were 
no Russians who could have replaced Finns in the innumerable local 
telephone exchanges. 
The Imperial Ministry of Finance compiled a list of a couple of 
hundred officials, ready to leave for Finland to sequester the treasury 
of the Finnish state, the Bank of Finland, the funds of the Finnish 
local government districts, private banks and private persons, so that 
the revolutionaries could not steal them.139 
Military judges were also to be ordered to Finland to deal with the 
numerous crimes expected against martial law. The Ministry of the 
Interior named prison guards and planned convoys for political 
criminals who were to be transported to Russia in order to avoid 
overcrowding in Finnish prisons.140 
department, delo 50(58-5), National Archives of Finland. 
136 Svodnaia vedomost', iavki na sbomye punkty chinov razlichnykh vedomst v 
sluchae ob"iavleniia v Finliandii voennago polozheniia, s ukazaniem chisla ikh i 
na kakoi den' oni iavliatsia. KKK 1913, I department, delo I_4, chast obshchaia, 
National Archives of Finland. 
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The gendarmes compiled a list of a couple of hundred Finns who 
were to be arrested at the moment of the declaration of martial law. 
The list was kept up to date until war broke out in 1914.141 
Seyn also asked for reliable police reinforcements to replace 
unreliable Finnish policemen. He was promised an expeditionary force 
of eight hundred men on foot and four hundred mounted, from Vitebsk 
and Vologda,142 and 136 men for routine police duties.'43 Compiling 
a list of officials to replace the administrators who should join the 
rebellion proved a problem, because Finns were unreliable and no 
competent Russians were available.144 
Then there was the problem of pay and the funding of the increased 
costs for all these people. In the case of mobilization, there would 
have been no problem, because wartime expenditure was foreseen in 
the regulations, but troops and other people were to be sent to Finland 
without a mobilization of reserves, as stated above. The Council of 
Ministers decided that the Ministry of Finance would have to find the 	 243 
money; for example 2,370,815 roubles for the Ministry of War.145  
The customs service had to be reformed, too, to prevent the illegal 
import of weapons for the Voima.' 46  The Council of Ministers ordered 
the Finnish Customs Service to increase their vigilance, but the 
Service did not obey, because the order had been given by the Russian 
government and was not based on Finnish law. The chief of the 
Customs Service Toivo Boisman was replaced by of Enehjelm, a 
Bobrikovian police official,147 but the disloyal personnel were 
141 Eremin to Seyn 14. X & 16. X 1913 & 17. V & 22. V 1914. KKK 1913,I 
department, delo 1-15, National Archives of Finland. 
142 Seyn to Kokovtsov 28. I 1913, KKK 1913, I department, delo 1-4; Svodnaia 
vedomost', iavki na sbomye punkty chinov razlichnykh vedomst v sluchae 
ob"iavleniia v Finliandii voennago polozheniia, s ukazaniem chisla ikh i na kakoi 
den' oni iavliatsia. KKK 1913, I department, delo 1-4, chart' obshchaia. National 
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National Archives of Finland. 
145 Seyn to Kokovtsov 28. I 1913. KKK 1913, I department, delo 1_4, National 
Archives of Finland. 
146 Reskript Glavnokomanduiushchago voiskami Gvardii i Peterburgskago Voennago 
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147 Pamiatnaia zapiska [on customs service] 25. III/7. IV 1910; Customs Office to 
the Senate 10. IX 1910; Seyn to Langhoff 18. IX/1. X 1910. KKK 1910, I 
department, delo XXI 15, National Archives of Finland. 
otherwise still there. That was why the Finnish customs offices would 
have shut down if martial law had been declared, and a few Russian 
customs offices opened instead, for which purpose the Ministry of 
Finance compiled a list of 127 officials ready to leave for Finland in 
twenty-four hours.148 All Finnish steamships, motorboats and decked 
sailboats were listed, and sinking or destruction threatened any vessel 
which would be found moving without leave in the area declared 
under martial law.'49 
The pilot and lighthouse service in Finland was vitally important 
for the navy, but its personnel had no naval competence, which, the 
navy complained, had caused the shipwreck of several warships and 
the running aground of the Imperial yacht in 1908. All Finnish pilots 
were deemed separatists or foreign spies. Replacing the chief of the 
service, Lieutenant General Sillman by Admiral Samsonov was 
therefore not enough, and the Admiralty Council took over the service 
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	 on 15 February 1912. In protest, 633 officials or 51% of the personnel 
left the service, and they had to be replaced by naval officers or pilots 
from the Empire.i50 The Finnish Diet sent a protest, once more 
meddling in a question of all-Imperial interest. Nicholas II left the 
protest 'without consequences', of course.151 Gradually, many new 
Finnish pilots were employed or the old pilots returned to work, so 
that in 1917 the service was again almost wholly Finnish.'52 
This agitation caused by the Russification of the pilot and 
lighthouse service gave reason for a new wave of gendarme 
information about sabotage by the dismissed pilots, who all, in the 
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Instruktsiia sudam voenno-tamozhennoi okhrany u beregov Finliandii, S.Peterburg 
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poberezhia i vodnogo prostranstva Finskogo zaliva, o reorganizatsii lotsmanskogo 
i maiachnogo vedomstva v Finliandii v finskoe uchrezhdenii i ob okhrane v sviazi 
s etom, pray russkikh sluzhashchikh v etikh uchrezhdeniiakh 25. IX 1914-28. XII 
1917. 
opinion of the gendarmes, seemed to have joined the Voima. The 
Navy Ministry concluded that the only means of fighting the agitation 
was to declare martial law over the Finnish coastal waters. But the 
Military District staff was of the opinion that if martial law were 
declared, it should cover all Finland, not only the coasts, in order to 
avoid confusion.153 A long discussion between the navy, army and 
foreign office followed, but in November 1913 the plans for the 
coastal state of war were completed and again a declaration was 
printed ready to be plastered up when necessary.154 
Declaring martial law in Finland would thus not have been a 
military operation only, but also a many-sided measure of security, 
and, in the end, a means of bringing the border country closer to the 
rest of the Empire, or Russification as the Finns called it. It is probable 
that the military part of the plan would have succeeded, but the 
administrative measures were obviously planned so haphazardly that 
they would have caused much confusion both for the Russians and 
for the Finns. 
Seyn favoured the idea of martial law in Finland, probably in order 
to make an end of the separatist tendencies in the country. For him 
personally, it would not have meant any increase in authority because 
according to the martial law regulations, he would have been subordi-
nated to the military commander-in-chief, as he, indeed, was in August 
1914. 
The interesting experiment was never made. Stolypin, nervous 
under the threat of losing the support of the Right, might have 
accepted Seyn's proposal, but he was murdered on 5 /18 September 
1911, and the proposal was discussed in the Council of Ministers 
under the chairmanship of Kokovtsov, a much more cautious and 
moderate man. The Council decided that martial law was not the 
proper way of administration in peacetime; it would only be a 
confession of Russia's failure to govern a province after one hundred 
years of domination.'55 
153 Zhumal soveshchaniia po voprosu o vvedenii voennago polozheniia v 
priberezhnom vodnom raione Finliandii. 19. V 1912. KKK 191, I department. 
delo 1_8, National Archives of Finland. 
154 Osobyi zhumal Soveta Ministrov 7. XI 1913 po voprosu o vvedeniia voennago 
polozheniia v priberezhnom vodnom raione Finliandii. KKK 1912, I department, 
delo 1 8, National Archives of Finland. 
155 Osobyi Zhumal Soveta Ministrov 14. X 1911. KKK 1911, I department, delo 42, 
National Archives of Finland. 
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The alarming gendarme reports did not cease. According to them, 
it seemed that the Finns were closing ranks; the Old Finnish 
conciliatory party was getting closer to their worst opponents, the 
constitutionalist Swedish and Young Finnish parties, and only a 
fraction tof he Old Finnish party still recommended submitting to 
Russia's demands. The Social Democrats kept a distance from the 
bourgeois parties, but their left-wing had sought contact with Russian 
Socialist Revolutionaries and Anarchists, these reports retailed.'56  
The Imperial government also had real difficulties in 1912. A new 
crisis broke out in the Balkans, and internal dissatisfaction led to 
strikes, uprisings and attempts at military revolt. In Helsinki 21 sailors 
were arrested and Admiral N.O. von Essen, commander of the Baltic 
Fleet, declared his Fleet in a state of war.157 But no rebellion took 
place in Finland, and in October Seyn reported that the Voima had 
decided to continue passive opposition.158 At the beginning of 1913, 
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	 the history of the Voima was again reviewed, with new information 
on the illegal import of arms, secret training in shooting and skiing, 
and the acquisition of motor boats and aeroplanes.159 Foreign spies 
were also continuing their activities in Finland, it was said, and still 
the Finnish police did not do anything to prevent it.16° 
Yet, it seems that the alarming information was losing credibility. 
In a survey already made in 1912, by Colonel Balabin, it had been 
stated that neither the Voima nor any plan of rebellion existed in 
Finland.161 Next year, in 1913, the gendarme activity caused an 
international public scandal. A retired gendarme official, Leonid 
Menschikoff, saw the error of his ways and told his story to a 
156 Kratkiia dannyia o politicheskom polozhenii v Fin-ii v nachale 1912 goda. KKK 
1912, I department, delo 25—V-1 part I, National Archives of Finland. 
157 Spravka (Memorandum on the arrests). KKK Hd 105, National Archives of 
Finland. 
158 Seyn to v. Brincken October 1905 (a concept). KKK Hd 105, National Archives 
of Finland. 
159 Spravka o Voime. KKK 1913, I department, delo 39-1; Po dokladu Polkovnika 
Utgofa o predpolagaemom kontrabandnom vvoze v krai transporta oruzhiia 7. XI 
1912. KKK 1912, I department, delo 8-52; Utgof to Seyn 7. III 1913. KKK 1914, 
I department, delo 7-2; Minister of the Interior Makarov to Seyn 21. IV and 16. 
V 1913, Seyn to Makarov 6. VII 1913. KKK 1913, I department, delo 9-3; 
National Archices of Finland. 
160 Spravka ob inostrannom voennom shpionazhe v Finliandii. KKK 1913, I 
department, delo 20_1, National Archives of Finland. 
161 Kujala, Venäjän hallituksen suunitelmat Suomen palauttamisesta järjestykseen 
vuosina 1907-1914, p. 298. 
journalist in Stockholm. He revealed that the gendarmes in Finland, 
lacking a knowledge of the local languages and helpless in the absence 
of reliable informants, had paid greedy, drunken or mad people for 
invented stories; if Finland was rebellious, the gendarmes were 
necessary in their easy jobs there. They also knew that the information 
they sent pleased their chiefs in St. Petersburg, who needed arguments 
against Finnish autonomy. Thus they reported, at first, about five 
thousand smuggled rifles, then about seventy thousand, and finally 
about two hundred thousand, in spite of not having found a single 
revolver. When two hundred thousand Finns had been armed, the 
number could not credibly be increased any more, but the Voima was 
then imaginatively supplied with additional machine guns and 
quick-firing cannons.162 At this time, the links between the Okhrana, 
or security service, and the Socialist Revolutionaries were also 
revealed, especially the double life of Evno Azev.'63 
After the scandal, the credulous gendarme chief Colonel Utgof was 	 247 
replaced by the more critical Colonel Eremin. Utgof was not fired but 
appointed to the post of gendarme chief in Warsaw, a duty with even 
more responsibility attached to it than the Finnish post. 
Seyn must have known, perhaps from the very beginning, but at 
least by this time, that no Voima existed since it had been dissolved 
in 1906.164 For him, the alarming information had been necessary for 
pushing out of office Gerard and Boeckmann and for getting increased 
powers, but now in 1913 he had reached the post of Governor-General. 
He had, in fact, been able to govern without extraordinary measures, 
and had little by little made the Finnish administration more obedient. 
The Finnish Diet could refuse taxes, but the Russified Senate was 
able to exist on the regular income of the the Finnish state and to pay 
the military millions. If Finns were left without schools, roads, or 
social amenities, it was no concern of the Imperial government as 
long as it did not cause any disorder. 
162 Statement on oath by the ancient gendarme official Leonid Menshikov to a 
notarius in Stockholm 5. IX 1913, copy in KKK Hd 87, n:o 3, delo Voimy, 
National Archives of Finland. 
163 In addition to the KKK, there is much material on the political police activity in 
the Antti Hackzell Collection, National Archives of Finland. 
164 Eremin to Seyn 10. VIII 1913, Seyn to Eremin 31. VIII 1913, KKK 1914, I 
department, delo 7-2. National Archives of Finland. 
In the midst of aliens 
The Russian garrisons in the Grand Duchy were islands in a Finnish 
sea, and probably felt a little isolated and lonely in these years of the 
growing hostility of the population towards them. Officers often had 
their families living with them, non-commissioned officers sometimes; 
for example, at Kuopio, Russian wives demanded aid from the town 
when their husbands left for war with the 22nd Army Corps in 1914.165 
Since the introduction of general national service, the privates were 
no longer in permanent service; instead, after their period of active 
service, they were transferred to the reserve, i.e. sent home to continue 
their civilian life, and thus, probably had even les chance or inclination 
than before to mix with the local natives. 
The massive red-brick barracks constructed for the new rifle 
brigades in the 1910s were architectural monuments of Imperial 
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	 military power. They were also planned according to the then modern 
ideas of what was healthy and socially proper.166  The Prussian-model 
uniforms of the period of Nicholas I and Alexander II period had been 
changed into more Russian style uniforms under Alexander III, and, 
though the army regiments were envious of the well-dressed Finnish 
rifle battalions, they were in fact adequately clothed for the climate. 
After the Japanese War of 1904-05 had proved that distinct colours 
made soldiers easily discernible targets, the olive-green mud-like 
colour had been adopted. 
For their spiritual well-being, each brigade had its military chaplain. 
In the days before the World War, Orthodox churches were built and 
parishes established in several new garrison towns. Constructed in the 
neo-Byzantinian style the churches are even to-day monuments to 
Russian imperial aspirations and to the Orthodox element in Russian 
nationalism. 
Contacts between the garrisons and the townspeople have not been 
studied in detail, nor do the military documents cast much light on 
them. There must have been a considerable number of commercial 
transactions between the Russian soldiers and Finnish civilians. "At 
Hamina people knew Russian, because there were Russian soldiers 
165 Kvick, Venäläisen sotaväen majoittaminen Kuopiossa 1910-1918 (Quartering 
Russian Troops in Kuopio 1910-18). 
166 Haila, Venäläinen rationaalisuus; 1910-luvun kasarmiarkkitehtuuri sosiaalisena 
käytäntönä. (Russian Barracks Architecture in the 1910s). 
and tradesmen there [...]". At Lahti, where the garrison was established 
in 1909 and the barracks completed in 1911, Russian tradespeople 
settled around the garrison area.167 
With the increasing friction between Imperial and Finnish politicians, 
social intercourse between upper-class Finns and Russians decreased. 
Finnish dissatisfaction was expressed in various forms of boycott: 
Russian officers had difficulties in finding accommodation at decent 
prices, and restaurants doubled their bills for Russian clients, 
schoolboys cried "Ruski pop" to Orthodox priests, a Lutheran priest 
sent his daughter to a lunatic asylum because she had shown sympathy 
for Russians...168 
During the Mechelin period, the most eager Russifiers had to leave 
Finland, and we have seen the influence of their embittered advice 
on Stolypin. The feelings of those who remained were probably even 
more bitter, because they saw every day how the local separatists were 
destroying the Imperial unity in the border country. They also must 
have felt slighted by the Finns, who believed themselves to be superior 
Westerners and held the Russians to be dirty Asiatics. A rare witness 
is Ivan Egorov, son of a non-commissioned officer in Sveaborg. He 
attended the Russian Alexander gimnazia or secondary high school in 
Helsinki, which had been established for educating Russian-minded 
Finns, but was in fact patronized only by Russian boys whose fathers 
served in Finland. For them, the Finns were despicable Tshukhny' 69, 
and he remembers a family friend to whom a sufficient proof of the 
primitive stupidity of the Finns was the fact that they called the horse 
he-vo-nen.. n0 
During these years, several cases of conflict were reported between 
the garrisons and the local population, which in some cases may have 
been serious. However, many of them were probably exaggerated by 
167 	 Halila, Landen historia, (The History of Lahti), pp. 499-500. In spite of the strong 
interest in local history in Finland, the presence of a Russian garrison is rarely 
dealt with in any detail in the books, and their economic or demographic 
importance, if any, is not mentioned. In the eyes of the historians of independent 
Finland, the Russian soldiers were aliens, who had nothing to do with the local 
life; at best, the cost to the town administration was remembered, e.g. Lähteenoja, 
Rauman kaupungin historia, (The History of Rauma), vol. IV. 
168 Muistioita tärkeimmistä poliittisista tapahtumista ja hallituksenvastaisesta 
liikkeestä 1899-1903, Hd 97, KKK, National Archives of Finland. (Memorandum 
on political occurrences and movement against the government). 
169 Tshukhna, a contemptuous word in Russian for the Finnic peoples. 
170 Egorov, Ot monarkhii ko oktiabriu. 
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the military staffs or the Governor-General's chancery, because, 
collected in the dossier "The abnormal position of Russians in 
Finland", they served as an argument for a law, in 1912, for equal 
rights for Russians in the country."' 
There was, of course, contact of another kind: "There were also 
many girls who were left pregnant when the Russians went to war".172 
But very few Russians married Finnish girls; for example, in the 
garrison town of Kuopio the church register does not tell of a single 
case,13 and most of the relationships were of the temporary sort; "she 
was only a woman from the suburb [and Russians] caught these 
women for themselves — no one could rival the soldiers: they could 
skewer Finns with their bayonets"."' In a study on prostitution in 
Finland, Russian clients are mentioned casually, but not studied 
separately from Finnish customers.15  
Probably most of the illicit relationships were entered into during 
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	 the war years of 1915-16, when the number of Russians increased 
and they were scattered in small deatchments in the villages close to 
their defence positions. Socializing grew even more frequent in the 
revolutionary year of 1917, when the discipline of the army and the 
norms of civilian society grew more loose. 
Politically and nationally conscious Finns thought it a shame, of 
course: "it was humiliating to see how immorally many Finns had 
intercourse with the alien garrisons... I heard of many 'engagements' 
of even educated Finnish girls with Russian soldiers, so it is no wonder 
that simple servant girls could not ward off the amatory advances... 
The only solace is that the offspring will be educated in the Lutheran 
creed of the mother."16 This was an additional reason for the wish, 
prevalent in patriotic circles in Finland, to get rid of the Russian 
presence in the country. 
171 Materialy o nenormalnym polozhenii russkikh v krae. KKK Hd 99, n:o 1; 22nd 
army corps staff 11. III 1911, I department, delo 53-1, National Archives of 
Finland; in 1909 there were 14 cases, in 1910, 15 to 38, and in 1911, 39 to 89. 
172 Haavikko—Hämäläinen, Ketunkivellä, (The Biography of Helvi Hämäläinen), pp. 
14, 35. 
173 Kvick, Kuopion varuskunta. 
174 Joel Lehtonen, p. 141. 
175 Häkkinen, Rahasta — vaan ei rakkaudesta, (A study of Prostitution), e.g. pp. 55, 
70. 
176 Hultin, Päiväkirjani kertoo, (the Diary of H.), vol. II, p. 284. 
At the beginning of the Russian period, the cultural life of Turku 
had been enlivened by the Russian officers garrisoned there."' By the 
end of the period, in Helsinki, only Russians patronized the Russian 
theatre or read the Finliandskaia Gazeta of the Governor-General. 
The era of nationalism caused problems for the non-Russian 
Imperial elites, who with a good conscience had served the previous 
Emperors, but now found that Nicholas II had chosen to be only a 
Russian monarch. Senator F.W. Schauman, the father of Bobrikov's 
murderer, was an example of a general who adopted the Finnish 
constitutionalist position. On the other hand, Vice-Admiral Anders 
Wirenius, Rear-Admiral Teodor Sillman, Major General Victor 
Hedlund, and Colonel Paul Kraatz, who were appointed Senators in 
the Russified Senate, had chosen the Russian side. It was neither an 
easy or a natural choice. Admiral von Wilcken of the Russian navy 
married a lady of the Cedercreutz family in Finland, their sons served 
in the navy and were Russians, while the daughter, Sigrid von 
Wilcken, married a Thesleff, originally of German stock in Finland, 
and was a Finn.18 Men like Carl Gustaf Emil Mannerheim, who 
continued serving in the Imperial army, were criticized by their family 
in Finland for serving the oppressor; Mannerheim's brother Carl was 
among the constitutionalists expelled by Bobrikov to Stockholm. But 
most of them served the Emperor to the end of the Empire because 
they did not want to endanger their career, nor — often ignored or not 
comprehended by modern historians — did they forget their oath to 
the Emperor and their military honour. 
Politically thinking Finns were thoroughly alienated from anything 
Russian. Juho Kusti Paasikivi, the future President of the Finnish 
Republic, then a rising star in the Old Finnish party, stated that the 
moment was not propitious for conciliation with Russia. Konni 
Zilliacus, the leader of the Activists, was of the opinion that cutting 
all ties with Russia was vital for Finland's national and democratic 
development. The constitutionalist leader Pehr Evind Svinhufvud, also 
a future President, said: "This is no good. We shall be lost if we 
cannot get rid of Russia". In their meetings, university students 
dreamed of national independence and a fight against the Russians.19 
177 Nikula, Turun kaupungin historia 1809-1856, (The History of Turku 1809-1856), 
p. 306. 
178 Thesleff, Ihana elämä, (A Wonderful Life), p. 23-30. 
179 Paasikiven muistelmia sortovuosilta, (The Memoirs of Paasikivi from the Years 
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These were idle dreams as long as no Finnish forces existed. The 
22nd Army Corps, by its mere presence, fulfilled its task of guarding 
Imperial sovereignty in the border country. Finnish autonomy had no 
international support, now even less than in 1899, because no great 
power had any reason to meddle in internal Russian affairs. 
In spite of the fact that the expressions of the Finnish leaders cited 
above seem fairly clear, the border country was not definitely lost for 
Russia. Most of the inhabitants probably accepted the presence of 
Russians as a fact of life, and outside the circle of politicians, few 
had any reason to complain of any direct material suffering due to 
the Russian domination. The Imperial army and navy were certainly 
not regarded in Finland as an alien army of occupation. 
Perhaps, with a different policy the Imperial government might 
have regained the loyalty of Finns; but its probable that the 
government should have been totally different to be able to adopt any 
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	 other policy. Russia was not in fact directed by anyone, it drifted 
without clear direction. Kokovtsov had no political programme 
comparable to the attempts of his predecessor Stolypin to unify the 
Empire and its government; Nicholas II had forbidden him the gestures 
of a grand vizier. Kokovtsov was a conscientious bureaucrat, mainly 
interested in balancing the budget and hoping to see a frictionless 
flow of events, while, in fact, standing under growing pressure from 
the Right and having to grapple with the problems of industrial unrest. 
The Finns he tried to pacify by putting off the worst problems, for 
example, by transferring the annexation of the Karelian Isthmus to 
a committee. But Kokovtsov could not definitely avoid the centralizing 
measures that the Nationalists, Rightists, and the military were 
demanding in the name of the unity of the Empire and military 
necessity, disregarding their political consequences. 
The development of the ethnic minorities in the border regions of 
the Empire into modern nations ran against Russia's development into 
a modern, centralized, nationally unified state, which was, in turn, 
retarded by strong conservative forces. Factors of military security 
were only one aspect, even though a vital one, of this problem, which 
in the end proved fatal for the Romanov Empire. 
of Oppression), vol. I, p. 200, vol. II, p. 199; Gummerus, Aktiivisilta taisteluvuo-
silta (Reminiscences of Activism), pp. 213, 222, 239-243; Enckell, Poliittiset 
muistelmani (Political Memoirs), p. 12. 
ON THE EVE 
Plans for a great war revised 
Planning for war went on more urgently, as international crises, naval 
rivalry and arms competition between the Great Powers brought a 
large-scale conflict ever closer. 
New instructions for the mobilization and concentration of the 
Russian army were given on 1 May 1912. Now, the armies were to 
be grouped into two fronts or army groups, one against Austria and 
the other against Germany, each with its commander-in-chief or 
glavno-komandaiushchii, under the autority of a supreme commander-
in-chief, verkhovnyi glavnokomanduiushchii . 
The plan for concentrating troops for the defence of St Petersburg 
was also reviewed, but its main features remained essentially 
unchanged, with only a few details revised. From the Viipuri direction, 
St Petersburg was to be defended by the 50th Division.180 Kronstadt 
was held by ten infantry battalions, six artillery battalions, two sapper 
companies and one mining company. In the region of Ingria—Estonia, 
a new 62nd Division was positioned in the coastal region, and a similar 
fresh 79th Division stood by as a general reserve.181 
The worst headache of the military staffs in Finland remained 
unchanged: in a war against the Triple Alliance the army corps would 
have to fight simultaneously against the external enemy and the local 
rebel bands — in military and naval plans the Voima survived the 
revelation of the gendarmes' lies. To avoid fatal defeats, the 
commander of the corps, Lieutenant General Olkhovskii, explained 
that a fourth brigade and additional cavalry were urgently necessary 
in the country, and his existing brigades had to be brought up from 
peacetime to wartime numbers. Sufficient troops had to be stationed 
in Finland to guarantee the security of the Imperial capital from the 
north, because in a crisis it might be impossible to transport 
reinforcements there. Olkhovskii also demanded double stores of 
munitions because the rebels might cut his supply lines, and he needed 
180 Eight battalions and 32 guns at Kuolemajärvi, two battalions and two sotnii at 
Terijoki, six battalions, 16 guns and six sotnii at Uusikirkko. 
181 RGVIA, fond 1343, opis' 3, delo 57, Obshchiia soobrazheniia otnosit'elno vybora 
punktov dlia pervonachal'nago raspolozheniia i sosredotocheniia voisk 1912. 
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sappers to repair bridges and other installations which the Finns would 
destroy. 
The commander reminded the Military District staff that a 
mobilization in Finland might provoke not only a local rebellion but 
also a general strike, and therefore he would need railway and 
telegraph troops to secure the communications. It was only with these 
additional troops that the army corps would be able to fulfil its tasks 
as a military force and uphold Russian sovereignty in Finland.182 
For his own political purposes, Governor-General Seyn supported 
the demands of the military command. More troops were necessary 
for the interior, since the concentration of garrisons in the south of 
Finland left most of the country denuded of Russian military forces, 
which was a serious matter, said the Governor-General, because of 
the Constitutionalist, Social Democrat, and Pan-Finnish agitation.'83 
The military authorities also wished to have flotillas on the lakes 
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	 in the interior against an eventual Swedish lateral attack from the Gulf 
of Bothnia through the country. Seyn agreed on the necessity of the 
flotillas for reminding the population of Imperial power and for 
quelling any rebellion or guerilla movement. But in practice not much 
was achieved. The army had no ships for the purpose.'84  The navy 
sent an experimental flotilla of light torpedo boats to Saimaa in 1910, 
but found their operation rather difficult in the narrow waterways of 
the lake system, and in vain demanded the cost of the crews (twelve 
officers, thirty-three non-commissioned officers, and 148 sailors for 
the eight boats) and maintenance from the War Ministry, who had 
paid for a flotilla on the Amu Dania in 1895-96.'85 
Olkhovskii's main demand was taken seriously and the fourth 
brigade was approved and started to be formed in the country at the 
end of 1913, although Sukhomlinov's grand programme for increasing 
the army strength by half a million men was accepted by the Duma 
182 Commander of the 22nd Army Corps to the commander-in-chief of the Guards 
and St. Petersburg military district 23. XII 1912. Ven sot asiak 11405, rukovodstvo 
obshch. mobil. National Archives of Finland. 
183 	 Seyn to v. Brincken 9. XI 1911, KKK Hd 14, n:o 5, National Archives of Finland. 
184 Seyn to Stolypin 22. II 1911; Statements by Nicholas Nicholaevich 18. III 1911, 
28. V 1911; Statements by the Navy Ministry 10. III and War Ministry 3. V 
1911, osobyi Zhumal Soveta Ministrov 4. VIII 1911, protocol of a mixed 
committee 28. XII 1912. KKK Hd 14, n:o 7, National Archives of Finland. 
185 RGAVMF, fond 418, opis' 1 delo 259 ob organizatsii Finliandskoi ozemoi flotilii 
5. I 1910-31. XII 1911. 
only in 1914. Thus, in 1914, the 22nd Army Corps at long last reached 
its full strength of thirty-two battalions in sixteen two-battalion rifle 
regiments (the normal infantry corps had eight four-battalion 
regiments). 
The cadres for the fourth brigade were commandeered from 
neighbouring detachments.186 Every brigade was to have four senior 
officers, nine captains, twenty-seven junior offices, eight officials and 
one chaplain, and it was specially ordered that the donating 
detachment must not try to get rid of their bad eggs but send first-class 
men only. Yunker schools were also combed for suitable officers. 
Each regiment was to consist in all of ninety-eight non-commissioned 
officers, 825 enlisted men in the line, seventeen trumpeters and 
thirty-five other musicians and fifty-five non-combatants,t87 that is of 
about half the wartime numbers, but it was planned that by 1915 they 
should be increased to 75% of the full complement.188 The new 
regiments were garrisoned in inland and northern towns as Seyn had 
wished, 13th at Vaasa, 14th in Tampere, 15th at Hämeenlinna, and 
16th at Oulu, but they were destined not to stay there for long. 
According to the new plan, the mobilization of the fighting troops 
of the 22nd Army Corps was to take from six to ten days, a shorter 
period than the previous plan had foreseen. In case of war, the various 
detachments of the corps were to be mobilized at their garrison 
towns. i89 The 20th Dragoon Regiment was to make ready at 
186 Ten non-commissioned officers, two musicians and 98 enlisted men for each rifle 
regiment: 
— the 13th Regiment at Vaasa, from the 1st Army Corps, the 1st Bn from the 
22nd Division, the 2nd Bn from the 24th; 
— the 14th Regiment in Tampere, from the 18th Corps, the Ist Bn from the 23rd 
Division, the 2nd Bn from the 37th Division; 
— the 15th Regiment at Hämeenlinna, for the 1st Bn from the 18th Borps and the 
50th Division, for the 2nd Bn from the 22nd Corps' Ist Brigade; 
— the 16th Regiment at Oulu, from the 22nd Corps, for the 1st Bn from the 2nd 
Brigade, for the 2nd Bn from the 3rd Brigade. 
187 RGVIA, fond 1343, opis' 2, delo 158, Vedomost' komplektovaniia 4 finliandskoi 
strel'kovoi brigady, i ob uvelichenii shtatnykh sostavov chastei voisk, Glavnoe 
Upravlenie general'nogo shtaba nachalniku shtaba voisk Gvardii i Peterburgskago 
voennago okruga 24. IX 1913. 
188 RGVIA, fond 1343, opis' 2, delo 158, St Petersburg military district staff to 
General Staff, December 1913. 
189 Corps staff in Helsinki, 
1st Brigade in Helsinki with two of its regiments, one in Turku, one at Tammisaari; 
2nd Brigade was to mobilize two regiments in Viipuri, one at Mikkeli and one 
at Hamina; 
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Lappeenranta, the two sotnias of Orenburg Cossacks in Helsinki as 
well as the detachment of field gendarmes. An aviation detachment'9° 
for the army corps was to be mobilized in St Petersburg. Munitions 
stores, field hospitals, field bakeries and other supply units were to 
be mobilized at a slower tempo.19' 
Constructing the barracks for the new troops cost plenty of money; 
the cost of the building sites for new garrisons amounted to thirteen 
million roubles or thirty-four million marks, which the army wanted 
to make the Finnish state pay. Kokovtsov, already routinely used to 
quarrelling with the Ministry of War on economies, stated that the 
Finnish Senate had difficulties enough as it was with the general 
administration of the country and with the military millions. In the 
end, the Senate scraped together eleven million marks in 1909-14 for 
this purpose,19' and the army probably paid the rest. 
Finns had been liberated from military service, but their horses 
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	 were needed for war. Again, a constitutional conflict threatened, 
because military necessity was all-Imperial but sequestrating private 
property was a question of citizens' rights. The Council of Ministers 
decided that this question was to be regulated through the all-imperial 
procedure decreed in 1910, which was so time-consuming that before 
anything could be accomplished, the war broke out. The army had to 
buy the horses it needed, in all more than 27,000 horses out of the 
294,264 counted in the country in 1914.193 
The provision of ships, motor boats, and motor cars as well as 
lorries was also discussed, but even here the legislative measures were 
not taken in time. 
The admirals had been planning a naval reconstruction since 1906, 
3rd Brigade at Lahti, Riihimäki, Lapeenranta, Kouvola: 
4th Brigade in Tampere, Vaasa, Oulu, Hämeenlinna, one regiment each; 
artillery in Helsinki, Tuusula, Viipuri, Hämeenlinna, one battalion each; 
190 In Russian division, perhaps comparable to a squadron, not to be mixed with 
diviziia, a division. 
191 Staff of St. Petersburg military district to the commander of 22nd Army Corps 
9/22. V 1914 "s dokumentom osoboi vazhnosti", orders for mobilization in force 
from I.XII 1914. Ven sot asiak 11327, National Archives of Finland. 
192 Spravka o raskhodakh finliandskoi kazny na voennyia potrebnosti 1909-1914. 
KKK 1914, II department, delo 91, National Archives of Finland. 
193 Spravka po voprosu o vvedenii v Finliandii voenno-konskoi povinnosti. KKK 
1909, II department, delo 55; Osobyi zhumal Soveta Ministrov 10. X 1913, KKK 
1913, II department, delo 21-15; Senate to Seyn 22. II 1916, Seyn to the Ministry 
of the Interior 27. II 1916, KKK 1914, I department, war delo 4-22, National 
Archives of Finland. 
as related above, but Russia's naval rearmament started in earnest 
only in 1911. A minimum programme of four dreadnoughts and a few 
lighter ships had been laid down in 1909, but the Duma was reluctant 
to give much money to the navy until, in 1911, Admiral I.K. 
Grigorovich was appointed Navy Minister and purged the notoriously 
corrupt administration to a certain degree. The four dreadnoughts of 
the Gangut class were completed in 1914-15. In 1911, it was also 
heard that Turkey was acquiring modern ships, and to counter this 
threat three big ships were constructed for the Russian Black Sea 
fleet.194 The Turkish naval scare also helped a "Law of Imperial 
Russian Navy" through the Duma in 1912. According to it, in twenty-
four years Russia was to create a mighty ocean-going fleet at the cost 
of 2.7 thousand million roubles. Nicholas II signed the law and stated 
that "this is a day of great hopes for Russia... the navy will be elevated 
to the might and power corresponding to Russia's glory and dignity". 
The Foreign Ministry also wanted a big fleet to support their 	 257 
diplomats.195 Big battle-cruisers of the Borodino class were laid down 
in 1912-1913, but war and revolution interrupted their construction.196 
To resolve the Near Eastern question, it was planned to carry out 
a two-pronged attack by the Black Sea fleet from Sevastopol to the 
Bosphorus and by a Mediterranean flotilla from the French possession 
of Bizerta to the Dardanelles. These plans were made by the diplomats 
of the Foreign Office and the admirals of the Naval General Staff, 
while the army opposed them because the fantastic-sounding plans 
implied a serious dispersal of forces from the German-Austrian front, 
where the fate of the Turkish Straits, too, would be decided. 
Reluctantly a couple of army corps were earmarked for the landing, 
but in fact these army corps were needed on the main front when the 
great war did break out.197 
194 Gangut, Petropavlovsk, Poltava, Sevastopol of 23,360 tons for the Baltic, 
Imperatritsa Manila, Imperator Alexander III, Imperatritsa Ekaterina Velikaia of 
22,600 tons for the Black Sea; battlecruisers Borodino. Izmail, Kinburn, Navarin 
of 32,500 tons launched in 1915-16 but never completed, four light cruisers for 
each sea, nine destroyers of the Bespokoinyi class and sixteen of the Leitenant 
Ilin class completed for the Baltic before or during the war. Conway's All the 
World's Fighting Ships 1906-1921, pp. 302-10. 
195 Petrov, Podgotovka Rossii.., p. 157-58. 
196 Petrov, Podgotovka Rossil..., pp. 89-91, 146-49; Adams, "Der Wiederaufstieg 
der russischer Kriegsmarine in den Jahren 1905-1914"; the most recent and 
complete work: "Nakanune voiny", Tri veka rossiiskogo flora, vol. II, pp. 6-65. 
197 Petrov, Podgotovka Rossii..., p. 160-76. The Straits Question has been dealt with 
Sukhomlinov would have liked to give up and destroy Sveaborg 
as he did with the fortresses on the Prussian border in 1910, but the 
navy did not consent to this retreat and started demanding 
fortifications at Reval as well. Construction was started in 1911, and 
in 1913 the fortresses were transferred from the Ministry of War to 
the Navy, with the argument that the generals did not understand naval 
strategy. Strong coastal fortresses were established at Porkkala and 
Naissaari (Nargen) to cover the navigation route through the Gulf of 
Finland, which was also to be closed with minefields. There was no 
time left before the war broke out for the planned high seas fleet to 
grow strong enough to fight on the open sea, and the plan was to 
keep the few completed big ships close behind the defence position. 
With their heavy guns they were to destroy any enemy ships that 
might break through the minefield. Flank positions were planned in 
the Moon Sound and the Turku archipelago, from where light craft 
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	 could have attacked the passing enemy. The new positioning, due to 
be completed in 1918, was christened "the Naval Fortress of Peter the 
Great". St Petersburg was the main centre of shipbuilding as well as 
other arms production, and Kronstadt remained a strong fortress and 
the main base for equipping and repairing ships. 
The naval fortifications and construction programmes were far from 
completed when the war broke out in August 1914, as was also the 
naval base of Reval, which was why Sveaborg continued to serve as 
a fortress and naval base. In 1909 the Sveaborg garrison consisted of 
about 1,500 men in the infantry and one thousand in the artillery, a 
couple of hundred sappers, forty men in the quartermaster's branch 
and thirty-two in the military hospital, in all about 4,300 soldiers, with 
double the number under the war-time nominal strength (9,892 
men).198 
Admirals did not have comparable importance to generals in the 
formation of Russian policy towards Finland, but the naval defence 
plans had their importance because, as we have seen, the naval forts 
and bases were among the main objectives of defence in the country. 
in numerous studies, mainly on the basis of E.A. Adamov, Konstantinopol i 
prolivy, vols. I - IV, Moskva 1925-26, also translated into German as Die 
Europäischen Mächte und die Türkei während des Weltkrieges, Konstantinopol 
und die Meerengen, nach den Geheimdokumenten des ehem. Ministerium für 
Auswärtige Angelegenheiten, Red. A. Adamov, vols. I - IV, Dresden 1930-32. 
198 RGAVMF, fond 1347, opis' 1, delo 67 o lichnom sostave chastei gamizona 
Sveaborgskoi kreposti v mimoe vremia 1. I 1908-27. XI 1909. 
Ships could not play the political role which army garrisons did, but 
the existence of coastal defence had its political importance in keeping 
the expected enemy distant from Finland; and sailors did have their 
role in history before the war ended. 
On the very eve of the outbreak of the European war, General Iu.N. 
Danilov, Quartermaster General of the Russian army in the first phase 
of the war, calculated that if Germany directed its main attack against 
France, there would probably not remain enough German forces in 
the east for a landing in Finland. If the Swedes should conquer parts 
of western Finland, it would have no influence on the operations on 
the continental main front. But if Germany only took up defensive 
positions in the west and turned her main forces towards the east, she 
might attempt a landing to threaten St Petersburg and compel Russia 
to disperse her forces. 
A direct German naval attack on St Petersburg was not probable, 
because Kronstadt was strong enough to deny access to the capital. 	 259 
A landing in the Gulf of Riga would mainly threaten the rear 
communications of the Russian main army. A much more probable 
case was an attack through Finland, where a good network of roads 
favoured the enemy, and the population was hostile to Russia. A major 
landing was possible at Koivisto, while even a minor landing could 
be successfully carried out in the west of Finland, because the Russian 
troops there were weak and scattered, and the enemy troops could 
easily be supplied by sea.199 
The role of Finland in the Imperial Russian defence plans as the 
defence glacis for St Petersburg had remained constant in all war 
plans. It was always the case that only the minimum number of troops 
were to be detached to defend western Finland. Only the coastal strip 
of the country was regarded as an eventual theatre of war, while the 
interior was fit only for guerilla bands 20° 
The war plans for 1908-14 in a way implied a criticism of Seyn's 
and even Bobrikov's work. These men had started their work in order 
to bring Finland closer to the rest of the Empire and to make easier 
the defence of the Imperial capital. We have seen the difficulties the 
199 Danilov's memoir 10/24. IV 1914, p. 134-39, 157-58; an appendix in Franz, 
Russlands Eintritt in den Weltkrieg. 
200 Debesh, Osobennosti boevykh deistvii na Finliandskoi mestnosti., pp. 7-9; W., 
"Kortfattad öfversikt af den vämepliktiga finska militärens utbildning åren 
1881-1901", pp. 571-609. 
war planners had to take into account because the Finnish population 
grew ever more hostile as a result of the policy of the Imperial 
government and its representatives in the country. 
The generals never felt, though, that the attempt at bringing the 
border provinces closer to the Empire had been wrong or should have 
been changed. In their Imperial way of thinking, coloured by 
nationalism, they were not able to take into account the view of the 
nationalities, they only complained that "the heavy burden of the War 
Ministry was to organize defence against the neighbouring million-
strong armies, and simultaneously to watch the forty million non-
Russian subjects [and] to maintain law and order in the interior of the 
realm" !01  
The Russian government did their best, or worst, to keep together 
the Empire and to prevent its structure from collapsing, but dynastic 
monarchism was not enough to keep the Russian masses satisfied, nor 
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	 was Russian chauvinism the right idea for attaching the nationalities 
to the principal nation. Of course, it is not certain that any policy 
could have made the Finns eager to remain the Tsar's subjects once 
the national idea had taken root in the Grand Duchy. 
However that may be, Russia, wanting to remain a Great Power, 
was inescapably involved in international power politics and unable 
to avoid being drawn into the great conflict of the European system 
in 1914. 
Britain no longer an enemy 
Defeat and revolution in 1905-06 made it clear to Stolypin and the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs Izvol'skii that Russia had to desist from 
advancing in Asia. Britain, Russia's old rival, faced the growing might 
of Germany and had insufficient forces for Imperial defence on the 
distant Asian frontiers. France, eager to avoid being drawn into a 
conflict of her old (since 1894) ally Russia and her new (since 1904) 
friend Britain, was able in 1907 to help them put aside their rivalry 
and to join the entente cordiale . 
Though the old animosity was slow to disappear among the Russian 
military men, Britain was no longer the 'naval enemy'. The Baltic 
Sea had lost part of its previous importance for the Royal Navy, 
201 Kuropatkin, Memorien, p. 110. 
because tar and hemp were no longer necessary for their ships. 
Nevertheless, freedom of the seas was an ancient principle of British 
naval and commercial policy, and British diplomacy stressed the 
necessity of free access to the Baltic through the Danish Straits. 
It is true that Admiral Sir John Fisher, when planning operations 
for a war against the growing German fleet, thought about a 
break-through into the Baltic, a landing on the Pomeranian coast, and 
an advance to Berlin of a British Expeditionary Force. But the threat 
of mines, torpedoes and submarines in the confined passages leading 
into the Baltic clearly made this plan impracticable. It was therefore 
planned to send the Expeditionary Force across the Channel to the 
Western front, while the Royal Navy would resort to the strategy of 
a distant blockade of Germany from Rosyth and Scapa Flow. In 
negotiations for a naval agreement with Russia in 1914, the British 
did not bind themselves to send any support for the Russians to the 
Baltic but only promised to tie down the main force of the German 	 261 
fleet in the west. A similar naval agreement was made with the French, 
who promised to maintain their superiority in the Mediterranean 
against the Turks, after dealing with the Austrian navy, while the 
Russians were to move on the Bosphorus.2o2 
The question of closing the Baltic Sea 
The German navy looked forward to the day when they could fight 
it out on equal terms with the Royal Navy in the North Sea. As for 
the Baltic, they hoped that the British fleet could be kept out, and the 
Baltic be made a mare clausum Teutonicum, forbidden for outsiders. 
Previously, the Russians had favoured the idea and they had probably 
even started the talks to this end — at least it was the Russian professor 
of international law, Fedor Fedorovich von Martens, who had first 
proposed the idea of closing the Danish Straits in 1903. But then there 
arose, in 1904, the problem of not being able to send their own Baltic 
fleet out into the ocean. The Germans dearly loved to see Admiral 
Rozhdestvenskii's fleet steam out of the Baltic through the Belt, nor 
had they any wish for a precedent which could have been used as a 
pretext to close other straits in far-away seas against their own 
Kaiserliche Marine. 
202 Sweet, "The Baltic in British Diplomacy before the First World War'. 
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The solution, for the Germans, was to dominate Denmark and put 
the Danish Straits under German defence. In 1903-08, the younger 
Moltke, the chief of the German General Staff, pressed Denmark to 
give a binding promise to join the German side in a future war. The 
Danes, with their weak armed forces, engaged themselves to observe 
a policy of friendship and co-operation with their frightening southern 
neighbour. But, in 1914, Moltke had no spare forces for the occupation 
of Denmark, as he had threatened, and the small country did not join 
the war. The Kaiser Wilhelm Kanal, completed in 1914, made it 
possible for the Germans to transfer their fleet from the North Sea to 
the Baltic and back as might be necessary. The Danes mined their 
Straits against any trespassers, but the international passage of the 
Sound remained open in principle and had to be watched by the 
Germans.z°3  
Germanic Swedes against the Slays? 
Sweden and Russia had fought each other for centuries, but the wars 
had ended in 1809, and in 1812-15 they had been allies. In 1854 
Sweden had not joined the Western Powers in their crusade against 
the Eastern giant, and in the second half of the century Sweden was 
militarily weak, with an ancient indelta system of recruitment and 
obsolete warships. Then, at the beginning of the twentieth century, 
Sweden joined the European armaments race, modernized her army 
and constructed armoured coastal battleships. In the atmosphere of the 
armed peace, the Swedes believed that the Russification of Finland 
by Bobrikov and Seyn aimed at the creation of a base for the 
annexation of the whole of Scandinavia. On the map, the north-
western arm of Finland stretched out towards the northern Atlantic, 
and Russian tinkers in Sweden were believed to be spying out the 
country for the General Staff in St Petersburg.2°4 
Many members of the Swedish court circles, officer corps and other 
elites were Germanophiles and Russophobes, who hoped for German 
203 In my book The Baltic Question 1903-1908 I have discussed these problems in 
detail. The Danish problem has been presented by Troels Fink in his studies: 
Spillet om dansk neutalitet 1905-1909; Ustabil balance. Dansk udenrigs- og 
frsvarspolitik 1894-1905; and Deutschland als Problem Danmarks. 
204 Aselius, The 'Russian menace" to Sweden; the Belief System of a Small Power 
Security Elite in the Age of Imperialism. 
support against the menacing Slav Empire. As for Russia, she 
supported the Norwegian striving for separation from the Scandinavian 
Union in 1905 in order to weaken Sweden, but Britain gained more 
from the divorce because Norway's unprotected merchant fleet was 
more dependent on British than on Russian friendship.2°5  
Russia's stationing of troops on the Åland Islands in 1906 — and 
the consequent attempt to liberate the Empire from the servitude of 
demilitarization — frightened the Swedes and made them to draw 
nearer to Germany, but not as near as the Germans might have hoped 
or the Russians believed. In 1910, the German General Staff started 
discussions with their Swedish colleagues about the possibility, should 
war occur, of an attack by two Swedish army corps on Finland in 
order to tie down an equal number of Russians there, and then to 
threaten the Russian capital, in order to draw additional forces away 
from the German front. This was exactly what the Russians expected, 
as we have seen. But, in fact, these discussions took place only 
between staff officers, and as soon as the Swedish government learned 
of them, they were stopped. Strict neutrality remained the official 
policy of Sweden, and her arming was aimed at the protection of her 
independence, and was not devised for pro-German and anti-Russian 
adventures.206 Of course, the Russians could not know this and they 
counted Sweden among their future enemies in the expected great war 
against Germany. 
German views on the naval situation in the Baltic 
Before 1904, the German naval staffs believed that until the Royal 
Navy were defeated, they could only observe whatever the enemy 
might undertake on their coasts in the Baltic, and that, 
correspondingly, "if the Russians have the least bit of initiative, they 
will dominate the Baltic sea, and we can even lose Pillau and 
Danzig".207 Even after the debacle of Tsushima, the Tsar's battleships 
which had been completed after the Japanese war could, from Libau, 
make the situation 'uncomfortable' for the Germans. But, in fact, 
Russian naval defence was withdrawn to the eastern end of the Gulf 
205 Omang, Norge og stormaktene 1906-1914. 
206 Lindberg, Bakom borggårdskrisen; Tyskland föreslår militär konvention med 
Sverige 1910; Lindberg, De svensk-tyska generalstabsförhandlingarna år 1910. 
207 Which even the Russians knew: Petrov, Podgotovka Rossii..., p. 233. 
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of Finland,208 as we saw above, and Libau was abandoned in 1910 as 
a major naval base. 
Then, for a while, the political situation also seemed favourable for 
the Germans after the Bosnian crisis of 1908-09, because neither 
Britain nor France had supported Russian designs on the Balkans. 
Thus there might have existed a chance of a naval duel between 
Russians and Germans. But even if neutral, Britain was dangerous 
and had to be watched with sufficient force in the North Sea. The 
General Staff of the German army did not believe in the possibility 
of a limited war on one front only. They supposed that the fleet could 
merely be kept in its defensive position on the Elbe estuary. 
The navy was not satisfied with planning for such a humble role. 
They dreamed of an attack on the Russian coasts to tie down enemy 
troops and to cause disorder in the rear of the Tsar's army.209 They 
supposed that the few Russian ships would be reluctant to join battle, 
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	 though the commander of the Russian Baltic fleet, von Essen was 
known to be an energetic and intelligent leader. The Russian torpedo 
craft which were still based at Libau were deemed the most dangerous 
part of the enemy fleet. Therefore, bombarding Libau was to be the 
first stage in the future naval war on the Baltic Sea. After that, Russia's 
coasts could be raided and her maritime trade cut. Threatening moves 
at sea would keep the St Petersburg garrison at home and away from 
the front facing the German army.210 
The army was asked whether they would march towards Moscow 
or towards St. Petersburg, whether they planned landings on the Gulf 
of Finland or on the Gulf of Riga, and whether they wished for naval 
support. The General Staff answered that no march towards the east 
208 Promemoria über die strategische Bedeutung des Kriegshafens Libau 10. III 1893, 
BA — MA RM 5/v 1632; Vorarbeiten zu den Operations-Plänen gegen Russland 
vom 15. Dezember 1892 bis Nov. 1908; Denkschrift über das Verhalten der 
deutschen Ostflotte im Kriege Deutschland gegen Zweibund 20. III 1903 BA—MA 
RM 5/v 1629; Operationspläne gegen Russland in Europa vom März 1903 bis 
Juni 1913. 
209 Zum Immediatvortrag 8. IV 1909, BA—MA RM 5/v 1629 Operationspläne gegen 
Russland in Europa vom März 1903 bis Juni 1913. — Immediatvortrag means 
papers referred by any office directly to the Emperor, without any intervening 
hand. There were several Immediatstelle in the German navy — the Navy 
Ministry, the Admiralty Staff, the commander-in-chief of the High Seas Fleet, the 
commander of the Baltic Fleet. The inability of William II to control these as 
well as similar military and civil authorities created the notorious Führungschaos 
in German government. 
210 Zum Immediatvortrag 9. III 1909. BA—MA RM 57v 1629. 
was planned nor any landings intended, but if something should 
happen in the east, a naval threat against Libau might be useful in 
tying down one Russian army corps in Livonia.2U 
Then the Russians started constructing dreadnoughts, the number 
of their light forces increased, and the naval situation in the Baltic 
Sea was no longer so favourable to the Germans. However, a major 
Russian attack was regarded as improbable, because their bases were 
so distant from the German coast. But torpedo craft from Libau could 
be expected at Danzig on the third day of war, and another attack 
from Helsinki on the tenth day. Mining attempts could be expected 
even further to the west, because the Russians were known to have 
trained for mine warfare.212 
A Russian landing on the German Baltic coast was deemed 
probable only with British help, which could only arrive after the 
Royal Navy had destroyed the German fleet on the North Sea. But 
even then it might be hoped that the British would be wary of sending 	 265 
their big ships into the Baltic through the Danish Straits, where mines 
and torpedoes would make any operation dangerous.m  
In the summer of 1914, the Germans heard about the Russo-British 
naval talks and surmised that Britain was financing the reconstruction 
of the Russian fleet in order to divide the German Hochseeflotte. A 
British naval visit at Reval in June 1914 was seen as a proof of the 
existence of such plans.214 
German plans on the eve of the war 
On the eve of the Great War, all modem German battleships were 
concentrated in the North Sea. Only obsolete coastal armoured ships 
of the Siegfried-class were left in the Baltic Sea with five light 
cruisers, seven torpedo boats and three submarines. From Kiel, they 
211 Sitzung im Generalstab am 18. März 1909. BA—MA RM 5/v 1633 Vorarbeiten 
zu den Operationsplänen gegen Russland von November 1908 bis Mai 1913. 
212 Operationspläne gegen Russland in der Ostsee fir das Sommerhalbjahre 1912, 30. 
IV 1912. BA—MA RM 5/v 1629; Admiralstabsreise Sommer 1913 & Grosse 
Admiralstabsreise 1913 Sommer. BA—MA RM 5/v 1630, Operationspläne gegen 
Russland in Europa vom März 1913 bis Juli 1914. 
213 An den Chef des Generalstabes der Armee 29. IX 1912. BA—MA RM 5/v 1629; 
Möglichkeit einer russischen Landung an der deutschen Ostseeküste 16. X 1912. 
BA—MA RM 5/v 1633. 
214 Marine-Attache (in London) Erich v. Müller B. VI 1914. BA—MA RM 5/v 1178 
Englisch-französische Beziehungen vom 10 Sept 1910 bis Dec 1917. 
were to fend off an attack from the east through the Bornholm Strait 
and from the west through the Danish Straits. Big ships of the 
Hochseeflotte could temporarily be transferred to the Baltic through 
the North Sea Canal, but not for long periods; and in any case, no 
decisive results could be obtained even in a victorious battle on the 
Baltic Sea, because the Russians could always retreat behind their 
fortresses. 
If Britain remained neutral, with only France and Russia as 
Germany's enemies, the eight old battleships of the Deutschland class 
could be detached from the main forces to guard Germany's Baltic 
coasts and harbours. If Austria and/or Italy could engage the French 
fleet in the Mediterranean, then a squadron even of dreadnoughts 
could be sent to the Baltic to blockade the Russian coast. But the 
Gulf of Finland could not be penetrated before the Russian forces had 
been whittled down by attacks from torpedo boats, minelayers, and 
266 	 submarines.715 
The old plan from the 1890's was still the basis for a very 
improbable duel with Russia. Such a war was to start by a surprise 
attack on Libau, Reval and Helsinki in order to eliminate Russian 
torpedo boats and submarines based there.216  The German fleet would 
sail secretly to the Gulf Finland and on the declaration of war it would 
bombard Reval and sink blockships in the narrows of Kustaanmiekka 
at Helsinki. Then the Gulf would be blockaded at Pihlajakari—
Naissaari or on the more western line Russarö—Odensholm. Blockade 
on the open sea, for example between Libau and Öland, was 
considered but found to require too much force and be likely to cause 
conflicts with neutral countries. 
The Gulf of Riga was to be blockaded with guardships and mines. 
In the Gulf of Bothnia the telegraph cables from Finland to Sweden 
might be cut, although German spies might need these communica-
tions.21' 
The Moon Sound was deemed the best base for the blockading 
forces. There was space enough there for anchoring even big 
squadrons, the island position would be safe from land attacks, enemy 
215 Verteilung der deutschen Seestreitkräfte auf die Nordsee und Ostsee im Kriege 
gegen Frankreich und Russland und bei neutralen, jedoch unsicheren Haltung 
Englands. BA—MA RM 5/v 1630. 
216 Die Sperrung russischer Häfen 3. II 1913. BA—MA RM 5/v 1633. 
217 A memorandum: Berlin, den 18 März 1913. BA—MA RM 5/v1630. 
torpedo craft attacking from Turku or the Gulf of Finland could be 
sighted in time, and the ice-free sailing season lasted from March to 
December:218 
The battleships transferred from the Hochseeflotte would be 
waiting for the Russian fleet, which was expected to come out at this 
provocation. The aim of the operation would be the domination of 
the Baltic Sea, achieved by the destruction of the Russian fleet in a 
decisive battle.219 
Old and new methods 
Obviously it was more pleasant for the German Baltic fleet staff to 
plan for the improbable duel between Russia and Germany than for 
the probable war against the Western Powers, in which Germany 
would have no forces left for the Baltic. The idea of a big-gun battle 
remained the essential feature of the plan. Torpedoes, mines and 
submarines were mentioned several times, but they were only regarded 
as secondary weapons and useful only in narrow straits and harbour 
approaches. By the end of the nineteenth century, it had been 
estimated that blockading the Gulf of Finland would have needed too 
many mines,220 but in 1914 it was realized that the Russians might be 
able to close the Gulf with their mines. The mine was regarded as a 
deceitful weapon, fit for devious Slays, not really a proper weapon 
for the Germans, as a young naval officer said to his superior who 
proposed using this novel arm.22 ' 
Commercial war was not planned, only a battle between warships. 
Even the eventual domination of the Baltic was seen as a means of 
keeping down the enemy naval force. Russia's commerce would be 
cut by the naval blockade of her coasts or with the closure of the 
Danish Straits, not by any operations against civilian ships. 
On the eve of the war, aeroplanes were not deemed useful, but the 
range of the Zeppelin, 2,000 kilometres, was sufficient for the stretch 
218 Stützpunkte; Die Sperrung der russischen Häfen 3. II 1913. BA—MA RM 5./v 
1630. 
219 Krieg Dreibund gegen Zweibund 30.VII 1914. BA—MA RM 5/v 1630. 
220 Denkschrift betreffend den Streuminenkrieg auf dem östlichen Kriegstheater 15. 
II 1896. BA—MA RM 5/v 1632. 
221 "Alles Unsinn, die Mine liegt den Germanen nicht!" O.d.O, 6. IV 1916. BA—MA 
RM 5/v 4940 Operationsdenkschriften des Ostseebefehlshabers für 
Ostseekriegführung vom August 1914 bis 10 März 1917. 
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from Kiel to Kronstadt. The attempt was considered rather risky because 
of the weather and Russian defences, but objectives worth bombing were 
listed: anchored warships, torpedo boats and submarines as well as 
bridges and docks at Libau, Helsinki and Reval 222 
Inducing enemy subjects to rise against their government was 
discussed, too. As early as 1884, the German consul in Helsinki 
proposed that Finnish pilots could be enlisted in the German service 
to steer an attacking fleet. The conscience of the inhabitants of the 
archipelago would not deter them from committing potentially 
treasonable acts if Finnish aspirations were promised support, because 
the people did not regard Russia as their fatherland.223  This idea was 
seriously taken up in naval planning only in 1912, when it was hoped 
that the pilots dismissed in the Russification of the Finnish pilot and 
lighthouse organization would eagerly enter German service because 
they were poor and despised Russia; they could also be blackmailed, 
268 	 "although violence should not be carried too far".224  
Information on the Russian fleet could be obtained from Finnish 
visitors to Germany, especially ships' captains. Agents were also sent 
to Libau, Riga, St Petersburg and Helsinki, before the outbreak of the 
war, to collect information on enemy movements, and to acquire maps 
and nautical charts. Communications ran through Stockholm, where 
a German naval captain was stationed for the purpose.225 
Plans beyond the Baltic Sea 
The Germans did not seriously plan permanent conquests beyond the 
Baltic Sea before the outbreak of the war, but the possibility was 
sometimes discussed. In 1896, the idea was aired with an explanation 
that the Finns felt sympathy for Germany and that many people of 
German origin lived in Estonia, Livonia and Courland.226  More reasons 
222 Admiralstabsreise Sommer 1913 & Grosse Admiralstabsreise 1913 Sommer. 
BA—MA RM 5/v 1630. 
223 Lootsen für die finnischen Schären, s.d. (1896). BA—MA RM 5/v 1632. 
224 Verwendung von finnischen und schwedischen Lotsen 30. I 1913. BA—MA RM 
5/v 1629; Bericht über die Aussichten der Gewinnung finnischer Kriegslotsen. 
BA—MA RM 5/v 1634. 
225 There is plenty of documentation on the spies in: BA—MA RM 5/v 1440, 1441, 
1442 Russland, Ganz geheime Nachrichten , vom Februar 1905 bis November 
1912, vom Oktober 1912 bis August 1913, vom Oktober 1913 bis July 1914. 
226 Operationspläne für die östliche Kriegsschauplatz 18. XII 1896, p. 161. BA—MA 
RM 5/v 1628. 
for such hopes were found in 1905-06: the Baltic Germans had been 
the most loyal subjects and servants of the Tsar, but then their 
autonomy had been filched away in the 1880s and now they had been 
left helpless victims of the revolutionaries. It was believed that they 
now wished to join Germany. The population in those countries was 
not entirely German, but in five years the Estonians and Letts would 
turn into good Germans. The march through the Baltic countries would 
be easy, if the provinces were promised autonomy or union with 
Germany. 
An advance on St. Petersburg would be even easier through 
Finland, and occupying a base on Åland would be a starting-point for 
revolutionizing and conquering the country. The Swedes in Finland 
would be eager to join the Germans, while the Finns would probably 
remain passive.227 Russification was the reason for the hatred against 
the Russians, which would probably cease if Russia restored Finland's 
autonomy.
»g 
These views were only discussed in reports on public opinion in 
the coastal countries, and no military or naval plans were made for a 
landing in the Baltic provinces or in Finland, not to speak of any 
plans for military occupation or permanent conquest. But it is 
interesting to see that the ideas of the defending staffs in St Petersburg 
and those of the potential conquerors did run in a parallel direction. 
For the history of Finland, it is also interesting to note that the 
German staffs were aware of the separatist feeling in the country, 
which had been explained to the European civilized public by Finnish 
constitutionalist propaganda against the Russian oppression from 1899 
onwards. No Power had taken official notice of the Finnish 
complaints, but a time was to come when the Germans would see that 
their own interests might be served by Finnish treason. 
227 It was a common mistake to call the Swedish-speaking people in Finland Swedes, 
and only the Finnish-speaking Finns; in spite of the language barrier and quarrel, 
there have never existed two distinct nations in the country, partly because Russian 
oppression united the people and partly because they lived in the country cut off 
from Sweden in 1809 and under the same conditions. 
228 Stimmung in den Baltischen Provinzen, Marine Attaché fir die Nordischen Reiche 
14.VI 1909. BA—MA RM 5/v 1437; Marine Attaché fir die Nordischen Reiche 
von Hintze 15. IV 1908. BA—MA RM 5/v 1440; Bericht über eine 
Erkundungsfahrt nach Russland, Finnland und Schweden 5. VI — 1. VII 1911, 
von Hauptmann v. Hoffmann. BA—MA RM 5/v 1440. 
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The End of the Empire 
THE GREAT WAR 
In August 1914, playing Great Power politics involved Russia in a 
war which was to be called the Great War and afterwards the First 
World War. The defeats in the Crimean War and in the Japanese War 
had seriously shaken the Empire, and even now a few people warned 
against the adventure of a new war. Witte and Kokovtsov thought that 
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	 no essential conflict of interests existed between Russia and the 
Germanic empires; on the contrary, it would have been preferable for 
the three conservative Empires to join forces against revolution and 
the liberal West. But reasons of national pride and political prestige 
made such a retreat unpalatable to the majority of statesmen and the 
political public in Russia. There had been diplomatic defeats in the 
Balkans twice, in 1908-09 and 1912-13. Then, Russia's position in 
the Orient had been threatened by Austria, but in 1914 Germany had 
emerged as the principal rival. A third diplomatic retreat in the 
Balkans would have shattered Russia's prestige and position as a Great 
Power, would have made her an Asiatic country, a victim of rather 
than a participant in the international system, like Turkey, Persia, 
China and even India. Russia entered the war to aid Serbia, not 
because of Serbia but because of her own existence as a Geat Power. 
The main battles of the Great War were to be fought on the 
continental frontiers, but naval blockades in the North Sea, in the 
Black Sea, and in the Baltic Sea also contributed their lethal effect 
on the belligerents. 
There are innumerable books on any front of the Great War. Norman Stone, The 
Eastern Front 1914-1917 is a classic; Bruce W. Lincoln, Passage through 
Armageddon; the Russians in war and revolution, gives a balanced picture, is 
readable and enjoyable, though unreliable in details. 
Opening moves in the Baltic Sea 
At the beginning of the war, in August 1914, Russian minelayers layed 
their mines between Porkkala and Naissaari (Nargen) as planned, and 
the fleet, with the dreadnoughts Gangut and Petropavlovsk among 
them when completed, was anchored behind the walls of Sveaborg 
waiting for the expected German attack. Next year the Poltava and 
the Sevastopol also joined the Baltic fleet. In addition, four destroyers 
and one submarine had been completed from the great programme of 
naval construction. Wartime emergency programmes were hastily 
drawn up for submarines, minelayers and torpedo boats; in 1915 eight 
destroyers and eight submarines were completed and in 1916 an 
additional eight destroyers and thirteen submarines.' 
The capital ships were not allowed to run into any danger but 
remained a fleet in being, while their sailors grew ever more bored 
and frustrated. 
In the first days of August 1914 a German landing was expected 
at any moment, which caused a some panic in Helsinki, but no enemy 
appeared. Soon it was learned that the enemy had no serious naval 
force in the Baltic Sea, only the obsolete Siegfried-class armoured 
ships for coastal guard, five old armoured cruisers and three small 
cruisers for reconnoitring eastwards, and elderly ships of the line of 
the Deutschland-class guarding the western approaches to the Danish 
Straits against the British.' 
The commander of Russia's Baltic fleet, Admiral von Essen, had 
not liked the withdrawal from Libau to the Gulf of Finland nor did 
he approve of passively waiting for an eventual attack by the enemy. 
In the first days of the war, he heard that Swedish warships had moved 
to the vicinity of Öland Island, and he started steaming westwards to 
sink the Swedish fleet should they not promise to stay neutral. The 
raid would probably have pushed Sweden to join in the war on 
German side, but von Essen was called back when his intention 
became known in St Petersburg at the last moment.4 
However, von Essen was allowed to operate his old and tactically 
obsolete' armoured cruisers to provoke the German fleet and tempt 
2 	 Conway's All the World's Fighting Ships 1906-1920, p. 292. 
3 	 RGAVMF, fond 418, opis' 1, delo 400, Svedeniia o protivnikom na Baltiiskom 
teatre 11. VIII-5. X 1914. 
4 	 Petrov, Podgotovka Rossii... pp. 207, 231. 
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them into a great battle in the minefield in the Gulf of Finland. This 
plan did not work because the German fleet remained in the North 
Sea. When the autumn nights turned dark, von Essen's armoured 
cruisers started mining German coasts and passages .6 
The construction of the Naval Fortress of Peter the Great was 
continued with increased vigour. International law was ignored during 
the war and in 1915 the Åland (Ahvenanmaa) Islands were included 
in the defence zone. The Turku—Åland Island Position of the Naval 
Fortress of Peter the Great was continually fortified in 1915-16 with 
coastal batteries of various calibres from 45mm to 12". Old cruisers, 
gunboats, torpedo boats and submarines were also posted in the 
archipelago.' 
Reval had been intended for the new naval base, but construction 
of the Reval Naval Port of Emperor Peter the Great was only 
beginning. The naval fortress also took time to complete; coastal 
272 	 batteries of 6" guns were positioned in 1915, and heavier 10" to 12" 
guns were taken over from old battleships which had been broken up, 
but the new big guns of 14" were slow to appear and the main batteries 
were not erected until 1916, eight guns on the Estonian side of the 
Gulf and four guns on island of Mäkiluoto on the Finnish side.8 
Sveaborg was hastily strengthened as a temporary wartime base. 
On a few small cliffs on the seaward front of the fortress batteries 
were constructed to keep the Kruunuvuorenselkä naval anchorage 
5 	 They were slower than the dreadnoughts, and badly protected against mines and 
torpedoes. 
6 	 Greger, Die russische Flotte im ersten Weltkrieg 1914-1917; Kääntönen, "Itämeri 
— unohdettu I maailmansodan rintama". ("The Baltic Sea, a Forgotten Front of 
the First World War" — though it is not at all forgotten by the nations of the 
Baltic region). 
7 	 RGAVMF, fond 353, opis' 2, delo 3, Abo-Alandskaja ukreplennaia pozitsiia 
1915-1916, p. 44: kvartirnoe rospisanie garnizona ostrova Oland; p. 65: plan 
kampanii na 1917 god (includes a list of the forces involved). 
Freiman, "Pietari Suuren merilinnoitus, erittäinkin sen meririntama v. 1909-1913 
suunnitelmien mukaan" (Peter the Great's naval Fortress, with particular reference 
to its maritime Front according to the Plans of the Years 1909-1913); Erkki 
Hannula, "Ahvenanmaan asema maailmansodassa" (Åland during the World War); 
Lehonkoski, "Viron rannikon linnoitukset ja Viron saarten valtaus maailmansodan 
aikana" (The Fortifications of the Estonian Coast and the Seizure of the Estonian 
Islands in the World War); Oksala, Venäläisten linnoitustyöt Ahvenanmaalla ja 
Turun saaristossa (Russian Fortification Works on Åland and Turku Archipelago). 
8 	 RGAVMF, fond 418, opis' I, delo 272 o postroike porta-baza im. Petra Velikago 
v Revele i o sozdanii Revel-Porkalaudskoi ukreplennoi pozitsii v sviazi s 
programmoi usilennogo sudostroeniia na 1912-1916 gg. 
:.:
• 
Russian warships in the Helsinki naval base in the winter of 1916-17; torpedo-boats in the 
foreground, auxiliaries behind them, an armoured cruiser in the right background. 
Photo: Sotamuseo 1295 N 86. 
beyond the range of the enemy's ship guns. In all twenty-four guns 
of 10"-11" were positioned in batteries of four, and twenty-four guns 
of 6" as well as numerous 57mm batteries erected against eventual 
raids by light enemy ships, with a couple of 75mm anti-aircraft guns. 
Permanent positions were constructed also for the landward defence 
of Helsinki—Sveaborg, first rather close to the built-up area and then, 
from 1915 onwards, further to the interior. The fortress area covered 
Santahamina (Sandhamn) and Lauttasaari (Drumsö) on flanks and the 
interior line of defence ran from Huopalahti (Hoplax) to Mellunkylä. 
The enlarged fortress 'esplanade' (where a state of siege could have 
been declared when necessary) consisted of the parishes of Espoo 
(Esbo), the Helsinki rural district, and Sipoo (Sibbo).9 
9 	 A Russian map without title or date in: Sota-arkisto, T 19168/5, Juuso Mannisen 
kokoelma. Talvio, 'Viaporin linnoitus ja sen tykistö vuosisadan vaihteesta 
vallankumoukseen' is a detailed but incoherent text; the English summary is 





















The Defence of St Petersburg in 
1914-1917 
After the disappearance of the 
Russian Navy in the Far East, 
Kronstadt and the flanking forts 
Ino and Krasnaia Gorka formed 
the defence of St Petersbug. In 
1909 fortification work was 
started to close the narrow 
passage to the Gulf of Finland 
between Porkkala and Nargen 
with coastal batteries and 
minefields and with flanking 
positions at the Moon Sound 
and the archipelago of 
Turku-Aland. The work 
continued through the war years 
to the summer of 1917. A new 
navy was to be built and slowly 
took form; it was to be based at 
274 	 Reval, but the base was not 
completed before the Russian 
revolution, and Sveaborg served 
as a provisional naval base, its 
fortifications modernized and 
landward positions prepared. 
Rear positions were prepared on 
the Narva—Suursaari—Kotka line. 
The army was to deny access 
to the enemy from the Gulf of 
Bothnia towards St Petersburg, 
with the foremost defences on 
the coast, and the main position 
on the western edge of the lake 
district, and rear positions 
streching from Kotka towards 
the north and from Viipuri to the 
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THE APPROACHES 
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THE SVEABORG FORTRESS 
DURING THE GREAT WAR 1914-18 
[Defence works of Sveaborg-Helsinki 1914-1917 
To protect the anchorage of the navy on the Kruunuvuorenselkä, Sveaborg was strengthened 
with modern forward batteries on the cliffs in the Gulf of Finland, and with field fortifications 
on the landward front of the city, first a close ring in 1914 and then the large zone of works 
shown in the map. 
Reval was also fortified on its southern land side. Kronstadt had 
been strengthened from 1909 onwards, its defences consisting in the 
end of two 13" and sixteen 12" guns as well as a couple of hundred 
guns between 9" and 6" plus one hundred smaller guns on the island 
and on the coasts close by at Ino and Krasnaia Gorka.10 The 
commandants of the fortresses were under the commander of the 
Baltic fleet, as was the army forces commander of the landward fronts 
of the fortresses, who held a position equal to an army corps 
commander." The Baltic fleet, in turn, was subordinated to the VIth 
10 	 RGAVMF, fond 418, opis' 1, delo 256 o primorskikh krepostiakh Baltiiskogo 
moria i razbor zapadnoi flotili shernoi pozitsii 30. I 1910-January 1911. 
I I 	 RGAVMF, fond 418, opis' 1, delo 356 o formirovanii chastei garnizona morskoi 
kreposti Petra Velikago i utverzhdenii ee shtatov 12. VIII 1914-25. VIII 1916. 
Army, the staff of which was in St Petersburg and which was 
responsible for the defence of the Imperial capital and the landward 
and seaward approaches to it. Viipuri was an army fortress under the 
42th Army Corps, but had also seaward batteries equipped with 6", 
9" and 10" guns.'Z 
State of war declared in Finland 
Martial law was declared in Finland because the Grand Duchy 
belonged to the broad zone in the western part of the Empire which 
was put under military administration.13 Governor-General Seyn 
started working under the command of the VIth Army staff in St 
Petersburg and later under the staff of the Northern Front, although 
he seems to have maintained contact also with the Council of 
Ministers. Military censorship was established, travelling was 
controlled, meetings forbidden, and workers' associations paralysed. 
The Finns did not attempt a general strike and the Voima did not 
exist, which may have been a surprise to those authorities who still 
believed in the gendarme reports of the imminence of Finnish 
rebellion. It seems that at least Seyn and the military authorities in 
Finland saw no necessity for the measures planned for the reconquest 
of the country or for the extraordinary plans for taking over the Finnish 
administration by Russian officials. Instead of hundreds of suspects, 
only a few of the most recalcitrant leaders of the passive or 
Constitutional opposition were arrested, among them Pehr Evind 
Svinhufvud, the future Prime Minister and later President of the 
Finnish Republic. He was sent to a comfortable exile in Siberia. 
The mobilization of the 22nd Army Corps was carried out 
according to plans, and no problems were caused by Finns. On the 
contrary, the army corps had reason to thank the population of 
Helsinki for their friendly treatment of the mobilizing detachments, 
and the Finnish railways for their zeal and punctual functioning 
without any hitch or mishap during the hectic days of mobilization." 
The army corps was then concentrated according to the previous 
12 	 Arimo, Suomen linnoittamisen historia 1918-1993. (The History of Fortifications 
in Finland in 1918-93). 
13 Graf, "Military Rule Behind the Russian Front 1914-1917". 
14 Commander of the 22nd Army Corps to Seyn 17. VII 1914, KKK 1914, I 
department, war delo no. 3-5, National Archives of Finland. 
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plans, one brigade in western Uusimaa (Nyland), another in the region 
of Hamina—Viipuri, and two on the Karelian Isthmus.15 
The idea was that the corps could fight off a big enemy landing at 
Koivisto or delay a smaller landing in the south-west of Finland. When 
it was seen that no invasion was coming from the sea, the 22nd Army 
Corps was transferred to the main front.16 
In case the enemy should unexpectedly invade Finland, for a while 
the 84th Division stood ready in Viipuri and Koivisto, the 50th was 
in the Valkeasaari (Beloostrov) region prepared to defend the 
approaches to St Petersburg, and if necessary the 74th could have 
been sent to help the 84th." These divisions were apparently reserve 
detachments in process of mobilization in the St Petersburg military 
district, intended for Finland only in case of an emergency, but 
essentially destined for the main front. As early as in August 1914, 
the barracks in Finland started to be occupied by opolchenie, i.e. 
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	 militia or replacement troops for training the repeated new levies of 
conscripts from Russia, or by resting and recuperating troops from 
the front; their organization in January 1915 will be described later 
in this book. 
15 	 Rauanheimo, "Venäläiset joukot Suomessa maailmansodan 1914-1918 aikana; 
niiden yleisryhmitykset ja toimintasuunnitelmat" (Russian Troops in Finland 
during the First World War, their Formation and Operational Plans). 
Rauanheimo's work is based on the J. Manninen collection in the Military 
Archives of Finland. 
16 	 In August—September the 22nd army corps was sent to the IXth Army on the 
South-Western Front and took part in battles in Galitsia and the Chenstokhovo-
Cracow operation. In October—December 1914 the corps belonged to the Xth 
Army on the North-Western Front and took part in the operations in East Prussia. 
In the beginning of 1915, the corps was again transferred, to the VIIIth Army on 
the South-Western Front, in April—December 1915 it fought as part of the Xlth 
Army and took part in the Peremyshl battle, and in 1916-1917 it took part in the 
summer attacks of the Vllth Army on the South-Western Front under Brusilov. 
At some time during the war the rifle brigades were transformed into divisions 
and more Finliandskie rifle regiments were established which had never seen the 
country after which they were named. The corps was dissolved in 1918. RGVIA, 
fond 2222, Shtab 22go armeiskago korpusa, introduction to the catalogue or opis'. 
17 	 Nastavlenie No 2 voiskam VI-i armii, raspolozhennym v Petrograde i blizhaishikh 
okrestnostiakh, dlia deistvii protiv dessanta na Finliandskom poberezh'e. 
Sotahistoriallinen toimisto, J. Mannisen keräämiä tietoja Venäjän sotavoimista 
Suomessa vv. 1808-1918, Sota-arkisto T 19168/5, Finnish Military Archives. 
Finland in the war economy of Russia 
The importance of Finland for Russia in the Great War was, first of 
all, that the country, tightly administered by the Russians, secured 
Petrograd from the North-West, as Finland had always done since 
1809. But, in the absence of enemy activity, it was soon found that 
this border country also had an economic importance for the Imperial 
war effort, an aspect which had never been considered in the pre-war 
military plans. 
The payment of a tribute instead of personal military service laid 
down in the law of 1912 continued during the war years. At first, it 
was expected to cause difficulties, because customs revenues were 
radically decreased when trade over the Baltic Sea ceased, and savings 
deposited in German bonds were beyond reach. Seyn proposed the 
seizure of private German and Austrian property in Finland instead, 
but the Council of Ministers was reluctant to make private enemy 
citizens pay for the faults of their governments, regarding such a form 
of revenge as beneath the dignity of the Empire. Resorting to 
government loans from the Bank of Finland was also regarded as 
improper, because it would have increased the amount of paper money 
in circulation.18 In 1914 the war had not yet abolished all decency. 
However, the Finnish economy soon recovered from the first shock 
of the war, and fifteen million marks for 1914 were paid without 
difficulties. From the tribute for 1915, the Senate would have liked 
to deduct the price of the Finnish barracks given over to the Russian 
army, but the old debt was left to be discussed after the war, and the 
Senate had to pay sixteen millions, and also paid the seventeen 
millions for 1916 without further objections. t9 
The Imperial treasury demanded payment, too, from the Finnish 
government for the gendarme corps working in Finland, in all more 
than one million roubles for the years since Bobrikov's time. The 
Senate responded by saying that the Emperor, in 1905, had annulled 
all Bobrikov's orders, the establishment of the Finnish gendarme 
18 	 Goremykin to Seyn 10. VIII 1914; Minister of Finance Barck to Seyn 17. I 1915; 
Osobyi zhumal Soveta Ministrov 10. III 1915. KKK 1914, II department, delo 
85, National Archives of Finland. 
19 Senate to Seyn 25. V 1915 and the consequent correspondence, KKK 1915, II 
department, delo 101; 0 vznose v Gel'singforskoe kaznacheistvo 17,000,000 
marok vzamen otbyvaniia finliandskimi grazhdanami lichnoi voinskoi povinnosti. 
KKK 1916, II department, delo 80, National Archives of Finland. 
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detachment included, and in any case no money could be paid on the 
strength of a ministerial order only; for Finnish questions with an 
Imperial interest, there existed the legal procedure decreed in 1910. 
The Emperor had decided that the Finnish Diet was not to be 
convened during the war because of the agitation the uncensored 
speeches might cause, though elections were to be held in 1916, as 
decreed in 1906 for three-year periods (if not dissolved prematurely). 
Thus the procedure for Imperial legislation was unworkable during 
the war because no statement could be requested from the Diet, as 
decreed in 1910. 
In the end, the Senate won this battle; the Ministry of War accepted 
the view that the increased number of gendarme officials in the 
country was a wartime matter and that they could thus be paid from 
the extraordinary war funds.20 
The Russified Senate of Finland, chaired by Mikhail Borovitinov, 
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	 Seyn's former chief of chancery, thus defended Finnish autonomy 
against the Imperial demands so vigorously that the Senate seemed 
separatist to the chauvinist circles in Russia21 The Senate was 
supported by Seyn, who was responsible for the smooth running of 
affairs in the country. Of course, this separatism was not due to any 
love of Finnish autonomy, but to the necessity of continuing the 
administration of the border country with the least possible disturbance 
during the war. 
The Finnish economy soon recovered from the initial paralysis of 
the country's exports, because the Russian army bought everything 
and anything Finland was able to produce, and feeding Petrograd was 
a lucrative affair. Unemployed men found employment in the 
construction of fortifications, in transporting war materials from the 
Norwegian border to the railhead in northern Finland, and several 
thousand Finns were hired for the construction of the railway in 
Russian Karelia from Petrograd to Romanov na Murmane (in 1917 
renamed Murmansk). 
The Diet of 1913 had made the usual three-year budget for 
1913-15, and since the Diet was not convened, no budget existed for 
1916. But the ancient Swedish constitution of 1772 and 1789 made 
20 	 Discussion on the payment for the gendarme corps KKK 1915, II department, 
delo 21-26, National Archives of Finland. 
21 	 Torvinen, "Borovitinov — kanden kansan syntipukki" (A Scapegoat of Two 
Nations). 
it legally possible to order by royal decree temporary taxes during the 
state of war, for example on capital, on official documents, on 
entertainment, and on wartime profits. The government income grew 
accordingly, from 95 million marks in 1914 to 108 millions in 1915 
and 127 millions in 1916,22 which was sufficient for the everyday 
working of the administration plus the payment of the military tribute 
to the Imperial Treasury. 
The Russian Government thought that Finland should pay more. 
The war turned out to be much more expensive than had ever been 
believed, and Finland, whose percentage of the imperial population 
was 1.8%, could and should, in the opinon of the Russian Government, 
pay at least 200,000,000 marks immediately, because 1.8% of Russia's 
war expenditure undoubtedly surpassed 200,000,000 roubles, three 
times the sum now demanded. 
Again the Senate proved reluctant. It explained that the cost of the 
war could only be counted after it was ended, and peacetime payments 
necessitated legislation according to the procedure of 1910. The 
defeated enemy could also be made to pay reparations, while, on the 
other hand, it was not certain at all that Finland would be spared 
destruction, if the expected enemy landing should take place some 
day. 
Aide-de-camp General Ivanov in the Stavka, or Imperial 
Headquarters, complained in November 1916: "To date the Finns have 
not carried any wartime burden, on the contrary, safe from all 
disasters, they are getting rich at our expence; work for the army and 
military orders are bringing them money..."2' 
The Imperial government did not endorse the proposal to make 
Germany pay for Finland, nor did they expect the border country to 
be destroyed so badly that this would cover its debt to Russia. The 
Minister of Finance Barck explained on 18 February/3 March 1917 
Senate 7. III and Seyn to Minister State Secretary 4/17. III 1916; 0 sostoianii 
statnago fonda v 1915 i 1916 gg. KKK 1916, Il department, delo 34, National 
Archives of Finland; for a short review of the Russo-Finnish trade during the war 
years, see: J.M. Bobovich & V.I. Bovykin, Venäjän ja Suomen väliset taloudelliset 
suhteet ja ensimmäinen maailmansota; and: Bobovich, Russko-finliandskie 
ekonomicheskie otnosheniia nakanune velikoi oktiabrskoi sotsialisticheskoi 
revoliutsii (epokha imperializma). 
Pamiatnaia zapiska o mestnom naselenii Finliandii, gen.ad. Ivanov, Stavka 23. IX 





that the 200,000,000 marks were badly needed for paying for the 
fortification works and army orders in Finland. "I remain awaiting a 
positive reply..."24  
Barck did not need to wait many days, for soon the whole Tsarist 
government was overturned. In fact, however, Finland unintentionally 
contributed to the financing of Russia's war effort, because her exports 
to Russia were paid in roubles, which the Bank of Finland had to buy 
from the exporters with marks; and the Bank also bought Russian war 
bonds. In the end, as the Empire disappeared, the Bank of Finland 
owned at least ninety-nine million of worthless rouble notes and 
bonds, and consequently notes of more than two hundred million 
marks were in circulation which only had a paper value. 
Few Finns fought in Russia's war, but economic and political ties 
bound the border country to the Empire. Increased economic activity 
brought wealth for many Finns, but deprivations for others. 
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	 Speculators flourished, agriculture and industry and their workers were 
fully employed, while people with a fixed salary, pay or interest 
suffered from the slowly increasing inflation.25 
Finns in Russian service 
Finnish-born officers in the Russian army, who had given their 
military oath to the Emperor, continued serving without hesitation, as 
did the Baltic Germans and other officers of non-Russian birth. There 
were even complaints among Russian soldiers that the high whole 
command was in German hands — Sveaborg was commanded by 
Lieutenant General Bauer, the Baltic fleet by von Essen, the VI Army 
by General van der Vliet, and highest of all, was Empress Alix of 
Hesse.26 
24 	 Keisarillisen Suomen Senaatin lausunto Raha-asiainministerin lakiehdotuksesta, 
joka koskee Suomen osanottoa niiden ylimääräisten menojen korvaamiseksi, joita 
sota on aiheuttanut valtakunnanrahastolle; Osobyi zhurnal Soveta Ministrov po 
voprosu o vypuske finliandskoiu kaznoiu zaimov na pokrytie chasti padaiushchikh 
na doliu Finliandii chrezvychainykh raskhodov, vyzvannykh nastoiashcheiu 
voinoiu, and consequent discussion 1915-1917: KKK 1914, II department, delo 
94 II; KKK 1916, II department, delo 48; the last letter of Barck from 18. II 
1917: KKK 1914 II department, delo 94 II, National Archives of Finland. 
25 	 This dependence of Finland from the Russian development was pointed out to 
me by my colleague Pertti Haapala. 
26 	 Egorov, Ot monarkhii... p. 117. 
In fact, the ethnic differences had no real importance; at least 
among the officers, only professional competence was considered.27 
The soldiers' suspicion of a lack of patriotism in the leadership was 
without any foundation. The list of noble family names only reflected 
the narrow social basis from which the high command was recruited. 
Instead of accusations of treason, a suspicion about lack of 
competence or adequate training would have been more reasonable. 
The outbreak of the Great War gave rise everywhere to a popular 
feeling of chauvinism, and the wave of all-Imperial patriotism touched 
even the Finns. There was some discussion in private circles about 
re-establishing a Finnish army of one or two divisions to participate 
in the defence of the Empire. These discussions came to nothing, but 
a few hundred volunteers entered the Russian army in the autumn of 
1914. In 1915 and 1916 the number of volunteers fell to a few only.78 
Finnish businessmen soon realized that the war had created for them 
a hugely profitable market in Russia. As an expression of sympathy, 
industrialists equipped an ambulance or field hospital, and several 
hundred hospital beds were set up in Finland for wounded soldiers.29 
For example, the Helsinki Seurahuone or assembly rooms and 
restaurant, were transformed into a military hospital, where "Russian 
Red Cross sisters, their faces and lips heavily painted, peeped from 
the windows..."30 
This sympathy may have been surprising to those Russians who 
had believed in the existence of the Voima. Seyn guessed that the 
idea behind these proposals was the hope that the Imperial government 
would desist from their unificatory policy in Finland if the country 
was proved loyal,31 as had happened in 1812, 1830, 1854-55, 1863 
and 1875-78.32 That was why the Governor-General tried to check 
the volunteer movement. 
27 	 Denikine, La decomposition de I'armee et du pouvoir, fevrier-septembre 1917, p. 
243. 
28 	 Seyn to the Minister of the Interior 16. XI 1916, KKK 1917, I department, delo 
2_32; Otchety o politicheskom sostoianii raznykh gubemii. KKK Hd 105, n:o 4, 
National Archives of Finland. 
29 	 KKK 1917, II department, delo 2110, perepiska I, National Archives of Finland. 
30 	 Leppänen, Elämäni teatteria, p. 42. (The Memoirs of L.). 
31 	 So, at least, believed Carl Enckell, Poliittiset muistelmani, vol. I, p. 54 (Political 
Memoirs). 
32 So explained a gendarme official to an Old Finn, Eino Voionmaa, Tsaarivallan 
suojeluosaston toimintaa Suomessa, p. 162 (The Reminiscences of V. about his 
Arrest by the Okhrana). 
283 
Finnish hopes were soon shattered by the publication of a catalogue 
of legislative projects for strengthening Imperial governmental 
authority in Finland, for securing the Imperial defence in the country, 
and for political and economic integration with the other parts of the 
Empire. The Finns called the list the Great Programme of 
Russification.33 It was, in fact, only a committee protocol submitted 
to different government departments for their comment, but, of course, 
it reflected the unificatory intentions of the Imperial government 34 
The Poles had been given a promise of reunification and a degree 
of national existence signed by Nicholas Nicholaevich, the Supreme 
commander-in-chief. This promise had encouraged the Finnish hopes 
of a restoration of the autonomy of the Grand Duchy. In fact the two 
cases were not comparable, because the Finns could not have such 
immediate importance to military operations as the Poles did, a great 
nation with a tradition of rebellions and living in the battlefield, partly 
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	 behind the enemy lines, partly in the rear of the Russian main armies. 
No reason existed for similar concessions to the Finns, a small nation 
with only a theoretical danger of a German or Swedish invasion to 
instigate the imaginary Voima to revolt. 
However, no measures for Russification were taken, because 
maintaining order in the country for the duration of the war was of 
more urgent importance, although many ministers thought that some 
limits ought to have been set to Finnish impudence. In contrast, the 
Minister for Foreign Affairs Sazonov warned: "For God's sake, don't 
egg on General Seyn, leave the Finns in peace", in order not to 
provoke Sweden. Kokovtsov's successor Prime Minister Goremykin 
agreed: "We have difficulties enough without worrying about the 
Finns. May the Devil take them all. Let us see how this all ends. Until 
then let us not take up the Finnish question". It was decided to follow 
a benevolent policy in practice, but no promises were to be given to 
the Finns.35 
33 	 Minister State Secretary Markov to General Ianushkevich 3/16. XII 1914. VSV 
Fc 3, n:o 16, National Archives of Finland. 
34 	 Rasila, "Vuoden 1914 venäläistämisasetuksen synty" (The Origins of the Decree 
on Russification). The programme had been made public even before the war, 
but the news of its definite confirmation caused the agitation in November. 
35 	 Tiazhelye Dni, sekretnyia zasedaniia Soveta Ministrov 16 iiulia — 2 sentiabria 
1915 goda; sostavleno A.N. Iakhontovym, b. pomoshchnikom Upravliaiushchaia 
Delam Soveta Ministrov na osnovanii ego zapisei v zasedaniiakh po sekretnym 
voprosam. Arkhiv Russkoi Revoliutsii XVIII, Berlin 1926, pp. 35, 110-12. 
Why didn't the Germans attack? 
The German High Seas fleet stayed in its North Sea anchorages and 
was never able to break the distant blockade of the Royal Navy. On 
the other hand, the British fleet did not attempt to break through into 
the Baltic. Of course, the Germans could never be certain of this and 
they had to watch the southern mouth of the Belts as well as the 
Sound constantly. This was the task of the Siegfrieds, the old coastal 
armoured ships of the German Baltic fleet, based on Kiel. Forgetting 
their pre-war carefree attitude towards eventual raids on their Baltic 
coast, German staffs also scratched together coastal defence troops to 
guard the long open beaches, in spite of the lack of manpower for 
the land fronts and war industries.36 
Only a minimal force was left for the active Baltic flotilla and not 
much activity could be expected of it. The Commander-in-Chief of 
the Baltic fleet, Prince Henry of Prussia, kept asking for reinforce-
ments from the North Sea, where, in his opinion, that naval war only 
meant laying anchored in the river estuaries. For most of the time, 
his demands were left unheeded.37 
In August 1914, Prince Henry detached his light cruisers and a few 
torpedo boats to Danzig. The German flag was shown on the Swedish 
coast, a few mines were dropped at the mouth of the Gulf of Finland, 
and the cruiser Magdeburg was lost, with her code book which the 
Russians salvaged and gave to the British, who were thus able to read 
all German wireless communications. The U 26 succeeded in sinking 
the Pallada, a Russian armoured cruiser, but this success was balanced 
by the loss of the armoured cruiser Friedrich Karl on mines which 
the Russians had laid off Memel. In January 1915, an operation against 
Utö was attempted but given up when the light cruisers Augsburg 
and Gazelle were badly damaged by Russian mines. 
The truth was that it was the distant Grand Fleet at Scapa Flow 
that kept the German fleets away from the Finnish coasts. On the 
other hand, the German High Seas Fleet remained in being and, in 
36 Adm. Stab 15. IX 1914. BA—MA RM 5/v 4046, Ostsee, Verschiedenes 17. VIII 




Der Krieg in der Ostsee, vols. I- III, the official history, tells the detailed story 
of German operations. Forstner, Krieg in der Ostsee, tells much about of the year 
1914, obviously from the author's own experience. Contemporary official 
correspondence: BA—MA RM 57v 3982, Operationsangelegenheiten Ostsee 1. I 
1915-31. VIII 1915 (contains papers from 1914 as well). 
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fact, blockaded the Russians in the Gulf of Finland, the minelaying 
raids excepted. 
Naval war of attrition 
Admiral von Essen died in the spring of 1915 and was succeeded by 
Admiral V.A. Kanin. Work on the Naval Fortress of Peter the Great 
continued, and the Gulf of Finland was even more tightly closed. The 
dreadnoughts were always kept in the Gulf of Finland, but the naval 
defence was cautiously pushed forward; the old Slava was transferred 
to the Gulf of Riga, based in the Moon Sound, accompanied by a 
couple of gunboats, of which the Khrabryi is worth mentioning.38 The 
British sent five submarines of the E class to the Baltic through the 
Sound, and small submarines of the C class were sent to Archangel 
and from there by train to the Russian Baltic ports.39 
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	 In the spring of 1915, the Germans again formed a detached flotilla 
for the eastern waters of the Baltic, now under Admiral Hopmann. 
He proposed a bombardment of Libau by the armoured cruisers, or 
even by modern battleships if they could be borrowed from the North 
Sea, but the Admiralty Staff forbade 'these constant demands for 
reinforcements'. Thus Hopmann could only send the light cruiser 
Strassburg to look for Russian ships plying between Finland and 
Sweden, the converted railway ferry Deutschland to drop mines here 
and there, and a few torpedo boats to cruise in the direction of the 
Gulfs of Finland and Riga. 
The great advance of the German army drove the Russians out of 
Poland in the spring and summer of 1915, and at the beginning of May 
the army group Lauenstein occupied Libau. Hopmann's cruisers 
supported the conquest by a bombardment, which was futile because the 
Russians had left the town in order to avoid being encircled there. During 
the summer, the German army conquered the whole of Courland. 
Prince Henry wanted Libau for his base. It was one hundred miles 
38 	 After the battles in the Gulf of Riga, the Khrabryi was withdrawn back to Helsinki 
and then to Kronstadt, where the ship was later called Krasnoe Znamia; during 
the Second World War the ship was sunk by Finnish motor torpedo boats at 
Suursaari in the Gulf of Finland, but raised by the Russians and after the armistice 
with Finland in 1944 was sent to Helsinki to remind Finns of the presence of the 
Allied Control Commission, though the Soviet army had not been able to conquer 
or occupy the country. 
39 	 Wilson, Baltic Assignment; British Submarines in Russia 1914-1919. 
closer than Danzig to the Gulf of Finland; from Libau any Russian 
attempt against the German coast could be prevented, and the navy 
could also contribute to the supply of the army on the Riga front. At 
first, the idea was that the harbour town would be given back after 
the war, on condition that the Russians did not rebuild their base there, 
but soon the navy wanted to keep it permanently; Libau was the first 
'war aim' of the Baltic fleet. Hopmann was appointed Seebefehlshaber 
Libau, naval commander at Libau. 
One of the Siegfrieds was positioned in Libau as a guardship. A 
counterattack by Russian armoured ships succeeded in sinking the 
minelayer Albatross and the British E 9 torpedoed the Prinz Adalbert, 
which had steamed out to help the minelayer. Thereafter the Libau 
flotilla was reinforced by the Brandenburg and Wörth, of the oldest 
pre-dreadnought battleship class. 
Then Prince Henry succeeded in borrowing a few big ships from 
the North Sea. Minesweepers cleared passages to the Gulf of Riga, 
airships and submarines secured the entry to the Gulf of Finland, the 
dreadnoughts Posen and Nassau kept watch for the Slava, and the 
armoured cruisers Roon and Prinz Heinrich bombarded Russian 
coastal batteries and damaged the gunboat Sivuch. Meanwhile, the 
battle-cruiser von der Tann and the light cruiser Kolberg bombarded 
the Utö fort and exchanged a few shots with the armoured cruiser 
Makarov. The cruiser Bremen was destroyed by a mine laid at Windau. 
The German Baltic fleet believed that they had compelled the 
Russians to remain in defensive positions, but higher naval staffs 
criticized the aimless raid on the Gulf of Riga, which had been 
concluded or interrupted so hastily that the enemy could claim a 
victory.40 
It is true that the Russians feared for the security of Reval and 
reinforced their positions at Hiidenmaa (Dagö) and Russarö at the 
mouth of the Gulf of Finland with heavy guns and new minefields. 
The plans to extend the naval fortress to the western islets had been 
made before the German raid took place. In fact, the active Russian 
mine warfare in 1915 was quite a success if German losses are 
counted, even though the big ships continued swing passively at their 
anchorages in Helsinki. 
The navigation season of 1916 saw renewed demands by Prince 
40 Stegemann, "Die deutsche Marinepolitk 1916-1918", p. 125. 
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Henry and his admirals for dreadnoughts and battlecruisers plus 
torpedo boats, minesweepers and submarines, but they were allowed 
only one armoured ship to guard Kiel, and the new naval commander 
at Libau Admiral Langemak had to give up even the old Siegfried 
and was left without any heavy ships. The armoured cruisers lost on 
mines were not replaced, and even the remaining units were retired 
because the experience of 1914 and 1915 showed that they were too 
weak against mines and torpedoes. Their crews were transferred to 
submarines, mine flotillas and convoy escorts. The Baltic fleet was 
left with only the three light cruisers, the Strassburg, Kolberg and 
Augsburg. 
The German Baltic admirals proposed the conquest of Saarenmaa 
(Ösel) and Hiidenmaa (Dagö) in order to be better able to confine the 
Russians to the Gulf of Finland, but the army would not detach any 
force from the Western front, where General Falkenhayn was 
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	 expecting victory from his operations at Verdun. In the summer, the 
Brusilov offensive caused a critical situation in the south-eastern sector 
of the Eastern front, but in the north only the Slava and Khrabryi 
contributed to the battle by a bombardment of the German flank from 
the Gulf of Riga. 
The undecided battle of Jutland in May 1916 only confirmed the 
status quo in the North Sea, where the strategy of mutual waiting and 
watching continued. It also confirmed the decision of Denmark and 
Norway to maintain their neutrality. For Russia it meant, together with 
the closure of the Black Sea Straits, that she remained practically 
isolated from the West. The aid which could be sent through 
Archangel and Vladivostok, with their long and weak railway lines, 
satisfied only a fraction of Russia's needs. 
An attack by the British fleet on the Baltic was sometimes 
discussed, for example, when the Russian Admiral Schoultz, attached 
to the Grand Fleet, asked for such an operation.41 In 1905 Admiral 
Fisher had proposed 'copenhagening' the German fleet at Kiel, where 
a rumour of such plans was heard and caused a momentary panic; 
and instead of the Gallipoli attempt, in 1915, Fisher proposed a landing 
on the Pomeranian coast,42 and perhaps his white elephants, the 
41 	 Schoultz, Englannin suuri laivasto maailmansodassa; mukanaolleen muistiin-
panoja. (The Grand Fleet in the World War; Memoirs of a Participant), pp. 84-88, 
143, 204, 602-03. 
42 	 Kennedy, The rise and fall of British naval mastery. p. 304. 
dreadnought-sized cruisers Glorious and Furious, which were 
unarmoured but equipped with heavy guns, were constructed with this 
operation in mind. But the idea was always deemed too dangerous. 
Then, learning that many German battleships were out of service, 
being repaired or replenished after the battle of Jutland, Admiral Kanin 
decided to plan a landing on Courland, in the rear of the German 
army facing Riga. The Tsesarevich was ordered to join the Slava and 
the big dreadnoughts were transferred from Helsinki to the Lappohja 
(Lappvik) anchorage (close to Hanko) in case the High Seas fleet 
should intervene. But when the planners calculated that at least 55,000 
men, 12,000 horses and 35,000 waggons were necessary for the 
operation, both generals and admirals were frightened at the scale of 
their plans. Kanin desisted from the attempt on the pretext that the 
Grand Fleet could not guarantee that the High Seas fleet would stay 
in the North Sea. 
By this time, German torpedo boats of the North Sea fleet had 	 289 
carried out a successful raid in the Channel, and the Baltic fleet wanted 
similar laurels. Admiral Langemak ordered eleven torpedo boats to 
bombard Baltischport on 10 November 1916. No Russian ships were 
encountered and no serious destruction was caused to the target by 
the bombardment, but on the way back seven torpedo boats were lost 
in a Russian minefield. Langemak lost his command and Hopmann, 
after a campaign in Turkish waters, was brought back to Libau. 
The numerous Russian submarines were unable to achieve much 
throughout these years because of mechanical defects and, probably, 
defective tactics and lack of decisive leadership. Their orders bound 
them to guard the mine defences of the Gulf of Finland and they 
never sighted a German warship, nor, to avoid provoking Sweden, 
were they allowed to disturb the German freighters which carried iron 
ore from the Gulf of Bothnia to Germany. But the few British 
submarines in the Baltic acted aggressively and caused the Germans 
work and worry out of all proportion. The damaged Prinz Adalbert 
had hardly been repaired when it was sunk by the E 8, killing 672 
sailors. The E 19 sank the Undine. In 1915 the submarines which 
fought the German transports were hampered by international 
regulations for limiting submarine war, but in 1916 the regulations 
were forgotten and the ore carriers were sunk without previous 
warning. 
The German Baltic fleet had to organize convoys to secure for their 
war industry the vital ore import from Sweden. There were the usual 
difficulties: the merchantmen had not been used to naval discipline 
and the navy lacked escort ships so that fishing craft had to be armed 
for the purpose. The ore ships were safe as long as they sailed inside 
the Swedish territorial waters but the passage across the southern 
Baltic Sea was dangerous. Russian minelayers also caused much 
anxiety to the German staffs and shipowners, who complained that 
the Russian mines threatened German domination of the Baltic sea.43  
On the German side, the U 28 sank the Russian minelayer Enisei, 
and the UC 4 mined the Russian passages where the minelayer Ladoga 
was sunk. Sometimes, German submarines tried to catch Russian ships 
in the Gulf of Bothnia. The British lost the E 18 in May 1916.44 
Thus the pre-war expectation of a big-gun battle had to be abandoned. 
The war at the sea turned out to be a drawn-out campaign of mines and 
convoys, in the Baltic as well as in the North Sea and the Atlantic. 
Motor torpedo boats were experimentally used in the narrow Irben 
strait between Courland and the Estonian islands, and the possibilities 




and Reval were discussed. The first airship of the German Baltic fleet, 
the PL 19, had been shot down when trying to bomb Libau in 1915, 
but German reports stated that Mariehamn (Maarianhamina) in Åland 
was bombed in July 1916 with 700 kilos of bombs from four Zeppe-
lins.45 Aeroplanes proved ineffective; out of 44 German machines in 
Courland in 1916, 30 were lost, but only four of them in battle with 
the enemy. 
The army front in Finland turned westwards 
After the 22nd Army Corps had left Finland, in January 1915 the 
various opolchenie, i.e. replacement or militia, troops sent to the 
country were organized into a new 10th Militia Corps. It consisted of 
the 1st Militia Brigade of six druzhiny,46 the 60th Militia Brigade of 
43 	 Zentralverein Deutscher Rheder, Hamburg, den 12. Juni 1915. BA—MA RM 5/v 
4046 Ostsee, Verschiedenes 17. VIII 1914-5. III 1918. 
44 	 PRO ADM 137 2001, Part II, British naval losses. 
45 	 "Les Zeppelins et la guerre", 1 Åerophile, revue technique & pratique des 
locomotions aeriennes, 17-18/1916, p. 263. I am obliged to Mr 011i Saloranta 
for the copy of the magazine. 
46 	 1st Militia Brigade, Hämeenlinna 
— Ist Estonia druzhina, Lahti 
— 2nd Estonia druzhina, Riihimäki 
— 3rd Petrograd druzhina, Tampere 
— 4th Petrograd druzhina, Tampere 
— 5th Petrograd druzhina, Hämeenlinna 
— 6th Petrograd druzhina, Hämeenlinna 
also six druzhiny,47 and the 68th Militia Brigade of four druzhiny,48 
with additional cavalry, artillery and sapper detachments. In addition 
to the militia brigades, the 8th Orenburg Cossack Regiment of six 
sotnias and various rear detachments belonged to the corps.49 To guard 
the coast of the Karelian Isthmus and of the Gulf of Bothnia, the First 
Petrograd Alexander III Border Guards Brigade of three foot and three 
mounted sotnias was formed in Petrograd and transferred to the coastal 
district divided into sectors and into small guard posts.50 The 
— 1st Militia Horse Sotnia, Hämeenlinna 
— 2nd Militia Light Battery, Riihimäki 
— 3rd Battery, Hämeenlinna 
— 50th militia sapper half-company, Pitäjänmäki (Sockenbacka) 
47 60th militia brigade, Helsinki 
— 323rd Novgorod druzhina, Helsinki 
— 324th Novgorod druzhina, Turku 
— 336th Olonets druzhina, Hanko 
— 337th Olonets druzhina, Tammisaari 
— 338th Olonets druzhina, Tammisaari 
— 339th Petrograd druzhina, Helsinki 
— 1st Light Battery, Tammisaari 
— 48th sapper half-company, Malmi. 
Druzhina originally meant the military retinue of medieval Russian princes and 
probably its adoption reflects an attempt to heighten patriotic feeling among the 
recruits. 
48 68th Militia Brigade, Helsinki 
— 307th Petrograd druzhina, Kouvola 
— 310th Petrograd druzhina, Toijala 
— 319th Novgorod druzhina, Helsinki 
— 340th Petrograd druzhina, Viipuri 
49 militia training detachment, Hämeenlinna 
militia transport detachment, Hämeenlinna 
militia mobile field hospital 
militia military-sanitary transport 
militia sanitary-hygienic detachment 
militia disinfection detachment 
militia mobile field hospital no. 4 
militia transport detachment no. 4 
militia training detachment no. 4 
Finland lines of communication department (etapnoe upravlenie), Viipuri 
— 1st rear area, Viipuri 
— 2nd rear area, Kouvola 
— 1st detached lines of communication company, Uusikirkko 
— 2nd detached lines of communication company, Viipuri 
Finnish military transport department, Helsinki (upravlenie zavedyvaiushchii 
peredvizheniem voisk finliandskago raiona) 
50 	 1st Petrograd Alexander III Boarder Guards Brigade, 
— 1st sector, Tornio 
— 2nd sector, Oulu 
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Sveaborgs' and Viipuri fortresses52 with their garrisons and with an 
additional militia brigade at each, were at this time subordinated 
directly to the Vlth Army staff. Later, Sveaborg was subordinated to 
the Baltic fleet and Viipuri to the army corps in Finland. I have not 
found any information as to the number of soldiers," only lists of the 
— 3rd sector, Vaasa 
— 4th sector, Pori 
— 5th sector, Turku 
— 6th sector, Viipuri-Valkeasaari (Beloostrov). 
51 Sveaborg fortess 
— fortress artillery 
— fortress mine battalion 
— fortress aviation detachment 
— fortress gendarme detachment 
— fortress sanitary department 
— 1st temporary hospital 
— 2nd temporary hospital 
— Sveaborg local lasaret (hospital) 
— fortress cattle 
— intendent department 
— engineer department 
— 3rd detached sapper company, Malmi 
62nd Militia Brigade 
— 322nd Novgorod druzhina, Sveaborg 
— 329th Estonia druzhina, Sveaborg 
— 332nd Tver druzhina, Sveaborg 
— 333rd Tver druzhina, Helsinki 
— 351st Livonia druzhina, Viipuri 
52 Viipuri fortress 
— fortress artillery (10 companies) 
— engineer department 
— mine company 
— wireless station 
— gendarme detachment 
— local military hospital 
— fortress temporary hospital 
— intendent's department 
— provisions magazine 
— fortress cattle 
— veterinary hospital 
69. militia brigade 
— 311th Petrograd druzhina, Viipuri 
— 315th Petrograd druzhina, Viipuri 
— 318th Novgorod druzhina, Viipuri 
— 321st Novgorod druzhina, Viipuri 
— 346th Novgorod druzhina, Viipuri 




There is an exception: RGAVMF, fond 353, opis' 2, delo 5 shtaba sukhoputnykh 
voisk podchinennykh upravliaiushcheiu Baltiiskom flotom, p. 119, Svedenie o 
various formations and detachments.54 
With the advance of the Germans into Poland and Lithuania in the 
spring of 1915, Finland also seemed to be threatened again. It was 
felt that the border country could not be left to be defended only by 
militia troops of minimal fighting value. The militia corps staff, with 
additional officers from the druzhiny, was transformed into a regular 
42th Army Corps staff in May-June 1915, at first located in Helsinki, 
but later transferred to Tampere in August. 
The militia druzhiny were transformed into regular battalions which 
were formed into regiments, and they in turn into infantry divisions, 
so that the 42nd Corps consisted of the 106th Infantry Division and 
the 107th Infantry Division, with the 8th Orenburg Cossack Regiment, 
as well as many rear detachments, a few of which retained the 
indication 'militia' in their names. 
The 106th Division was first positioned in the region of Lahti— 
Riihimäki—Hämeenlinna—Tampere—Pori, and it consisted of four 	 293 
infantry regiments and three artillery batteries!' The 107th Division 
was formed in the south-west of Finland and in Helsinki—Sveaborg 
with its four regiments and three artillery batteries.56 The artillery 
sostoianie chinov i loshadei garnizona Sveaborgskoi kreposti 15. IX 1915. In 
September 1915 there were 317 officers, 93 officials, 64 doctors, 12,631 soldiers 
'of the line' and 1,541 men detached to other tasks, and only 8 horses in Sveaborg. 
54 	 All the preceding lists included in: RGAVMF, fond 1347, opis' 1, delo 75, boevoe 
raspisanie chastei VI armii, o raskhodakh po soderzhaniiu voisk, upravlenii i 
uchrezhdenii i pr.; boevoe raspisanie 30. I 1915. 
55 	 The 106th Division consisted of: 
— the 421st Tsarskosel'skii Infantry Regiment, formed of the 1st and 2nd druzhiny, 
the staff and one battalion at Peipohja, one at Rauma and Pori, one at Tampere; 
— the 422nd Kolpinskii Regiment, formed of the 5th and 6th druzhiny, the staff 
and one battalion at Hämeenlinna, two battalions at Riihimäki; 
— the 423rd Luzhskii Regiment, formed of the 3rd and 4th druzhiny, the staff 
and two battalions at Tampere, one battalion at Vaasa; 
— the 424th Chudskii Regiment, formed of the 307th, 310th and 340th druzhiny, 
the staff and two battalions at Lahti, one battalion at Koria; 
— the artillery batteries, the 1st at Rauma, the 2nd at Pori, the 3rd at Hämeenlinna. 
In July 1915 the 41st Detached Sapper Battalion was added to the strength of the 
106th Division, in September 1916 a fourth battalion was added to each of the 
regiments, in December 1916 the 120th Artillery Battalion joined the division. 
The staff was moved to Pori in March 1916 and from there to Hämeenlinna in 
May 1916, and to Tampere in December 1916. 
RGVIA, fond 2421, opis' 1, introduction to the catalogue or opis'. 
56 	 The 107th division consisted of: 
— the 425th Kargopol'skii Regiment, formed of the 323th, 337th, 339th druzhiny, 
the staff in Helsinki with two battalions, one battalion on the railway 
stores of both divisions were at Lappeenranta, the forward supply 
stores were positioned at Riihimäki and temporary mobile supply 
detachments were loaded in railway waggons. The 8th Orenburg 
Cossack Regiment was at Tuusula and Kerava, the 1st Militia sotnia 
at Hämeenlinna, the 48th and 50th Militia sapper half-companies in 
the Helsinki region. 
Together with the 43rd Army Corps in the Baltic provinces, the 
42nd belonged to the VIth Army, whose staff was in Petrograd. The 
43rd Corps consisted of the 108th and the 109th Divisions in Estonia 
and the 110th in Petrograd.57 In December, 1916 the VIth Army staff 
was transferred to lead troops on the Rumanian Front, and its troops 
in the north were divided between the XIIth Army and the detached 
42nd Army Corps. The detached corps commander had the authority 
of an army commander under the Northern Front commander-in-chief. 
The area of the 42nd Army Corps then covered almost all Finland, 
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	 including the Viipuri fortress and for a while even Kronstadt, but with 
the exception of the southern coast, where the Sveaborg fortress, the main 
base of warships, was subordinated to the Baltic fleet commander, as 
was also the Naval Fortress of Peter the Great with one of its batteries 
at Porkkala and its Turku-Aland Archipelago Position.58 
The Viipuri fortress garrison consisted of fortress artillery staff and 
Helsinki-Turku; September 1915 transferred to the garrison of the Naval Fortress 
of Peter the Great; 
— the 426th Rovnenskii Regiment, formed of the 324th, 336th, 351th druzhiny, 
the staff and two battalions at Tammisaari, one in Turku; September 1915 
transferred to the garrison of the Naval Fortress Peter the Great; 
— the 427th Zibetskii Regiment, formed of the 330th, 333rd, 351st druzhiny, the 
staff and two battalions in Helsinki, one battalion at Sveaborg; 
— the 428th Staritskii Regiment, formed of the 322nd , 329th, 332nd druzhiny, 
in Sveaborg; 
— the artillery batteries, the 1st at Tammisaari, the 2nd at Riihimäki, the 3rd in 
Turku. 
In February 1916, the 107th Division was divided in two, and the halves were 
built up into full divisions, with the new 116th Division of the 425th and the 
427th as well as of two new regiments for the garrison of the Naval fortress, 
while the two new regiments of the 107th Division the 426th Pudozhskii and the 
428th Lodeinopoleinyi Regiments at first garrisoned Sveaborg, but in July 1916 
the Pudozians were transferred to the Moon Sound, and the Lodeinopolians 
garrisoned Helsinki. RGVIA, fond 2422, opis' 1, introduction to the catalogue. 
57 	 The 440th Regiment of the 110th Division, formed of the 555th, 573rd and 722nd 
druzhiny, was temporarily positioned in Viipuri. 
58 	 RGVIA, fond 2262, shtab 42go armeiskago korpusa, introduction to the catalogue 
or opis'. 
a fortress artillery battalion and the 10th company of the Sveaborg 
fortress artillery, fortress engineer staff and one mine company, and 
a wireless telegraph station plus a gendarme detachment. This 
catalogue gives a picture of the branches of arms at the Viipuri 
garrison, but not their strength in numbers. In Viipuri there were also 
the Finland lines of communication staff, which organized the 
transport of men to and from Finland, under the military communica-
tions chief.59 
The Sveaborg fortress garrison consisted of its temporarily attached 
infantry detachments from the 107th Division as stated above, and of 
its fortress artillery staff and fortress artillery regiment, gendarme 
detachment, military telegraph, hospitals and magazines, and the 3rd 
detached sapper company. 
There was also a vozdukhoplavatel 'nyi or aviation company in the 
catalogue of the Sveaborg garrison; part of the force operated in the 
area of the Naval Fortress.60 In a Finnish history book the air force 
was identified as the 2nd Aeroplane Brigade of two detachments, of 
which the 4th was stationed on Åland and the 5th in Turku, with 
bases or air stations in Helsinki, at Jungfrusund, Lappohja and Jurmo. 
The detachments had the nominal strength of nineteen aircraft each, 
for naval reconnoitring, of Stetinin M-9 class flying boats and Farman 
float planes. The first brigade may have been on the Estonian coast.61  
The differences occurring in the fortress garrisons between January 
and the summer of 1915 indicate the frequent moves of various 
detachments, which cannot here be followed in details. 
The construction work of the Naval Fortress of Peter the Great was 
carried on under the command of its Chief Constructor. As soon as 
any sector or part was completed, it was taken over by the fortress 
commander, who was subordinate to the commander of the Baltic 
fleet, who in turn obeyed the VIth Army commander and the Northern 
Front commander-in-chief. 
As shown by the positions of the 42nd Army Corps, the idea of 
the pre-war plans of withdrawing to the line of Kymijoki was 
59 For a detailed list, see The Appendix. 
60 Staff, observation posts, train, stores and fuel depots. Amirkhanov, Morskaia 
krepost' Imperatora Petra Velikago, p. 77. 
61 
	
	 Bremer, Ilmavoimien osallistuminen Suomen vapaussotaan v. 1918, pp. 8-11. (The 
Participation of Air Forces in the Finnish War of Liberation). Bremer does not 
identify his sources. 
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abandoned as no enemy appeared on the Finnish coasts. Even before 
it was definitely seen that the Germans were not coming to Finland 
in 1915, parts of the 107th Division were transferred to Estonia in the 
summer, because of the catastrophe in Poland, the loss of Courland 
and the consequent threat against Riga, Livonia and Estonia, while 
the rest were garrisoned in Helsinki and Sveaborg, as shown above, 
and the 42nd Corps was left to fulfil its task with only the 106th 
Division. To the desperate demands of the 42nd Army Corps for 
reinforcements, the VIth Army could only answer that they had no 
troops available to replace the division which had been withdrawn.62 
On the other hand, in step with the progress of fortification work, the 
Gulf of Finland seemed to be ever more safely defended by the coastal 
forts and the minefields as well as by the fleet at Sveaborg. 
Fortification work was also started on the Åland islands at the 
beginning of the summer of 1915. Together with the island forts in 
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	 the Turku archipelago, these forts formed the Abo-Olandskaia 
Shernaia Pozitsiia or Turku-Åland Archipelago Position on the right 
flank of the Naval Fortress of Peter the Great. Since 1906-07, the idea 
had been to base light naval forces here to attack the flank and rear 
of an enemy approaching the main defence line between Naissaari 
(Nargen) and Porkkala. The island position also had a certain 
importance in guarding the Gulf of Bothnia, though it was not possible 
to close the northern gulf as safely as the Gulf of Finland, because 
there was broad open water between Åland and Sweden, and above 
all because Sweden's neutrality could not be trusted; Sweden might 
turn into an invader herself. 
That is why the coast had to be closely guarded both by the border 
guards and the regular army troops. The front of the 42nd Army Corps 
was turned from the south and south-west to the west, and instead of 
the Kymijoki, the coast of the Gulf of Bothnia became the foremost 
line of defence in Finland. 
An additional factor in pushing the forward defence line to the 
Bothnian coast was probably the importance of the Grand Duchy for 
the economic war effort, discussed above; Finland was no longer 
merely a glacis for the defence of the Imperial capital as it had been 
for the past hundred years. 
62 	 RGVIA, fond 2262, opis' I, delo 24, VIth Army to the 42nd Army Corps 26. 
VIII 1915. 
After the 107th had left the country, the 106th Division was given 
more detailed instructions for its task of defending the coast from 
Lappohja up to Uusikaupunki, and to observe the coast from there up 
to Vaasa. Oulu was also to be defended and the enemy was to be 
prevented from crossing the River Tornio. The Baltic fleet was asked 
to help by giving early warning to the army corps of enemy 
movements close to the Finnish coasts.63 In the harbours which were 
still kept open on the Gulf of Bothnia at Rauma, Mäntyluoto, 
Kaskinen, Vaasa, Pietarsaari, and Kokkola, preparations for mining 
the passageways were made in case Sweden should join the enemy.64 
The military staffs in Finland reminded the VIth Army that they 
did not have sufficient troops to occupy the entire coast of the Gulf 
of Bothnia, and that military troops were not to be dispersed in small 
detachments, especially as they were not trained for coastal guard 
duties. The 42nd Corps and the 106th Division would have preferred 
to keep their troops concentrated, ready to fend off small landings, 	 297 
or, if a major landing should take place, to retreat from the coast to 
the lake district. There, in the interior of Finland, fortifications could 
be constructed on the narrow isthmuses between the lakes. Because 
of the planned withdrawal from the coast to the interior redoubt, the 
naval fortresses also had to start fortifying their rear or landward fronts 
towards the north from Sveaborg, Porkkala and the temporary 
Lappohja anchorage close to Hanko.65 
Like the pre-war plans and directions, the new tasks given to the 
42nd Army Corps were very detailed, with every possible move of 
the supposed enemy taken into account, so that little initiative was 
left to the executive officers.66 
As instructed, the 106th Division positioned its 423rd Regiment 
on the right flank to guard Tornio and to observe the coast down to 
Kristiinankaupunki, while the 422nd and 421st Regiments were 
positioned to defend the most menaced region Pori-Peipohja-Rauma, 
and the 424th Regiment stood in reserve at Hämeenlinna with the 
63 RGVIA, fond 2262, opis' 1, delo 24, Boevaia zadacha Korpusa i mery eia 
osushchestvleniia, 2. VI-31. X 1915. 
64 	 RGVIA, fond 2262, opis' 1, delo 24, Commander of the Baltic fleet to the 42nd 
Army Corps commander 18. VI 1915. 
65 	 RGVIA, fond 2262, opis' 1, delo 24, the 106th Division to 42nd Army Corps 6. 
VII 1915, Baltic fleet to the 42nd Army Corps 13. VII 1915, Commander of the 
42nd Army Corps Lieutenant General Resin to the Vlth Army 14. VII 1915. 
66 	 Order for the 42nd Army Corps 17 July 1915, Sota-arkisto T 19168/5. 
additional task of guarding the railway from Tampere to Riihimäki 
and Kouvola.67 
The positions of the infantry divisions and regiments given here 
and in footnotes on the previous pages existed in June 1915, but there 
were numerous transfers, and it is difficult but, happily, also 
unnecessary to catalogue all the changes. For example, in August 1915 
it was the 421st Regiment which had to guard the northern coast. Its 
third battalion was garrisoned at Tampere, and the first and second 
battalions were dispersed at Vaasa, Kaskinen, Kokkola, Kemi, Simo, 
Oulu, one company at each place. There was also an armoured train 
at Oulu in August 1915. 
These troops had recently been formed from the militia druzhiny 
and it was reported, for example, that the first and second battalions 
of the 424th Regiment had trained satisfactorily in rifle shooting and 
were ready for battle, while the third battalion was extremely weak 
298 	 in this respect.68 
In October 1915 new recruit druzhiny, of which the 16th was 
trained at Viipuri, joined the VIth Army and the 43rd Army Corps, 
but only a cavalry detachment was added to the 42nd Corps.69 
In the spring of 1916, the VIth Army staff reviewed the situation 
in its area. They expected renewed German operations either towards 
Kiev, or Moscow, or Petrograd. The eventual attack on the capital 
was supposed to consist of thirty divisions. It was not very probable 
that the Germans would use their fleet for the operation because no 
decision had taken place in the North Sea; nevertheless, the enemy 
had a sufficient number of freighters for transporting from seven to 
twenty divisions. Of the probable objectives of the attack, a landing 
on the coast of the Gulf of Bothnia presupposed the silencing or taking 
of Åland, where the defences were not yet completed. If the enemy 
succeeded in penetrating the Gulf, they would absolutely dominate 
the sea and a landing was very probable. The other possible objective, 
the Gulf of Finland, was closed by two mine belts, the foremost from 
Hanko to Tahkona with torpedo flotillas on the flank with bases at 
Turku-Aland and the Moon Sound, and the main belt at Porkkala—
Naissaari, protected by heavy coastal batteries. Trying to break these 
67 	 RGVIA, fond 2262, opis' 1, delo 24, Major General Stankevich, prikaz po 106-i 
pekh. div. 19. VII 1915. 
68 	 RGVIA, fond 2262, opis' 1, delo 132, raskvartirovanie chasti korpusa 1915. 
69 	 RGVIA fond 2262 opis' I delo 24, boevoi raspisanie VI Armii 18. X 1915. 
defences would cause heavy losses to the enemy and would scarcely 
succeed.70 
A more likely possibility was a land attack from Courland and 
Lithuania towards Riga and Livonia, but fending off that operation was 
the task of the XIIth Army, while the Vlth Army and the 42nd Army 
Corps concentrated on defending the immediate approaches to Petrograd. 
The Russians' intention to commence a serious defence of Finland 
itself from the very coast grew stronger in 1916. However, the main 
fortified defence line was still positioned along the westward border 
of the interior lake district, though the idea of withdrawing even 
further to the east was kept in mind. 
The corps staff reviewed their defensive possibilities and agreed on 
the general lines sketched by the army staff. In the south-west, the 
Turku-Aland position could be regarded as satisfactorily prepared for 
defence, and the north-west coast, the top of the Gulf of Bothnia, was 
rather distant from the enemy's goals. Thus the assumption was that 
the enemy would land somewhere on the coast between Lappohja and 
Turku, or in the Rauma—Pori region. The landing and advance were 
supposed to take some time, which would make possible the transfer 
of reinforcements from Petrograd to Finland. 
The coastal belt with its good roads was narrow and easy to defend 
as the Sveaborg fortress and the Baltic fleet secured the Gulf of 
Finland. The enemy was supposed to have a natural base for its 
operations in Swedish-speaking Pohjanmaa, from where roads 
traversed the lake district to the east of Viipuri, but the distance to 
be marched by the enemy was long, and the lake system of Saimaa 
could be crossed only through a few narrow isthmuses which were 
easy to close with fortifications. 
Landings in the far north could be regarded as diversions from the 
main attack, because the distance from Tornio or Oulu to Joensuu and 
from there to Petrograd was even longer and more difficult than that 
through the lake district. 
Work had already started on the main defence line from Helsinki—
Tampere—Keuruu—Saarijärvi—Nurmes on the western edge of the lake 
district. Now orders were given to be prepared to construct a fortified 
rear position from Säkkijärvi to Lappeenranta and from there to 
70 RGVIA, fond 2031, opis' 1, delo 159, oborona poberezhia Baltiiskogo morla, p. 
25 ochetnaia raporta No 2 razvedyvatelnogo shtaba VI Armii 11. III 1916. 
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300 	 An artillery firing position on the dry-land front of the Helsinki-Sveaborg fortress during the 
First World War, with an 6' obsolete cannon. The earthen walls were replaced by concrete 
constructions as soon as money, materials, and labour force allowed. 
Photo: Sotamuseo 1518 N 83. 
Savonlinna and even further to Joensuu. 
The coast of the Gulf of Bothnia was guarded even more closely 
than in 1915. The staff of the 42nd Army Corps was in Tampere, the 
106th Division staff was transferred to Pori with the 424th Chud 
Regiment and artillery battalion, and the 421st Tsarskoe Selo 
Regiment to Rauma. The 423rd Luga Regiment was positioned at 
Vaasa, while the 422nd Kolpino Regiment was left at Hämeenlinna 
as a general reserve. For a time the reserve was reinforced by the 
457th Korochansk and the 458th Dudzhansk Regiments of the 115th 
Division, recently brought to the country, but they were soon 
transferred to Kuopio and Mikkeli to start constructing field 
fortifications in the rear position. Obstacles and desmolitions were to 
be prepared in such coastal regions as were expected to be occupied 
by the enemy. The 40th Sapper Battalion staff was at Tampere. 
Detached immobile coastal batteries were stationed at the main 
harbour approaches of the Gulf of Bothnia." 
71 	 Rauma 3rd, 4th(half 2 guns), 13th, 15th detached batteries; Pori 4th(half), 2nd; 
Kristiina 8th, 10th, 11th, 14th; Vaasa 9th; Uusikaarlepyy 18th, 17th; Pietarsaari 
5th, 16th; Kokkola 17th, 6th. RGVIA, fond 2262, opis' 1, delo 151, kvartimoe 
rospisanie 1. XII 1915. 
The units of the 115th division mentioned above only remained in 
Finland for a short time and were transferred to the garrison of the Naval 
Fortress of Peter the Great on southern side of the Gulf of Finland. 
A detached 2nd Baltic Cavalry Brigade staff was formed and 
quartered at Tampere to lead the 8th Orenburg Cossack Regiment of 
six sotnias at Tuusula and the new 3rd Baltic Cavalry Regiment of 
four squadrons in Turku.72 
In 1915-16, border guard troops were strengthened in Finland to spare 
the 106th Division from what was for them the alien task of guarding 
the coasts of the Gulf of Bothnia and the Karelian Isthmus as well as 
the Russo-Finnish border against illegal emigration and enemy infiltration 
or arms smuggling. By the end of 1916, there were four regiments of 
the Petrograd Border Guards Brigade, and four foot regiments of the 
Detached Finland Border Guards Brigade (formed in 1916), both brigades 
with their sapper detachments, in all a little over 4,000 men.73 
New militia detachments were brought to the country. In Ostrov in 	 301 
the Novgorod region the 92nd Militia Brigade had been stationed 
with its 328th, 367th, 370th, 391st and 540th druzhiny, in all about 
10,000 men. In the spring of 1916, the staff of the brigade with three 
of its druzhiny was transferred to Finland, leaving the 370th and 540th 
in Russia, but with the 32nd, 33rd and 34th druzhiny added to the 
brigade. The troops of the druzhiny were positioned in companies, 
platoons or even smaller posts to guard positions prepared in the rear 
of the field troops, as well as railways and bridges.74 The militia 
72 	 RGVIA, fond 8260, opis 2, delo 54, Prikaz 42mu Armeiskomu korpusu 27. VII 
1916. 
73 	 On 1st January 1917, the reported strength of the 42nd Army Corps was: 
— 106th Division 	 14,208 
— detached Finland Border Guards Foot Brigade 1,458 
mounted sapper detachment 61 
— Petrograd Border Guards Brigade 1,770 
mounted sapper detachment 255 
— 40th Sapper Battalion 1,259 
— 42nd Motorcycle Detachment 39 
— fourteen detached immobile coastal batteries (four old cannons of 6" or 42— 
in each) 
— 120th Artillery Brigade 17x 3" field guns, the number of gunners not given. 
Kronstadt, with its 3,325 men, was for a while part of the corps, but lies outside 
Finland. 
RGVIA, fond 2262, opis 1, delo 153, boevoi sostav, boevoi rospisanie i 
obezpechenie vsemi vidami dovolstviia. 
74 	 The brigade headquarters in Helsinki, druzhina headquarters 32nd at Kouvola, 
33rd Oulu, 34th Tammisaari, 328th Savonlinna and Antrea, 367th Lappeenranta, 
brigade was not part of the 42nd Army Corps, but would have been 
operationally subordinated to the corps in case of an enemy attack, 
with the 33rd druzhina concentrated at Seinäjoki, and the 34th, the 
328th, the 367th and the 391st at Tampere-Toijala, while the 308th, 
which arrived in September 1916, and the 32nd were to continue their 
railway guarding duties.75 
Unceasing worries 
During 1915 and 1916 the Baltic fleet mainly stayed in its anchorages. 
The flagship Riurik, the first battleship division and the first 
dreadnought division were at the Helsinki anchorage protected by the 
Sveaborg fortress, as was one cruiser brigade and most of the torpedo 
boat divisions, with another cruiser brigade, a few torpedo boats and 
submarines at Reval.76 Only ships detached to the Gulf of Riga saw 
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	 battle, to be described below. The incrreasingly strong defences closed 
the Gulf of Finland, and the Russian Baltic fleet, very superior in 
numbers to Prince Henry's fleet, tied itself to the defences by adopting 
the role of monitors or floating batteries for the battleships. The navy 
in fact blockaded its main forces in the Gulf. The minelaying raids 
on dark autumn nights were quite vexing for the Germans, but could 
not upset the German domination of the western part of the Baltic 
sea. On the other hand, the British mastery of the North Sea tied down 
the main part of the High Seas fleet, causing only obsolete armoured 
ships to be left for Prince Henry to guard the Danish Straits, while 
the Admiral at Libau had only a token force at his disposal. 
In 1916, as with the 42th Army Corps, the Russian Baltic fleet also 
planned rear positions in case it should be compelled to give up its 
forward position at the mouth of the Gulf of Finland. The construction 
of bases started at Kotka and Koivisto,77 mine fields were planned in 
391st Hämeenlinna. RGVIA, fond 8260, opis' 2, delo 54, o sosredotochenii 
brigady 8. II-30. X 1916. 
75 	 RGVIA, fond 8260, opis' 2, delo 54, p. 99, Inspektor zapasnykh voisk Severnago 
fronta komanduiushchemu 92. br. na sluchai ekstrennago vysova k boevoi 
deiatel'nosti, 6. IX 1916. 
76 	 Riurik, flagship; I brigade: Andrei Pervozvannyi, Pavel I, Tsesarevich, Slava; II 
brigade: Gangut, Sevastopol, Petropavlovsk, Poltava; I cruiser brigade: Gromoboi, 
Makarov, Baian; II cruiser brigade in Reval: Rossiia, Bogatyr, Oleg, Avrora, 
Diana. RGAVMF, fond 418, opis' 1, delo 158, Spisok otriadov i sudov 
Baltiiskogo moria (1916). 
77 	 RGAVMF, fond 418, opis' 1, delo 414, perepiska po oborudovanii portov i baz 
the central region of the Gulf across the navigation channels at 
Suursaari, and batteries of heavy 12"-10" guns with 6" supporting 
guns were wanted for Lavansaari, Someri and Kilpisaari.78 But the 
withdrawal to the Suursaari position and the Koivisto base was to be 
taken only when the army was compelled to leave the lake plateau. And 
preparations for withdrawal did not mean desisting from the basic idea 
of a defence in Finland, a defence always intended to keep the country 
in Russian hands and prevent the enemy from approaching Petrograd.79 
In 1916 the British submarines under Commander Francis Cromie 
achieved their greatest success, while the Russian fleet was bound the 
defence position in the Gulf of Finland. 
The 42nd Army Corps still complained of the insufficiency of their 
forces, and especially of the obsolesence of their artillery, the minimal 
number of machine guns granted them, and the lack of labour for the 
preparation of planned positions whose total length exceeded 1,500 
versts. But the corps did not receive any permanent reinforcements, 	 303 
only promises of help if the Swedes should join the war. Then, a 
guards corps would be sent, one division to occupy the region of 
Tampere—Lempäälä, another division to Urjala—Toijala—Hämeenlinna; 
and an infantry corps, one division to Lahti and another to Kausala—
Kouvola; and also a cavalry corps to guard the sparsely populated 
parts of eastern Finland, one division to Iisalmi, another division to 
Siilinjärvi—Kuopio, and a third division to Suonenjoki. The 42nd Army 
Corps was to delay the enemy as much as possible and then, after the 
reinforcements had arrived, to concentrate in the region of Vaasa.80 
The main approach routes were prepared for defence with field 
fortifications, guns positioned in harbours, and permanent fortresses 
constructed on the rear or land side of Helsinki and Viipuri. In time 
of war, money was freely spent and plans were realized for which the 
military had begged in vain for decades.81 Nevertheless, the work 
Kotka, Kem, Rogskul, Biorko 14. I 1915-26. VIII 1917. 
78 	 RGAVMF, fond 418, opis 2', delo 234 ob usilenii morskoi tylovoi positsii v 
Finskom zalive, lanvar' 1917. 
79 	 RGVIA, fond 2262, opis 1', fond 26, from General van der Vliet of the VIth 
Army, from Ruszkii of the Northern Front, to the 42nd Army Corps 5. I 1916, 
8. I 1916, predlozheniia boevykh deistvii 42 armeiskago korpusa. 
80 	 RGVIA, fond 2262, opis' 1, fond 28, Plan oborony Finliandii 22. IV 1916. 
81 	 There was waste and corruption, too. For example, the Finnish businessman Aleko 
Lilius relates of innumerable 'inspection fees' which various authorities demanded 
before accepting construction plans. Lilius also tells how Uusikaarlepyy lost its 
railway when the Mäkiluoto fortress needed rails; wooden beams were floated in 
proceeded slowly because of insufficient material and labour!' The 
Sveaborg fortress calculated that it needed 1,036 guns of various 
calibres for its landward positions, while in January 1916 only 318 
guns existed!' About 30,000 unemployed Finns were hired for 
fortification works. In addition, about 3,000 Chinese coolies dug 
trenches for the Russian army, provoking much comment in the 
country by their strange habits and behaviour.84 
In October 1916, the rear position was reconnoitred and operations 
planned there, positions to be fortified were marked out and field 
fortifications started. It was also stressed that the estuary of the 
Kymijoki and the harbours of Kotka and Hamina had to be included 
in the naval rear position, lest the enemy should circumvent the 
position through coastal passages.S5 The importance of lake flotillas 
was again stressed, for reconnoitring and communication purposes, 
for the protection of flanks and for preventing the enemy from crossing 
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	 the waterways. In the absence of proper warships, small passenger 
steamers and tugs were requisitioned and equipped with field guns. 
Finns used to ridicule these flotillas, regarding them only as a means 
for their crews and commanders to escape service on the battle front,86 
which may be true, but they could have been useful if the enemy had 
attempted a lateral attack from the west to the east through the lake 
district.87 On the main battle front and later in the Russian Civil War, 
improvised river and lake flotillas played an active role.88 
The landward positions of the naval fortresses were to be defended 
by army troops. These detachments on both sides of the Gulf of 
Finland and in the island positions on Åland and the Moon Sound did 
stormy seas to the fortress; fifty hedgehogs were acquired from Sweden to fight 
poisonous snakes in the islands... Lilius, Nuori mies panee toimeksi, passim, 
particularly pp. 100-15. 
82 	 RGVIA, fond 2262, opis' 1, delo 106, Commander of the Baltic Fleet to the 42nd 
Army Corps 21. I 1917. 
83 RGAVMF, delo 353, opis 2', delo 5, pp. 30-35, Zapiska po voprosu ob 
artillerriiskom vooruzhenii sukhoputnogo fronta Sveaborgskoi kreposti, 28. I 1916. 
84 	 I have heard that daughters even of society circles were interested in them and 
that some of the best families in the country have Chinese genes as a consequence, 
but there is neither written nor even visible proof. 
85 	 RGVIA, fond 2262, opis' 1, delo 28, raport Shtabu Sev. Fr. 29. X 1916, Shtab 
Sev. Fr Glavnomu rukovoditeliu rabot v tylu 15. XII 1916. 
86 	 Ruohonen, Laivoja ja laivamiehiä Tampereen vesillä; (Memoirs of Inland Lake 
Steamers and Sailors). 
87 	 RGVIA, fond 2262, opis' 1, delo 37 o satakundskoi flotilii 5. I 1917. 
88 	 Tri veka rossiiskogo jlota 1696-1996, vol. II, pp. 209-28. 
not belong to the 42th Corps but were united under the "commander 
of the dry-land forces", sukhoputnyia voiska, of the Naval Fortress of 
Peter the Great. The regular Sveaborg garrison now consisted of two 
regiments of fortress artillery, two sapper companies, two mine 
battalions, one aviation company, and one telegraph company. The 
garrison was strengthened by field troops; there was the 428th 
Lodeinopoleinyi Infantry Regiment of the 107th Division, as well as 
the 128th Infantry Division with its 509th Gzhatskii, 510th 
Volkhovskii, 511th Sychevskii, and 512th Desnenskii Regiments. In the 
Turku-Aland Archipelago Position, in addition to the coastal batteries, 
there were at first detached infantry companies and field guns on 
different small islands, with a detached battalion being formed at 
Turku to be transferred to Mariehamn, the capital of Åland. Later a 
rifle regiment of the officers' rifle school was transferred to Åland as 
well as some detached field batteries. As everywhere, numerous 
auxiliary detachments increased the hordes of soldiers, especially 
non-combatants.89 The reports do not give the number of men in the 
various detachments; in war-time conditions the numbers were 
constantly changing.90 
At the end of 1916, the dryland artillery regiments of the Sveaborg 
fortress were dissolved and instead the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Fortress 
Artillery Brigades were set up, with artillery battalions numbered from 
1 to 24, eight in each brigade, in all seventy-two heavy and 
twenty-four light batteries. The necessary additional cadres for the 
new formations were taken from the 107th, 118th and 128th Infantry 
Divisions, which had to train new men to replace those given up.91  
The orders making these changes were not accompanied by any 
explanation, but evidently the fortress artillery was given a stronger 
and more elastic organization. 
The battle plans were destined to remain on paper and the 
fortifications remained unused, because neither Germany nor Sweden 
89 Twelve companies and a machine-gun and a training detachment plus working 
parties, with staff at Dalkarby. RGAVMF, fond 353, opis 2', delo 3, 
Abo-Olandskaia ukreplennaia pozitsia 1915-1916, p. 44: kvartimoe rospisanie 
gamizona ostrova Oland. 
90 Kvartimoe raspisanie chastei voisk, podchinennykh Komanduiushchemu flotom 
Baltiiskogo moria 1. II 1917. RGVIA, fond 2262, opis' 1, delo 106. 
91 RGAVMF, fond 353, opis' 2, delo 14, p. 133, Prikaz Glavnokomanduiushchago 
armiiami Sevemago Fronta i Flotom Baltiiskogo Moria 30. IX 1916; p. 321, prikaz 
sukhoputnym voiskam 15. II 1917. 
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invaded Finland before Russia left the war in 1917. But the 
preparations show how serious the danger of a Swedish or German 
landing seemed to the Russian staffs, and how little they trusted their 
ability to defend their positions. The plans do mention the importance 
of a tough defence, but the care given to preparing rear positions ever 
more to the east seems rather defeatist. The defeatist attitude was, of 
course, quite reasonable in the light of battle experience on the Eastern 
front in 1914-16. 
If the enemy had invaded Finland, the country would have been 
burned by the retreating defenders on the traditional Scythian—
Kutusovian model. Plans were made and orders given, first of all for 
moving offices and transferring public archives and the cash of the 
banks from the coastal towns to the interior. Means of transport were 
earmarked for the operation, and the fortress of Viipuri was made 
ready to receive the treasury of the Bank of Finland in the event of 
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	 German cruisers approaching the Finnish coast. Only the basic 
functions of the Governors' offices were to be kept up in safe 
localities, while supernumerary officials were to be sent off with two 
months' salary and transported where they wished.92 
The enemy was to be prevented from benefiting from a conquered 
Finland. All provisions were to be removed to the interior, the 
telephone network and everything else that the enemy might find 
useful was to be destroyed. In February 1915, the provincial 
Governors were ordered to prepare for the demolition work, and plans 
for the evacuation of the population were drawn up. People were to 
walk across the country to eastern Finland, because railways would 
be available only for military transports. Evacuation was not to be 
compulsory, but no provision would be made for those who remained; 
everything was to be either removed or destroyed.93 To liberate the 
fortress area of Sveaborg of 'harmful elements' in case of an enemy 
approach, about 200,000 people would have been made to walk from 
Helsinki to the Kuopio, Mikkeli and Viipuri gubernii.94 
92 Vyvoz po voennym obstoiatelstvom vnutri strani bankovykh chennostei i del 
Pravitel'stvennykh uchrezhdenii. KKK 1914, I department, war act 1-2; 0 
meropriiatiiakh po voprosu ob organizatsii evakuatsii grazhdanskikh Tits i 
pravitel'stvennykh uchrezhdenii. KKK 1915, I department, war delo 2-6, National 




Instruction to all police officials 22. II 1915; the Governor of Vaasa to his 
subordinate officials 29. V 1915 and 20. VI 1915, KKK 1915, I department, war 
delo 2--6 II, National Archives of Finland. 
Thus it seems probable that a disaster similar to that suffered by 
Poland during the Russian retreat in 1915 would have been visited on 
Finland, too, if the enemy had invaded the country. It seems that some 
of the Governors were reluctant to plan for a catastrophe on this 
scale,95 but of course the absence of plans would only have increased 
confusion. 
The Swedish danger 
The naval situation in the Baltic Sea prevented an enemy invasion 
of Finland, but the Russians were quite right in expecting an attack 
from the Gulf of Bothnia. 
After General Moltke had failed in the west, but Field Marshal 
Hindenburg and General Ludendorff had stopped the Russian steam 
roller in East Prussia, General Falkenhayn tried an attack in the east 
in order to knock Russia out of the war. The German advance in 1915 
swept the Tsar's armies out of Poland, and panic reigned in Petrograd 
for a while, but by the end of the summer the Germans had run out 
of steam. Nicholas II dismissed his uncle Nicholas Nicholaevich and 
took the office of Supreme Commander-in-Chief for himself, leaving 
the government to the Empress Alexandra and her friend Rasputin, 
with their protegé Boris Stürmer as the new Prime Minister. 
Contrary to Falkenhayn's expectations, the succesful conquest of 
Poland made separate peace with Russia more difficult, because the 
Germans did not want to give up what they had conquered. Ludendorff 
especially has been accused of greed, because he believed that 
Germany could not stand a long war of attrition against the Western 
Powers without the resources of the area later to be called the 
Lebensraum in the East.96 
For his part, the Tsar had already decided to re-unite Poland under 
his sceptre and to take the Turkish Straits, which had been promised 
to him by his entente allies to humour him and his people after their 
tremendous losses. The Slays, suffering under Austrian tyranny, were 
to be liberated. All this implied the carving up of the Hohenzollern 
94 RGAVMF, fond 353, opis' 2, delo 5, p. 206, Plan evakuatsii 16. IV 1916. 
95 	 Turpeinen, Keisarillisen Vendjän viranomaisten suhtautuminen jääkäriliikkeeseen, 
(The Reactions of the Russian Authorities to the Jäger Movement), p. 131. 
96 	 Kitchen, The Silent Dictatorship; the Politics of the German High Command under 
Hindenburg and Ludendorff 1916-1918. 
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and Habsburg empires. 
These contradictionary war aims made plans for a separate peace 
hopeless.97 
In connection with Falkenhayn's plans in 1915, the Swedish 
General Staff was asked whether they could supply a couple of 
Swedish army corps to cross the Gulf of Bothnia and to advance 
through Finland towards Petrograd. As in 1910, there were people in 
the Swedish court as well in the diplomatic and officer corps who 
favoured joining the Germanic war against the Slav menace. German 
victory would also have dispelled the danger of a radical 
democratization of Swedish society. However, King Gustav V and the 
conservative Hammarskiöld government had decided to maintain 
neutrality, the so-called Activists were left in a minority, and schemes 




	 In the spring of 1916, the Swedish Activists again tried to force 
the government to abandon neutrality, using the Russian fortification 
works on Åland to agitate public opinion against the eastern threat. 
This worried the Russians and they spoke about pulling down the 
fortifications at the end of the war. Although no definite undertaking 
was given, the Swedish government and parliament were satisfied, 
and thus the end result of the Activist agitation only confirmed 
Sweden's neutrality.98 
As far as is known, there was no Russian intention to mount an 
offensive against Sweden or towards the Norwegian Atlantic coast. It 
is true that General Kuropatkin had written that Russia was not 
satisfied with the border in the north, and the Russian Consul at 
Hammerfest dreamed of his station being annexed by his country.99 
But Russia never had the force to do anything in the distant periphery, 
and she had enough Arctic coast of her own, where the port of 
Romanov or Murmansk was being constructed and connected by a 
railway to the central parts of Russia in 1917. 
97 	 Not the masons, as claimed by Fejtö, Requiem pour un empire defunt, passim; 
otherwise a good exposition of the attempts of negotiated peace during the war. 
98 	 Luntinen, "The Åland Question in the Last Decades of the Russian Empire". 
99 	 Kuropatkin, Memorien, p. 50; Jungar, Ryssland och den Svensk-Norska unionens 
upplösning, p. 86, a note on the consul's ideas. Contemporary pamphlets: Hedin, 
Ett varningsord; Emeljanoff, Rysslands framträngande till Atlanten och de 
Rysk-Svenska relationerna framtid; Svar pd 'ett varningsord' af Sven Hedin; 
Emeljanoff, Existerar 'den Ryska faran'? 
At the beginning of the war, the German envoy in Stockholm, von 
Reichenau, had believed that Sweden would easily join Germany, but 
his successor von Lucius perceived that the Activists were only a 
minority, and he opposed the suggestions of Falkenhayn and the other 
army leaders to put pressure on Sweden. 
The German naval staffs calculated that as an ally Sweden might 
open a few harbours to the German Baltic fleet and help keep the 
Sound closed, but, on the other hand, the ore convoys sailed safely 
inside the territorial waters of neutral Sweden, guarded by Swedish 
warships, while they would have been open to attack by the British 
submarines if Sweden had joined the war. 
Thus the idea of an attack over the sea from Sweden through 
Finland did exist among the Swedish and German staffs, as the 
Russians supposed, or perhaps knew from their spies in Stockholm. 
But, in fact, the danger never was as great as it was conceived by the 
Russian military and naval leaders, whose duty it then became to plan 
to repel it.'°°  
Revolutionizing a minority nation 
The Finnish separatist movement, which the gendarmes had conjuring 
up since 1905, did exist now, and made the German-Swedish danger 
seem only more real to the defenders in Finland. 
The German leaders intended to revolutionize the minority 
populations in the Russian Empire and make them ask for German 
help for their liberation, in order to camouflage Germany's 
annexationist intentions. 
Many of the peoples in East Central Europe were willing to be 
helped. The Baltic Germans in particular sighed for their liberation 
from Russia, but also among the Poles, Ukrainians, White Russians, 
Jews and Caucasians willing collaborators were found, and a League 
of Russia's Oppressed Minorities was formed under German auspices 
100 Stewen, Saksalaisten suunnitelma hyökätä Pietariin Etelä-Suomen kautta I 
maailmansodan aikana (The German Pland of Attacking Petrograd through 
Southern Finland); Carlgren, Neutralität oder Allianz, Deutschlands Beziehungen 
zu Schweden in den Anfangsjahren des ersten Weltkrieges; Eskola, Suomen 
kysymys ja Ruotsin mielipide ensimmäisen maailmansodan puhkemisesta Venäjän 
maaliskuun vallankumoukseen (Swedish Opinion on Finland); Schubert, Schweden 
und das Deutsche Reich im Ersten Weltkrieg; Die Aktivistenbewegung 1914-1918; 
Bohn, Deutsche Kriegsziele im Ostseeraum im Ersten Weltkrieg. 
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in 1916.101 
The Finns were considered one of the useful oppressed peoples. 
Since the days of Bobrikov, they had made known their dissatisfaction 
with tsarist absolutism and Russian chauvinism. 
It is true that a group of Finnish Constitutionalist intellectuals and 
businessmen hoped for the victory of the liberal Western Powers, 
whose greater resources strengthened belief in their final success, 
while a German victory threatened to strengthen absolutism, 
conservatism and militarism throughout Europe. But even an 
Anglophile like Professor Edward Westermarck hoped for the defeat 
of the entente, because the thought of a victorious Russia was 
unbearable.10' 
There was the slight hope that were Germany defeated, Russia 
would become less important as an ally for the West, which then 
might press Russia to restore the autonomy of Finland. But during the 
310 
	
	 war it was quite impossible.103 As Russia's losses grew, the Western 
Allies had to desist from any interference in her internal affairs in 
order not to alienate her from the alliance. 
In November 1914, when the Great Programme of Russification 
was published, a few Finnish students decided that this clearly 
expressed threat made rebellion and separation from the Empire the 
only way of saving their nation. To them it seemed criminal not to 
seize the unique opportunity of the Great War to contribute to Russia's 
defeat.104 The long-felt frustration erupted in Activism. 
Active fighting against the Tsar was a crime not only in Russian 
law but also in Finnish constitutional and criminal law; it was treason 
against Finland's legitimate Grand Duke. But many young Finns felt 
no longer bound by their oath of loyalty and thought of Russia only 
as the hereditary enemy, claiming that Nicholas II had broken his 
monarch's oath in 1899. 
Because the Finns lacked military skills, and since Sweden kept to 
its neutrality, the Finnish Activists had to resort to German help. They 
regarded the scientifically progressive, well-ordered and disciplined 
101 S. Zetterberg, Die Liga der Fremdvölker Russlands 1916-1918. 
102 E.Westermarck, Minnen ur mitt liv, p. 346. 
103 
	
	 E. Estlander, Elva årtionden ur Finland historia, vol. IV, pp. 277-83; Söderhjelm, 
Werner Söderhjelm, p. 177; Westermarck, Minnen ur mitt liv, p. 346; Gummerus, 
Aktiivisilta taisteluvuosilta, pp. 266-67. 
104 Landtman, Finlands väg till oavhängighet, p. 59. 
German Empire as the most noble example of Western culture, in 
stark contrast to the Asiatic, despotic, bloated Tsarist Empire. They 
believed in a German victory, because Germany was right, and 
underestimated German defeats, because Finland's cause depended on 
Germany's success. 
The students were supported by a few of the old Activists of 
1904-06, but by very few political leaders, who held their attempt to 
be a dangerous adventure. Among the politicians only the University 
Rector, Edvard Hjelt, joined the Activists. 
By the beginning of 1915, the Activists had organized an Active 
Committee and an advisory Military Committee of a few retired 
officers in Finland, and a Delegation Abroad for the Liberation of 
Finland in Stockholm as well as a Finnish Office in Berlin, led by 
Fritz Wetterhoff, a Finnish emigre. 
Thus the Germans had no difficulties in calling up a resistance and 
liberation movement in Finland.'05 In January 1915 an agreement was 	 311 
made on training two hundred Finns as scouts, guides, agitators for 
revolt and saboteurs behind the Russian lines for Falkenhayn's 
German—Swedish operation through Finland. 
Sweden could not openly aid the Finnish Activists, although most 
Swedes hoped that Finnish autonomy would be restored. The majority 
of the Swedes did not want to get involved in a war against Russia, 
as we saw above, not even in order to help Finland. They hoped that 
the tsarist government would, in time, develop in a more liberal 
direction and make possible a negotiated solution to the Finnish 
105 There has been heated discussion on whether the Germans or the Finns were the 
initiators of the movement, and whether it was in fact initially a movement of 
liberation or only an impetuous start of Activism, which the Germans transformed 
into a serious military attempt. The discussion has been mostly concerned about 
the national pride of Finns and the credit due to the students — historically not a 
very important question. The fact remains that the German schemers found eager 
collaborators in Finland. 
Memoirs by participants: Y. O. Ruuth, Itsenäisyyspolitiikan edellytykset ja 
alkuvaiheet (The Conditions and Early Stages of the Politics of Independence); 
Gummerus, Jääkärit ja aktivistit (Memoirs from the War Years); on German 
policy towards the Finns: Nurmio, Suomen itsenäistyminen ja Saksa (Finnish 
Independence and Germany); Apunen, Suomi keisarillisen Saksan politiikassa 
(Finland in the Politics of the German Empire); Menger, Die Finnlandpolitik der 
deutschen Imperialismus; discussion of the initiative: Klinge, Itsenäisyys -
jääkäriliike - sortokausi (Independence - the JägerMovement — the Years of 
Oppression); P. Zilliacus, Jääkäriliikkeen synty ja päämäärät (The Origins and 
Aims of the Jäger Movement). 
question. An independent Finland was not regarded as a viable idea 
because it was expected to remain dependent on German support and 
thus to fall under a new oppression. A calm and happy future united 
with a free, constitutional Russia was preferable.106 On the other hand, 
the Swedish Activists supported their Finnish brethren in hoping that 
a Finnish rebellion or a German attack to the north would draw 
Sweden into the war, but they failed, as we already saw. 
But, in spite of their neutrality, the Swedish authorities, in fact, 
gave vital aid to the Finns. The Activist Delegation in Stockholm was 
allowed to work without any obstruction, their communications with 
home and Berlin were not disturbed, and men who only spoke Finnish 
were helped on their journey through the country from the border to 
Stockholm and further forward to Germany. 
Not all the offices of the German government were enthusiastic 
about scheming with rebels and revolutionaries. The Ministry of War 
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	 was reluctant to give money for their training, and soon Falkenhayn's 
interest, too, turned to the West. But a few influential people at court, 
in the Auswärtiges Amt, and in the military headquarters favoured the 
idea, and it was decided to continue the training course. Even if it 
promised no immediate profit for Germany, it would prove the high 
cultural level of the Empire and encourage other small peoples to join 
her cause. In September 1915, William II signed an order to train two 
thousand Finns as regular soldiers. They might be found necessary or 
useful for Germany in her Russian policy, but no binding commitment 
to Finnish autonomy or independence was given. 
The Activist Committees in Finland organized recruitment for the 
Ausbildungstruppe Lockstedt. In all, 1,896 men were inscribed in the 
rolls. The first 200-strong group had consisted mainly of Swedish-
speaking students, but the main body came from all strata of the 
Finnish population. The patriotic idea of liberating Finland was the 
basic motive of the movement, but there were also adventurers, of 
course, or men seeking employment or vainly trying to emigrate to 
America, or social misfits; of the lower classes, more unmarried men 
and workers than fathers and farmers took part, because it was easier 
for them to leave home. Nor did they all adapt well to Prussian 
discipline, and social dissatisfaction at home was reflected also in the 
gulf in Germany between the upper-class and more proletarian 
106 	 Gummerus, Jääkärit ja aktivistit, p. 160. 
members. Many men fell sick, a couple of hundred troublemakers 
were arrested and transferred to labour detachments or prison camps, 
four men deserted to the Russian side, and in the end, when the 
battalion was sent to Finland in 1918, many men were left in Germany 
because the war of liberation was turning out to be a civil war, too, 
and the Red trainees could not be trusted. 
But for the majority, about 1,200 men, morale triumphed over all 
difficulties, and the patriotic goal remained.107 
In 1916, the unit was transformed into the Royal Prussian Jäger 
Battalion No. 27, after which the Finnish liberation or Activist 
movement is often called the Jäger movement. The battalion was sent 
to the northern part of the Eastern front to gain battle experience, and, 
probably, to earn their upkeep. Happily, the sector was mostly quiet 
and their casualties were few. 
In Finland, enough antipathy towards Russia existed for a network 
of spies to be organized there, but the spies noticed that the population, 	 313 
in general, remained peaceful and passive, and, contrary to what the 
Activists in Stockholm and Berlin said, no popular rising could be 
expected unless Swedish or German forces invaded the Grand Duchy 
and encouraged its inhabitants to rise.108 
In fact, the disarmed Finns would not have had any chance of 
surviving a rebellion against the Russian army. By its mere presence, 
the 42nd Army Corps maintained Imperial sovereignty in this border 
country. 
In addition to recruitment for the Jäger movement, agents were 
smuggled into Finland to annoy the Russians and to sabotage the 
transport of war materials from Britain through Norway and Sweden 
to Finland and to the Russian front. And even if no operation in 
Finland was planned, it was well to keep rumours alive, because the 
107 The basic work on Jägers is: Lauerma, Kuninkaallinen Preussin Jääkäripataljoona 
27 (The 27th Royal Prussian Jäger Battalion); Rasila, Jääkäreiden sosiaalinen 
tausta ja motiivit (The Social Background and Motives of the Jägers). 
After the independence of Finland was secured, for a major part due to the Jägers, 
their history was hallowed, and even nowadays critical study of the defectors and 
Red Jägers has provoked controversy: Lackman, Jääkärimuistelmia (Jäger 
Memoirs) and: Lackman, Jääkärit marssivat (The Jägers March). 
108 Nachrichten über Finnland, vom 2. August 1914 bis 31. August 1915, BA-MA 
RM 5/v 4999, Innere Lage Russlands und Zustände seines Heeres Ende 1914; 
Nachrichten über die russische Armee, einschl. allgem. Kriegsvorbereitungen, vom 
August 1917 bis 7. März 1917, BA-MA RM 4979. These dossiers contain plenty 
of information on Russia and Finland during the first war years. 
consequent fear kept Russian forces tied down in the country and 
away from the front.109 
Fantasies of a naval attaché 
The existence of the Finnish rebel forces inspired the German naval 
attaché in Stockholm, Fischer-Lossainen, to scheme for an operation 
in the north in August 1915. The attaché wrote to the Admiralty 
Staff"' proposing a landing of the Locksted troops in Åland, which 
would sound like a trumpet call to men throughout Finland to join 
the liberation army. Russian forces in Finland and Petrograd would 
feel threatened, many troops would be tied down in the north, and 
perhaps even the Russian fleet would be provoked to leave its bases 
for the fatal battle with the German fleet. Then, with the Finnish army 
of liberation trained, the Germans and the Finns could land at Oulu, 
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	 Vaasa, or Rauma and bring arms to additional detachments via 
Jyväskylä to Iisalmi, Kuopio, and Nurmes, from where two hundred 
thousand Finns would march towards the south, while the German 
fleet would attack Helsinki and Sveaborg. 
The Russian troops in Finland were reported by the Activists to be 
badly equipped and insufficiently trained. The eager amateur spies 
were not very competent in their counting; in their reports, the number 
of Russians in Finland varied from twenty thousand to one million. 
The Finnish Activists dreamed of an independent monarchy 
reaching to Lake Onega and the White Sea, guarding the German 
northern flank against Russia. The liberation of Finland would be the 
first strike against the Eastern colossus, perhaps the signal for a 
general revolution there.`' I 
Fischer-Lossainen also calculated that even if Sweden were to 
remain watching the Finnish volunteers bleeding white on Åland, 
which was improbable, at least Germany could remain comforted with 
109 Einladung zu einer Besprechung der finnischen Angelegenheiten 29. III 1915; 
Colonel Zimmermann to Adm. Stab 28. V 1915, BA—MA RM 5/v 4999. 
110 Admiralstab, the naval counterpart of the army General Staff. 
111 Über eine militärische Aktion in Finnland, von Herr Wetterhoff übergeben 24. 
VIII 1915, BA-MA RM 5/v 5204; P.M.Aussichten einer Erhebung, Sept. 1915; 
Finnland, eine Denkschrift, streng vertraulich, die Finnländische Kanzlei in Berlin 
s.d. [summer 1915]. BA—MA RM 5/v 4999; Finnland im Lichte des Weltkrieges, 
von Friedrich Wetterhoff, Berlin 1916, BA—MA RM 5/v 5000, Nachrichten über 
Finnland vom 1 September 1915 bis 3 Juli 1917. 
the knowledge that everything had been attempted for a German 
solution of the Scandinavian and Finnish questions."2 
The Imperial Chancellor, Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg, 
supported the proposal to acquire Swedish support and liberate 
Finland. Russia had to be further weakened because it still seemed 
reluctant to sign a separate peace. If the Russians could be pushed 
back from the north, as was happening in Poland, getting free from 
the Muscovite nightmare was worth the effort, in the Chancellor's 
opinion. 113  
The Admiralty Staff took Fischer-Lossainen seriously enough to 
answer him with an reasoned refusal. They calculated that for the 
proposed attempt at least one division of infantry would be necessary, 
compared to which the Finnish force would remain quite tiny. 
Battleships would be needed from the North Sea to secure the 
dominion of the Baltic Sea and confine the Russian fleet to the Gulf 
of Finland. Swedish help would be necessary to protect the daily 	 315 
supply transports, or at least permission had to be acquired to use 
Swedish bases along the route from Germany. And there was always 
the danger to the ore transports if Sweden should be attracted to join 
Germany. 
Nor was it certain that the occupation of Åland would produce the 
hoped-for political result. Sweden's policy was so unpredictable that 
permission had to be asked before planning anything, and the attempt 
was to be undertaken only if Sweden promised to join Germany — 
contrary to Fischer-Lossainen's idea to make the attempt in order to 
provoke Sweden to join it. The prestige of Germany demanded that 
if an operation were undertaken, it should not miscarry and the Finns 
could not be left bleeding on Åland. 
At this stage, the Admiralty Staff allowed only the gathering of 
information on Åland in preparation for any operation.114 
112 Marine-Attaché fir die nordischen Reiche 7. VIII 1915, 14. VIII 1915; P. M. 13. 
VIII 1915. BA—MA RM 5/v 5204, Alandsinseln vom August 1915 bis Februar 
1916. — Fischer-Lossainen was readily roused to enthusiasm and apparently 
influenced by the scheming and imaginative Finnish agent in Berlin, Fritz 
Wetterhoff, who promised that an army of 200,000 Finns could easily be called 
forth. Über eine militärische Aktion in Finnland, von Herrn Wetterhoff übergeben 
24. VIII 1915, BA—MA RM 5/v 5204, Alandsinseln vom August 1915 bis Februar 
1916. 
113 Reichskanzler 11. VIII 1915, BA—MA Rlvl 5/v 5204 Alandsinseln vom August 
1915 bis Februar 1916. 
114 Vorläufige Bemerkungen, Berlin 15. VIII 1915; Vermerk 25. VIII 1915, BA—MA 
The Activists did gather information. They reported that the 
fortifications on Åland were miserable, occupied by only a penal 
battalion, led by epileptic, drunken or idiotic commanders, with boats 
ready for an escape. On the other hand, domination of the Islands 
would open access to the Gulf of Bothnia, control the traffic between 
Finland and Sweden, guard the mouth of the Gulf of Finland, enable 
naval and military operations to take place against the Baltic provinces 
and Petrograd, and help to control the Russian transport route through 
northern Sweden from Narvik. 
Again, the Admiralty Staff answered that while Åland might be 
easy to conquer, all German naval forces would thereafter be tied to 
the permanent defence of the islands. The possession of the islands 
might induce Sweden to join Germany, but Sweden was not important 
enough to warrant the operation; her army consisted of 480,000 men, 
of whom only ten divisions were field troops, and her warships were 
316 	 weak and obsolete. 
If Sweden joined the war, it might demonstrate to other neutral 
countries that Sweden trusted in the final victory of Germany, but it 
would need material support, its commerce with the West would cease, 
and the ore transports to Germany would be endangered. 
The Admiralty Staff also doubted whether Sweden could be made 
to join Germany. Sweden might feel tempted by the possession of 
Åland and the restoration of an autonomous Finland as a shield against 
Russia, and the destruction by Germany of England's arrogant naval 
domination would also benefit Sweden. On the other hand, war would 
be costly, and might cause political difficulties at home and with 
Denmark and Norway. A victorious strong Germany might also be an 
unpleasant development for Sweden.15  
As a further argument for turning the plan down, the Admiralty 
Staff calculated that sending a division to Åland would need fifteen 
transports and, for securing the operation, eight battleships, four 
battlecruisers, thirteen light cruisers, ten torpedo boat flotillas, nine 
submarines, two aircraft tenders, four airships, and more than thirty 
transports for naval supply, plus escorts, minesweepers and auxiliaries. 
A permanent detachment would be necessary on Åland of two 
RM 5/v 5204 Alandsinseln vom August 1915 bis Februar 1916. 
115 Über die Besetzung der Aland-Inseln, von Major v. Beyer 18. XII 1915; 
Denkschrift über Besprechung 18. XII 1915; Anschreiben zur Denkschrift 21. I 
1916. BA—MA RM 5/v 5204. 
battleships, three armoured ships, two cruisers, one torpedo boat 
flotilla, and nine submarines, in order to prevent the Russian fleet 
from surprising the defenders from the coastal passages. Thus no force 
would be left for the North Sea, and the whole strategy of naval war 
would be changed,116 which was of course unthinkable. 
While the naval staff spent much ink and paper fending off the 
objectionable proposals, Falkenhayn only stated that troops were 
needed on important fronts and could not be spent on uncertain 
attempts. "I desist from discussing any details".117 
Nevertheless, Prince Henry's staff would have liked to take up the 
planning of the Åland operation. They felt that the OHL"t might 
consent if the importance of the Gulf of Finland were explained. But 
the Prince was not given permission for any further planning, and the 
pilots whom his staff had enlisted at Libau had to be dismissed.19 
At the end of 1916, the naval attaché again asked whether he would 
be allowed to discuss the Åland operation with the Swedes. Permission 	 317 
was not given, with the added reason that now the islands were much 
more strongly fortified, while eliminating the Russian fleet would need 
such a large naval force that the principal effort against Britain would 
suffer.120 
At the beginning of 1917, Finnish Activists once more tried to 
explain that the conquest of Åland was not only sensible but dictated 
by logic, because the Gulfs of Finland and Bothnia and in fact the 
entire Baltic Sea could dominated from the islands; Åland was the 
heart of Russian naval power. The naval staff only commented that 
the importance of Åland was exaggerated in these repeated proposals 
and the difficulty of the conquest belittled. In the summer of 1917 
the naval staff repeated their standpoint.121 
The proposals of the German naval attaché were not viable, but 
they indicate the kind of operations that were being thought about, 
116 Erwägungen über ein Unternehmen gegen die Alandsinseln, Jan 1916; 
Erwägungen über ein Unternehmen gegen die Alands Inseln 21. I 1916 (two 
different, complementing papers). BA—MA RM 5/v 5204. 
117 Falkenhayn to Adm.Stab 3. II 1916. BA—MA RM 5/v 5204. 
118 OHL =Oberste Heeresleitung, the army headquarters. 
119 O.d.Ostseestreitkräfte 6. II 1916; Chef d.A.d.M an O.d.O. 2. IV 1916. BA—MA 
Rlvi 5/v 5206, Alandsinseln vom 18. Februar 1916 bis 5 April 1918. 
120 Ludendorff an Adm.Stab 29. X 1916; Adm.Stab an Ludendorff 5. XI 1916. 
BA—MA RM 5/v 5205. 
121 Pro memoria von J. Castrén 30. I 1917, Erwägungen über ein Vorgehen gegen 
die Ålandsinseln, Adm. St. 2. VII 1917. BA—MA RM 57v 5205. 
though not developed into real military or naval plans. The Russian 
generals and admirals in Finland and Petrograd had reason enough to 
be worried about an enemy landing on Åland or on the coast of the 
Gulf of Bothnia and felt they had to prepare defences against an enemy 
advance through the interior lake district. Measures against a Finnish 
rebellion had also to be taken. 
Measures against the Jäger movement 
It seems that for a long time the Russian authorities in Finland had 
no inkling of the recruitment of nearly two thousand Finns into the 
enemy army. In spite of the gendarmes and border guards, the Jäger 
recruits could at first leave the country legally, crossing the border 
from Tornio to Haaparanta, with the explanation that they were going 
to study in Sweden, to emigrate to America, or to be employed on 
318 	 Allied or Norwegian ships. 
The military authorities received intimation of preparations for a 
rebellion and of the smuggling of young men out of the country in 
1915,122 but Colonel Eremin, the chief of gendarmes in Finland, 
belittled the danger. He believed that the Finns would certainly not 
rise until a successful revolution in the interior of the Empire had 
made their rebellion safe. Nor had the Governor-General any 
knowledge of a rebellious organization, and young men did not seem 
to be emigrating in abnormally large numbers. As late as January 
1916, it was believed that the Germans might be recruiting a few 
Finns to act as guides in the event of a landing, but no information 
of preparations for an armed rebellion existed.13  
But then more information came from spies via Paris, London and 
Rotterdam, and a couple of Activist recruiters were arrested, who 
proved surprisingly voluble during their interrogation. However, it was 
not until the summer of 1916, when the Jäger battalion was transferred 
to the front and four deserters went over to the Russian side, that the 
authorities were reliably informed of the size of the movement, of the 
organization of the battalion, and even of the names of many of the 
122 The Vlth Army staff to Seyn 28. IX 1915, the 42th Army Corps to Seyn 30. IX 
1915. KKK 1915, I department, delo 2-85, National Archives of Finland. 
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Jägers.124 
Outraged, the staff of the Northern Front demanded tighter control 
of emigration from Finland and also demanded a proclamation that 
illegal emigrants would be sentenced to death if caught and, if not 
caught, their closest relatives would be punished.'25 
Governor-General Seyn did tighten the passport control. For 
example, he demanded that a photograph be attached to the passport 
and that a paid ticket to America be shown by a prospective emigrant. 
But Seyn did not prohibit all emigration, explaining that it would 
cause unrest in the country. Nor did he proclaim the threat of death, 
which would have been an admission of the existence of the rebel 
movement, a proof of the incompetence of the regime, and a 
confession of a centennial failure to make good subjects out of Finns 
admitted to the Empire in 1809.126 
The relaxed attitude of Seyn to the rebellious Jäger movement 
seems surprising, especially when compared to how nervously he had 	 319 
reacted to the non-existent Voima movement before the war. A partial 
explanation lies in the fact that Eremin was more competent and less 
credulous than Utgof had been. Again, during the state of war and 
under the military censorship, there were no popular meetings or noisy 
press articles, as there had been in 1911-12, to alarm the authorities. 
Now it was seen more clearly than before the war that the Activist 
movement was supported only by a tiny fraction of the population. 
Nor did Seyn need for his own purposes the alarmist information, 
which he had probably not completely believed even before the war. 
The separatist higher administration of Finland, accused of allowing 
the activity of the Voima, had been replaced by Russians or loyal 
124 Kratkii ocherk prestupnago obshchestva, obrazovaysagosia v 1915 godu v 
Finliandii, s tseliu otdeleniia poslednei of Rossii, pri pomoschi Germanii. KKK 
1915, I dept, delo 2-85, National Archives of Finland. 
What the Russians knew of the Jäger movement was first studied by J. Manninen, 
"Venäläisten ulkomailta saamat tiedot jääkäriliikkeestä" (Information from abroad 
about the Jäger Movement received by the Russians); and a thorough study was 
made by Turpeinen, Keisarillisen Venäjän viranomaisten suhtautuminen 
jääkäriliikkeeseen. 
125 The VIth Army staff to Seyn 3. XI 1915; 27. 1 1916; 15. II 1916; 3. V 1916, 
KKK 1915, I department, delo voiny 13-14; the VIth Army to Seyn 6. VIII 1916, 
12. VIII 1916, KKK Hd 48, National Archives of Finland. 
126 Seyn to Goremykin 10. XII 1915; Seyn to the Council of Ministers 18. I 1916; 
Seyn to the Northern Front staff 4. IV; Seyn to the Northern Front staff 11. V 
1916. KKK 1915, I department, delo voiny 13-14, National Archives of Finland. 
Finns, and it was in Seyn's interest to show his competence as keeper 
of law and order in the militarily important border country. A complete 
prohibition on crossing the Swedish border would have made 
emigration to Germany more difficult, but the consequent dissatis-
faction of the population would have been a much more serious 
problem than the loss of a few potential traitors over the frontier. 
It seems that wartime taught Seyn the skill of governing, which 
was necessary because the Empire, which had appeared so mighty in 
peacetime, now could ill afford any more enemies. For the military, 
this was more difficult to understand, because they saw the immediate 
problem but were not trained in the administration of difficult 
populations.`27 From the point of view of the survival of the Empire, 
it is a pity that this wisdom had not been learned earlier. By this time, 
tsarism had made too many enemies among the peoples of the Empire, 
and only a few months remained before it was to fall, to the joy of 
320 	 the oppressed peoples. 
The arrested recruiters and saboteurs, guilty of treason and due to 
be punished by death, were conscientiously interrogated by Russian 
authorities in Petrograd. The investigation took so much time that no 
conclusion was reached before the prisoners were liberated by the 
revolutionary mob in March 1917. 
Another cause of conflict between the civilian and military 
authorities was the import of grain to Finland in 1915 and 1916 from 
the distant gubernii of Russia, which Seyn supported and even 
organized with his usual energy, because the chaotic state of the 
railways made difficult the acquisition and transportition of grain from 
the South.128 Since Finnish peasants had taken to raising dairy cattle, 
the country had exported butter but had been utterly dependent on 
imported grain. 
The military authorities, especially the Commander-in-Chief of the 
Northern Front General Ruszkii and then General v. Plehwe, were 
suspicious of the grain imports. Why did the Finns hoard grain if not 
for feeding the enemy expected to land shortly? Seyn explained to 
127 Graf, "Military Rule Behind the Russian Front 1914-1917; the Political 
Ramifications", pp. 390-92. In the large zone of military administration behind 
the front the generals governed so heedlessly that Graf thinks it was one of the 
principal reasons of the Russian revolution. 
128 Seyn to Moscow, Dvinsk, Kiev, Odessa, Vladikavkaz, Ekaterinodar, 
Novocherkassk, Stavropol, Orenburg, and Kazan gubernii 1. IV 1915. KKK 1915 
II department, delo 58-1, National Archives of Finland. 
the generals that grain was only imported to feed the population. 
Stopping the grain trains would be dangerous because hunger and 
high prices would cause popular discontent and disorder.129 The 
Northern Front staff complained to the Stavka that the local 
Governor-General did not support their efforts.'30 Seyn answered with 
detailed statistics of grain import and consumption to prove that no 
stores were being hoarded.131 
Aide-de-Camp General F.F. Trepov was sent to inspect military 
hospitals in Finland, with the secret task of clearing up the problem 
of the grain imports. He found that no hoarding of grain had taken 
place, the amount of grain imported had really been necessary for 
feeding the population and keeping them peaceful. Nor did Finnish 
political circles plan separation from Russia; they only wanted their 
autonomy restored and guaranteed.132  
The Stavka believed the Governor-General133 and so did the Council 
of Ministers. At first, they did not even believe in the existence of 	 321 
the Jäger movement, and after the information was confirmed, they 
comforted themselves with the fact that the Germans had sent the 
rebel battalion to the Eastern Front and not to Finland to start a 
rebellion there.134 Even the Northern Front adopted a bit more of a 
relaxed attitude to the northern border country when General Plehwe 
was replaced by General Kuropatkin (who after his Governor-
Generalship in Turkestan had now once more the chance to prove his 
incompetence as Commander-in-Chief). 
A further example of the wartime administration of the border 
country was seen when Finnish crofters (small tenant-farmers) were 
threatened with mass eviction by their peasant landlords in 1916. The 
crofters' labour was made redundant by the continuing modernization 
of Finnish agriculture, and they had been threatened with eviction in 
1909, when an unconstitutional Imperial decree had put off their 
129 	 Seyn to the staff of the Northern Front 30. I 1916, KKK Hd 104, no. 11, National 
Archives of Finland. 
130 The staff of the Northern Front to the Chief of Staff at Stavka 4. II 1916, KKK 
Hd 104, no. 11, National Archives of Finland. 
131 	 "Spravka" 24. II 1916, KKK Hd 104, no. 11, National Archives of Finland. 
132 Novikova, "Sekretnaia missiia general-adiutanta F.F. Trepova v Finliandiiu, fevral' 
1916 goda, po materialam rossiiskikh arkhivov", Rossiia i Finliandiia v XIX —
XX vekov, pp. 41-49. 
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Council of Ministers to Seyn 11. I 1916, KKK Hd 104, no. 11, National Archives 
of Finland. 
134 Lemke, 250 dni v tsarskoi stavke, pp. 542, 667. 
eviction until 1916 in order to acquire time for solving the problem; 
but no solution had emerged. Now Seyn acquired a new Imperial 
decree to prevent the eviction.135 Even then, Seyn cannot be regarded 
as a special friend of the crofters; his aim was to avoid mass 
dissatisfaction and disorder, but whatever his motives, he did protect 
them. 
At the beginning of 1916, rumours were heard that, contrary to 
earlier decisions, the Russian army was to conscript Finns, because 
the immense losses at the front were rapidly exhausting the resources 
of the Russian people; the nomad peoples in Central Asia, until then 
exempt from military service, became liable to conscription in 1916. 
The rumours caused some agitation in the border country and were 
denied.136 But in fact, in October, General Shuvaev, the Minister of 
War, did propose the conscription of all Finnish men between 18 and 
43 years of age for the field army or for labour detachments.137 
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	 The proposal was supported by the Novoe Vremia. The editor 
wondered whether it was really possible that the Finns did not 
understand that they had to bear their part of the common burden of 
Imperial defence. After the war and victory, patriotic Russians would 
be asking about Finland's contribution, and the answer would be that 
Finland, which Russia had raised into existence from Swedish slavery, 
had remained an outsider in the mortal battle, and that a few Finns 
had even sided with the enemy. What could then be left of Finland! 138 
But Seyn found several reasons for opposing even this proposal. 
He explained that conscription would probably strengthen the Finns 
in their hostility and separatism. And too many Germanophiles or 
even German spies and saboteurs would infiltrate the Russian army 
from among Finnish recruits. German and Swedish agents would also 
increase their anti-Russian propaganda in the border country, and 
agitation and disorder would follow. That would necessitate sending 
more Russian troops to the Grand Duchy. The confusion might 
provoke the enemy to direct its attack on Finland, and substantial 
135 Rasila, Torpparikysymyksen ratkaisuvaihe, Suomen torpparikysymys vuosina 
1908-1919 (The Final Phase of the Crofter Problem), pp. 208-12. 
136 The staff of the Northern Front to Seyn 24. I 1916, Seyn to the Stavka 4. III 
1916. KKK 1915, I department, delo 2-85, National Archives of Finland. 
137 The Minister of the Interior to Seyn 31. X 1916, KKK 1917, I department, delo 
2-32, National Archives of Finland. 
138 Novoe Vremia 3. IX 1916, newspaper clipping in: KKK Hd 48, n:o 4, National 
Archives of Finland. 
detachments from other fronts would have to be transferred to repel 
the landing. Thus conscripting Finns would weaken, not strengthen, 
Russia's military forces. 
If labour service were ordered instead of military recruitment, Seyn 
continued, it would be equally detrimental to Russia. The proposed 
recruitment of 200,000 or 300,000 men into labour battalions out of 
a male population of 735,000 between 17 and 55 years of age would 
be a fatal loss to the economy of the Grand Duchy, which, in 1915, 
had produced war materials to the value of 130 million roubles; in 
1916 the sum would probably amount to over 200 million roubles, 
and in 1917 to even more. Horses, cattle, as well as agricultural 
products and firewood were exported for the army, the navy, and the 
Imperial capital. Finns with their carts and horses also transported war 
materials from the Arctic harbours. Thus the loss of one half of their 
labour force would cause a corresponding irreparable loss to the 
Empire's supplies, while disorder and centrifugal tendencies in the 	 323 
border country would only be increased.139 
Vital military and economic imperial interests once again made 
Seyn defend the privileges of the Finns, which he did not accept at 
all in principle. The proposal of the War Ministry was dropped and 
Finns were spared being massacred on the Eastern front. 
Thus, in the end, the war years of 1915 and 1916 were peaceful 
and prosperous for Finland, even if public life was closely controlled. 
The hope of the Activists for independence or guaranteed autonomy 
seemed to be getting more distant. Entrepreneurs and speculators 
found Russian domination rather profitable and deplored the radical 
policy of the Activists, and workers found employment in war 
production and army work. The hidden conflicts between capital and 
labour, between town and country, between producers and consumers 
did grow,10 but could not come to light under the wartime controls. 
Russian measures for strengthening the defence of the coasts sufficed 
to make the German staffs drop all proposals for invading Åland, not 
to speak of the rest of Finland. 
The country seemed to be tightly in Russian hands. 
139 Seyn to the Minister of the Interior 16/29. XI 1916. KKK 1917, I department, 
delo 2-3, National Archives of Finland. 
140 Teräs, Sota ja teollinen modernisaatio; with a "Summary: War and Industrial 
Modernization; Rationalization of Labour Process and Industrial Relations During 
the First World War." 
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THE EMPIRE POWERLESS 
The fall of the Emperor and Grand Duke 
The Great War exhausted Russia, revealed the incompetence of the 
Tsarist regime, and strained the obsolete structure of Russian society 
beyond breaking-point. In March 1917 the people in Petrograd rose 
in revolution. The government lost its grip, the Emperor ordered 
counter-measures, but the troops did not obey. Many generals were 
delighted at the chance of getting a more competent regime, and 
Nicholas II had to abdicate on 15 March. The Duma liberals formed 
a Provisional Government to carry on the war but all principal reforms 
were to be left until a Constituent Assembly could be convened. 
Socialists formed a Soviet of soldiers', sailors' and workers' deputies 
to keep an eye on the bourgeois government. 
When news of the disorders in Petrograd was heard in Finland at 
the beginning of March, Generals Pashenko and Gulevich as well as 
Vice Admiral A.I. Nepenin, commanders of Sveaborg, the 42nd Army 
Corps, and the Baltic fleet, tried to isolate the garrison and the crews 
to prevent the news from provoking disorder and loss of fighting 
ability. They remembered also their earlier experiences in 1905 and 
their consequent fears of the Voima. Now the town of Helsinki was 
to be divided into four areas for rapid restoring of order, with the 
509th Regiment responsible for the south-west part, the 510th for the 
north-west, the 511th for the north-east, the 428th for the south-east, 
and troops of the 92nd Militia Brigade for the railway station, while 
the 512th was to be held in reserve with four guns and one sotnia of 
border guards.:4' Seyn, ignorant of the Emperor's fall, reported on 
2/15 March that everything remained under control, ordered the 
re-arrest of Finnish Jäger Activists whom the mob in Petrograd had 
let loose from the jails, and considered joining the operation against 
the revolt as ordered by the Emperor. To counter this danger, F.I. 
Rodichev was appointed Duma Commissar for Finland, and through 
the military telegraph he contacted Nepenin who had decided to 
support the Provisional Government. Nepenin invited Seyn and 
Borovitinov to his flagship and arrested them in the morning of 16 
141 RGAVMF, fond 353, opis' 2, delo 5, p. 186, Prikaz po Sveaborgskoi kreposti 27. 
II/12.III 1917. 
March and sent them to the capital under guard. 
However, the news could not be kept secret; sailors and soldiers 
from Petrograd and Reval informed their comrades in Helsinki, and 
the news spread rapidly. The disappearance of the Tsar and his 
representatives meant the cessation of all authority and discipline. 
Russian soldiers and Finnish civilians participated in public meetings 
and demonstrations. "Russian soldiers, among them wild Cossacks and 
Turkmen, their high fur hats carelessly atilt, greatcoats hanging open, 
waving red flags, rode in their cars crying svoboda".142 Frightened 
bourgeois people wore red rosettes. Teachers ordered their pupils: 
"Throw away your Russian textbooks, it is revolution now!". 
Dissatisfaction had silently mounted during the long war years and 
the attempted censoring of the news brought it to a sudden explosion; 
the sailors of the Baltic fleet killed dozens of their officers,143  Nepenin 
among them. Next day, 4/17 March, Rodichev arrived and with great 
effort calmed down the sailors, who elected Vice-Admiral A.S. 	 325 
Maksimov as their new commander.l44 
Even before the Great War, in 1906 and 1912, sailors had been apt 
to revolt, and in 1915 Bolshevik cells had been discovered among the 
crews of the big ships. The battle squadrons had been, for a while, 
anchored at Lappohja to keep them distant from the workers in 
Helsinki — or, perhaps, in readiness for the landing operation which 
Kanin planned — but a summertime transfer was no definite preventive 
against revolution. 
During the Great War, the Russian army had changed. Nearly one 
million soldiers had been killed, two million had been taken prisoners 
of war, four million had been wounded, and five million had fallen 
sick, many of them healed, of course, but a few hundred thousand 
142 Glory Leppänen, Elämäni teatteri, p. 44. 
143 "The peculiar defensive position of the Baltic fleet [...] obviously exacerbated 
psychological and physical strain [...]", due to harsh discipline, lack of action, 
and "sense of impending defeat", Saul, Sailors in Revolt, the Russian Baltic Fleet, 
pp. 215-16. 
144 There is no end of literature on the years 1917-1918 in Finnish history. The 
following three can be regarded as classics: Paasivirta, Suomen Itsenäisyyskysymys 
(Finnish Independence); vol. I-1I, Polvinen, Venäjän vallankumous ja Suomi 
1917-1920 (The Russian Revolution and Finland), vol. I-II; Upton, Vallankumous 
Suomessa 1917-1918 (The Finnish Revolution 1917-1918). Latest research and 
detailed bibliography: Suomen itsenäistymisen vuodet 1917-1920, (The Years of 
Finnish Independence 1917-1920), vols. I—Ill. 
died of their wounds or sickness.145 The losses had been replaced by 
calling to arms ever new hordes of young recruits and elderly 
reservists, reluctant soldiers, who were trained in the militia or 
replacement druzhiny. Losses of career officers were made good by 
training reserve officers from students, clerks, shop assistants, or 
anybody with a little education, who were far from the pre-war officer 
corps in their political and professional opinions. They were unable, 
perhaps also unwilling, to maintain the authority which the regular 
officers had had, but they were also unable by democratic leadership 
to bridge the chasm between peasant conscripts and senior officers 
from the gentry. 
Lack of arms, absence of artillery support, faltering supply, inept 
care of the wounded, news from home of suffering, badly planned 
operations, the apparent purposelessness of the fighting, and mounting 
losses increased the war-weariness of the army. During 1917 about 
326 	 two million men left the army without leave.'46 
Dissatisfaction seethed especially in the druzhiny training in the 
rear and in the supply echelons, which were insufficiently and 
incapably officered, and feared being sent to the front. The 'guards' 
regiments in the Petrograd garrison, who refused to shoot the 
demonstrators in March 1917, were very different from the Imperial 
guards who had pacified the Moscow uprising in 1905. 
This development was reflected in the reports of the 42th Army 
Corps "on revolutionary activity". The development of the army and 
navy in general could not but affect the garrisons in Finland, too, 
which were in constant contact with the bases at home because of the 
frequent transfers of replacement soldiers. Sailors were not so 
frequently changed because the navy did not suffer any comparable 
losses, but their safe, monotonous, and boring existence was apt to 
increase dissatisfaction with the harsh discipline. Neither the army nor 
the navy could do much to counter the reported dissatisfaction, 
because the reasons for it were hidden in the very structure of the 
Empire. Agitators and enemy agents were considered the only 
conceivable reason, and they were zealously detected, but this was 
not sufficient to counter the threat. In March 1917, sailors and soldiers 
145 
	 The problems of the casualty statistics have often been discussed but without any 
very definite results, e.g. Golovine, The Russian Army in the World War, pp. 
75-105. 
146 Golovine, The Russian Army in the World War, p. 260. 
"Long live the free Finnish people! Let all nations unite in the free realm of sacred work! Long 
live free Russia and Finland!' Liberated from the Tsar and all fear of authority, the soldiers of 
the Russian army easily adopted the mindlessly violent behaviour of the peasant revolts and 
contributed to the radicalization of the Finnish Left. 
Photo: Sotamuseo 613 N 92. 
in Finland immediately and eagerly took part in the all-Imperial 
revolution.147 
A Soviet of soldiers, sailors, and (Russian) workers in Helsinki 
was organized on 4/17 March, and in time further spontaneous organs 
were established. The most important of them were the oblast' or 
regional committee for Finland, elected by the garrison soviets on 24 
147 The soldiers of the working detachments in the interior of the country are 
remembered as lazy and disobedient hooligans, by an old Finnish observer with 
a good memory but no great love for the Imperial army. 
April/7 May, and the central committee of the Baltic fleet sailors, 
called Tsentrobalt, on 28 April/11 May.148 Orders were obeyed only 
when approved by the soviets, if at all. Freedom did not make the 
defence organization stronger as the generals had expected when they 
had supported the coup in March, but degenerated at places into 
military mob rule whereby the word svoboda got its connotation of 
anarchy. 
The political and military consequences of the revolution have, 
naturally enough, been the principal object of historical research. In 
officers' memoirs, and in emigrant or western historiography, the 
revolution seems to have been an outbreak of incomprehensible 
anarchy, mob rule and murder, and the destruction of the fighting 
ability of the armed forces. For Soviet historiography, the main interest 
was in the rivalry between moderate and radical revolutionaries and 
the predestined victory of the Bolsheviks. According to more recent 
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	 studies, the committees and soviets tried to make the service tolerable 
for the soldiers and sailors, but they also felt responsible for the 
maintenance of order and minimum defence ability of the forces, and 
they worried about the import of provisions from the South of Russia 
because of the threat of hunger due to the chaos in Russian railways. 
The Russian sailor and soldiers with their soviets influenced Finnish 
history, too, by their presence and also because they supported Finnish 
workers in local labour conflicts, and "decisively opposed the attempts 
of Finnish authorities to isolate them from the labour movement in 
Helsinki and other towns".149 The sailors and soldiers participated in 
demonstrations and the Bolsheviks among them encouraged Finnish 
Red radicals, though their exact influence in internal Finnish 
development is difficult to measure.'" 
The point of view of an illiterate,'5' bewildered peasant soldier, free 
148 There were a few hundred Russian workers in workshops and shipyards in 
Helsinki and Sveaborg , Dubrovskaia, Gel'singforskii soviet deputatov armii, flota 
i rabochikh v 1917 godu (mart-oktiabr) , p. 42. 
149 
	 Dubrovskaia, Gel 'singforsskii sovet... passim, labour conflicts pp. 80-81. The 
author often calls the Finnish authorities "national bourgeoisie". 
150 Their activity has been differently appreciated by Soviet and Western historians, 
as defence of democracy and progress against counter-revolution and bourgeois 
nationalism, or as agitation for Red revolution and Bolshevik dictatorship against 
traditional legal Finnish social order. 
151 	 According to Dubrovskaia, p. 100, 60% of the dry-land soldiers in Finland were 
illiterate. Mass meetings and oral agitation were important in mobilizing them for 
political activity. 
at last from military discipline, but far from home, prey to the different 
party agitators competing for influence among the men under arms, 
has been neglected in historiography.152 Certainly the soliders felt 
relieved after the inhuman discipline and degrading treatment had 
ceased, but in spite of the propaganda of the various agitators they 
may not have totally identified with the parties. They voted 
increasingly for the Bolsheviks, but obviously not always for political 
reasons; they wanted to end the war and to get home, which only the 
Bolsheviks were irresponsible enough to promise to them. 
The armed forces had been the last and best guarantee of social 
order, external security and Imperial regime. But when the humble, 
long-suffering men, who had conquered the Empire for the Tsars, 
ceased to obey, the army dissolved into a disorganized mob and the 
Imperial throne crashed down. It became evident that the ultimate 
guarantee of the structure of the Empire had not been armed force 
but the spiritual ties of discipline, obedience, loyalty, and religious 	 329 
belief in the legitimacy of the Emperor. 
The definite dissolution of the armed forces did not take place at 
once and, to a certain degree and for a while, the army still remained 
a useful political force for the Provisional Government. Moderate 
socialists, i.e. Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries, were in a 
majority in the committees, and even though they first suspected the 
Provisional Government, they then supported it, especially after five 
Socialists were appointed ministers in May,153 and much happened 
during the summer before the Soviets became Bolshevik organs. 
Finland ungrateful 
On his trip to Helsinki in March, Rodichev also promised that the 
Provisional Government would rectify the wrongs done to Finland by 
the previous regime. The unconstitutional measures were annulled by 
a declaration on 20 March, the Diet was convened (as elected in 1916 
with 103 Social Democrats and 97 deputies from the other parties) 
152 There were a few Russian women workers in Helsinki and Sveaborg, with one 
representative elected to the executive committee of the soviet, but a feminist 
point of view has been totally absent in any history. 
153 On the Russian army in 1917-18: Wildman, The End of the Russian Imperial 
Army, vol. I: The Old Army and the Soldiers' Revolt; vol. II: the Road to Soviet 
Power and Peace. 
and a Finnish Senate appointed, with six bourgeois and six socialist 
Senators. The liberal Mikhail Stakhovich was appointed Governor-
General, Baron Sergei Korff his aide, and a Finn, Carl Enckell, 
became of Minister State Secretary, i.e. Finland's representative in 
Petrograd. 
Dissatisfied minorities started emerging in all regions of the Empire 
after the fall of the old regime. In contrast to other separatist 
populations, there was no need to establish a new nation or borders 
in Finland, nor any hesitation among the liberals in Petrograd about 
restoring its constitution. 
At first, the Provisional Government supposed that the Finns would 
be eager to join the new free Russia in her fight against the 
conservative militarist Central Powers. Rodichev spoke about re-
establishing the Finnish troops, who would be disciplined and could 
replace the disorderly Russian troops in the border country. Kerenskii 
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	 visited Helsinki and said that the liberty acquired by revolution must 
be defended, because German capitalism, the enemy of European 
democracy, threatened freedom both in Russia and in Finland. Because 
tsarism had disappeared, there no longer existed any necessity for the 
Jäger movement, whose members would be pardoned if they desisted 
from their anti-Russian activity. 
Admiral Maksimov also called upon the Finns to organize a 
volunteer corps against the Germans. He declared that now was the 
time to turn against all enemies, against German spies and saboteurs 
as well as against the minions of the old regime, to guarantee freedom 
and brotherhood. 
The Activist Committee organized a meeting on the Swedish side 
of the border at Haaparanta with their Delegation Abroad. Together 
they decided that there was no ground for trusting Russian promises 
to respect Finland's rights, and even less reason to join the Russian 
side in the war. Only German support could guarantee Finland against 
an eventually revived Russian Empire. 
Since the times of Bobrikov, the Russian opposition had believed 
that the Finns disliked tsarism but would eagerly join a free Russia. 
Unfortunately, it was not easy for Finns to distinguish Russia and the 
Russians from their representatives in Helsinki. The idea of forming 
a nation out of the population of Finland had been built up by an 
enormous effort in all fields of political, social and cultural life, and 
Bobrikov's contrary policy of bringing the border country closer to 
other parts of the Empire had been intolerable oppression and violence 
in Finnish eyes, and had provoked a chauvinist and almost racist 
dislike of anything Russian. The 'good' Emperors — Alexander I, II, 
and III — were remembered, but mainly as a contrast to the strict 
Nicholas I and the evil Nicholas II and his satraps. All cultural, 
economic and political benefits from the dependence on Russia were 
to be denied and forgotten for a long time. In 1917, politically active 
Finns only tried to get as free from the great neighbour's domination 
as possible — though there were differences in what was regarded as 
possible — and there was no wish in any party in the country to get 
closer to Russia, however free Russia might now imagine herself to 
be. 
The Finnish political leaders did not answer the requests of 
Rodichev, Kerenskii or Maksimov, who, on their part, no longer tried 
to discuss the military question any more. They probably did not want 
to provoke a direct refusal and defiance of the Provisional 
Government, especially as it was well known that the Finnish Social 
Democrats opposed the system of a standing army and preferred the 
idea of a people's militia. 	 331 
In the meetings of the principal Finnish political parties in April 
and May as well as in the constitutional committee set up by the Diet, 
the general idea was that Finland still belonged to the Empire as 
established in 1809, but that the Provisional Government had only 
inherited the Emperor's authority, not the Grand Duke's, whose 
successor was to be elected by the Diet as ordered by the Swedish 
Constitution of 1772. The aim was to take over all internal Finnish 
matters to be decided in Helsinki, and to have autonomy guaranteed 
internationally, if possible at the future peace conference. 
Voices demanding more, even complete independence, were heard 
in all parties, but for a while the old juridical and de facto ties with 
the Empire, though weakened by the oppression, were kept alive by 
the presence of the strong — at least numerically — Russian army in 
Finland. The opinions of 'the men of independence' were those of a 
minority. Their most single-minded and purposeful leader was 
Svinhufvud, freed from his Siberian exile "by God and Hindenburg" 
as he said. 
Nevertheless, a conflict between the Finns and the Provisional 
Government was brewing. It was difficult for even moderate Finns to 
understand that their demands for internal independence and 
international guarantee, for them modest wishes, offended the 
Russians. The Provisional Government did not want to let the Empire 
fall apart while the war was going on, and moderate Socialists, i.e. 
the Mensheviks and the Socialist Revolutionaries, regarded the 
separatism of national minorities as treason against the proletarian 
brotherhood. 
Only Lenin promised the Finnish Social Democrats a complete 
divorce from Russia, in order to make national antagonism disappear 
and to make possible the unification of all revolutionary proletarians. 
As yet, Lenin was too unimportant to make much difference, but 
contact between Finnish Socialists and this presumed German agent 
made the Provisional Government even more suspicious of Finnish 
strivings. 
The fateful summer offensive of 1917 on the south-western front, 
initially successful but finally disastrous, definitely destroyed the 
discipline of the old army and nearly provoked a new revolt in 
Petrograd.1$4 The Provisional Government was revealed as no better 
than its tsarist predecessor, driving soldiers to die for what were to 
them incomprehensible imperialist reasons. 
Finnish Socialists, encouraged by the information from the capital 
that the Provisional Government had fallen, supposed the moment 
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	 propitious for acquiring more freedom for their class struggle. In a 
majority in the Diet and supported by men of independence in other 
parties, in all 136 votes, they easily carried through their proposal for 
transferring sovereign authority in internal questions to the Finnish 
Diet, leaving only foreign policy and military questions to the Russian 
government. A minority of 55 moderate bourgeois deputies deplored 
the hasty provocation of the mighty neighbouring country, as well as 
the fact that executive and legislative power was being concentrated 
in the Diet which was dominated by the Social Democrat majority. 
Contrary to the hopes and beliefs of Finnish Socialists and Activists, 
by the end of July Kerenskii was able to overcome the crisis. The 
Provisional Government revived, and, briefly, opinion in Russia turned 
to the Right. Bolshevik leaders were arrested or went in hiding. 
Kerenskii, supported by the Western ambassadors, tried to restore 
army discipline and induce workers to continue the production of war 
materials. 
Submarines, whose crews had remained loyal to the government, 
were ordered to sink the battleships in Helsinki if their Bolshevik 
sailors tried to prevent the restoration of order in Petrograd. Rear 
Admiral D.N. Verderevskii, whom the Provisional Government had 
appointed to succeed Maksimov, did not dare to obey such an order. 
Pavel Dybenko, the Bolshevik leader of the Tsentrobalt, went to the 
154 Heenan, Russian Democracy's Fatal Blunder: the Summer Offensive of 1917. 
capital to demand an explanation, but was arrested, and the Tsentrobalt 
was paralysed. For a while, the Baltic fleet obeyed the Provisional 
Government and the moderate Socialists, and the Helsinki Soviet, 
realising where the wind blew, also supported the government. 
Because the decision of the Finnish Diet was a unilateral coup 
d'etat, it almost caused an armed conflict between the Finnish Left 
and the Provisional Government. 
Adventurous activists and cautious Germans 
On the main battle fronts, the Great War continued. In Germany, 
Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg was replaced by the weak Georg 
Michaelis and later Georg Herding, while Ludendorff gathered ever 
more power into his hands. The Russian revolution seemed to liberate 
Germany from the war on two fronts and make possible annexions in 
the east. German war aims were defined in more detail; Poland had 
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been proclaimed independent under German and Austrian protection 
in 1916, and in April 1917 the Germans decided to annex Lithuania 
and Courland. The acquisition of grain from the Ukraine and oil from 
the Caucasus were becoming more definite war aims because with 
these resources Germany might be able to survive the entente 
Einkreisung, or encirclement, and continue to wage a world war. 
Because the Provisional Government was slow to offer peace, Russian 
radical revolutionaries were further supported and Lenin was 
transported from Switzerland to Russia to act as a bacillus of Red 
revolution. 
As yet Finland was not definitely included in the war aims of the 
Reich, but to counter the restoration of Finland's rights by the 
Provisional Government, the Auswärtiges Amt declared on 27 March 
that Finland's independence was not contrary to German interests. 
This declaration was given to Finnish Activists, but kept secret in 
order not to prevent a separate peace with Russia. 
Ludendorff took the Finnish Jäger battalion under the immediate 
command of his headquarters, and transferred it from the Courland 
front to Libau on 25 March. Training was started for prospective 
officers, non-commissioned officers, sappers, and communications 
specialists, and for their eventual employment as leaders of the Finnish 
liberation army. 
For the Finnish Jäger Activists, the revolution in Russia caused 
much headache. They had decided not to join the new Russia, but 
they could not be sure that all Finns would refuse the co-operation 
that had been offered. "If we should accept autonomy from Russia 
now, all the work for the Finnish cause among the Central Powers 
during the war will be rendered in vain."155 If Finland had stayed in 
the Russian Empire, the Jägers would have remained traitors with little 
chance of returning home. Activists at home were instructed to 
demand so much from Russia that conciliation would thereby be made 
impossible.'56 
The Activists at home tried to organize for action. Detachments 
masked as fire brigades were established in many localities and 
training meetings were held. Membership remained lower than hoped 
for, and arms there were none.157 The Activists also hoped for co-
operation with the Social Democrats, who were known to oppose the 
Provisional Government, but their different aims — political 
independence on the part of traditional Finland, or radical social 
reform on the other hand — made united efforts ever more difficult. 
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	 In May, a few members of the Activist Delegation in Stockholm 
proposed to German representatives that Germany should invade 
Finland with a couple of army corps. Finns would eagerly join the 
invaders and the former officers of the Finnish national army could 
easily train two hundred thousand men to take part in the battle. 
Ludendorff had no intention of invading Finland at this stage, but 
he encouraged the Activists to continue planning for a popular rising. 
He was preparing an attack, which then, at the beginning of 
September, was directed at Riga. A Finnish rebellion could have been 
useful to a certain degree in obstructing Russian countermeasures.158 
The Activists interpreted Ludendorff s encouragement as the 
promise of an imminent German expedition to Finland. Colonel 
Nikolai Mexmontan of the old Finnish army undertook to prepare a 
detailed plan for the new Finnish national army and its operation. 
According to the plan, the Jägers were to be landed on the coast of 
155 Suomen vapauttamisen ulkomaanvaltuuskunta (The Delegation Abroad for the 
Liberation of Finland), kotelo 1, pöytäkirja 17. III. 1917, National Archives of 
Finland. 
156 Suomen vapauttamisen ulkomaanvaltuuskunta, kotelo 2, Erich to the AK (Activist 
Committee) in March 1917, National Archives of Finland. 
157 
	
	 Gummerus, Jääkärit ja aktivistit, pp. 414-15, 454. The development of the Finnish 
armed organizations in 1917 has been thoroughly studied by Turo Manninen, 
"Järjestysvalta järkkyy", "Kaartit vastakkain", "Tie sotaan". Itsenäistymisen 
vuodet 1917-1920, vol. I, pp. 246-432. 
158 Erwägungen über ein Vorgehen gegen die Alandsinseln, Adm. St. 2. VII 1917. 
BA-MA RM 5/v 5205. 
the Gulf of Bothnia to convene and train the liberation army, which 
would then advance southwards to chase the Russians out of the 
country. 
The Stockholm Activist Delegation told the German agents that 
rebellion was to be expected very soon, and the agents seem to have 
supposed that Mexmontan's sketches were definite military plans and 
that the promised host of rebels was ready to act. The OHL ordered 
captured Russian rifles to be sent to Finland and the Jäger battalion 
was told that "soon the rumble will start". The commander of the 
battalion, Captain Eduard Ausfeld, planned to send small vanguard 
commandoes in submarines to prepare military actions and to cut 
communications between Finland and Russia. The big arms transport 
and the main group of Jägers were to follow on 10 September. 
The Activists also drafted political plans. The attack would 
probably break up the Muscovite Empire, the fragments of which 
would form independent states, such as Estonia, Novgorod, the 
Ukraine, and Georgia. Finland had no force to liberate herself, but 
she had the right to independence because Finns were a separate 
nation, and it was in the German interest to help them. Finland would 
take part in the Great War on Germany's side and even after the war 
she would be a useful link in the chain of the Central Powers.159 
These plans reflected the pro-German and anti-Russian orientation 
of the Activists, but they had no practical importance, because the 
operations did not take place. At the last moment Mexmontan heard 
that no German landing was coming, and the German staffs learned 
that their agents in Stockholm had informed them incorrectly; as yet, 
the Activist organization existed mainly on paper, the few slightly 
armed 'fire brigades' excepted. 
Had the attempt taken place, the result would probably have been 
catastrophic. Sending transports to the Finnish coasts would have been 
extremely dangerous. It is true that much of the Russian Baltic fleet 
was paralysed by revolution, but even a few gunboats could have 
destroyed unarmed transport ships, and an amateur revolt, though led 
by Jägers, could easily have been put down by the Russian troops in 
Finland. In spite of the revolution, the Russians would probably have 
defended themselves against aggression. Germany might have 
159 Memoranda by Mexmontan 9. VIII 1917, 28. VIII 1917; a memorandum by 
Edvard Hjelt 20.-25. IX 1917. The Mexmontan Collection, box 2, National 
Archives of Finland. 
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benefited from the incident, but the Finnish liberation movement 
would have suffered in a comparable manner to the Irish one in 
1916.160 
The German Baltic fleet had not known of the planned operation 
and they had no intention of attacking Finland. The winter of 1916-17 
had been long and hard and ice had covered the Baltic Sea, even in 
the south on the German coast. When the waters opened, the coastal 
flotilla guarded the Danish Straits as they had done during the previous 
summers. At the beginning of April, Admiral Hopmann steamed from 
Kiel to Libau with the Kolberg, Augsburg, Strassburg, and a flotilla 
of twenty-two torpedo boats and twelve submarines. 
Prince Henry thought that these minimal forces would barely suffice 
for protecting German transports and blockading the enemy in its 
bases. No daring raids were to be made, only the minefields laid out 
in the previous years were to be completed. Fast escorts and 
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	 minesweepers were all employed in the North Sea, and only converted 
fishing craft were left to carry on in the Baltic. The Russians did not 
lay down any new minefields in German passages, but the old ones 
had to be swept. Convoys were established for the ore transports from 
Sweden and on the Swinemünde—Libau route. More than four 
thousand passages were made and five million tons of iron ore were 
imported without loss. 
The consequences of the revolution in the Russian Baltic fleet were 
closely observed. It was noticed that the sailor Soviets controlled 
Admiral Maksimov, "a dishonest climber, ready to join any political 
movement". The Russian fleet was in a state of demobilization, honest 
officers tried to save what they could, but it was not certain whether 
they would succeed. The flotilla on the Gulf of Riga was not as 
dissolute as the main battle fleet at Helsinki.161 Fighting continued in 
the Irben Strait, where the German and Russian coastal batteries faced 
each other, and where the Slava and Grazhdanin (previously 
Tsesarevich) with the cruiser Baian accompanied by a few destroyers 
160 	 Lauerma, Kuninkaallinen Preussin Jääkiiripata joona 27, p. 767. 
161 	 There is plenty of intelligence material in the German military archives from this 
time: BA—MA RM 5/v 4996, Politik Russlands, die russische Revolution, vom 
14. März 1917 bis 30. Juni 1917; BA—MA RM 5/v Politik Russland, die russiche 
Revolution, vom 15. September 1917 bis 19. November 1918; BA—MA RM 5/v 
4065, Einfluss der revolutionären Bewegung in Russland auf den Kampfgeist der 
russischen Flotte, II 1917-31. XII 1917; BA—MA RM 5/v 4975, Tätigkeit der 
engl. Seestreitkräfte i. d. Ostsee, vom 17. April 1917 bis 19. Juli 1917. 
and gunboats were active. 
Thus the revolution had not paralysed the entire Russian Baltic 
fleet. The spies believed that "the nationalists led by Kerenski" were 
trying to maintain Russian domination on the Gulfs of Bothnia and 
Finland.' 62 
Finland out of the reach of the Western Powers 
The French consul in Helsinki, Reynaud, was worried by the 
development of Finnish opinion. Activists, 'these few radical fanatics', 
were defying the Russian governmental policy, which was ridiculous 
but also dangerous. The German-inspired idea of independence was 
winning ground in the Grand Duchy, and because Finland was too 
weak to survive unsupported, she would fall under German tutelage 
and thus the Western Powers would be cut off from their contact with 
Russia. Reynaud proposed that Paris should try to oppose the German 
schemes in Finland lest the enemy got the country in its grip. Because 
Finns did not trust the promises of the Russian government, the 
Western Powers had to intervene. 
The consul was given small sums of money for anti-German 
propaganda, but it did not have much effect. There were people in 
Finland who understood that independence with German help would 
be difficult to attain and that such an attempt might provoke the lethal 
counter-measures of the Russian government. But left between the 
two Empires, the Finns could not pay much attention to the West, 
and Western-oriented Finns in the summer 1917 had no influence in 
the country and had to remain silent observers of the stormy history 
then being made.'63 
The British were worried about the revolutionary Russian sailors 
selling their warships to the Germans. According to French 
information, there was discussion about buying the ships to prevent 
such an increase in the enemy strength, or sinking them, but neither 
intention was carried out.164 
162 BA—MA RM 5/v 4975, Nachrichten über die feindliche Flotte und 
Küstenbefestigungen. 
163 Consular reports from Helsinki: Correspondence Politique, Russie Nouvelle Serie 
nr 13 Guerre 1916-1918 Russie, vols. 707-710, Finlande I — IV, 12. mars 1915 
— 15 febr 1918, Archives et documentation, Ministare des Affaires Etrangeres. 
164 M. Markku Järvinen has studied the French diplomatic reports from Petrograd 
and has kindly given me permission to refer to his studies here, based on: The 
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There were occasional scares in the German naval staffs about the 
Royal Navy avenging their losses in the submarine war with a raid 
on the Baltic, but, in fact, the British still had no wish to be trapped 
there. Only the British submarines were a constant nuisance to the 
Germans. 
Preparations against a German landing in 1917 
The Russian military and naval staffs feared that the Germans would 
undertake a landing in Finland as soon as the Baltic was free from 
ice. Petrograd was still defended in Finland by the 42nd Army Corps 
and by the fortresses of Peter the Great, Sveaborg, and Viipuri. In the 
beginning of the summer of 1917, there were 578 officers and 20,194 
soldiers in Sveaborg, including about 10,000 men of the 128th 
Division — part of them on the land front to the north of Helsinki — 
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	 and, in addition, about one hundred officers and five thousand men 
in the Turku-Åland Archipelago Position. The Naval Fortification of 
Peter the Great was still being constructed in Porkkala and on the 
islands off the coast, on the Estonian coast, and in Åland, although 
revolution slowed down the work, as did also the lack of Finnish 
currency on the Finnish side:65 Nevertheless, of the twelve coastal 
batteries with their forty-one heavy guns, five batteries were 
completed in 1917 with sixteen cannon.166 The entire garrison of the 
Naval Fortress of Peter the Great amounted, when at their most 
numerous in the summer of 1917, to about eighty thousand men, with 
the main mass on the Estonian side, but the numbers on the Finnish 
side (between Hanko and Porkkala) were not indicated separately.167 
The Baltic fleet was anchored at Helsinki, at times also at Lappohja 
(Lapvik) by Hankoniemi; light forces were in Reval and in the Gulf 
French Ambassador in Petrograd to the Foreign Ministry, on 14 December 1917, 
Ministare des affairs etrangeres, Archives diplomatiques, Guerre 1914-1918, 
Russie 660, dossier general. 
165 RGAVMF, fond 353, opis' 1, delo 15, p. 107, Order of War Ministry 4. VIII 
1917 to clear the books of all naval fortification works in Finland. 
166 	 Tri veka rossiiskogo flota, vol. II, p. 114. 
167 RGAVMF, fond 353, opis' I, delo 11l, svedeniia o shtatakh i kolichestvennom 
sostave chastei sukhoputnykh voisk podchinennykh Komanduiushchemu flotom 
Baltiiskogo moria: 
1. 	 III 1917 1,775 officers 36,852 soldiers 2,760 non-combatants 
1. VI 1917 2,156 79,013 8,778 
I. VIII 1917 2,177 69,587 9,234 
of Riga.168 
The navy had planned to fight from the island position of 
Turku-Aland with light forces on the flank of the enemy advancing 
towards the Gulf of Finland. The intention was to station in the 
archipelago the gunboats Khivinets and Bobr' as well the cruisers 
Rossiia, Gromoboi and Diana, supported by numerous submarines, 
torpedo boats, patrol boats plus minelayers and sweepers.169 But no 
action was seen as no Germans approached. 
Since December 1916, the 42nd Army Corps had been a detached 
corps, with all troops in Finland and the Viipuri fortress subordinated 
to its commander. The corps in turn was subordinated to the Northern 
Front or army group until September 1917, when the front staff was 
dissolved and the corps was subordinated to the Petrograd military 
district. 
Although no German landing took place, the defenders could not be 
carefree. Spies heard that the Germans were preparing a popular rising 	 339 
in Finland in order to divert Russian forces from the main front.170 
The Northern front instructed the corps to prepare for defence, in 
the first instance on the line from the Kymijoki to Joensuu which had 
been a rear position but was now called the central position, and a 
new rear position was to be prepared from Viipuri to Lake Ladoga. 
The fortified forward western edge of the lake region could be 
defended if the situation should be exceptionally favourable."' 
The commander of the 106th Division instructed his troops to 
prepare to oppose the enemy landing between Siipyy (Sideby) and 
Uusikaupunki (Nystad) and 'in case of need' to retreat towards 
Petrograd via Hämeenlinna and Viipuri. The chief of staff, in turn, 
instructed the troops to be careful not to provoke the local population, 
to gather their scattered small detachments in more concentrated 
masses in order to be safe, to improve guards and patrols and prepare 
for taking over telegraph offices and telephone exchanges and lines 
to secure communications between the different detachments.12 In 
168 On the the disposition of the fleet in the winter 1916-1917, see appendix. 
169 RGAVMF, fond 353, opis' 2, delo 3, Abo-Alandskaia ukreplennaia pozitsiia 
1915-1916 gg., p. 65, Plan kampanii na 1917 god. 
170 RGVIA, fond 366, opis' 1, delo 115 o sredotochenii voisk v Finliandii v iiun'e 
1917 goda, p. 2 kopia telegrammy nashego voennago agenta v Parizhe 13. VI 
1917. 
171 RGVIA, fond 2262, opis' 1, delo 32, SevFr — 42nd Army Corps 27. IV 1917. 
172 	 Suomen vapaussota vuonna 1918, vol. III, p. 130 (The Finnish War of Liberation). 
March 1917, the divisional strength was reported to amount to 247 
officers, 27 doctors, 27 officials, 13,663 privates (of whom 1,713 were 
non-combatants or detached elsewhere, na komandakh), with more 
than two thousand horses.13  
In February an armoured train came to Finland, as well as the 4th 
and 28th Bicycle Companies of 526 men together, and the 42nd 
Motorcycle Detachment with thirty-nine men. The 40th Detached 
Sapper Battalion's strength was 1,259 men. The 2nd Detached Baltic 
Cavalry Brigade with 1,289 sables was still positioned in south-
western Finland to back up the coastal defence. It consisted of the 
3rd Baltic Cavalry Regiment and 43rd Don Cossack Regiment. The 
Viipuri fortress was placed under the 42nd Army Corps, with its four 
fortress infantry battalions (3,640 bayonets), the fortress sapper 
company (252 men), 45th Sapper Battalion (446 men), and a mine 
company (312 men)14 (artillery not mentioned), all of which were 
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	 included in the 42nd Army Corps numbers. There were also the 
fourteen detached coastal batteries protecting the harbours of the Gulf 
of Bothnia as in 1916. Four more were planned, but do not seem to 
have received their guns before October 1917. 
The 92nd Militia Brigade of 5,797 men guarded railways in the 
interior, and was not included in the army corps but was to be 
commanded by the corps commander in case of operations. In April, 
the 2nd and 172nd Reserve Infantry Regiments were reported at 
Hamina. Their troops had been constructing field fortifications in the 
central position in the lake district since 1916.15 They disappeared 
from the report before the end of the month. In the interior, there 
were innumerable supporting rear establishments, magazines, 
detachments, commands and posts.16 
At the beginning of May, the reported strength of the 42nd Army 
Corps was 531 officers and 24,850 men, not including the border 
guard division. The 5th Caucasian Cossack Division with the 1st 
173 RGVIA, fond 2421, opis' 2, delo 163, Svedeniia o boevom sostave, p. 58: 1. III 
1917. 
174 RGVIA, fond 2262, opis' 1, delo 153, Boevoi sostav, boevoi rospisanie i 
obezpechenie vsemi vidami dovol'stvie, p. 137: 5. IV 1917. 
175 The presence of a detachment of the 172th Regiment was reported from Kuopio 
in 1916: Kvick, Venäläisten joukkojen majoittaminen Kuopioon 1910-1918. 
(Quartering Russian troops in Kuopio 1910-18; an unpublished MA thesis in the 
University of Tampere). 
176 See appendix. 
Caucasian Cossack, the 1st Taman Cossack Regiments and Cossack 
rifle detachment, in all 2,558 sabres and bayonets, was added to the 
strength 16 May. 177 
The coasts were still guarded by the troops of the Detached 
Composite Border Guards Division of Finland, with its headquarters 
first in Helsinki, then transferred to Viipuri. It consisted of the First 
(Emperor Alexander III dropped from the title) Petrograd Border 
Guards Brigade's mounted regiments with their headquarters at Oulu, 
Vaasa, Pori and Turku, in all 1,628 sabres in May 1917, and the 
Finland Border Guard Brigade's foot regiments with their headquarters 
at Oulu, Kokkola and Vaasa, as well as at Kuokkala on the Karelian 
Isthmus, in all 6,877 bayonets. 
The exact numbers given above must not be taken too seriously, 
because they changed from week to week, men fell ill and a few 
probably died in the hospitals, were ordered elsewhere, a few deserted, 
while, on the other hand, new recruits were brought in. The strength 	 341 
of the rear units, for example, the lines of communication (etapnye) 
detachments which were responsible for the railway transport of men 
from Russia to the detachments in Finland, the hospitals, the bakeries, 
the cattle detachments, were rarely included in the bayonet strength 
of the corps. 
The Naval Fortress of Peter the Great, with fortifications in the 
archipelago of Turku-Aland and on the southern coast, and the fortress 
of Sveaborg, remained under the command of the Baltic fleet. The 
navy also strengthened its own rear positions and tried to create a 
new defence-line even further to the east at Lavansaari—Someri—
Haapasaari.18 As the position in Åland was too weak to close the 
Gulf of Bothnia, though minefields were laid in the navigation 
channels, the naval fortress staffs were always worried about the 
danger of a landing there, which could threaten their landward rear 
positions on the coast of Gulf of Finland. Not trusting the 42nd Army 
Corps, they tried to form a new line of defence towards the north 
from Hanko at Lohja—Inkoo, but deplored the lack of money and 
177 RGVIA, fond 2262, opis' 1, delo 153, Boevoi sostav, boevoi rospisanie i 
obezpechenie vsemi vidami dovol'stvie, p. 74: 12. II 1917; p. 84: 20. II 1917; p. 
131: 27. III 1917; p. 155: 10. IV 1919; p. 163: 18. IV 1917; p. 184: 5. V 1917; 
p. 193: 12. V 1917; p. 203: 16. V 1917. 
178 RGVIA, fond 2262, opis' 1, delo 106, Perepiska s morskim vedomstvom i 
nachal'nikom Sveaborgskoi ukreplennogo raiona 1917, tha 42nd Army Corps to 
the Baltic fleet 6. 11917; the Baltic fleet to the 42nd Army Corps 23. I 1917. 
labour force for the purpose.19  
The parallel but independent preparations reveal a degree of mutual 
suspicion between the army corps and the navy. The significance of 
this suspicion was never to be tested in real battle because the 
Germans only arrived when the revolution had taken all fight out of 
both of services. 
Orders were again given to organize sapper detachments for the 
destruction of all railway and harbour installations as well as stores 
and arms to prevent the enemy from capturing them.189 
The various reinforcements sent to strengthen the defence of 
Finland rapidly lost their fighting value and some of them remained 
here only for short periods. In the critical days of July and August, 
orders were given to the 45th Division with its 177th, 178th, 179th 
and 180th Regiments to take positions close to the Russian border at 
Perkjärvi; the 5th Caucasian Cossack Division was to stand by at 
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	 Uusikirkko, and the 14th Cavalry Division was to station one of its 
regiments at Lappeenranta and send its Hussar Regiment to Helsinki 
and the Uhlans to Lahti.181  But the Provisional Government was losing 
its authority among the soldiers in the border country. 
In September-October there was a discussion about evacuating the 
Åland garrison because of its conflicts with the local inhabitants.'82 
179 RGVIA, fond 2262, opis' I, delo 106, Perepiska s morskim vedomstvom i 
nachal'nikom Sveaborgskoi ukreplennago raiona 1917, the Baltic fleet to the 42nd 
Army Corps 21. I 1917. 
180 RGVIA, fond 2262, opis' 1, delo 118, mery po podgotovke zhel. dor. linii po 
unichtozhenii. 
181 The exact number of Russian soldiers and sailors remains uncertain. Suomen 
vapaussota vuonna 1918, vol. III, gives the number of 80,000 men, without citing 
their source. The often mentioned number of 100,000 soldiers and 25,000 sailors 
in August 1917 is an estimate based on the reports from Activist spies and retired 
Finnish officers, compiled by Mexmontan in Stockholm, and is mainly guesswork. 
The number of sailors has, of course, been even more of a puzzle, because ships 
kept coming and going. Juuso Manninen, in his unpublished and unfinished 
manuscript, Sota-arkisto T 19168/5, states that guessing the number was 
practically impossible because troops were frequently changed, and their soldiers 
were often sent home or escaped there. Ohto Manninen, "Venäjä Suomen sodassa", 
pp. 46-47, Itsenäistymisen vuodet 1917-1920, vol II, accepts the number of 
124,500 soldiers and sailors, as does also Dubrovskaia, Gel'singforsskii sovet 
deputatov armii, Hota i rabochikh, p. 20, as given by Rauanheimo, "Venäläiset 
joukot Suomessa maailmansodan aikana, p. 544-558, based on Juuso Manninen's 
manuscript. For a detailed catalogue of the Russian units in Finland in November 
1917, see Annex. 
182 RGVIA, fond 366, opisi 1-2, delo 115 Otnoshenie general-gubematora Nekrasova 
Morskomu ministru Verderevskomu o vyvoze russkikh voisk s Alandskikh 
The construction of fortifications in Finland was stopped by the end 
of the summer of 1917, because the constructors had no Finnish 
currency left and the Finnish Senate did not grant them any more 
credits. It dawned on the Russians that the position of their forces 
might be uncertain in the country by the end of the war; officers and 
officials started evacuating their families from Finland.18' 
Countering Finnish insubordination 
The decision of the Finnish Diet to assume internal sovereignty was 
taken rather seriously by the Provisional Government. Kerenskii 
telegraphed to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief General Brusilov 
(who, in June 1917, had succeeded General Alekseev, Nicholas II's 
chief of staff) that the Finnish Diet had declared Finland independent 
and that a German landing was imminent.184 
Brusilov promised to send more troops to the threatened country 
from the 45th and 112th Infantry Divisions and the Don Cossacks. 
He supposed that these reinforcements would suffice to avert a 
German landing — presuming that they would do their duty; discipline 
was already very much of a problem. But he did not believe in a 
major German invasion, although a minor one might be attempted to 
aid the expected popular rising. The general categorically refused to 
grant political concessions to the Finns.'ss 
When Kerenskii succeeded in reorganizing the Provisional 
Government after the July crisis, he probably wanted to demonstrate 
his ability to restore order in Finland as well as in Russia. The 
reinforcements promised by Brusilov were to be used in disciplining 
the Finns when no German landing took place. 
The idea was to concentrate the troops, which were until then 
scattered all around the country, in the region of the Helsinki—
Petrograd railway, in accordance with the pre-war plans for internal 
disturbances in the border country. It is not quite clear what additional 
ostrovov v sviazi s konfliktami s mestnymi zhiteliami. 
183 Protokol zasedaniia komissiia 13 iiunia 1917 goda. Morskoi general'nyi shtab, 
fond 418 Morskogo krepostnogo soveta, delo Abo-Olandskaia positsiia, p. 14; 
Voennyi Inzhener Ivanov 6. IX 1917 Komanduiushchemu Baltiiskim flotom, pp. 
25 et seq. Tsentral'nyi Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Voenno-Morskogo Flota/ 
Microfilm NL 158, National Archives of Finland. 
184 RGVIA, fond 366, opis' 1, delo 115, Kerenskii to Brusilov 11. VII 1917. 
185 RGVIA, fond 366, opis' 1, delo 115, Brusilov to Kerenskii 11. VII 1917. 
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troops in fact arrived in Finland, because, for example, the promised 
112th Division was hastily thrown into the main battle front,186 and, 
in the beginning of August the Governor-General was again promised 
the swift arrival of the 14th Cavalry Division and one brigade of the 
45th Infantry Division.187 It seems that the 2nd Brigade of the 45th 
Division did arrive to Finland with its 179th Dünamunde and 180th 
Vindava Regiments, but only for a few weeks, because by the end of 
August it was no longer included in the report. In August, too, the 
1st Cavalry Corps was included in the 42nd Army Corps. It consisted 
of the 14th Cavalry Division and of the 5th Cossack Divison.188  The 
14th Division was one of the loyal troops which had put down the 
Bolshevik disorders in Petrograd in July.'89 
The 42nd Army Corps was numerically at its strongest at the end 
of August 1917 with 38 battalions, 49 squadrons or sotnias, 1,195 
officers, 6,449 sabres, 26,502 bayonets and 5,993 in detachments, 272 
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	 machine guns and thirty-six field guns. t90 At this time, the Border 
Guards Division amounted to 218 officers and 7,826 privates,191 the 
permanent Viipuri garrison (mine, sapper, communications detach-
ments; the artillery garrison not mentioned) to seventeen officers and 
678 privates, the 40th Sapper Battalion to thirty-two officers and 1,142 
privates, and the 92th Militia Brigade to sixty-three officers and 2,523 
men. These numbers are not complete, because they only count 
fighting units (boevoi sostav), not staffs and rear detachments.192 
186 RGVIA, fond 366, opis' 1, delo 115, Brusilov to Kerenskii 12. VII 1917. 
187 RGVIA, fond 366, opis' 1, delo 115, the Petrograd military district to 
Governor-General 2/15. VIII 1917. 
188 The 14th cavalry division: the 14th Maloiarskii Dragoons, the 14th Iamburgskii 
Uhlans, 14th Don Cossacks as well as a rifle regiment and the 13th Horse Artillery 
Battalion; 5th Cossack Division: 1st Tamanskii Cossacks, 1st Caucasian Cossacks, 
3rd Ekaterinodarskii Cossacks, 3rd line (foot) Cossack regiment, Caucasian 
Cossack foot detachment, 4th Caucasian artillery battalion. 
189 Knox, With the Russian army 1014-1917, vol. I, p. 136. 
190 RGVIA, fond 2262, opis' 1, delo 153, Boevoi sostav, boevoi rospisanie i 
obezpechenie vsemi vidami dovolstvie, p. 287: 19. VII 1917; p. 349: 27. VIII 
1917. In the New Style, the dates are 1. VIII and 30. VIII. 
The artillery of the corps was reported as consisting of over four hundred guns, 
but only thirty-six were field cannons, while the majority belonged to the fortress 
of Viipuri, most of them obsolete, even bronze cannons from the sixties, and 
numerous 6" — 42— cannons of the 1877 model, but also four Japanese and two 
Russian 1909 model 11" coastal guns and two Japanese 9" mortars. RGVIA, fond 
2292, opis' 1, Vedomost' o sostoianii vooruzhenii v kreposti Vyborga 2. XI 1917. 
191 RGVIA, fond 4929, opis' 1, delo 23, Svedeniia o sostave i kolichestv chinov i 
loshadei. Shtab finliandsk. pogranich. okhrany, p. 267: 24. VII/7. VIII 19I7. 
Again, of the immobile batteries at the Bothnian harbours only the 
number of guns was given, not the number or men; there were 
eighteen batteries in November 1917, the oldest of which were armed 
with 6" or 42— obsolete guns, but the newest batteries numbered 
from 12 to 18 had two to four light guns of the 1895 model.193 
The 43rd Don Cossack Regiment was also perhaps sent to 
Finland,194 but is not mentioned in the reports of the 42nd Army Corps. 
The 128th Division from Sveaborg was preparing positions on the 
mainland for the rear defence of the fortress, close to the main railway 
line from Hanko to Riihimäki and further eastwards.'95 
Russo-Finnish conflict defused but internal tension 
grows 
Minister State Secretary Enckell, the representative of the Finnish 
Senate in Petrograd, was worried about the Socialist takeover in 
Helsinki and opposed the Activists. He wanted to avoid a conflict 
with the Russian government, which had been reorganized after the 
July crisis; Enckell hoped that under Kerenskii the new government 
would be able to stop the fall of Russian society into revolutionary 
chaos. He easily persuaded Kerenskii to give up the military 
measures,196 which had been implied in the Prime Minister's 
correspondence with Brusilov. Instead, the Diet could be dissolved, 
using the sovereign authority which the Provisional Government had 
inherited from the Emperor. In a manifesto on 31 July, the Provisional 
Government did declare inadmissible the unilateral usurpation of 
sovereign authority from the future constitutional assembly of Russia 
by the Finnish Diet, which was therefore dissolved,197 an order which 
automatically implied new elections to be held after two months. 
192 RGVIA, fond 2262, opis' I, delo 154, Boevoi sostav, boevoi rospisanie i 
obezpechenie vsemi vidami dovol'stvie 1. XI — 31. XII 1917 goda, p. 2: 5./16. 
XI 1917. 
193 RGVIA, fond 2262, opis' I, delo 154, p. 19: Svedeniia o boevom sostave chastei 
Upravlenii inspektora artillerieiu 42 AK, 9./22. XI 1917. 
194 	 Polvinen, Venäjän vallankumous ja Suomi, vol. I, p. 94. 
195 RGVIA, fond 2262, opis' 1, delo 106, 42th army corps staff to Baltic fleet staff 
27. VII 1917. 
196 Enckell, Poliittiset muistelmani, vol. I, pp. 88-90. 
197 Baryshnikov, "K.Enkel — pervyi predstavitel' nezavisimoi Finliandii v Petrograde." 
Rossiia i Finliandiia v XIX—XX vv: Istoriko-kulturnyi kontekst i lichnost', pp. 
50-55. 
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Disregarding the order for dissolution, Kullervo Manner, the radical 
Social Democrat chairman of the Diet, convened a meeting of the 
deputies, but they were denied entrance to the meeting-hall by armed 
soldiers. The Russian Helsinki Soviet, with its Menshevik and SR 
majority, had decided to let the soldiers obey the Governor-General. 
Stakhovich found some troops among the recently arrived cavalry 
reinforcements who were still willing to obey orders. 
For the last time, the Imperial army fulfilled its task of maintaining 
the integrity of the Empire against separatists. Its presence in the 
country, together with existence of the Baltic fleet, in spite of their 
'democratization', had also prevented the enemy from seriously 
considering a landing during the summer. 
The conflict revealed a many-sided web of contradictions. From 
the point of view of the Finnish Socialists and Activists, the 
Provisional Government had usurped the sovereign authority in 
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	 Finland, in spite of the clearly expressed wish of the majority in the 
Diet. From the Russian point of view, the Provisional Government 
had only restored the authority of Russia over Finland, which had 
belonged to Russia since 1809. The moderate and cautious minority 
in the Diet deplored the irresponsible policy of the Socialists and 
Activists, because it ignored the apparently overwhelming Russian 
military force. Transferring sovereign authority to the Diet also 
threatened to concentrate all power in the hands of the Socialist 
majority in the Diet. 
The Activists criticized the moderates for their co-operation with 
the Russian government. To the Social Democrats, what had happened 
seemed unpatriotic and smacked of a bourgeois class intrigue. Among 
them radical tendencies were growing and constitutional politics were 
discredited with the dissolution of the Diet. Finland's independence 
from bourgeois Russia began to seem vital for the Finnish workers' 
movement. 1 98 
Enckell certainly exceeded his authority as Minister State 
Secretrary, but as an adviser in Finnish questions to Kerenskii he 
succesfully prevented an open armed conflict. Thereby he also used 
the Russian card or the 'Petrograd road' in internal Finnish politics 
for moderation and against Activist and Socialist adventurism. 
198 Uusi Päivä 10. VIII 1917, 11. VIII 1917; Upton, Vallankumous Suomessa, vol. 
I, p. 234. 
The co-operation between the non-Socialist and Socialist parties, 
which had started after the liberation from tsarism in the spring, ended. 
The six Social Democrat Senators left their offices,'' and the six 
non-Socialist Senators continued in the rump Senate. Stakhovich was 
increasingly frustrated with his task200 and asked for permission to 
resign. He was replaced by the Leftist-Liberal Nikolai Vissarionovich 
Nekrasov on 17 September. 
The break-up of the Senate reflected a continuing polarization in 
Finnish society. In the hot summer, social dissatisfaction had risen 
because of unemployment due to the cessation of exports to Russia 
and the stopping of fortification works. The dissatisfaction was 
sharpened by rising prices and the threat of hunger, because revolution 
and chaos had made imports from Russia impossible. Agricultural 
strikes in Finland had added bitter feelings to the fears. Mutual 
suspicion between the better-off and have-not classes sometimes 
boiled over into strikes, closures and conflicts. 
The absence of military discipline caused increasing conflicts 
between Russian soldiers and Finnish officials and citizens. The 
consumption by the army of provisions also caused worry, as their 
supply from Russia grew ever more problematic, while one of the 
reasons for the Finnish social unrest was the threat of hunger.201  
During the summer complaints started arriving from different regions 
of Finland about the cost of living, lack of foodstuffs, and the unruly 
behaviour of the soldiers, as well as the reluctance of the local 
population to let either their homes or public buildings for quartering 
Russian troops.202 
The army ceased to be the ultimate support of law and order in 
the border country which it had been since 1809. Housing, feeding, 
disciplining the troops, their participation in local politics, and their 
conflicts with Finns, caused continuous headaches for the Finnish 
Senate as well as for the Provisional Government and the military 
staffs and soviets. To the consternation of Finnish industrialists, strikes 
199 Paavolainen, Väinö Tanner, pp. 124, 162-63. 
200 Paavolainen, Väinö Tanner, p. 160. 
201 RGVIA, fond 2262, opis' 1, delo 143, perepiska s finliandskim general-
gubernatorom i grazhdanskimi vlastiami Finliandii /42 armeiskii korpus, kvartirnii 
komitet goroda Raumo komandaiushchemu 42 AK 8. IV 1917; a report from 
Seinäjoki 14. VII 1917. 
202 RGVIA, fond 2262, opis' 1, delo 143, perepiska s finliandskim general-
gubernatorom i grazhdanskimi vlastaiami Finliandii. 
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and demonstrations could no longer be countered by military force, 
while, on the other hand, Finnish workers were surprised when 
Russian soldiers, the former oppressors, proved sympathetic to their 
movement and sometimes even joined demonstrating Firms and 
supported striking workers. The conduct of undisciplined soldiers and 
Finnish layabouts with their disorderly behaviour gave rise to 
increasingly nervous and alarming newspaper reports. 
With the disappearance of tsarism, the Finnish police force, which 
had too conscientiously served the regime, had also dissolved 
spontaneously in March. Instead, volunteer home guards appeared to 
protect property, and workers' guards to protect meetings, demonstra-
tions, and strikers. These civilian guards were not an effective police 
force, and even less an army, while the Senate's authority over them 
was minimal. The home guards and workers' guards suspected each 
other of planning violent activity against the opposite camp. 
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	 In August, the troops had prevented the convening of the Finnish 
Diet, but when the Finnish Social Democrats decided again to defy the 
order of the Provisional Government, 20,000 soldiers and sailors held 
a demonstration and decided to "defend the Finnish democracy" against 
the Government. Nevertheless, "a serious problem for the revolution" 
in Finland was the fact that "due to the heritage of tsarism", in the 
words of Dubrovskaia, the historian of the Helsinki Soviet, the Russian 
and Finnish Social Democrats were separated by national feelings. The 
soviets and committees in Finland were mainly interested in the social 
and political problems in Russia and agitation among the Russian 
troops, while the Firms acted independently and only a few Left radicals 
welcomed Russian participation in local politics.2o3 
At the beginning of October, elections were held to replace the 
dissolved Diet. With the revived interest in politics, and as a reaction 
against the social unrest, the non-Socialist parties won 108 seats in 
the Diet, leaving 92 for the Socialists. Though the Social Democrats 
were still by far the biggest party in the Diet, the result was a bitter 
defeat for them, because they had been used to seeing their strength 
constantly increasing, having risen from eighty deputies in 1907 to 
103 in 1917, and because they had grown accustomed to regarding 
other parties as a united bourgeois opponent. Their disappointment 
increased the radical tendencies in the labour movement. 
203 Dubrovskaia, Gel singforsskii covet... p. 155. 
When the workers' guards, soon to be called Red Guards, were 
seen fraternizing with the Russian soldiers, the Activists lost their 
desire for co-operation with the Social Democrats. On the other hand, 
the home guards and their conservative mentors realized that expelling 
the Russians was the only possible means of securing life, property 
and social order in the country. The fire brigades and home guards 
started combining into a White Guard. 
As yet, only the Russians had arms. 
German moves in the Baltic towards the north-east 
During this time, the Germans had moved closer to Finland. When 
the summer of 1917 passed and Russia still seemed inclined to 
continue the war, Ludendorff decided to give the Provisional 
Government a further push. At the beginning of September Riga was 
taken, and because the conquest was easy, the OHL decided to 
continue the offensive in order take up positions for advancing on 
Petrograd after the winter. The Russian fleet was to be chased out of 
the Gulf of Riga and the islands of Saarenmaa (Ösel) and Hiidenmaa 
(Dagö) were to be seized. This was a welcome chance for the German 
navy to do something worthwhile and to counter the inactivity which 
had led many sailors into disobedience. "A succesful operation was 
necessary to restore popular confidence in, and enthusiasm for, the 
navy".204 Ships from the North Sea and Baltic Sea fleets were formed 
into a Flottenverband für Sonderunternehmung, a naval detachment 
for special operations, under Vice Admiral Schmidt, and the army 
operations were to take place under the 8th Army command at Riga. 
Eleven battleships were transferred from the North Sea to silence the 
Russian coastal batteries and to fend off eventual counterattack by the 
Gangut-class dreadnoughts.205 
The operation started on 11 October 1917, the landing on the 
islands was successful, and co-operation between the army and navy 
went well. The defenders had no fight left in them, twenty thousand 
204 Scheer, Deutschlands Hochseeflotte im Weltkrieg, pp. 412, 416-22. 
205 Battlecruiser Moltke and battleships König, Bayern, Grosser Kurfürst, Kronprinz, 
Markgraf Friedrich der Grosse, König Albert, Kaiserin, Prinzregent Luitpold, 
and Kaiser; with one cruiser and 27 torpedo boats from the North Sea, 5 cruisers 
and 24 torpedo boats from the Baltic, 99 minesweepers, 99 anti-submarine craft, 
6 submarines, 6 airships, 100 aeroplanes, 19 troopships, 20 transports for munitions, 
coal freighters, a victuals transport, oil tankers, water tankers, and hospital ships. 
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of them surrendered, while the Germans lost four hundred men. No 
Ganguts were seen, only the old Slava tried to oppose the German 
dreadnoughts in the Moon Sound and was bombarded out of battle, 
as were also the British submarines, only one of the three in the Riga 
Gulf managing to escape to Hanko. The greatest problem turned out 
to be minesweeping in the stormy and dark autumn weather, with 
Ludendorff pressing the admirals for speedy action. SMSs Grosser 
Kurfürst, Bayern and Markgraf were damaged by mines and had to 
be towed back to Kiel. The other battleships returned to the North 
Sea on 27 October. 
Thus the Germans mastered the Gulf of Riga, from where Finland 
could be easily reached, but further operations were interrupted by 
the approaching winter. All ships were withdrawn from the eastern 
Baltic and only a detachment left under steam at the western end of 
the sea to secure the Danish Straits. 
Military dissolution 
After the defeat of Brusilov's summer offensive and the consequent 
disorders, General Komilov had been appointed commander-in-chief 
with the idea that he would restore military discipline and internal 
order. The attempt failed on 12/25 September, because Kerenskii did 
not trust Komilov, and because the general's troops did not obey him. 
As a reaction, the current of public opinion shifted to the Left again. 
The Bolsheviks, banned as traitors in July, now gained the majority 
in the Soviets of many cities; the most important was the Petrograd 
Soviet, where Trotskii was chosen chairman. 
An immediate reaction was seen in Viipuri. The garrison of the 
fortress organized a 'swimming school' for their officers: the 
commander of the 42th Corps Oranovskii and twenty-five others were 
pushed off the bridge and shot in the water. "Owing to its proximity 
to 'revolutionary Petrograd' and to the evil influence of the Baltic 
Fleet ... discipline on the Northern Front deteriorates more rapidly 
than elsewhere", the British military attaché Major General Sir Alfred 
Knox wrote.206 
The murders of the officers by sailors in March or in September 
were not organized by the Bolshevik party, they were sudden bursts 
206 Knox, With the Russian army 1914-1917, vol. II, p. 594. 
350 
of spontaneous rage. The success of the Bolsheviks was due to the 
fact that Lenin, irrespective of any Marxist theories, understood what 
the people wanted and was radical enough to promise to fulfil their 
wishes. The dissatisfaction, hatred and rage could thus be funnelled 
into support for the party, enambling the Bolsheviks to subject the 
country for decades. Happily for Finns, the sailors and soldiers were 
not angry with the Grand Duchy, but with the regime at home in 
Russia. 
The big Russian army in Finland was strong only in numbers. The 
commander of the Baltic fleet, Rear Admiral A.V. Razvosov (after 
Maksimov and Verderevskii — the revolution consumed commanders 
fast), the new commander of the 42nd Army Corps Lieutenant General 
Parkhomov, and Governor-General Nekrasov, who had succeeded 
Stakhovich in September, agreed that the first necessity was to get 
rid of the 106th Division, because it was completely useless for battle 
and specially hated by the population. Instead, Nekrasov demanded a 	 351 
Cossack division, two regiments of which were needed immediately.207 
The 128th Division, from the garrison of the naval fortress, also had 
a bad influence even on the Cossacks, making them and others still 
loyal lose their discipline 208 
The difficult situation was reflected in the bickering of the Russian 
authorities with each other. Governor-General Nekrasov complained 
that Admiral Razvosov was reluctant to take any action towards 
liquidating Bolshevik domination and was sceptical about all measures 
for strengthening governmental authority. In his opinion, the army 
commanders were only fit to be dismissed and replaced as soon as 
possible. Perhaps it was best to concentrate all military authority in 
the hands of the commander of Sveaborg, the 42nd Army Corps 
included, to which post a man who would be reliable and able to 
co-operate with Nekrasov should be appointed. The reply he received 
was that the army corps could not be put under naval fortress 
commandants, but that unfit commanders would be relieved. Also the 
unruly troops had already received the order to leave the country, but 
the committees and Soviets were reluctant to obey.209 
207 TsGAOR, fond 1778, opis' 1 delo 273, Nekrasov to Kerenskii, razbor 
shifrovannykh telegrammov iz Gel'singforsa, podana 18. IX, poluchena 19. IX. 
208 RGVIA, fond 366, opis' 1, delo 115, Governor-General to Ministry of Marine 
4/17. IX 1917. 
209 RGVIA, fond 366, opis' 1, delo 115, Glavkoverkh 2. IX 1917. 
After the loss of the Estonian islands, the Russian staffs were 
increasingly worried about renewed defeat and the disobedient and 
indisciplined troops. The Stavka tried to make the Ist, Vth, XIIth and 
XIIIth Armies as well as the Baltic Sea naval forces and the Naval 
Fortress of Peter the Great tighten up their measures for the defence 
of Petrograd after the loss of the islands,210 while the defeated and 
demoralized troops escaped from the Gulf of Riga.2" Desperately, the 
commanders tried to make the army more reliable by ordering the 
innumerable superfluous staffs and undisciplined rear detachments to 
be dissolved.212  The XIIth Army was to be responsible for the defence 
of Reval on the land side, while the 42nd Army Corps had to defend 
the Uusimaa guberniia, i.e. the northern land side of the naval 
fortresses 213 
The naval fortress commander protested, because the 42nd Corps 
was already transferring its headquarters and also as many of its 
352 	 scattered troops as it was able to move towards Viipuri, leaving open 
the land side of the naval fortress,214 while no help could be expected 
from the Estonian side nor could any help, even if sent, reach the 
northern side of the Gulf before an interval of three or four weeks, 
in which time the enemy would have already occupied Finland. 
The naval land forces leadership still regarded the fortress of 
Sveaborg as satisfactorily fortified and manned with its fortress 
infantry.215 More effort should have been made at Hanko, but now 
there was no money for any additional works. There still was the 
210 RGAVMF, fond 353, opis' I, delo 6, telegrammy Glavnokomanduiushchego 
severnym frontom s prikazam sukhoputnym voiskam prikryvat' podstup k Reveliu 
i uderzhivat' zanimaemyia pozitsii, v sviazi s vysadki nemtsev na ostrovah Ezel 
i Gange (sic! ought to be Dage), 6.-16. X 1917. 
211 RGAVMF, fond 353, opis' 1, delo 6, telegram 8. X, pp. 7, 13. 
212 RGAVMF, fond 353, opis' 1, delo 6, pp. 15-27, telegrams in October to several 
troops and staffs of the Northern Front. 
213 RGAVMF, fond 353, opis' 1, delo 6, pp. 31-35, telegrams to the XIIth army and 
42nd Corps 20. XI 1917. 
214 RGAVMF, fond 353, opis' 1, delo 6, p. 37, telegram of the naval fortress staff 
to the Northern Front. 
215 RGAVMF, fond 353, opis' 1, delo 172, Svedeniia o sostoianii chinov i chastiakh 
voisk, podchinennykh komanduiushchemu Baltiiskogo Moria... p. 249 
Sveaborgskoi krepost' 5/18. X 1917: 332 officers, 33 doctors, 9,233 soldiers, 1,883 
non-combatants. All the land troops subordinated to the Baltic fleet numbered 
nominally (po shtatu) 1,052 officers, 116 doctors, 270 officials, and 40,104 
soldiers with 3,700 non-combatants, but in fact numbered only 680 officers, 86 
doctors, 191 officials and 20,096 soldiers with 1,918 non-combatants 1/14. X 
1917. 
128th Infantry Division on the land front of the Sveaborg fortress, 
with the 428th Lodeinopoleinyi infantry regiment on the left flank at 
Hanko, and the 3rd Kuban Cossack Regiment in support. On Åland 
were the Åland battalion and the officers' school rifle regiment, but 
the island position should have had one or two additional regiments 
supported by artillery and even cavalry, and Sveaborg's land front 
needed three more infantry divisions which were, however, not 
available — on the contrary, the 128th Division was without an artillery 
brigade, its numbers were under strength,216 and it refused to occupy 
its positions on the front as ordered.217 It is not quite clear what 
"satisfactory" meant in the situation described. 
The 29th Division of the 20th Army Corps was transferred to 
Finland.218 In September, the 114th Novogorod and 115th Viazma 
Regiments arrived in Helsinki with their 1,766 and 2,092 soldiers;219 
and in December the 113th Starogub, the 115th Viazma and the 116th 
Maloiarsk Regiments were stationed at the Sveaborg fortress area, in 	 353 
all 499 officers, 8,756 soldiers and 1,137 non-combatants. The 114th 
Regiment and the 129th Strike Battalion were not included in the 
Sveaborg numbers; they probably stayed somewhere on the land front, 
perhaps at Lahti, but were subordinated to the fortress commander.22° 
216 The nominal strength of a regiment was 
with 264 non-combatant men, but the 
regiments were in October: 
the 509th Gzhatsk Regiment 64 officers 
the 510th Volkhov 	 59 
the 511th Sychno 
	
73 
the 512th Desna 	 52 
the 428th Lodeinopole Regiment, of the 
strength, but better: 
74 officers and 3486 men 'in the line' 
actual numbers of the 128th division 
1,563 in line 	 173 non-combatants 







107th Division, was far from full 
54 	 2,083 	 233 
the Vladivostok mine battalion was at about half its nominal strength (number 
under the stroke): 
15/35 	 329/640 	 25/49 
Only the 3rd Ekaterinodar Cossack Regiment was close to its nominal strength: 
27/26 
	
711/936 	 68/93 
RGAVMF, fond 353, opis' 1, delo 172, Svedeniia o sostoianii chinov i chastiakh 
voisk, podchinennykh komanduiushchemy Baltiiskogo Mona... p. 249. 
217 RGAVMF, fond 353, opis' 1, delo 6, p. 39, telegrams from the Baltic fleet to 
the Northern Front. 
218 The 29th division was transferred from the battlefront to the rear in August 1917, 
and their archive does not contain any documents later than that, RGVIA fond 
2359, but their appearance in Finland was duly recorded by the staff of the land 
forces of the naval fortress, v. following notes. 
219 1'787 and 1'495 under nominal strength. 
Military plans and orders were increasingly futile. Officers had no 
authority left, and even moderate socialists lost their influence among 
the soldiers and sailors, while the Bolsheviks, Left Socialist 
Revolutionaries, Internationalist Mensheviks, Anarchists and other 
radicals formed a Left majority in the local soviets and committees. 
By the end of September, practically all the troops were out of the 
government hands. The Bolshevik leaders Ivan Smilga of the Oblast' 
committee, Pavel Dybenko of the Tsentrobalt and Pavel Shishko of 
the Helsinki Soviet formed a troika or triumvirate whose influence 
was great among the troops and who did not allow their use for 
counter-revolutionary purposes.m 
Finnish-Russian discussions 
Kerenskii, having lost support on the Left and on the Right, tried to 
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	 survive on an ever narrowing basis. He declared Russia a republic on 
17/30 September, but the gesture had no concrete meaning, and in 
Finland it was not noticed at all. 
For the Finns, the situation in Russia seemed extremely uncertain; 
anarchy appeared as probable as a tsarist restoration. In order to secure 
Finnish autonomy as far as possible, the rump Senate asked for certain 
sovereign rights to be transferred to them from Petrograd. In his 
desperate situation, during the Komilov debacle, Kerenskii gave the 
Finnish Senate the authority to issue decrees, to make decisions on 
establishing or disestablishing government offices, and to decide 
questions concerning the university, schools and the church. But the 
Russian sovereign, who- or whatever that might be, was to appoint 
the Governor-General and Senators, to convene and dissolve the Diet, 
and to confirm the laws and budgets. 
The agreement fulfilled only the minimal demands of the Finns, 
and the paper was far from a constitution, being only a document 
signed by Kerenskii, who saw himself compelled somehow to pacify 
the border country. 
In Finnish historiography, it has been customary to classify the 
Provisional Government as equivalent to its tsarist predecessor 
because it did not admit the complete internal autonomy of Finland, 
220 RGAVMF, fond 353, opin' 1, delo 14, p. 14 prikaz sukhoputnym voiskam 
Baltiiskogo moria 17. XI 1917. 
221 Dubrovskaia, Gel'singforsskii sovet... pp. 160-61. 
which to the Finns seemed legal, necessary and well-founded. 
The constitutional committee set up by the Diet to prepare the 
definite constitution for Finland, manned by cautious constitutionalists, 
tried to find an agreement acceptable both to the Russian government 
and to the Finns. This was no longer due to any great loyalty to 
Russia, but mainly to the fact that the moderates still did not consider 
Finland strong enough to decide her fate unilaterally. The committee 
explained that, as always since 1809, the complete internal sovereignty 
of the border country would be the best guarantee for the military 
security of the north-west border of the Empire. They wanted a signed 
constitution and an elected Finnish head of government to convene 
and dissolve the Diet and to confirm its decisions. Questions of 
common interest were to be discussed in a Russo-Finnish mixed 
committee on the basis of an identical proposal for each parliament, 
and cases of discord were to be referred to the International Court at 
the Hague. Foreign policy and military questions were to be handled 
by the Russian government. 
In October, a Russian delegation of international law specialists 
stated that a Finnish President, separate from an all-Imperial head of 
state, was inadmissible, and that Finland could only be allowed local 
autonomy, and that changes in its constitution were to be confirmed 
by the Russian government n2  The Russian lawyers still thought that 
Finland was part of an indivisible Russian Empire and that its position 
was to be determined by the sovereign Russian power. 
While the question of Finland's position was being discussed with 
the Russian government, the internal quarrel among the Finns grew. 
Socialists grumbled because they had lost their coup to attain 
sovereign power, the men of independence did not like the idea of 
giving the Russians too much say in Finnish affairs, and the Activists 
did not accept the need for any discussions with the Russians. 
The Russian delegation, rather than conceding Finnish demands, 
would have let the Finns take by force what they liked, because such 
unilateral, illegal measures could later be annulled by superior force, 
while voluntary concessions might prove irrecoverable."'' 
Nekrasov still hoped to oppose with military force the Finnish 
strivings for separation. Because of the close relations between the 
222 Idman, Maamme itsenäistymisen vuosilta (The Memoirs of I.), pp. 165, 169. 
223 TsGAOR, fond 1789, opis' 1, delo 29 iuridicheskago soveshchaniia pri Vr. Pr., 
Delo o Finliandii, 15. X 1917. 
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Finnish Socialists and the Bolsheviks, additional troops could not be 
transported straight to Helsinki. Nekrasov planned that loyal Cossacks 
should be brought by train to Hämeenlinna, Riihimäki and Lahti, from 
where they could easily ride to Helsinki, while the unreliable 128th 
Division should be sent away across the Gulf to Reval. Nekrasov also 
asked for four armoured cars; it was a small detachment, but if 
reliable, very useful for decisive action when necessary.224 But he was 
not able to get any support from the army; on the contary, the 
Bolsheviks did not allow the 128th Division to obey the order to 
leave 225 
For their part, the Finnish Senate was still cautious, because they 
feared that illegal and unilateral means could easily lead to anarchy 
and revolution. But they were ever more eager to get as free as 
possible from the increasingly disorderly and dangerous Russian 
power. In negotiations that were destined to be the last between the 
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	 rump Senate and the Kerenskii government, it was agreed that the 
Provisional Government was to give a declaration of desisting from 
use of the sovereign authority in Finland, that the chairman of the 
Diet would acknowledge the declaration, and that the Senate would 
take over the supreme power. Foreign policy and military questions 
were to remain in the Russian sphere, and Russian consent would be 
requested for legislation which affected military interests or the rights 
of Russians in Finland. Nekrasov and Enckell boarded the night 
express train to Petrograd in the evening of 6 November 1917 to bring 
the paper to Kerenskii for signature 226 
The numbers of Russian troops decreased from the maximum 
reached in August, but only slowly. After the 45th Division's 
battalions left in the beginning of September, there remained 
twenty-six battalions and forty-nine squadrons in the 42nd Army 
Corps, then on 25 October/ 7 November the Viipuri fortress regiments 
were no longer reported, and also the Lodeinopole Regiment soon 
disappeared,227 so that only twenty battalions and forty-nine squadrons 
224 TsGAOR, fond 1778, opis' 1, delo 273, Nekrasov to Kerenskii 19. IX 1917, 
Petrograd to Nekrasov 20. IX 1917. 
225 Dubrovskaia p. 154. 
226 For the history in more detail, see: Luntinen, Itsenäisyyspäätös kypsyy, Irti 
Vendjästä, Itsenäistymisen vuodet 1917-1920, vol. I, pp. 194-243. 
227 The Viipuri garrison had been transferred to the Northern Front as a punishment 
for their participation in the murder of their officers. Knox, With the Russian 
army 1914-1917, vol. II, pp. 688-89. The 428th Lodeinopoleinyi Regiment and 
remained.228  By the beginning of January the cavalry had been reduced 
to nineteen squadrons, and by 21 January there remained only eighteen 
and a half battalions. 
NUMBER OF MEN IN THE 42th ARMY CORPS 




11 /24. VIII 1,173 6,451 26,848 5,789 
5/18 X 1917 684 6,143 19,033 3,845 
23.XII/5.I 487 2,282 14,128 3,017 
8/21. I 1918 482 2,184 9,436 2,745 
In addition to the 42th Army Corps, there remained in Finland the 
border guards, the militia druzhiny and the soldiers and sailors of the 	 357 
Baltic fleet. In the middle of January 1918 there seem to have been 
about seventy-thousand soldiers and sailors in the country.229  
a few Baltic sailors, about two thousand men in all, were ordered by the Petrograd 
Revolutionary Military Committee to aid the Bolshevik coup in Moscow on 2/15 
November 1917. Tri veka rsooiiskogo flota, vol. II, p. 137. 
228 RGVIA, fond 2262, opis' 1, delo 153, Boevoi sostav, boevoi rospisanie i 
obezpechenie vsemi vidami dovol'stvie, p. 434: 12/25. X 1917. 
229 0. Manninen, "Venäjä Suomen sodassa", Itsenäistymisen vuodet 1917-1920, vol. 
II, pp. 46-47; Tanskanen, Venäläiset Suomen sisällissodassa vuonna 1918, pp. 
16-17. I have not found any sources in the RGVIA or RGAVMF to confirm the 
numbers, nor any reason to doubt them. 
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Imperial Rivals 
FROM THE RUSSIAN TO THE 
GERMAN EMPIRE 
The German appetite grows 
By the beginning of November 1917 winter was coming and cold, 
hunger and death threatened the Russians, with no hope of help from 
Kerenskii's government. With their promises of peace and bread, the 
Bolsheviks had acquired the support of soldiers and workers, and by 
allowing the requisitioning of manorial lands by the peasants, at least 
the temporary neutrality of the peasants had been obtained. The 
Bolshevik party had won a majority in the city Soviets, while the 
moderate socialists were only afraid of a rightist counter-revolution 
and not able to imagine any danger from the Left. 
On 25 October/7 November 1917, Red Guards and sailors swept 
away the Provisional government and, led by Lenin, the Council of 
People's Commissars started constructing Socialism in Russia. To 
make true the promise of peace, negotiations with the Germans were 
started at Brest-Litovsk. 
Germany demanded a broad area in southern and western Russia 
as well as the Baltic provinces. The OHL hoped to be able to recruit 
big new units from the region,' and their intention was to transform 
the provinces into separate German duchies with close economic and 
military ties with Prussia. No concessions to local national feeling 
were to be admitted.' The Imperial navy considered the possession of 
1 	 Army corps A from Estonia, B from Livonia, C from Courland, D from northern 
Lithuania, E from central Lithuania and F from southern Lithuania, each corps 
to consist of two divisions. 
2 	 Ausw. Amt 23. IX 1918. BA—MA RM 5/v 3597 Verträge mit den Baltenländem, 
Gr.H.Qu. 22. VI 1918, BA—MA RM 5/v 4648 Marine Konvention (Baltenländem). 
The German eastern war aims have been discussed by Fischer, Deutsche 
the Baltic provinces necessary for German domination on the Baltic 
Sea and for the economic exploitation of Russia, Finland and 
Scandinavia. Prince Henry and his staff also considered that the 
possession of the Baltic provinces was vital for German naval interests 
in the Baltic sea.3 
The Germans' appetite was growing the more they found Russia 
weakening. Finland was also involved in their plans, though as yet 
no definite decision had been made. The local political development 
in the north worked to the German advantage. 
Problems on the way to the north 
Germany still had problems with Sweden. In 1917, the shift in opinion 
towards the Left throughout Europe could be perceived even in 
Stockholm. In the autumn, the Conservative government was replaced 
by a Left Liberal and moderate Social Democrat government. Sweden 
started to limit ore transports to Germany, and Swedish ships were 
allowed to carry Entente goods on the oceans. 
The German Foreign Office heard rumours that Britain had 
promised Åland to Sweden as a reward for joining the war on the 
Entente side. Perhaps, after all, the archipelago should be occupied to 
thwart such schemes; from Åland, Finland could be drawn closer to 
Germany, which, in turn, might prevent Sweden from moving too far 
to the side of the enemy. Ludendorff himself was also worried about 
British influence in Norway and Sweden, and he, too, believed that 
Germany's loss of influence could be made good with the conquest 
of Åland. He supposed that one battalion of pioneers (sappers) would 
suffice to conquer the islands.' 
The German Admiralty staff was especially worried about the 
transport of war materials from the West via Scandinavia to Russia, 
which would grow if Sweden should join the enemy. From a base on 
Kriegsziele, Revolutionierung und Separatfrieden im Osten, 1914 bis 1918; 
Zeman, Germany and the Revolution in Russia 1915-1918; Volkmann, Die 
deutsche Baltikumpolitik zwischen Brest-Litowsk und Compiegne; S. Zetterberg, 
Die Liga der Fremdvölker Russlands 1916-1918; Bohn, Deutsche Kriegsziele im 
Ostseeraum im Ersten Weltkrieg. 
3 	 Heinrich Prinz von Preussen 17. III 1918, BA—MA RM 5/v 4467. 
4 	 Kuhlmann to State Secretary von Lersner 29/30. IX 1917; Stüttzing, Stockholm 
to AA 9. X 1917; Steinwachs drahtet aus Stockholm 1. XI 1917, OHL forwarded 
to the to Admiralty staff. BA—MA RM 5/v 5205. 
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Åland, the German navy hoped to be able to interdict the transit traffic. 
But there were always the practical problems of sending transport 
ships on unswept seas and landing on a distant coast. Supplying the 
attacking force also remained a headache, but now, if the army should 
advance to the Baltic provinces, the ships could steam along the 
Estonian coast to the north even if Swedish bases were not available 
for them! 
Then the Bolsheviks took over in Russia and further advance to 
the east was interrupted when peace talks were started with them in 
December 1917. 
The Soviet delegation was reluctant to discuss any concessions to 
the Germans as they expected that Lenin's peace manifesto would 
make the peoples of the Central Powers rise against their militarist 
governments. 
People in the states and armies of the Central Powers were 
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	 war-weary; indeed, a few mutinies took place, and some talk was 
heard of a peace without annexations and reparations. But 
Ludendorff's military regime was strong enough to suppress all 
opposition for a while. With Russia defeated, it seemed possible to 
obtain Germany's war aims in the east and to transfer the army to 
the west for a final decisive attack. 
The Russians were reluctant to concede the German demands, but 
also unable to continue the battle. In January 1918, Trotskii left 
Brest-Litovsk, declaring that the war had ended even if no peace was 
signed. This was nonsense to the Germans and they started advancing 
to the east on 18 February 1918.6 "There is no other way, otherwise 
the thugs will beat the Ukrainians, Finns and Balts, raise a 
revolutionary army, and cover all Europe with their beastliness 
(Schweinerei )".' 
The advance was easier than expected, "the Russian army had 
degenerated worse than anyone had supposed, no one wants to fight 
us".8 The Germans liberated the Ukraine and took White Russia, 
5 	 Vertreter des Admiralstabes bei OHL 3. IX 1917; Beurteilung einer Unternehmung 
gegen die Aalandsinseln im jetzigen Zeitpunkt 4. IX 1917; Albionunternehmen 
12. X 1917; Überlegungen über ein Vorgehen gegen die Alands-Inseln im 
Anschluss an die Einnahme von Ösel und Moon 12. X 1917. BA—MA RM 5/v 
5205. 
6 	 Starting from February 1918, the Bolsheviks adopted the Gregorian calendar. 
7 	 Die Aufzeichnungen des Generalmajors von Hoffman, vol. II, p. 185. 
8 	 Die Aufzeichnungen des Generalmajors von Hoffman, vol. II, p. 223. 
occupied Lithuania, Livonia and Estonia, and marched into Reval on 
25 February). Bolshevik revolutionaries were pushed back to Russia, 
and local national independence movements were suppressed. Luden-
dorff was prepared to continue operation Fangstoss to Petersburg9 and 
Moscow should the Bolshevik government persist in its obstruction. 
The terms of peace were reasonable and moderate, in his opinion.10 
To save his regime, Lenin induced his colleagues to consent to all 
annexations Germany demanded. Peace was signed at Brest-Litovsk 
on 3 March 1918. Ludendorff was able to transfer part of his armies 
to the west, but substantial numbers of troops had to stay in the east 
to occupy the liberated countries. 
The German Baltic fleet took over Libau for a naval base and 
fortress, and Reval was made a base for minesweepers and 
submarines, while other Baltic fortresses were occupied by the 
German army. 
Nevertheless, the war against Britain remained the first task of the 
High Seas fleet, and securing the Baltic Sea against eventual British 
attack remained the main task of the Baltic fleet. For the sailing season 
of 1918, a few ships only could be detached to the eastern Baltic Sea 
to sweep mines, convoy transports, and protect German harbours» 
At this time the Finns had finally decided to break away from 
Russia, while as a side-effect of the Russian revolution, a civil war 
had also broken out in the country. 
Finland divided and detached from Russia 
On the morning of 7 November 1917 at the border station of Valkea-
saari/Beloostrov, Enckell and Nekrasov learned that the Kerenskii 
regime no longer existed. All the discussions about defining Finland's 
position in the Russian State had been in vain. 
The Bolsheviks very much hoped for a revolution in Finland, too, 
9 	 The German-sounding 'Sankt-Peterburg' was changed to 'Petrograd' in 1914, and 
the chauvinist-sounding name back to 'Peterburg', without 'Sankt', by the 
Bolsheviks in 1918; in 1924 the city was named after Lenin and in 1991 renamed 
'Sankt-Peterburg'. 
10 	 Ludendorff, Kriegführung und Politik, p. 283. 
11 Documents on the discussions and plans concerning the Baltic Sea and Baltic 
provinces are in the Verträge mit den Baltenländem, BA—MA RM 5/v 4648; 
Marine Konvention (Baltenländer) BA—MA RM 4648; Oesel, Baltische Gewässer 
1. XI 1917 — 30. IX 1918. 
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first in order to secure their precarious position in Petersburg against 
counter-coups from the northwest, and then to spread the world 
revolution further to Scandinavia and Germany. 
Finland seemed ripe for revolution. Finnish society had its 
centuries-old structure inherited from the Swedish period and 
developed during the period of autonomy. It was a rather well-ordered 
and basically viable society, but under stress by the rapid growth of 
population and modernization. It was not able to absorb the immense 
pressure of the Great War and the quick changes of the Russian 
revolution rapidly enough to avoid a violent crisis. There was 
unemployment and a threat of hunger, wartime difficulties infected 
old social problems, and the defeat of the Social Democrats in the 
elections in October, in addition to the Bolshevik example, 
strengthened radical tendencies. The loss of the legitimate authority 
of the Grand Duke, and the dissolution of the public forces of order 
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	 — the police and the army — caused a vacuum where the Right and 
the Left factions competed for power, polarizing into the Whites and 
Reds, deeply suspicious of each other.12  
The Russian 42nd Army Corps as well as the militia brigade and 
border guards division remained in Finland, but they were losing all 
vestiges of discipline, and the Bolsheviks were in a majority in all 
the Soviets. A few thousand soldiers from the 422nd and 424th 
Regiments13 and Baltic Fleet sailors with a few warships14 were 
ordered to Petrograd to defend the people's regime against 
counter-revolution, and the 428th Lodeinopole Regiment went to help 
the Bolsheviks in Moscow°. The majority of the soldiers were 
probably not eager to fight for revolution, though they voted for the 
Bolsheviks because of Lenin's promise of peace and land.16 
12 	 Holodkovskii, Suomen työväen vallankumous 1918, p. 93 (The Finnish Workers' 
Revolution), Polvinen, Venäjän vallankumous ja Suomi, vol. I, p. 121 (The 
Russian Revolution and Finland); Rinta-Tassi, "Lokakuun vallankumous ja 
Suomen itsenäistyminen", p. 111. (The October Revolution and Finland); Haapala, 
Kun yhteiskunta hajosi (When Society Breaks Down). 
13 	 RGVIA, introduction to fond 2421, 106-i pehotnaia diviziia: on the demand of 
the the Finland oblast committee and Petrograd revolutionary committee the 422nd 
Kolpino regiment and two companies of the 424th regiment were sento to fight 
fight counterrevolution 28 October/10 November 1917. 
14 	 The torpedo boats Metkii, Zabiiaka, Samson and Deiatel'nyi with 1,800 sailors 
from the battleships. Dubrovskaia pp. 164-65. 
15 	 Tri veka rossiiskogo flota, vol. 1I, p. 137. 
16 	 It is, however, an exaggeration to say that the army corps in Finland was vitally 
The Finnish worker's leaders formed a revolutionary central 
committee on 9 November/28 October to support the Russian 
revolution and to start one of their own. However, many leaders 
hesitated. They knew that the workers had much to lose besides their 
chains; victory was uncertain and revenge was certain if the revolution 
were to be defeated. They believed that the bourgeoisie would be 
aided by the Germans, while Russian support for them was far from 
assured. In order somehow to support the Russian revolution they 
decided to start a general strike." 
The Russian army corps was not officially involved in the Finnish 
strike. The oblast' (regional, i.e. of all Russians in Finland) committee 
and the Helsinki Soviet decided only to observe what was happening, 
the Tsentrobalt ordered sailors to keep to their ships, and the 42nd 
Army Corps decided only to defend themselves if the bourgeoisie 
should attack. Nevertheless, the Finnish Red Guards were given a few 
thousand military rifles, to be taken back after the strike. 
The new Finnish Diet, with its non-Socialist majority of 108 to 92 
Social Democrats, had convened and discussed the problem of the 
sovereign power in Finland. For the bourgeois leaders it was 
unthinkable to regard the Bolshevik Peoples' Commissars as the 
sovereign ruler of the Grand Duchy. Since the Social Democrats had 
lost their majority, it was now possible for the other parties to accept 
the handing-over of the supreme power to the Diet. The laws on 
democracy in local government and the eight-hour working day, 
approved in the summer but not confirmed in the absence of the 
monarch, were confirmed by the new authority, in order to pacify the 
mob outside the Diet. 
The Socialist leaders continued the meeting of the revolutionary 
committee. The proposal to seize power was adopted by 14 votes to 
11, but the proposed leaders did not dare to take the responsibility, 
and the proposal was defeated in a second vote. The committee's 
authority was transferred back to the regular executive committee of 
the Social Democratic Party, and the strike was stopped on 16 
important for the October revolution, as Ketola says in his Kansalliseen 
kansanvaltaan. The Red Guards of the capital, and the Red sailors of Kronstadt, 
with the neutrality of the army garrison in Petrograd, made the military coup 
possible; and the general situation in Russia formed the political background of 
the takeover of power by the Bolsheviks. 
17 Soikkanen, Kansalaissota dokumentteina, vol. I, p. 237. (The Civil War in 
Documents). 
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November. The Finnish Socialists had no leader comparable to Lenin, 
who would have dared to take the chance regardless of consequences. 
In the Social Democrat party convention on 25-27 November, a 
minority was against revolution, another minority was for it, while 
the majority was unable to make up their minds. In vain did Stalin, 
attending the convention, stress Lenin's advice to the Finnish party 
to seize power while promising of fraternal help.18 
The non-Socialists were shocked at the violence revealed during 
the strike. The men of independence and their activist 'fire brigades' 
lost all inclination for co-operation with the Left, who seemed to have 
joined the Russians, while the previously cautious bourgeoisie moved 
closer to the Activists. They were unanimous in their conviction that 
the undisciplined Russian soldiers and sailors had to be expelled from 
the country before order could be restored. Svinhufvud formed a new 
Senate and appointed as Senators only such men as were decisively 
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	 for independence. They believed that Finland had to get rid of 
revolutionary Russia and restore order in the country before it was 
incurably infected by the Red epidemic. 
Accordingly, Svinhufvud informed the Diet on 4 December 1917 
that the Senate was preparing a new constitution for Finland as an 
independent republic, and on 6 December 1917 the Diet accepted the 
progamme. 
The Socialists voted against the bourgeois programme. They were 
not against independence, but they did not want to alienate the 
Bolsheviks, their sole possible support, and would have preferred an 
agreement with the Red Russia, with a mixed committee to sort out 
the details of the separation. As the final decision would have been 
left to the future constituent assemblies of the two countries, Russia 
would still formally have had authority over Finland's fate. 
The Old or White Russia never accepted the separation of Finland; 
in their opinion, Finland's political independence constituted a 
manifest violation of Russia's vital interests and indisputable rights.19 
But the Whites had not much say in the matter, even after organizing 
their exile committees in Paris. The Empire was rapidly falling apart, 
18 	 Upton, Vallankumous Suomessa 1917-1918, p. 327-36. (Revolution in Finland); 
Rinta-Tassi, Lokakuun vallankumous ja Suomen itsenäistyminen, p. 118. 
19 Russian ambassador Maklakoff to Quai d'Orsay 12. I 1918; AMAE, 
Correspondence Politique, Russie Nouvelle Serie nr 13 Guerre 1916-1918, Russie 
Vol 710, p. 84. 
not only in the North, but also in the Baltic provinces, in the Ukraine, 
in the Caucasus and in the Asiatic Russia. For example, Bashkiria 
declared its independence on 6 December/23 November.20 
The Bolshevik government had a very loose grip on Finland, 
because there existed few Finnish Bolsheviks, and few civilian 
Russian Bolsheviks lived in Finland. The Finnish Social Democratic 
party was independent of the Russian one. Finnish Socialists explained 
to Lenin that the victory of the Finnish proletariat presupposed that 
the class battle could be carried on without any national problems 
interfering; the bourgeoisie must not be allowed to monopolize the 
patriotic cause.21 Lenin advised the Finnish comrades that they only 
needed to send an official petition to the People's Commissars asking 
for their recognition of Finland's independence. 
Ludendorff certainly wanted the Russians to be chased as far to 
the east as possible, but freeing his divisions from the east for the 
Western front was the most immediately important goal, and 	 365 
secondary matters were not to be allowed to disturb the negotiations 
at Brest-Litovsk. The Ukraine or Finland were to be taken, but only 
after the Soviet government had acknowledged their independence. 
The Germans thus encouraged the Finns to obtain recognition from 
the Bolsheviks, though the Finns were afraid that a later Russian 
government might disavow this; the Soviet power was not expected 
to last long. 
At Brest-Litovsk, the Bolshevik delegation explained that if Finns 
really wanted independence, the Soviet government was ready to 
consent to it. Thus, when Edvard Hjelt, the Finnish delegate in Berlin, 
asked for German support, the Germans were able to say to him that 
such support was being given, but that Finns had to ask for recognition 
in Petrograd.22 
Svinhufvud was extremely reluctant to do this because asking for 
acknowledgement implied de facto recognition of the Bolshevik 
government and conceding them the right to decide Finland's fate, at 
least formally. But since neither Germany nor the Scandinavian 
countries would accept Finland's independence if Finland did not first 
clear up the matter with the Russian government, the step had to be 
taken. On 18/31 December 1917 Svinhufvud went to Petrograd and 
20 	 Kansan lehti 6. XII 1917. 
21 	 Rinta-Tassi, Lokakuun vallankumous ja Suomen itsenäistyminen, pp. 133-34. 
22 	 Polvinen, Venäjän vallankumous ja Suomi, vol. I, p. 182 et seq. 
the recognition of Finnish independence was signed by Lenin, Trotskii, 
Stalin, and other People's Commissars. 
Then Germany was able to give her official recognition to her 
protegee, only preceded, a few moments earlier, by the French govern-
ment, whose lively consul in Helsinki, Reynaud, had advised Paris to 
take such a measure to vex the Germans. The Scandinavian countries 
followed, but Britain and America refused to accept the carving up 
of their former ally just when they were desperately trying to revive 
a Russian White government in order to restore the Eastern front. 
The final decline of Russian military might in 
Finland 
There was very little else that Lenin could do for the revolution in 
Finland. The People's Commissars were reluctant to move the old 
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	 army out of Finland, because its presence was to a certain degree 
comforting to the local Reds, who also received arms from the 
soldiers, but the army was definitely useless for revolutionary 
purposes. 
In an atmosphere of threatening revolution and continuing mob 
disorder, the Finnish Senate on 16 January adopted the White Home 
Guards as the official army of the Finnish state. Lieutenant General 
Mannerheim, recently arrived from Russia, was appointed 
Commander-in-Chief with the task of restoring order in the country. 
The first armed skirmishes between the Whites and Reds took place 
on 19 January 1918. Negotiations with the Soviets about the 
repatriation of the Russian troops did not produce any results. The 
White Guards started disarming bewildered Russian garrisons in 
Pohjanmaa on 28 January. In southern Pohjanmaa the Russians were 
totally surprised, in the northern part of the region they tried to oppose 
the Whites but were soon subdued. 
The commander of the 42nd Army Corps, Nadezhnyi, directed the 
border guards to gather their small detachments on the western coast 
into bigger formations at Oulu, Vaasa, Pietarsaari, in Turku and other 
garrison towns,23 but it soon became clear that the Finnish White 
guards were moving too fast and Nadezhnyi's orders did not reach 
23 	 RGVIA, fond 4929, opis' 1, delo 51, perepiska v sviazi s vystupleniem beloi i 
krasnoi Gvardii v Finliandii, p. 17, commander of the 42th Corps Nadezhnyi to 
the 1st Border Guards Foot Regiment 11. I/24. I 1918. 
the north-western garrisons. The Whites were estimated by the 
Russians to be rather strong, 93,000 men with arms taken from "us" 
and 3,500 men trained in Germany, who had already landed in 
Pohjanmaa.24 Later, it was learned that at least a number of the Russian 
troops in Pohjanmaa, 6,000-8,000, had been disarmed by the Whites 
and sent in railway wagons to Sortavala and then ahead to Kontupohja, 
where they had been disbanded to find their way home.25 
Demobilization of men in the oldest age groups (recruits called up 
in 1897 and 1898, i.e. about 40 years of age) had been already ordered 
before the Bolshevik coup,26 to counter indiscipline, desertion, leaving 
positions without permission or refusal to fight. Industrial workers, 
who had been mobilized as a punishment for participating in strikes 
were sent back to their factories.27 In December general demobilization 
by successive age groups had been ordered starting with the oldest 
contingents of 1899 and the youngest of 1915-19, and leaving the 
stores, magazines, hospitals and lines of communication organizations 	 367 
to leave the last; the assembly point for leaving the country was to 
be at Kouvola, and from Petrograd the men were to continue to their 
distant home regions; all civilian railway traffic was to cease during 
the demobilization phase.28 
After the first skirmishes of the Reds and Whites, Podvoiskii, the 
People's Commissar for military affairs, ordered the 42nd Army Corps 
to disarm the Finnish White Guards. Enckell, who still remained at 
his post in Petrograd, protested that the Guards were the national army 
of Finland, and the order was cancelled. The civil war in Finland was 
not an openly Russo-Finnish war. 
When the Germans started their advance into the Baltic provinces 
in February, the Northern Front tried to defend the approaches to 
Petersburg. The 42nd Corps in Finland was ordered to concentrate its 
main forces in the region of Lappeenranta—Säkkijärvi—Viipuri to 
defend the northern flank of the capital. An enemy landing was to be 
24 	 RGVIA, fond 4929, opis' 1, delo 51, p. 107, the 42th Corps to the 106th Division, 
the 92th Militia Brigade, the Border Guards Brigade 25. I/7. I1 1918. 
25 	 RGVIA, fond 4929, opis' 1, delo 51, p. 217, pokazanie 25. II 1917. 
26 	 RGVIA, fond 4902, opis I, delo 30 o dezertstva v chastiakh divizii, p. 307, the 
42nd Corps to the Border Guards Brigade 8. X/21. X 1917. 
27 	 RGVIA, fond 4902, opis' 1, delo 10 o demobilizatsii, p. 89, Dezhumyi general 
pri Glavnokom to shtab Finl. pogr. svod. divizii 26. VII 1917/6. I 1918. 
28 	 RGVIA, fond 4902, opis' 1, delo 10 o demobilizatsii, p. 35, 42nd Corps to svodn. 
pogr. brig. 5/17. XII 1917. 
expected somewhere on the south-western coast, where Hanko was 
the most probable point, the earliest to be free from ice. Until then 
no immediate danger threatened the western part of Finland and 
demobilization could be continued as planned, but in case of anything 
happening, all troops in the west, Sveaborg included, were to be placed 
under the commander of the 106th Division 29 A popular rising against 
the defending army corps was also expected — the Finnish civil war 
had, in fact, already started — but only hasty proposals were made to 
contain it 30 
The idea of the Soviet leaders was not to demobilize all the units 
in Finland; the regiments of the 106th Division were only to be 
reduced to their peacetime two-battalion strength.3' 
Then, when Trotskii uttered his statement "neither war nor peace", 
the commander-in-chief Ensign Krylenko declared to the army that 




bourgeoisie, had made demands to which the Russian revolution could 
not consent. But "neither will nor shall we wage the war inherited 
from the tsars and the capitalists". The war had ended on 28 
January/10 February, and consequently full demobilization was 
ordered on all fronts. Troops were to be withdrawn to rear positions 
and on into the interior of Russia, but the demobilization had to 
proceed in an orderly fashion, and materials and arms worth thousands 
of millions were not to be left abandoned?' 
However, it was impossible to carry out the demobilization in an 
orderly fashion. For example, from Viipuri it was reported that after 
the intended demobilization the garrison should have had about 1,500 
men, but in fact there were only five hundred men, while a successful 
defence of the fortress district would have necessitated a garrison of 
thirty or forty thousand men, or at least five to six thousand men to 
defend the inner fortress.33 All army property in Viipuri was given to 
29 	 RGVIA, fond 2262, opis' 10, the 42th Corps commander Nadezhnyi and a corps 
committee member to the 106th Division 20. II 1918. 
30 	 RGVIA, fond 4929, opis' 1, delo 69, zhurnal voennykh deistvii za 1918 gody 1. 
I - 14. III 1918; an almost illegible pencil sketch. 
31 	 RGVIA, fond 2421, opis' 1, 106 peh. diviziia, introduction to the dossier. 
32 RGVIA, fond 4902, opis' 1, delo 9 o raznoi perepiski, Obiavleniia prikaz 
Verhovnago Glavnokomanduiushchago Krylenko 29. I 1918 / 11. II 1918. 
33 	 RGAVMF, delo 1350, opis' 1, delo 78, oborona kreposti Vyborga, p. 25, Komkor 
42 Nadezhnyi Narodnomu Komissaru po voennym delam Podvoiskomu 18/5. II 
1918. 
"Russian soldiers and Finnish Reds in Tampere in 1918. No. 9 Colonel Svetshnikov." In spite 
of being numbered in the group photo, these people, fighting for a losing cause, have been 
relegated to the dustbin of history. 
Photo: Sotamuseo 720 N 93. 
the Finnish Red Guard.34 
At first, in January and February 1918 it was not quite clear whether 
it was a Finnish Civil War or a continuation of Russian revolution 
that was taking place in Finland. While the 42nd Corps in Viipuri 
was mainly concerned with demobilization and repatriation of their 
troops, the chief of staff of the 106th Division in Tampere, Colonel 
Svetshnikov, who had gone over to the Bolshevik side, made detailed 
34 	 Most of the materiel left by the Russians was taken over by the Finnish Whites 
after the defeat of the Reds in the Civil War. Rifles and guns left by the Russian 
army and navy in 1918 constituted the main armament of the Finnish army which 
in 1939-40 and 1941-44 fought off the Soviet army. 
plans for his troops to continue the Russian revolution. The Finnish 
Red Guards he regarded as only auxiliary troops.35 But soon he 
understood that there was no fight left in his troops, and he then served 
as an adviser to the Finnish Red Guards headquarters. 
In spite of the order of the People's Commissars, the Baltic fleet 
could not be demobilized and sent home from Finland as rapidly as the 
army, unless an immense property were be lost for the working people. 
The attempt was made to keep ready for action a first category of ships,'6 
while a second category37 was to be kept in the harbours, their crews 
either demobilized or ordered to fill up the first category crews, and a 
third category of ships'$ was to be completely decommissioned. Bases 
were to be decommissioned as they ceased their work.39 
Before the Finnish civil war started, in the middle of January, the 
number of Russian soldiers and sailors in Finland has been estimated 




the Red part of the country, and most of the soldiers had left by 15 
March, and sailors by 15 Apri1.40 Symptomatic of the lack of discipline 
and the absence of officers was the condition of a barracks abandoned 
by the troops: "never in my life had I been able to imagine that such 
filth could exist. Masses of bedbugs, lice and cockroaches crept on 
35 	 Suomen vapaussota vuonna 1918, vol. III, pp. 155-56; Svetshnikov, Vallankumous 
ja kansalaissota Suomessa 1917-1918,- muistelmia ja aineistoa. (Memoirs and 
Materials on the Revolution and Civil War in Finland); O. Manninen, "Venäjä 
Suomen sodassa" (Russia in Finland's War), Itsenäistymisen vuodet 1917-1920, 
vol. II, pp. 40-73. 
36 	 Six ships of the line, five cruisers, 31 torpedo boats, 19 submarines, 15 guardships, 
23 minesweepers, 8 minelayers, 2 auxiliaries. 
37 	 One ship of the line, six cruisers, 24 torpedo boats, 7 guardships, 14 minesweepers, 
one minelayer, 4 auxiliaries. 
38 	 9 submarines, 13 sweepers, 3 gunboats, 2 auxiliaries. 
39 	 RGAVMF, fond 972, opis' 3, delo 35, Dybenko & Raskolnikov, prikaz po flotu 
Baltiiskogo moria o nevozmozhnosti proizvesti polnuiu demobilizatsii flota 20. II 
1918. 
40 	 Repatriated soldiers and sailors 
16.-31.I 	 9,800 
1.-15.I1 	 9,300 
16.-28.II 	 12,300 
1.-15.III 	 20,300 
16.-31.III 	 2,900 
1.-15.IV 	 11,000 
16.-30.IV 	 1,000 
1.-15.V 	 1,000 
In all 	 68,200 
O. Manninen, "Venäjä Suomen sodassa", p. 61. 
the dirty walls, floors could not be seen for garbage and rubbish, not 
to speak of the lavatories..."41  
Only liquidation commissions were left to clear up the affairs of 
the troops garrisoned in Finland, but with the defeat of the Finnish 
Reds even they had to cease their work,42 and the advancing Whites 
robbed the quarters of the naval liquidation commission.43  
When the Bolshevik leaders realized that the old army was useless 
for revolutionary purposes, volunteers were invited to join a new 
"National Socialist People's Red Army",44 but the call went unheeded. 
It was only during the summer of 1918 that Trotskii started to get a 
"Workers' and Peasants' Red Army" in fighting condition, too late to 
intervene in the Finnish civil war. 
Only a couple of thousand individual Russian volunteers joined the 
Finnish Red Guards, and a few thousand Russian Red Guardists were 
sent by the Petersburg military district to the Karelian Isthmus front, 
where they were thoroughly defeated by the Finnish Whites. In all, 	 371 
about 5,000-9,000 Russians joined the circa 80,000-100,000 Finnish 
Red Guards. Those Russians, even civilians, who were caught by the 
White Finns in or after battle, were massacred. 
After the peace of Brest-Litowsk had been signed, even the 
existence of individual Russian volunteers in Finnish Red Guards gave 
rise to German protests, which definitely kept the Bolsheviks from 
intervening in Finland even if they had had any forces to do so. 
So the Russians left Finland, which had been part of their Empire 
for 110 years. 
Civil war in Finland 
As related above, political discord had grown close to an open conflict 
in 1917. The decision of the Senate to adopt the White Guards as the 
official army of the Finnish state on 16 January 1918 with the task 
to restore order in the country was interpreted by the Socialists as a 
41 	 Maija Järnefelt, Muistelmani, p. 170. (Memoirs of J.) 
42 	 RGVIA, fond 2262, opis' 7, likvidatsionnaia komissiia, delo 4, protokoly 27. II 
- 10. IV 1918. 
43 RGAVMF, fond 353, opis 1', delo 209 o razgrome zanimaemogo komissiei 
pomeshchenie agentami beloi gvardii i opisi delam unitshtozhennym pri etom 5. 
V 1918. 
44 Perepiska po raznymi voprosami: ... o formirovanii narodno-sotsialisticheskoi 
gvardii... RGVIA, fond 2262, opis' 1, delo 249. 
bourgeois coup. However, the regular Social Democrat Party organs 
still did not want to revolt. But Left radicals got additional Red 
members appointed to the party committee, and Lenin's government 
sent a trainload of rifles and ten field guns to the Finnish comrades. 
Red guards were mobilized to protect the approaching train, and 
skirmishes with White guards took place. Feelings grew angrier, 
moderates were silenced. While the White Guards started disarming 
Russian garrisons in Pohjanmaa on 28 January, the Red Guards in 
Helsinki simultaneously occupied government buildings. To their 
consternation, they were unable to arrest the Senate, a few members 
of which had already escaped to Pohjanmaa to Mannerheim's 
headquarters, while others went into hiding in Helsinki until they 
seized the Russian icebreaker Volynets and travelled via Reval and 
Berlin back to White Pohjanmaa. 
As explained above, the Russian revolution did not directly spread 
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	 to Finland, but both the Bolshevik success and their aid inspired the 
Finnish radical Reds to resort to force, and frightened the Whites to 
countermeasures, while the dissolution of the old army had left the 
country without any legitimate force to maintain law and order. Except 
for the most moderate Social Democrats, the party members supported 
the Red revolt out of a feeling of solidarity, while the majority of the 
Finnish people never doubted the legitimacy of the White side. 
When acknowledging Finland's independence, Lenin did not want 
to create a bourgeois state in the neighbourhood of Petersburg, but 
neither did he plan for a restoration of the Russian Empire. His aim 
was world revolution, and at the beginning of 1918 it could not be 
foreseen that the revolution would be limited to Russia and that the 
Bolsheviks were destined to have to try Socialism in one country only. 
But whatever the Bolsheviks' motives and aims, the intention was to 
maintain their influence in the border country with the aid of the 
Finnish Reds. 
For the Whites, the civil war was a war of liberation in two senses: 
the Russians were disarmed and expelled from the country, even if 
that was not the main aspect of the actual fighting; and with the Red 
defeat, the Bolshevik regime lost its influence in the country, both 
what little they had then and whatever they might have gained later,45 
45 	 The Reds did not fight against Finland's freedom, but for justice and equality, as 
they perceived it, and for workers' power; but the perceived motives are irrelevant 
in considering the meaning and importance of what had happened, what it did 
which probably spared Finland from the unspeakable horrors of 
Stalin's regime. For the Reds, the war was the long desired revolution, 
a battle for a better and more just society, or a chance to avenge past 
wrongs and make good the untold sufferings of the poor classes. The 
Whites did not regard the war as a class battle against workers or 
poor people; the Reds were perceived as rebels and murderers. At 
least after the war, it appeared that the main reason for the White 
hatred of the Reds was not the crimes of the hooligans, but the fact 
that the Reds had accepted the presence of the Russians in the country 
and had fraternized with them in demonstrations and meetings 46 
War and revolution had paralysed Russian military strength in 
Finland, and the Empire had no other support left in the country. Even 
Red Russia was favoured only by a minority of the lower classes, 
while the majority adapted well to developments in Finnish society 
after the war. 
The White side, on the other hand, had the might of Germany 	 373 
behind them, or so it seemed. From the Russian Empire, Finland was 
drawn into the German sphere of influence. The Civil War in Finland 
was part of the Great War. 
An expedition to Finland discussed in Germany 
The situation in Finland seemed more and more promising for 
Germany. The Russian infantry had lost all discipline and fighting 
ability; perhaps the cavalry and artillery were not so much infected, 
but the sailors were the worst — they had sold all the brass fixtures 
from their ships, and their morale was completely 'maximalist'47 . 
Spies informed the German staffs that "in Helsinki [Finnish] Socialists, 
Red Guards and [Russian] soldiers fraternize and committ robberies, 
burglaries, and murders"." 
In the autumn of 1917, arms had been sent to Finland on the SS Equity, 
cause and might have caused. 
46 	 Halsti, Mies elää elämäänsä, p. 102. (Memoirs of H.) 
47 	 Probably meaning extreme radicals; German officers could not be expected to 
discern the philosophical differences between maximalists and Bolsheviks. 
48 	 Ehrenhalb tätiger Vertrauensmann Nr 54 meldet 8. X 1917. BA—MA RM 5/v 
4983 Nachrichten über die russische Armee, einschl. allgem. Kriegsvorbereitungen 
vom 2. September bis 14. November 1917; Nachrichtenoffizier Mitte 6. I 1918, 
BA—MA RM 5/v 5000 Nachrichten über Finnland, vom 1. September 1915 bis 
3. Juli 1917. 
in December a few Jägers travelled with a second consignment of 
arms to Pohjanmaa, and eight Jägers with four tons of arms were 
landed by the UC 57 on the southern coast 49 These measures were 
aimed at encouraging the pro-German Finnish Activists, and were not 
for any definite operation. 
But then, by the end of 1917 Ludendorff definitely included Finland 
in his plans. Under a German king, 'independent' Finland would join 
the Baltic provinces, the Ukraine and Poland to form a German sphere 
of interest. The Ministries of War and the Marine also pointed out 
the need for Finnish raw materials and minerals, pulp and paper, and 
also the importance of preventing the Entente from getting these 
materials. North German businessmen studied Finnish forests and 
waterfalls and planned a German-Finnish joint company to take over 
Finland's foreign trade.5° 
It was also known that, in spite of having acknowledged Finland's 
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	 independence, the Soviet government had not withdrawn their soldiers 
from the country after the Brest-Litovsk treaty. And in Scandinavia 
'young Socialists', it was asserted, had already taken steps to start a 
revolution and to carry it from the North to Germany.5i All this made 
necessary and legitimate a German intervention in Finland. Even 
afterwards, it was stated that in the fight against the Finnish Reds 
Germany had been protecting her own interests both internally and 
externally!' 
Of immediate and alarming strategic importance was the fact that 
the British had established a base at Murmansk and were advancing 
southwards to set up a new Eastern front, and that the Red government 
49 	 The UC 57 never returned home, and was probably destroyed by mines in the 
Gulf. The Jägers were supplied with a few arms and plenty of explosives to blow 
up railway bridges, but the region was already in Red hands, and with the Uusimaa 
White Guards the Jägers crossed the ice to German-held Estonia in February and 
returned with the German expedition in April. Cf. Pekkola, Ihmisten kiusana 
(The Memoirs of P., a Jäger from 1917-1918). The small load of arms carried 
by the Equity was distributed among the Home Guards in Pohjanmaa. 
50 Reichs-Marine Amt and Adm. Stab 2. III 1918. BA—MA RM 5/v 2874 
Handelskriegsrecht Deutschlands und seiner Verbündeter; Gr. H. Qu. 4. III 1918, 
BA—MA RM 5/v 2752, Militärpolitische Angelegenheiten Finnland. 
51 Fischer-Lossainen 20. II 1918, BA—MA RM 5/v 2769, Militärpolitische 
Angelegenheiten Schweden; Nachrichtenoffizier Generalkommando 52, 8. III 
1918. BA—MA RM 5/v 4998, Politik Russland, die russische Revolution, vom 15. 
September bis 19. November 1918. 
52 	 von der Goltz, "Saksan aseellinen apu", Suomen vapaussota, vol. VII, p. 7. 
(German Military Help for Finland in the War of Liberation). 
in Russia seemed too weak to fight off the intervention.53 
Hjelt and Svinhufvud carried to Berlin an urgent call for help from 
the part of Finland occupied by the Reds. More serious, from the 
German point of view, was the chance that the Whites might win the 
civil war without German help. Mannerheim was known to oppose 
German intervention, and he was supposed to have plans for restoring 
the ancien regime in Petrograd, too.54 It seems that the Germans did 
not learn about an attempt of Helsinki "business community" to ask 
the British submarine sailors to prevent Russian sailors from landing 
whilst the Whites dealt with the Reds ashore.ss 
Admiral Holtzendorff, chief of the German Admiralty staff, pressed 
for an expedition to Finland. He supposed that by the end of March 
the Red city of Tampere would be surrounded by the Whites, and 
thus there was not much time left for the German intervention before 
the big victory would make the White Finns intractable, while a 
speedy liberation of southern Finland by the Germans would make 
people there German-minded and would create a counterforce to 
Mannerheim.56 
The Auswärtiges Amt, more cautious than the annexationist military 
leaders, warned against an intervention, because they did not believe 
that Finland could remain independent when Russia grew strong again. 
And it was hardly correct to provoke even a Red Russia so soon after 
the peace negotiations had been started. 
But the annexationists explained that the civil war in Finland was 
no concern of Russia because the Bolshevik government had 
recognized the independence of the former border country. That 
caused another problem: if the intervention in Finland was not part 
of the war against Russia, new credits had to be voted for the 
operation, and that could give the Left opposition in the Reichstag a 
chance to oppose the grant. But the Kaiser decided that the 
intervention was in the German interest, because Finland might side 
53 von der Goltz, "Saksan aseellinen apu", Suomen vapaussota, vol. VII, p. 7. 
54 Militär-Attaché Stockholm 25. II 1918, BA—MA RM 5/v 2752, Militärpolitische 
Angelegenheiten Finnland; Nachrichtenoffizier Generalkommando 52, 28. II 1918, 
BA—MA R:'v1 5/v 4998, Politik Russland, Die russische Revolution. 
55 Wilson, Baltic Assignment, p. 215. 
56 Adm. St. 1. III 1918, Marine Attaché für die Nordischen Reiche, BA.-MA Rvi 
5/v 3983, 0-Angelegenheiten Ostsee; Holzendorff 11. III 1918, BA—MA RM 5/v 
2752; Militärpolitische Angelegenheiten Finnland, Agent report 25. III 1918, 
BA—MA RM 5/v 1034 Finnland vom Januar 1918 bis Juni 1919. 
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with the Entente if she were not aided. The operation, it was argued, 
was not a new war but only a police action to expel undisciplined 
mobs from Finland, as requested by the legally acknowledged 
government there; and it was vitally important for securing German 
interests in the war then going on.57 
In the Great War, Finland soon proved undoubtedly important. 
From there the Germans might have been able to reach the Murmansk 
railway and also secure their control of the Baltic Sea by closing the 
mouth of the Gulf of Finland. It might also have become necessary 
to advance further to the east to attack Petersburg from the north as 
well as from the south, from Estonia, if the Bolshevik government 
should prove intractable.58 
The official Finnish invitation for German aid was received on 17 
February 1918. As a first move, the Finnish Jägers were released from 
the German army and the reliable ones59 were transported aboard 
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	 Finnish ships to the White capital, Vaasa, where they arrived on 25 
February. The Swedes materially aided the move by lighting the 
beacons and lighthouses, which were normally extinguished during 
the war. The Jägers were vitally important to the victory of the White 
army as leaders, while the Red Guards, numerically perhaps equal or 
even stronger, totally lacked trained officers, with the exception of a 
few Russian advisers. 
Then the German army started collecting troops for a brigade which 
was to land on the coast of the Gulf of Bothnia to support the Finnish 
White army. The Admiralty staff organized a special detachment for 
the Baltic Sea, Sonderverband Ostsee under Vice Admiral Meurer. 
The almost obsolete Nassau class, the first German dreadnoughts, 
formed the main naval force, with a couple of torpedo boat flotillas, 
a few auxiliary cruisers, an aeroplane tender, a hospital ship, and 
numerous transports. 
An unexpected Swedish move made a speedy start even more 
necessary. 
57 	 Aspelmeyer, Deutschland und Finnland während der beiden Weltkriege, p. 57. 
58 	 Ludendorff to Adm. Stab 24. II 1918, BA—MA RM 5/v 3983. 
59 Unreliable Red Jägers were left waiting for later repatriation, cf. Lackman, 
Jääkärimuistelmia. 
The Åland incident 
In Åland, Red guards, undisciplined Russians, and a White detachment 
— which had retreated from the Red part of the mainland — were 
making life difficult for the local population. To save them, King 
Gustaf V and his Minister of Marine, Erik Palmstierna, sent a 
peacekeeping force, which arrived on the Islands on 14 February. The 
local population asked for self-government or, preferably, union with 
Sweden. The Reds and Russians were expelled from the Islands, and 
the Whites transported to White Pohjanmaa.60 
On hearing the news of the Swedish coup, the Sonderverband 
made ready and the Großherzöglich Mecklenburg Jäger Battalion 14 
was embarked, but then the expedition had to wait while the political 
problem was sorted out. The Admiralty staff thought that Åland, when 
liberated, could perhaps be left to the Swedes, if co-operation between 
the Germans, Swedes and Finns against the British and Russian 
enemies might then arise. No, the Baltic naval staff answered, Finnish 
sovereignty on the islands would be a guarantee against Entente 
influence in the North. Germany herself might need the Islands for a 
naval base, which would be impossible if Sweden, having got there, 
then joined the Entente, but it would easy to arrange with the Finns, 
whom "we have politically tied to ourselves and our aims". 
William II promised Gustaf V that he was not going to prevent 
Swedish humanitarian work on the islands, nor did he plan a 
permanent annexation, but he asked that the King should not prevent 
the German expedition. Of course, the King consented; after all, 
Sweden had only a couple of armoured ships against the German 
dreadnoughts. Even if the Nassau was worn out and the Posen under 
repair, the Rheinland and the Westfalen were powerful enough to 
scare the Swedes. The Sonderverband arrived in Åland on 5 March 
1918.61 The Swedes met the Germans peacefully, and soon left the 
archipelago. It seems that with the exception of the court and a few 
officers, the King and his Minister had slim support in political circles 
in Sweden for their imperialist activity. Mannerheim sent an officer 
60 Stjemfelt, "Åland 1918 — säregen föregångare till nutida FN-operationer." 
61 Adm. Stab to OHL 23. II 1918, Ludendorff s.d.(February 1918), 
0-Angelegenheiten Ostsee 1. IX 1915 - 31. I 1918, BA MA RM 5/v 3983; 
Holtzendorff 25. V 1918, Ostsee 0-Angelegenheiten 1. V 1918 — 15. VIII 1918; 
Marinevertreter Helsingfors 17. VI 1918, Laufende Marine Politik, Aaland 
BA—MA RM 5/v 2702; Laufende Marine Politik, Aaland, BA—MA RM 5/v 1023. 
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to act as Military Governor at Mariehamn to underline Finnish 
sovereignty over the islands. 
Thus the Russian, Red Finnish, and Swedish claimants to Åland 
had to desist from their aspirations and were replaced by the forces 
of the German Empire. The fortifications erected by the Russians were 
restored into fighting condition in spite of the protest of the Swedish 
government that the demilitarized (since 1856) status of the 
archipelago remained important for Stockholm's security. At the 
behest of the military and naval leadership, the Auswärtiges Amt 
delayed discussions on the projected destruction of the fortresses, so 
that negotiations were only started in August, and never concluded 
before Germany's fall in November 1918.62 
Germany would have liked to keep Åland if it had been possible 
and easy, but the archipelago was not in itself a goal of German 
imperialism;63 it was important only as a means for further politics 
378 	 and military-naval action. 
The expedition to Finland 
The German plan had been to establish a base on Åland for a landing 
on the Gulf of Bothnia, but then, after taking the Islands, further 
advance up the ice-covered Gulf was deemed too dangerous. An 
icebreaker had been lost to mines and the Rheinland ran aground and 
had to be sent home for repairs. 
Instead, Hanko on the south-western edge of Finland was chosen. 
The Hochseeflotte was against risking any big ships, but Ludendorff 
insisted, and Meurer of course supported the expedition. The chief of 
the Admiralty staff, Admiral von Trotha, dreamed of seizing the 
icebound and helpless Russian ships in the Finnish ports.64 More 
troops were collected and an Ostseedivision or Baltic Division was 
formed under the command of General Rüdiger von der Goltz. The 
62 Marine Politik Nordstaaten 8. IX - 15. X 1918, BA_MA RM 5/v 3916; 
Zusammenstellung der marinepolitischen Ereignisse zwischen Deutschland und 
Russland in Ostsee und Eismeer nach Brester Frieden, Admiralstab 28. VII 1918, 
Militärpolitische Angelegenheiten, Nordstaaten BA_MA RM 5/v 3919. 
63 As hinted by Menger, Die Finnlandpolitik des deutschen Imperialismus 
1917-1918, p. 129. 
64 
	
	 M[äkeläl, "Amiraali von Trotha ja Saksan apu Suomelle 1918" (Admiral von 
Trotha and German aid for Finland in 1918), pp. 1195-96; Herwig, 'Luxury Fleet', 




















GERMAN ADVANCE IN 1917-18 
AND THE FINNISH CIVIL WAR 
German advance in 1917-18 and the Finnish Civil War. 
The Russian revolution of 1917 created a vacuum of power in the East, filled by German 
influence which prevented the spread of the Red influence to the previously Russian border 
countries by the Baltic Sea. 
SMS Posen arrived to replace the Rheinland. 
Ice conditions were reconnoitred by aeroplanes, mines were swept 
— in which two minesweepers were lost — and lighthouses on the 
Estonian coast were lighted, which made possible the exact marking 
of the narrowly swept passages. The expedition arrived at Hanko on 
3 April. The Russians blew up their submarines wintering there and 
left, and as well the Red flag on the town council building was soon 
lowered. 
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From Hanko, the Baltic Division advanced towards Helsinki and 
Riihimäki. They saw the traces of the civil war: houses looted, people 
killed, women weeping; the bayonet seemed to have been the favoured 
means of murder. "Und so was nennt sich noch Jarde, verdammtes 
Schweinvolk ob rot oder weiss" (And such people call themselves 
Guards, damned beasts all, reds and whites equally), a German Uhlan 
of the Guards wondered.65 The Sonderverband sailed on to Revai and 
from there crossed the Gulf of Finland to join the army division in 
the conquest of Helsinki on 13-14 April. "Suddenly, shots broke a 
windowpane. Far up on Yrjönkatu a few soldiers could be seen. They 
approached, they had strange uniforms, THEY WERE GERMANS" 66 
The nightmare of the Whites ended, it was the turn of the Reds to 
fear for their lives. 
The Finnish icebreaker Tarmo took Suursaari and together with the 
Volynets, which, after the seizure, was rechristened the Väinämöi- 
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	 nen,67 carried another German brigade from Estonia to Loviisa, on the 
northern coast of the Gulf. The Reds were thus pressed between the 
Germans in the south and the Whites in the north. 
Alarmed by the appearance of the German expedition to Åland, 
part of the Russian fleet in Helsinki had escaped through the ice-bound 
Gulf of Finland to Kronstadt, aided by the giant icebreaker Ermak, a 
deed which can be deemed heroic, with regard to the weather, the 
ice-covered sea, and the condition of the ships after more than a year 
of revolutionary neglect. "The loveliest sight of my life. Russian 
warships are just now escaping towards Petersburg, leaving their 
smoke hanging in the air", an eye witness wrote on 12 March.68 Then 
the Tarmo expedition to Suursaari prevented further moves. The 
Russians in Helsinki sent a delegation of naval officers elected by the 
crews to Meurer, who promised them protection and a free passage 
home if they desisted from fighting and from destroying anything. An 
accord was signed on 5 April, and such ships as were navigable left 
Helsinki.69 Sveaborg was found abandoned, its guns stripped of their 
65 	 Halsti, Muistelmat, vol. I, pp. 84, 87. 
66 	 Glory Leppänen, Elämäni teatteri, p. 46. 
67 	 The ship was left to serve in Estonian navy until the Soviets took over in 1940 
and named it again Volynets. 
68 	 Aho, Hajamietteitä kapinaviikoilta, vol. III, p. 22 (Thoughts during the weeks 
of the rebellion). 
69 	 In all, 211 ships reached Kronstadt, while 171 lesser ones were not able to leave 
their wartime bases. Conway's All the World's Fighting Ships 1906-1921 p. 293; 
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'German soldiers advancing along the Aurora Street in Helsinki in April 1918.' In the 
background to the right, the Alexander Gimnaziia , which was intended to house a future 
Russian university, which would contribute to the Russification of the Finnish civil service. The 
German liberation and the White victory in the Civil War put an end to all Russian influence 
in the country. 
Photo: Sotamuseo 709 N 88. 
locks. A few British submarines were blown up by their crews to 
avoid leaving them to the Germans.70 Thus the idea of seizing the 
Russian battleships was rendered void, because Meurer believed that 
the Russian sailors were sympathetic to the Finnish Reds and he was 
anxious to silence the ships and fortresses in Helsinki. In fact, the 
sailors seem to have been rather indifferent about the war in Finland, 
while the surviving naval officers might have attempted to sink their 
ships if the Germans had insisted on taking them over. The 
the British sailors blew up their submarines the E 1, E 8, E 9, E 19, C 26, C 27, 
C 35, PRO ADM 137, part II, British Naval Losses, but it is not quite clear 
whether all were in Helsinki or some at Hanko. 
70 E 1, E 8, E 9, E 19, C 26, C 27, C 35, according to Vitikka, "Britit Itämerellä 
1500-1700-luvuilla" ("The British in the Baltic Sea"; in fact, Vitikka writes rather 
much of the 19th and 20th centuries, and not much about the 16th-18th centuries). 
commander of the Russian Baltic Fleet, Rear Admiral A.P. Zelenoi, 
left Helsinki on 28 April on board his flagship, the Pamiat Azova. 
Admiral Meurer reported: "In loyal comradeship-in-arms with the 
army we completed our task. Thus we have succeeded in making a 
further move in our fight for naval domination against the English".71  
In reality, it was a step against Russian naval might, which had 
been rendered powerless by the revolution, but, of course, might have 
put up some fight if sufficiently provoked. Without German help, the 
White Finns might have found the Russian ships a problem hard to 
tackle. Now the Russian navy had been pushed to the eastern end of 
the Gulf of Finland, behind the walls of Kronstadt. 
In the land campaign, the battle of Tampere had ended in White 
victory on 6 April, and the German landing and occupation of the 
southern parts of the country rendered the situation of the Reds 
definitely hopeless. The Karelian Isthmus was cleared, the Red 
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	 government escaped to Russia with twenty thousand supporters, and 
the last Russians were massacred in Viipuri at the end of April. The 
last Reds were flushed out in the Kymijoki valley during the first 
week of May. 
To counter the admiration for the German liberators in southern 
Finland, Mannerheim organized a victory parade by his peasant army 
in Helsinki on 16 May 1918. Killing arrested Reds continued for a 
while, but the majority of them (about 80,000) were collected in 
prisoner-of-war camps, where about 12,000 of the starved prisoners 
died of typhus and influenza. Many of the survivors were amnestied 
in the autumn, but agitators, leaders and those guilty of crimes were 
retained. 
The Bulgaria of the North 
The Ostseedivision stayed in Finland for the summer and autumn of 
1918. Mannerheim disapproved of the German presence, especially 
their influence in the organization of Finnish troops from volunteer 
bodies into a regular army, because his authority suffered, and, even 
more significantly, he understood that the Germans had plans of their 
own for Finland. The Senate, however, believed that constant German 
71 	 von Meurer s.d. (April 1918), BA—MA RM 5/v 1034, Finnland vom Januar 1918 
bis June 1918. 
support was vital for Finnish independence in case of a Russian 
revival, which Finland could not withstand alone. To ensure German 
support, Finnish conservatives proposed the election of a German 
prince as King of Finland, and Prince Friedrich Karl of Hesse accepted 
the nomination. Monarchy or 'a strong government' was also preferred 
to prevent any revival of mob rule or Red terror; and there were 
people ambitious to become courtiers, of course. 
The new Finnish army was organized into three infantry divisions 
and a jäger brigade, with peacetime strength of 25,000 men. General 
von der Goltz was the chief military adviser with the title of 'German 
General in Finland', and Colonel von Redern was influential, too, as 
the chief of the Finnish staff. Their commission, confirmed by the 
Finnish Minister of War Thesleff,72 was to secure German interests in 
the organization of the Finnish army.73 
The situation in Finland was thus quite propitious for German 
interests, but in the Gulf of Finland problems remained because the 	 383 
Russians had been allowed to save their ships. Meurer and the Baltic 
naval commanders would have liked to keep the Posen and the 
Westfalen, but the big ships were ordered back to their home base in 
Jade. The remaining light craft and minesweepers guarded the 
passages and harbours in the Gulf, under the command of Admiral 
von Usslar at Libau, who had the title 'Commander of the Baltic 
Waters', Befehlshaber der Baltischen Gewässer. 
Some hope or wish existed that the Red sailors might sell their 
ships, and later, by the end of the summer, Russian monarchist officers 
took up the idea. They told the Germans that Trotskii, under the 
influence of the English, had ordered the ships to be blown up to 
avoid leaving them to be captured, and the officers said that they 
preferred a German internment of their ships in order to save them 
for a future Imperial Russian fleet. On the other hand, the German 
Foreign Office proposed that the Soviet government should comb out 
the British agents from their crews and the German embassy at 
Moscow should enlist reliable agents instead; thus the Russian ships 
72 	 Wilhelm Thesleff, a Finnish-born colonel in the Russian army, was wounded and 
taken prisoner-of-war in the conquest of Riga, joined the Jägers and tried to rival 
Mannerheim. 
73 	 Dienstanweisung 29. VI 1918 für den Chef des deutschen Generalstabes beim 
finnischen Heere oberst von Redern (signed by Wilh. Thesleff). BA—MA RM 5/v 
2705, Laufende Marine Politik. 
could be made to join the fight against the British on the Murmansk 
coast. The German Admiralty staff opposed these proposals, because 
they implied the possibility of a rebirth of the Russian Imperial fleet; 
it was better to let the Russians blow up their ships.74 Nothing came 
of these plans, any more than the similar British ideas in 1917, 
because the sailors had in fact no idea of selling any ships, and the 
Red terror soon liquidated the monarchists. 
However, a couple of hospital ships and a few warships had been 
left in Finland and they were taken over by the Germans. They gave 
some of them to the Finns, who organized a navy of their own, under 
the guidance of the Germans, of course. Training for mine-sweeping 
was started at Santahamina on 16 May, and during the summer four 
flotillas were formed.75 
The German naval officers dreamed of a big role in Finland, 
comparable to that of the army officers. The chief adviser of an 
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	 independent Finnish naval commander-in-chief was to be Åltester 
deutscher Seeoffizier in Finnland' and simultaneously 'Marine-
vertreter bei den Kaiserlich deutschen Ministerresident', i.e. senior 
naval officer and naval attaché; lieutenant commander (Korvetten-
kapitän) Reuter was appointed to the post. But higher staffs considered 
that two senior officers were sufficient for the tiny forces of Finland, 
and in the end Reuter, as adviser to the Finnish fleet commander, 
Rear Admiral Johannes Indrenius, was placed under the orders of 
Colonel v. Redern.76 
At Brest-Litovsk, the Bolshevik government had undertaken to 
clear the navigation passages from mines, but the task proved insuper- 
74 	 Adm. Stab to OHL 3. V 1918, BA—MA RM 5/v 3986; Embassy in Moscow to 
AA 25. VII 1918, Reichs-Marine Amt to Adm. Stab 9. IX 1918, BA—MA RM 
5/v 2701; Adm. Stab to Hochseeflotte 13. IX 1918, BA—MA RM 5/v 3919. 
75 Vorschlag für die Sitzung mit Vertreter der finnischen Regierung der 
Seefahrtsabteilung 24. IV 1918. BA-MA RM 5/v 4467, Finnland vom 1 Mai bis 
7 juni 1918. Each of the flotillas consisted of 10-15 minesweeping boats, a couple 
of tugs, and a bigger tender; memoirs of a participant: Lieto, "Meriemme 
miinanpuhdistustyön alkuvaiheita v. 1918", (Minesweeping in 1918), pp. 314-16, 
333-34. 
76 	 Vorschlag zur organisation der Küstenverteidigung Finnlands, s.d. (July 1918) 
BA—MA RM 5/v 1034; Über Organisation der Finnischen Marine s.d. (July 1918) 
BA—MA RM 5/v 4468 
For the Finnish point of view see: Mattila, "Organisaatiokysymyksiä 
merivoimiemme perustamisvaiheessa" & "Merivoimiemme alkutaipaleelta" pp. 
15-23 & 96-107; Mattila, "Suomen laivastovoimien vaiheista ennen itsenäisyyden 
aikaa". (The Foundation of the Finnish Navy). 
able for the Red fleet, not least because the Finns would not allow 
any Bolsheviks in their waters, nor had the Germans any wish to see 
a Russian naval revival even in the form of minesweeping trawlers. 
Therefore Russians were freed from the obligation, but then there 
emerged a problem over the charts of the minefields, which the 
Russians said they had lost." 
A further problem was the possession of the fort of Ino after the 
conquest of the Karelian Isthmus. The Finns demanded that the Russian 
garrison should leave the fort, but the Germans thought that because 
Kronstadt could easily be bombarded from Ino, that demand might drive 
the Russians into desperation. Instead, the Finns should demand as a 
compensation, said the Germans, the fjord of Petsamo on the Arctic coast, 
and perhaps also Murmansk. In the opinion of the German Admiralty 
staff, even that was too little: the Finnish border should be moved to 
Lake Onega and the White Sea, in the German interest's 
Then the garrison of Ino blew up the fort and left the ruins for the 
Finns, but a further disagreement arose about territorial waters. The 
Bolsheviks mined the approaches to Kronstadt and Petersburg, which 
provoked a German protest. The argument was that the Gulf of 
Kronstadt measured eleven miles and in Brest the Bolsheviks had 
promised not to mine international waters, i.e. outside the three-mile 
limit. The Russians claimed all the waters to the east of Suursaari—
Someri—Vidskär were included in their minesweeping area, and no 
foreigners could be allowed in the vicinity of their base. For their 
part, the Finns would not let their islands be included in the Russian 
area, and the Germans wanted to control the Gulf of Kronstadt to 
prevent any surprises by the Russian warships — they always feared 
a provocation by the ever-present British agents.79 
77 Much detailed documentation is in BA—MA RM 5/v 2701, Laufende 
Marine-Politik Ostsee vom Februar 1918 bis Juli 1919; BA—MA RM 5/v 3966, 
Ostsee, 0-Angelegenheiten vom 1. V 1918 bis 30. VI 1918; BA—MA RM 5/v 
4976 nachrichten über die feindliche Flotte und Küstenbefestigungen; BA—MA 
RM 5/v 4996, Politik Russlands, die russische Revolution. 
78 Holtzendorff to OHL 16. V 1918, BA—MA RM 5/v 3986; Bericht des 




Records of these discussions, with innumerable uninteresting details, are included 
in the dossiers BA—MA RM 5/v 2701 Laufende Marine-Politik Ostee vom Februar 
1918 bis Juli 1919; 2767 Militärpolitische Angelegenheiten Russland; 3920 
Militäpolitische Angelegenheiten Nordstaaten; 3987 Ostsee 0-angelegenheiten 
1.VII-31.X 1918. Trotskii and his sailors were not, of course, British agents, any 
more than Lenin was a German one. 
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Grandiose dreams 
In the summer of 1918 the Germans had a few difficulties with their 
two friends the Bolsheviks and the Finns. They invited the two parties 
to Berlin and tried to help them negotiate. To make possible the 
pacification of the east and encourage the Bolshevik government to 
fight against the British in the north, Finnish expansionist dreams 
about East Karelia were restrained for a while; but the Finns wanted 
no peace without the liberation of all Karelia. 
The idea of a Greater Finland was well in accordance with the 
temper of times; all Europe was dreaming of a Greater Rumania or 
making a Yugoslavia out of Serbia or redeeming Italia irredenta or 
recovering the lost provinces of Alsace and Lorraine, nor to speak of 
Polonia rediviva. The eastern border of Finland, which had delimited 




For the Activists, it seemed natural that the Eastern Karelians should 
to be liberated along with the rest of the Finnish people. They had 
been governed by Russians since the conquest by Novgorod and they 
were Orthodox Christians, but they should have been Finns if only 
they had known what was best for them. The arguments for a Greater 
Finland were that the inhabitants of East Karelia spoke a dialect of 
the Finnish language, the national epic, the Kalevala, had been 
collected there, and the country belonged geologically to 
Fennoscandia, not to the Russian plain. The annexation of East Karelia 
made sense economically, too, because of the immense forests, 
mineral resources, water-power and fishing waters of the region; by 
these prospects the Activists tried to stir up German support for their 
dreams. The annexation was also supposed to make the defence of 
Finland easier on the three narrow isthmuses, one between the Gulf 
of Finland and Ladoga, another between Ladoga and Onega, and the 
third between Onega and the White Sea. 
There existed a few East Karelians who strove either for the 
independence of their country or for joining Finland, and who were 
encouraged by the Finnish interest. In June 1918, they took the town 
of Olonets for a while, and there were scattered risings against the 
Bolsheviks. On the other hand, Finnish workers constructing the 
Murmansk railway and Red Guards, who had escaped from Finland, 
formed a detachment to fight against the White Finns, who crossed 
the border in the North. This body was enlisted in June 1918 by the 
British expedition and was formed into a Murmansk Legion to fight 
against the German-supported White Finns and the Bolsheviks. 
The Activists argued that Germany had every reason to take East 
Karelia or to support Finland in its annexation, for Britain was certain 
to steal the province; tsarist Russia had allowed her ally to take 
Murmansk as a base.80 
While the German government and the OHL kept the Finns on the 
leash during the summer of 1918, the German Baltic naval staffs 
continued planning for Finnish co-operation in the naval war. The first 
task was to occupy the coastal fortresses vacated by the Russians at 
Hanko, Porkkala, Sveaborg and Koivisto. Thus not many men were 
left to man the few surviving ships of the former Russian Baltic fleet. 
In addition to the minesweeping flotillas, which already existed, a 
torpedo boat flotilla and a coast guard flotilla were planned to give 
the Finns a naval force against their malevolent neighbours. On 1 
October 1918, the gunboats Karjala and Turunmaa with the torpedo 
boats S 1, S 2, S 3, S 4 and S 5 steamed out to sea and "for the first 
time the Finnish national flag flew above the open sea".81 Finland was 
thus an ally comparable to Bulgaria (as Wetterhoff had enthused), 	 387 
which could be allowed national symbols of its own, not being an 
occupied Reichsland like the Baltic provinces where all manifestations 
for national feeling were denied. 
An annex to the Brest treaty was signed on 27 August 1918, 
whereby Soviet Russia promised to expel the British from the country, 
while the Germans were not to allow the Finns to attack Petersburg 
meanwhile. But as the autumn of 1918 drew closer, it was seen ever 
more clearly that the Bolshevik government had probably no wish 
80 Finnland im Lichte des Weltkrieges, von Friedrich Wetterhoff, Berlin 1916. 
BA—MA RM 5/v 5000 Nachrichten über Finnland. — Wetterhoff was the fiery 
representative of the Finnish Jäger movement in Berlin, apt to be carried away 
by fantastic visions, but these features were common to all Finnish nationalists. 
It is to be stressed that the economic aims were of interest mainly as lures for 
the Germans; the nationalists were no businessmen themselves. cf. Churchill, 
Jääskeläinen, Nevakivi. 
81 Aftonbladet 2. X 1918, Hufvudstadsbladet 9. X 1918; cuttings from the 
Swedish-speaking newspapers were pasted in the German reports, BA—MA RM 
5/v 1034, Finnland vom Januar bis June 1919. 
The guard ship Golub was taken in April by the Germans, rechristened the Beo 
but given to the Finns in November and called the Uusimaa; the Pingvin became 
the German Wulf and then the Finnish Hämeenmaa, Chinok became the 
Turunmaa, the Filin the Karjala, the minelayer Voin was rechristened the M 7 
and then the Louhi, the minesweeper Zashchitnik became the T 2 and then the 
Vilppula, the Fortral became the Rautu, and the motor coastal minelayers the 
Loimu, Paukku, Lieska, and Pommi were originally Russian T-boats. A few 
captured ships were later returned to Soviet Russia, e.g. the minesweepers the 
Gruz, Kaps 'ul, Krambol, Plamia, and seven torpedo boats out of the ten captured. 
and certainly no capability to prevent the British and their Russian 
and Finnish auxiliaries from advancing southwards from Murmansk 
and Archangel. 
Reports from Petersburg told of political tension, demonstrations, 
lack of bread, peasant disorders, monarchist plots, and looting by Red 
soldiers. Respectable people were hoping for German intervention: 
the Baltic Provinces, Lithuania and the Ukraine had been liberated, 
even Finland. Only Great Russia remained in misery. Desperate 
Russians prayed for help from their previous enemies; they would be 
eternally grateful if Germany would help them, but if not, the British 
with their unlimited means would put up a new government in Russia 
and make Russia wage war against the Germans. The British were 
said to be organizing a local independent republic out of the Karelian 
districts of Viena and Olonets to prevent the Germans from getting 




the Czechs, Serbs, Latvians, Cossacks and Russian White mercenaries 
could be made to fight against the Germans!' 
Reports of the British influence continued to be alarming — if the 
military and naval staffs really believed them; they may also have 
been provoked by the staffs, to provide arguments for their wish to 
intervene in the east. The essential goal of the OHL was included in 
the promise in the treaty of 27 August to come and help Soviet Russia 
if it should be unable to fulfill its engagements. 
The Bolshevik government would not allow any German help to 
arrive through Petersburg; such a promise might have shattered any 
patriotic support the Soviet power enjoyed. But there existed no way 
from the Baltic to Murmansk except through Petersburg — the roads 
from Finland through the forests could be used only by guerilla 
troops. 
However that may be, eight divisions were ordered to prepare for 
operation Schlußstein towards the east from Narva and Pskov, and 
the Baltic division in Finland also received orders to take part. A new 
Sonderverband under Vice Admiral Boedicker was formed. Five 
82 Agent reports and military and naval comments on them in BA—MA RM 5/v 
2767 Militäpolitische Angelgenheiten Russland; 4066 Russland 1.IV 1918-22.X 
1918; 4998 Politik Russland, Die russische Revolution vom 15. September bis 19 
November 1918; Die Militärpolitische Lage in osten 15. VII 1918, Grosses 
Hauptquartier 4. VIII 1918, Grosses Hauptquartier 15. VIII 1918 (memoranda), 
BA—MA RM 5/v 1435, Nachrichten Russland Allgemeneines, vom April 08 bis 
September 1918. 
cruisers (the Regensburg, Stralsund, Strassburg, and Frankfurt in 
addition to the Kolberg which already belonged to the Baltic fleet) 
and numerous torpedo boats were transferred to Koivisto in the Gulf 
of Finland, while the dreadnoughts Ostfriesland, Thüringen, and 
Nassau remained waiting in Kiel, and the light forces continued 
sweeping the Gulf of Finland free of mines. 
At the end of August and beginning of September, Boedicker sailed 
to the east to inspect the preparations. A landing detachment was 
formed for the conquest of Petersburg, and naval support for the army 
was planned for the crossing of Lake Ladoga and the transport of 
supplies.83 Of the enemy, it was known that a few warships — one of 
the Novik class, two torpedo boats, one submarine, six minelaying 
boats — had been transferred to Ladoga, but in the first half of 
September they were already docked for the winter. On the Onega, 
there were four torpedo boats and four motorboats, but they were 
immobile because their sailors opposed any operations.84 
Thus the German army and navy had taken the Baltic provinces 
and Finland from Russia; the Baltic was again a German sea. German 
might was on the doorstep of the former Russian capital, which was 
threatened from Narva, from Viipuri and from the Gulf of Finland. 
The Swedes, worried about the threatening German—British conflict 
in Finland, tried to make the Germans promise not to advance to the 
Murmansk coast, so that the British could leave the region. But for 
the German navy, the Arctic coast was the ultimate goal of 
intervention in Finland, and it could be reached only by aiding the 
Finns to liberate their Karelian brothers. Then, because they would 
be too weak to defend their conquest against a revived Russia, they 
would remain dependent on Germany and would allow the German 
navy into their Arctic harbours." 
Ludendorff agreed with the idea of letting Finland annex the Arctic 
coast. The region along the Murmansk railway was to be Finnish, but 
the fate of the Kola peninsula would be discussed later. Finns could 
83 	 Adm. St. 24. VIII 1918; Kaiserlich Deutscher Marinevertrer, Helsinki 15. IX 1918 
BA—MA RM 5/v 3987 Ostsee 0-Angelegenheiten 1. VII.-31. X.1918. 
84 	 Angeblich zuverlässige Meldung 30. VII 1918; Zuverlässiger Helfer berichted 26. 
VIII 1918; Nachrichtenstelle Helsingfors 9. IX & 17. IX; Zuverlässiger Agent No 
65 2. X 1918; Zuverlässiger Gefährsmann 10. X 1918. BA—MA RM 5/v 4978, 
Nachrichten über die feindliche Flotte und Küstenbefestigungen. 
85 Correspondence of Auswärtiges Amt and Admiralstab 11. IX — 13. IX 1918. 
BA—MA RM 5/v 2752 Militärpolitische Angelegenheiten Finnland. 
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develop the coast, but German capital should be given concessions 
there for forestry, sawmills, and harbour installations.86 
Plans for permanent German influence in Finland, and for effective 
exploitation of Finnish and Karelian raw materials and markets, were 
drafted by political and business circles in Germany, though they had 
no immediate influence on military and naval operations.87 
The staff of the Sonderverband estimated that since no decision 
could be reached on the Western front or in the North Sea, it had 
been a sensible move to direct naval operations to the Baltic. But it 
was only the first step. With the conquest of the Murmansk coast and 
the establishment of a naval base there, Britain would no longer be 
able to prevent German ships from reaching the Atlantic Ocean. 
Russia's contact with the West would be cut, and submarine operations 
from the north would break the British blockade of the German Bight 
and the coast of Flanders. The Entente understood these facts and that 
390 	 was why they had invaded the north of Russia.88  Finland would be the 
solution to the German strategic problem on the war of two fronts.89 
The Admiralty Staff agreed with Meurer, and his staff continued 
to develop these ideas even after the Admiral had left the Baltic, and 
again Ludendorff agreed. The full value of Finland as an ally would 
only be realized when its territories were extended to the Arctic coast. 
It would be a favourable factor in the Great War, and, after the war, 
Finnish access to the Arctic Ocean would be economically useful for 
Germany.90 
86 	 OHL to Adm. Stab 24. V 1918, BA-MA RM 5/v 3988, Reichs-Marine-Amt to 
OHL 10. IX 1918, BA—MA RM 5/v 4648. 
87 Nurmio, Suomen itsenäistyminen ja Saksa (The Finnish Independence and 
Germany); Rautkallio, Kaupantekoa Suomen itsenäisyydellä; Saksan 
sodanpäämäärät Suomessa 1917-1918 (German War Aims in Finland) 
88 Bericht des Befehlshabers des Baltische Gewässer 16. VI 1918; Über die 
Verhältnisse in Finnland 10. VII 1918, BA—MA Rivi 5/v 2701; Meurer 29. IV 
1918, BA—MA RM 5/v 1034. Beiträge fur ein aufzustellendes Marineabkommen 
mit Finnland, Korvettenkapitän Brun 12. IX 1918. BA—MA RM 5/v 2705, 
Laufende Marine Politik, Marine Konvention Finnland. — The naval treaty, which 
would have made these plans official, could not be concluded in time before the 
German defeat in November, but the preliminaries reveal the direction of ideas 
among the military and naval leaders. 
89 	 Kiep, Saksan laivaston toiminta Suomen vapaussodassa keväällä 1918 p. 11 (The 
Activity of the German Navy in the Finnish War of Liberation in the Spring of 
1918. — Doktor Kiep served as a staff officer in the Sonderverband). 
90 Holtzendorff to OHL 19. V 1918. BA—MA RM 5/v 3986. OHL remarks to 
Reichs-Marine-Amt 10. IX 1918. BA—MA Rivi 5/v 4648. 
The end of the German Empire 
Everything was ready for the operation Schlußstein and plans for 
victorious submarine warfare from the Arctic base had been sketched 
out, which also implied aiding the Finns to seize the East Karelia. 
But the Great War had exhausted Germany, too. The German army 
in the west turned from advance to retreat. Bulgaria, the southern 
model for Finland, had collapsed by the end of September, and the 
troops collected for Schlußstein were sent to the South, though they 
arrived too late. Austria had needed propping up for a long time. In 
the end, Ludendorff himself lost all hope. 
The Finns realized that they had trusted the losing power in the 
Great War and rapidly changed sides. Mannerheim was called back 
to service as Regent, and succeeded in persuading the victors that 
Finland was, after all, on their side. The Finns, the most eager 
Germanophiles excluded, minded Finland's interests and sought aid 
wherever it was obtainable. 
The King-elect, Friedrich Karl, ceased to learn Finnish, and the Baltic 
division left Finland, the last troops on 12 December 1918, to continue 
fighting for a while on the southern side of the Gulf. General von der 
Goltz was honoured in speeches of gratitude by the Finns for his 
contribution to the liberation of Finland from the Reds and Russians. 
The Germans had insufficient time to carry out their plans for the 
exploitation of Finland. Finland had been a grateful and eager vassal, 
and the fate reserved for it in German plans has become known only 
subsequently. 
THE NAVAL ENEMY FOR THE LAST 
TIME 
In November 1918 the Royal Navy arrived and German hegemony 
was replaced by an intrusion of the British Empire into the Baltic. It 
was only with the consent of the victorious enemy that the Baltic 
Division could be transported away from Finland.91 Thus both the 
Russian and German empires were practically extruded from the Baltic 
91 	 Telegrams from Copenhagen and Christiania 24. XI 1918, BA—MA RM 5/v 2701. 
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Sea and the coastal lands by the ancient 'naval enemy' of the Russian 
war plans. 
Western intervention and local conflicts 
As Imperial Russia lost her will and ability to fight, Britain, France, 
the USA and even Japan had tried to prop her up materially and 
spiritually, with ammunition from their stores and with propaganda 
for their war aims. After the Bolsheviks defected from the Entente, 
the Allied involvement grew into a military intervention, first to 
restore a White government to continue Russia's fight against the 
Central Powers, and then to contain the Red revolution. 
As we saw above, a British expedition to the north landed at 
Murmansk and Archangel in March 1918 to guard the stores of 
military material the allies had sent there. Its aims were to encourage 
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	 the Russians to build up a new Eastern front to prevent the flow of 
German divisions to the Western front, and finally to help rid Russia 
of the Bolsheviks.92 There the local Pink if not quite White Soviets 
joined the interventionists. Strengthened by the Murmansk Legion and 
other half-starved auxiliaries — hunger was more important for the 
local people than ideology — the interventionists cautiously advanced 
southwards towards Onega and Vologda during the summer.93 But the 
northern Russian counter-revolutionary governments were never able 
to stabilize their position, nor to make contact with the main White 
forces in Siberia or in south Russia. Fighting went on in 1919, with 
varying success. War-weariness increased among the British soldiers 
and sailors, while the Bolshevik force grew with their success in the 
civil war on other fronts. In February 1920, the Reds conquered 
Archangel and, in March, took Murmansk. For Finland, the main 
significance of the Allied forces in the north was, in 1918, that they 
drew the German interest towards Finland, as recounted in the 
previous chapter, and, in 1919, prevented the Finns from taking 
Russian or East Karelia. 
92 	 Maynard, The Murmansk Venture, pp. 2-6, 311. Later research has not been able 
to add much to General Maynard's explanation, though of course the Soviet 
historians have not agreed with his statement that the English had ample 
justification for their imperialist intervention in Russia. 
93 PRO ADM 1-8550-29, Baltic/Arctic reports, Naval situation in the Arctic, 
February 1919. 
A British squadron under Rear Admiral Edwyn Alexander-Sinclair94 
made a short visit to the eastern end of the Baltic Sea at the end of 
1918 to give naval support to the local nationalists against the 
Bolsheviks. The British caught two Novik-class destroyers, the 
Spartak and Avtroil, of the Red fleet off Reval and gave them to 
Estonia,95 and were congratulated for their further success by the 
recipients.96 The Finnish government also offered icebreakers to help 
British warships at Reval in January 1919,97 obviously with a wish to 
make the Royal Navy better disposed towards the import of grain into 
Finland. There was hunger in Finland after the two chaotic years of 
1917 and 1918 (though not comparable to the famine in Russia), and 
American aid was badly needed, but did not arrive until 1919. 
In spite of the Bolshevik recognition of Finnish independence on 
31 December 1917, a state of war had existed between Finland and 
Russia since the Finnish civil war in 1918, though Finland did not 
officially intervene in the Russian civil war. 
Mannerheim, who can be regarded as one of the Russian White 
generals,98 might have dreamed of participating in the conquest of 
Petersburg to earn the gratitude of the future Russian White 
government, while the Finnish Activists deemed the situation 
favourable for promoting the Finnish liberation of the Finnish people 
in Russian Karelia. Now, in contrast to the Jäger years, the Activists 
were silently approved of by the industrialists, who dreamed of the 
immense virginal forests beyond the border. 
After sporadic raids from Finland to Russian or East Karelia in 
1918, in April 1919 a semi-official volunteer expedition went to 
Aunus (Olonets), the southern region of Karelia, to aid the inhabitants 
94 With the light cruisers Cardiff, Caradoc, Calypso, and seven destroyers. 
95 Rechristened the Vambola' and Lennuk. Later the Estonians also took over the 
gunboats Bobr', Sputnik and Imperator, rechristening them the Lembit, Laene and 
Vanemuine. Conway's, p. 415. 
96 PRO ADM 12 1620 Digest 52 Russia: Congratulatory Messages from Estonia, 
Protest by Russian Soviet Government against the capture of certain vessels by 
Estonian Provisional Government with the help of British forces in the Baltic. 
97 PRO ADM 1620 A Digest 52 Russia, Carriage of Foodstuffs from America to 
Finland, 9 January 1919, Ice Breakers for warships arriving at Reval, offer of 




	 Luckett, The White Generals, pp. 125-153 "General Mannerheim and the Finnish 
victory"; pp. 299-306, 314-22 "Yudenich". Mannerheim had always maintained 
contact with his family in Finland and had no difficulty in becoming a Finn again. 
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against Russians, but the Red Army soon drove them back into two 
parishes in the vicinity of the Finnish border. There was also a rising 
in Viena, in the northern region of Karelia, with a few Finnish 
volunteers to help, perhaps even to instigate the movement. The 
British expedition with their local auxiliaries advanced from 
Murmansk southwards against the Bolsheviks. Their presence made 
clear to official Finland that annexation would be possible only with 
Western permission, which was not forthcoming. It seems that when 
foreign Powers had acknowledged the independence of Finland, while 
not defining its area, they had implied recognition only of the borders 
of the Grand Duchy, not ethnic Greater Finland. Thus no official 
support could be given to the volunteer expeditions to Aunus and 
Viena, though they received arms from the Finnish army.99 
An expedition to make Ingria Finnish also took place, but was 
easily repulsed by the Reds. Extending Finland to the very suburbs 
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	 of Petersburg was an even more unrealistic attempt than trying to 
liberate Karelia. 
Many of the Red Guards who had escaped from Finland in 1918 
to Bolshevik Russia joined the Red Army to earn their living and 
fought on many fronts during the Russian civil war, first of all against 
the Finnish intruders in Karelia,100 where they contributed to the 
restoration of the Bolshevik Empire in these bleak regions. Similar 
local detachments from various nationalities were seen on the many 
fronts in the Russian civil war, the most notorious of which were the 
Latvian riflemen. They were originally regiments in the Imperial army, 
which had joined the revolution as organized units and were used as 
life guards for Bolshevik dignitaries and as shock troops for the 
99 Itkonen, Muurmannin suomalainen legioona (The Finnish Musrmansk Legion), 
Nevakivi, Muurmannin legioona; suomalaiset ja liittoutuneiden interventio 
Pohjois-Venäjälle 1918-1919 (The Murmansk Legion; Finns and the Allied 
Intervention in northern Russia); Churchill, Itä-Karjalan kohtalo 1917-1922; 
Itä-Karjalan itsehallintokysymys Suomen ja Neuvosto-Venäjän välisissä suhteissa 
(East Karelian Autonomy in Finnish-Soviet Relations). Nygård, Itä-Karjalan 
pakolaiset 1917-1922 (East Karelian Refugees in Finland); Nygård, Suomalainen 
äärioikeisto maailmansotien välillä (The Finnish Extreme Right Between the 
World Wars). 
100 "Finskie internatsionalisty", p. 628; "Internatsionalnye formirovaniia Krasnoi 
armii: 3-i finskii kommunisticheskii polk, 6-i finskii strel'kovyi polk, 480-i finskii 
strel'kovyi polk", p. 236. Grazhdanskaia voina i voennaia interventsiia v SSSR; 
entsyklopediia. Salovaara, "Suomalaisrykmentit Venäjän kansalaissodassa" 
(Finnish Regiments in Russian Civil War). 
Tsheka.101 One can only try and guess how the civil war in Finland 
might have ended if Bobrikov had not dissolved the Finnish rifle 
battalions in 1901; probably some of them could have survived the 
Great War and might have been infected by Bolshevism, as the whole 
Russian army was. 
The Royal Navy takes over in the Baltic Sea 
The Imperial German troops left Estonia by the end of 1918, 
destroying all communications and leaving the country in chaos. A 
red Estonian-Russian army advanced close on their heels. In January 
1919, the British squadron with their gunfire aided the Estonians 
against the Bolsheviks, but were forced to withdraw by the 
approaching winter. The British also gave arms and munitions, but 
they had no land forces to help the Estonian Provisional government, 
which had difficulties in organizing defence forces of its own. 
Responding to a call for help, the Finnish government consented to 
send volunteers, in all nearly 4,000 men (regular troops were only 
then being organized in Finland and were necessary for the defence 
of the Finland's own borders). The Reds were soon pushed back, and 
after a landing by the Estonian navy, i.e. in captured Russian ships, 
led by Admiral Johan Pitka, Narva was taken on 17 January. Estonians 
and Finns also fought Latvian Bolsheviks while the Latvian army had 
to fight Russian Reds and Whites as well as the Germans on their 
southern border. 
The Finnish expedition to Estonia was not meant so much as an 
act of Finnish expansion as help to a sister nation. But securing the 
southern side of the Gulf against a Russian re-conquest was in the 
Finnish interest, and the expedition also demonstrated a Finnish wish 
to side with the Western victors who were intervening in the Russian 
civil war and supporting the Baltic countries. The volunteers were not 
quite unanimous, nor perfectly disciplined; some of them wanted to 
liberate Petersburg, others would have preferred to destroy the city 
which had usurped Finnish land along the Neva, and one regiment 
even waged an independent war behind the Red lines. There was a 
big-brother attitude among many Finns towards their southern 
101 	 Berzins, The Latvian Riflemen. — I am obliged to Dr Marko Nenonen for pointing 
out this book to me. 
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neighbours, very much irritating to the Estonians, as was also the 
loutish drunken behaviour of the Finnish volunteers in their free 
time.102 
Free Estonia was stabilized and the Provisional Government was 
replaced by a constituent assembly in April 1919. Another attack by 
the Bolsheviks was repelled in May. 
In the navigation season of 1919, a stronger British naval 
detachment was sent to the Baltic, first to keep an eye on imperial 
German troops and Baltic German Freikorps in the Baltic Provinces 
(General von der Goltz among them). The Germans naturally enough 
regarded these provinces as their own, as they had since the thirteenth 
century. The feudal oppressors were resented by the local peoples and, 
as previous enemies, were suspect to Western governments. For a 
while, the Germans were tolerated, though not welcomed, to secure 
the local defence against the Reds, but after the Versailles treaty had 
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	 been signed, they were repatriated in the autumn. Many Germans 
and Balts joined a 'West Russian army' established in Courland under 
Prince Bermondt-Avaloff in the autumn of 1919, but the adventure 
ended in a total failure.'o3 
The Senior Naval Officer in the Baltic in 1919 was Rear Admiral 
Sir Walter Cowan, whose light cruisers had been based mainly at 
Harwich during the war years.104 He took over Libau from the local 
German Freikorps, and also based some of his forces in Reval. Cowan 
102 Sillanmäki, "Pohjan pojat Viroa vapauttamassa", Sotilasaikakauslehti 4/1997, pp. 
58-63. 
103 General von der Goltz dreamed of a German settlement of the 'rich empty fields' 
in the east, 'without hurting the Letts', and hoped with Bermondt's help to restore 
Russia in German sphere of interest. von der Goltz, Toimintani Suomessa ja 
Baltianmaissa (My Mission in Finland and in the Baltic Provinces). For a Soviet 
Russian view, see: "Germanskaia interventsiia v Pribaltike i Belorussii 1918" and 
"Germanskaia interventsiia v Sovetskoi Rossii", Grazhdanskaia voina i voennaia 
interventsiia v SSSR; Entsiklopediia, pp. 146-148. 
104 Bennett, Cowan's War. — Before the Great War, Admiral Cowan had served with 
Kitchener in the Sudan, and he later retired in 1931 at the age of sixty, but in 
the Second World War rejoined an Indian Cavalry Regiment in the North African 
desert, escaped from an Italian prisoner of war camp, and continued his war with 
the Commandos on the Yugoslavian coast. cf. Fitzroy Maclean, Eastern 
Approaches, Penguin Books 1991 (1949). — 
In all 238 ships were involved in the Baltic operations of 1918-20, HMS Cardiff 
being the flagship. The light cruisers Ceres and Coventry visited the Baltic 
1918-19, the Curacao was damaged in May 1919, and the Curlew, Danae, and 
Dragon took part in operations in 1919, but it is difficult to compile a complete 
list in the absence of the relevant documents. 
was instructed by the Admiralty to control trade in the Baltic Sea and 
to support British policy in the Baltic Provinces105 — an order implying 
confidence in the ability of the Admiral, very different from the 
detailed instructions we have seen binding the Imperial Russian 
defenders of Finland. There were difficulties in deciding what was to 
be the British policy; the small Baltic states were useful allies against 
the Bolsheviks, but would have been an embarrasment if the expected 
revival of the Old Russia had taken place.106 
The first naval task, inherited from the Germans, was to sweep the 
navigation passages free from mines between the principal harbours 
of Danzig, Tallinn, Helsinki and Viipuri. Trade was thus made 
possible, and also allowed, between the Baltic countries and with 
neutral and allied countries, then also with Germany on ships under 
1600 tons. t 07 
First, the British fleet mainly kept an eye on the unruly Germans 
in the Baltic provinces and their moves between Danzig and Libau, 	 397 
but soon the Admiral had more to worry about with the Bolshevik 
fleet. It is true that the Russian ships which had escaped from Helsinki 
to Kronstadt in the previous year suffered badly from lack of crews. 
Sailors, the 'flower of revolution', had been sent all over the vast 
country to stiffen the Red Guards and the Workers' and Peasants' 
Red Army against the White counter-revolution and foreign 
intervention.108 With officers liquidated and the fleet under the 
sailors' mob rule, the ships were badly neglected. 
Nevertheless, the Bolsheviks got over the loss of their destroyers 
and succeeded in raising steam in a few ships to form a deistvuiushchii 
otriad sudov or 'active detachment', the dreadnought Petropavlovsk 
among them.109 They steamed towards the West, but turned back 
before they came within range of the British cruisers' guns. The Red 
ships probably tried to provoke the British to pursuit them into the 
105 PRO ADM 12 1619 B 50 Orders for Force Operating, 24 May 1919. 
106 So it is not quite fair to say that the policy was "a muddle", as Bradley, Civil 
War in Russia 1917-1920" does, p. 144; it was the situation that was not clear. 
107 PRO ADM 1 - 8550 -29 Baltic/Artic reports, 13 February 1919, 12 April 1919; 
Channels in Baltic and Gulf of Bothnia, publication of, to mariners, and navigation 
in; PRO ADM 12 1619 B 50 Gulf of Finland, preparation for minesweeping. 
108 "V ogne revoliutsii", "V gody grazhdanskoi voiny", Tri veka rossiiskogo flota. 
vol. II, pp. 128-61, 162-244. 
109 In addition to the Petropavlovsk, the old battleship Pamiat Azova, the cruiser 
Oleg, five destroyers and four submarines. 
mine fields in the Gulf, where, indeed, the British did lose one cruiser 
and had another put out of action. Clashes first took place in May,110 
and during the summer two destroyers and one submarine were lost 
to mines. The main British aim was to prevent the Bolsheviks from 
conquering the small Baltic countries and to aid the anti-Bolshevik 
Russian land forces." Like their German predecessors, the British 
also hoped to capture Russian ships,"2 but the Bolshevik sailors had 
no intention of surrendering their vessels. In fact, discipline was 
improved in the Red fleet under Trotskii, though their ships remained 
few in number and lacking in operational ability. The British captured 
a few run-down ships discarded by the retreating Russian fleet in the 
previous year. 
In order better to keep an eye on the Bolshevik fleet in Kronstadt, 
a base was organized at Koivisto with the permission of the Finnish 
government. Permission was gladly accorded, and the local authorities 
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	 did their best to help their British guests. The Finns were happy and, 
in fact, also lucky in having lost both their Russian Imperial 
connection and their German friends, who were replaced by the naval 
British Empire, much more disinterested and less oppressive — or at 
least more distant, and in fact rather weak in 1919. 
The Finns eagerly to their their originally, basically Western 
orientation (the West had comprised of Germany as well as of France 
and England). The Allies only demanded that the Finns desist from 
the German orientation in their foreign and internal policy. The 
Finnish Social Democratic party had been revived in the autumn of 
1918, undisturbed by the Red radicals, who were at the time 
establishing their own Finnish Communist Party in Moscow. In free 
elections in the spring of 1919, moderate republican parties — Liberals, 
Agrarians, and Social Democrats — won a majority in Parliament. 
110 PRO ADM 12 1620 Digest 52 Russia: Action Between Bolshevik and HM Ships 
May 31st, increased efficiency of the Bolshevik naval forces. 
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	 The most recent Russian naval historiography regards the activity of the Red fleet 
as a defence against the attack organized by the Western Powers in support of 
Koltshak's operations in Siberia, of Estonian and Russian White attempts on 
Petersburg and Finnish White action in Olonets, v. Tri veka rossiiskogo Hota, vol. 
II, pp. 172-73. There is no sense in discussing whether any operation is aggression 
or defence, but the Finnish expedition to Olonets was not at all approved of by 
the West. It has obviouly been difficult for the Russian naval writers to liberate 
historiography from war-time suspicions and Soviet propagandist views. 
112 PRO ADM 12 1619 B 50, 20 April 1919, Disposal of Bolshevik Fleet in event 
of Capture. 
Finland was no longer purely White, to the regret of the former 
Activists and Jägers. 
Britain acknowledged Finland as an independent country on 6 May 
1919, the USA on 7 May, and France reconfirmed her recognition on 
12 May. Finland was recognized as it had existed as a Grand Duchy, 
i.e. including Åland, but with no encouragement for the annexation 
of East Karelia. The constitutionalist liberal leader K.J. Ståhlberg was 
elected President on 25 July 1919, while only a minority supported 
Mannerheim, the other candidate. 
Though not intervening in Russian affairs, Finland did not abstain 
from friendly moves towards the British, as we saw above. A Finnish 
flotilla of light craft was also based at Koivisto, where the 
Waffenbrüderschaft of the previous summer evidently did not disturb 
the new comradeship-in-arms. In minesweeping operations, the 
Finnish navy suffered their first losses, too, but did not take part in 
fighting the Russians at sea. 
Feats of light forces 
The British used Coastal Motor Boats for secret-service operations. 
Agents boarded the boats at Koivisto or Terijoki and were landed 
behind the Red lines.' 13 The importance of such ventures is difficult 
to estimate; they probably did not achieve much, but kept the Tsheka 
on its toes until it was able to undermine and destroy all opposition 
in Bolshevik Russia. 
Cautious Finnish politicians regarded good relations with the future 
Russian White government as important, but no intervention against 
the Red usurpers was undertaken. The Finnish leaders demanded 
guarantees for Finland's independence, the annexation of East Karelia, 
and the Arctic harbour of Petsamo as preconditions for any 
intervention. As the Russian White leaders refused to acknowledge 
even Finland's separation from the Empire, not to speak of any Greater 
Finland, no operations could be undertaken to aid them. 
In June 1919, encouraged by rumours of the approach of the British 
fleet and White Russian forces from Estonia, the crew of the Bolshevik 
fort at Krasnaia Gorka revolted. Red ships from Kronstadt bombarded 
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	 Agar, Baltic Episode, A Classic of Secret Service in Russian Waters. A nice book, 
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British intervention in the Baltic Provinces and in the North in 1919-20. 
After their victory in the West, the Allies replaced the German influence in the Baltic region to 
fight the Red menace, but their operations were complicated by lack of sufficient strength and 
by local nationalist ambitions. 
the fort and Russian Whites demanded British help for the rebels. 
Because of the minefields, ships could not be sent close enough, and 
after a while the fort was taken by the Bolsheviks and the rebels 
massacred.14 
114 It is true, though, that Tri veka rossiiskogo jlota vol. II, p. 175 does not know 
During the summer, the British continued their operations against 
the Red fleet. At the end of July 1919, they attempted an air attack 
with seaplanes from HMS Vindictive on Kronstadt to bomb Bolshevik 
ships. The fragile aicraft with their small bombs and without bomb 
sights did not cause much damage, but the pilots took photographs of 
the naval harbour, and the attack drew the attention of the defenders 
to the sky, instead of to the horizon. 
British MCB's from Koivisto, led by Lieutenant Commander 
Augustus Agar, had succeeded in torpedoing the Bolshevik armoured 
cruiser Oleg on the night of 16-17 June. Admiral Cowan decided to 
make an end of the Bolshevik threat in the Gulf with this new 
promising weapon. 
The raid was carried out on 18 August to immobilize the heavy 
ships of the Bolshevik fleet so that Cowan's cruisers would be able 
to deal with the lighter ships. The attack succeeded, the defenders 
were suprised, the Pamiat Azova was sunk, the Petropavlovsk 
damaged, as was the pre-dreadnought battleship Andrei Pervozvan-
nyi.15 A couple of CMB's were lost and a few of their crews arrested 
by the Bolsheviks, freed only after long and difficult efforts by the 
British Foreign Office. Of the intended victims, the dreadnought 
Respublika was not hit, nor were the armoured cruisers Riurik or 
Baian; but it seems that the attack discouraged the Red sailors, because 
no further naval activity of the Red fleet could be observed for a long 
time afterwards. The CMB's also mined access passages to Kronstadt, 
and on 21 October the destroyers Azard and Gavriil were sunk by 
these mines. 
Again, the approaching winter compelled the British ships to 
withdraw from the eastern end of the Baltic. The last ships left 
Koivisto on 28 December, at the last moment, indeed; at the request 
of Admiral Cowan to the Finnish President, the Finns stayed one day 
more, and lost three of their eggshell torpedo boats crushed by ice, 
without any loss of life.»  
Meanwhile, Russian counter-revolutionary attempts had been 
organized by General Iudenich with his staff in Helsinki but with 
anything about the fate of the rebels. 
115 PRO ADM 12 1620 A Digest 52 Russia, Attack, Cronstadt Naval Harbour, Report 
of SNO, Baltic, on combined sea and air on, 18 August 1919. 
116 Thus they did not spend "an extremely uncomfortable" winter frozen in, as Agar 
said, p. 251. 
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troops in Estonia, encouraged by a British military mission led by 
General Sir Herbert Gough. In July 1919, Iudenich's troops together 
with Estonian and Ingrian detachments, supported by Estonian 
warships on the Gulf flank, advanced from Narva to Gatchina, but 
had to retreat before a Bolshevik counterattack, until the main body 
of Estonian troops were transferred from Latvia to stop the Reds. 
General Iudenich tried a new offensive towards Petersburg in the 
autumn. Again Jaama (Iamburg), Gatchina, and Krasnoe Selo were 
approached as well as Krasnaia Gorka from the sea, but the Bolsheviks 
fought off the attack at the end of October 1919. In November, 
Iudenich's troops were dissolved, and a Russian-Estonian cease-fire 
came into force on 31 December. 
Cowan regarded the Baltic situation as stabilized and sent most of his 
cruisers home, while the remaining squadron was based in Copenhagen. 
Finns and Estonians praised the assistance given by the British 
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	 fleets,'" and were extremely sorry to see the Royal Navy leaving their 
neighbourhood, because they felt the need of British assistance in 
organizing their defence against Bolshevik Russia.18 They asked that 
part of the Baltic force should winter in the Gulf of Finland, or even 
that a few ships should be permanently posted in either capital, 
Helsinki or Tallinn, but to this the Admiralty did not consent.19 
The Finns had been very strongly pro-German up to 1918, and their 
strong feelings in 1919 for the Entente may be wondered at. In his 
memoirs, Captain Agar explains that the sympathy of the Finns and 
Estonians for Cowan was due to the fact that the Admiral was there 
to work for their national independence.120 
Of course, Britain did not work for Finnish or Estonian 
independence, but for her own interests, nor had the Finns been so 
much pro-German or pro-Entente as pro-Finland. Because of their 
117 PRO ADM 12 1620 B Digest 52 Russia, Publication of article 9 December in 
Finnish papers on praising assistance given by HH Ships. 
118 PRO ADM 12 1620 A Digest 52 Russia Finnish Navy, As to instruction of _, 




PRO ADM 12 1620 A Digest 52 Russia Baltic withdrawal of British Naval Forces, 
Finnish opinion 17 September; Re peace negot. Soviet and Estonia, request that 
some of HM ships may be sent from Copenhagen to Reval, Admiralty cannot 
bind themselves to maintaining HM ships indefinitely at Reval 18 December 1919; 
British squadron in Estonian Waters, Estonian Government request that MH 
Government will prolong the stay of the _, 5 December 1919. 
120 Agar, p. 240. 
worry about a Russian restoration or revival they sought support 
wherever they could find it, and so did the Baltic nations.'2' 
A still-born Empire 
There was yet another attempt at an Empire to replace Germany and 
Russia in the Baltic region. Under Jozef Pilsudski, the reborn Poland 
dreamed of restoring her ancient greatness. The twenty-seven million 
Poles were the biggest nation in East Central Europe, but felt inferior 
and uncertain between twice as many Germans and four times more 
numerous Russians. Pilsudski in Warsaw planned a federation of 
Poles, Lithuanians, Latvians, White Russians and Ukrainians, strong 
enough to withstand the pressure from either side. He seems to have 
thought that Finland in the north was the second nation in strength, 
having cleared up its own internal upheaval in the spring of 1918, 
having long traditions of national self-government, an army tried in 	 403 
battle, and enjoying international recognition. Poland might have 
supported a Finnish annexation of East Karelia at the time Poland was 
acquiring the borders it had had before 1772. To make the plan even 
more palatable to the Finns, Pilsudski proposed leaving Estonia in a 
Finnish sphere of interest, and forming a Finno-Polish tutelage over 
Latvia. 
The scheme was launched successfully. At Versailles, Germany was 
made to give Posnania and Upper Silesia to Poland, and Danzig made 
a 'free' city to create access to the sea for Poland. In the east, Russia's 
internal chaos made Poles confident of their ability to take the 
Ukraine, White Russia and Lithuania. 
A certain interest in Pilsudski's scheme was shown in Helsinki,'" and 
Konstantin Pats, the Estonian Prime Minister, might have consented to 
co-operation with Finland because it could have increased Estonia's 
security against Germany and Russia. But he would hardly have 
countenanced the subordination suggested by Pilsudski. 
121 Polvinen, Paasikivi, valtiomiehen elämäntyö (The Life of Paasikivi, the 
Statesman), vol. II, pp. 23-89 a most solid and balanced treatment of the peace 
negotiations. 
122 Hovi, Olavi, The Baltic Area in British Policy, 1918-1921; vol. I: from the 
Compiegne Armistice to the Versailles Treaty, 11.11.1918-20.1.1920; Hovi, 
Kalervo, Cordon sanitaire or barriere de I'est? The emergence of the new French 
eastern European alliance policy 1917-1919; Hovi, Kalervo, Interessensphären 
im Baltikum; Finnland im Rahmen der Ostpolitik Polens 1919-1922. 
In March 1920, war broke out between Poland and Red Russia. 
The Poles advanced to Kiev in May and their grandiose plans seemed 
to be coming true, but then in July the Red Army drove the Poles 
almost back to Warsaw. However, the Red Army had overstreched 
its forces, too, and with French advisers and munitions the Bolshevik 
hordes were beaten back. Greater Poland remained a dream, but 
neither had the World Revolution advanced. The Bolshevik regime 
covered a diminished Russian Empire and had to be satisfied with 
constructing Socialism in one country only. 
The Royal Navy was still present on the Baltic Sea, but these inland 
adventures were of more concern to the French with their idea of 
establishing a little Entente to provide support against a future German 
threat. 
Free from the threat in the West, and after the increasingly war-
weary interventionists had desisted from their attempts, the Red Army 
404 	 chased away the last White troops from the Crimea. 
The nations in Russia's former western frontier provinces realized that 
the Bolshevik power was permanently established in the Kremlin. A 
Russian-Estonian peace treaty was signed on 2 February 1920, the border 
drawn roughly along the ethnic divide of Estonians and Russians. 
In 1920, Estonia was able to revive from the long struggle — from 
Bolshevik agitation, from masses of refugees, from internal political 
uncertainty, and from undue Finnish influence. Its constitution was 
confirmed on 16 June and in January 1921 Konstantin Päts was elected 
President, Riigivanem. 
The West had taken their time before recognizing Estonian as well 
as Latvian and Lithuanian independence de jure, waiting for a White 
restoration in Russia and perhaps a federation of the various separating 
parts of the former Empire. When it was clear that no Russian White 
power could be resurrected and that the Entente peoples had no wish 
to continue intervention in the east, Britain's remaining interest was 
stability in the Baltic region and free trade with the countries there. 
France tried to erect a cordon sanitaire of small border states against 
the Red epidemic after the weakness of the White counter-revolution 
became apparent. Estonia was recognized de jure by France 26 
January 1921. 
The Lithuanian—Soviet peace treaty was signed on 12 July 1920, 
and the Latvian—Soviet one on 11 August. In the Russian-Polish peace 
treaty of Riga on 12 October 1920, White Russia and the Ukraine 
were divided between the two powers. Polish troops took Vilna from 
the Lithuanians, who had to make Kaunas (Kovno) their capital. 
Russo-Finnish negotiations had also been started but they were 
delayed, because of the quarrel about national self-determination in 
East Karelia as well as the discussion of the neutralization of a few 
small Finnish islands in the Gulf of Finland in the passages to 
Kronstadt. It was only after the Poles had been chased out of Kiev 
that the Helsinki government desisted from their dreams. With the 
position of the Bolshevik government ever stronger, Finland had to 
give up even the two parishes still occupied by Finns in East Karelia. 
In the Karelian Isthmus, the border remained where it had stood since 
1812, only twenty miles from Petersburg, and access to Petsamo on 
the Arctic coast was given to Finland as promised by Alexander II in 
1864. The border between the Imperial and the Grand Ducal 
administrations was transformed into an international border. The 
Finnish-Russian peace treaty was signed on 14 October 1920.123 
Finnish nationalist adventurers tried to seize Viena between October 
1921 and February 1922, but their attempt did not attract even 
semi-official support and was doomed to fail. This venture had no 	 405 
imperialist backing from the West, as was believed by the suspicious 
Russians even seventy years later in their historiography.124 
A Greater Finland could not be realized, and was not, in fact, even 
attempted seriously, excepting by rather weak extreme nationalists, 
who had no support in the moderate centre and left parties, i.e. 
Progressive Liberals, Agrarians, and Social Democrats. 
The story of alien Imperial armed forces in Finland ends with the 
present chapter, since in 1919-20 no Russian armed forces, Imperial, 
Bolshevik or White, existed in Finland, except in East Karelia if this 
area is accepted as part of ethnic Finland. Happily, the German Empire 
had fallen, too. After having materially aided in sweeping away the 
confused remains of the previous Empires, the Royal Navy of the 
British Empire had left their bases in Helsinki and Koivisto at the end 
of 1919, and even their indirect influence diminished with the 
disarmament in the West after the Versailles peace treaty. Apparently 
at the height of their power after the victory in the Great War, the 
British had in fact exhausted their economic and industrial strength 
and stood at the beginning of their Imperial decline.'25 
123 Jukka-Pekka Pietiäinen, "Suomen ulkopolitiikan alku" (The Beginning of Finnish 
Foreign Policy), Itsenäistymisen vuodet 1917-1920, vol. III, pp. 252-472. 
124 "Interventsiia antanty na severe", Grazhdanskaia voina i interventsiia v SSSR, 
Entsyklopediia, p. 232. 
125 	 Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery, p. 315. 
Conclusion 
The Imperial Russian army and navy were garrisoned in Finland in 
1808-1918, for 110 years. The garrison was not strong, at least in the 
opinion of its commanders. There were frequent changes, but usually, 
in time of peace, there was one infantry division, increased to an army 
corps when necessary. The country far to the North beyond the Baltic 
Sea was in fact not tempting enough for any naval enemy as long as 
the defending forces maintained their cohesion and discipline, which 
406 	 in turn depended on the vitality of the Imperial regime in Russia. 
The strategic aim of the Finnish and Russian troops in Finland and 
the Baltic fleet was to defend St Petersburg against an enemy who 
might try to land in Finland and advance towards the Imperial capital, 
as Sweden had done in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. On 
paper, in the Russian war plans, Finland was not to be defended for 
her own sake, because the country was important mainly in closing 
the approaches from the Baltic Sea through the Gulf of Finland, while 
the western parts of the country were considered too distant and 
strategically unimportant. But when real war broke out in 1914, the 
foremost defence-line was pushed to the very coast, although rear 
positions were also prepared in case retreat became necessary. 
The task of the garrison had also been to defend the throne, that 
is social order and Imperial sovereignty. The Russian presence in 
Finland was not an occupation, and even less a reign of terror. Killing 
people is the business of soldiers, but the Imperial Finnish and Russian 
troops did not need to kill anyone if, by their mere presence, they 
fulfilled their purpose here: they reminded the population of the 
respect that was due to the regime; military force was always the last 
resort in securing social and political order. 
The Russians in Finland were rather isolated from local society, 
not so much by their military profession as by their religion, language 
and culture. Russian enlisted men always remained aliens among the 
Finns. At first, among the gentry or aristocracy, no ethnic difference 
existed, but with the emergence of nationalism the Finns draw aloof 
from the Russians. Finnish detachments were first included in the 
Imperial army, but after 1878, while the national service battalions 
belonged to the Imperial armed forces, they were no longer part of 
the Russian army. 
There were everyday commercial relations between the garrisons 
and their surrounding communities, few marriages but numerous 
shorter liaisons, often for pecuniary consideration. The army was also 
used for marking occasions of Imperial importance with parades, 
which were demonstrations of force, with a political and military 
purpose, but also esthetically satisfying and emotionally inspiring. The 
barracks were part of the garrison town architecture and monumental 
proofs of Imperial might. The military bands revived musical culture 
in Finland, military training was part of education in the country, 
strategic necessities dictated the direction of some of Finland's 
railways, the army and navy bought many things in the country — 
from ships to nails — and paid for them, even if they also made the 
Finnish State pay millions into the Imperial treasury. A few soldiers 
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left their genes in bastard children to increase the number and the 
quality of the population, while many Finns also served in the Empire 
and reached high positions there; some of them became Russified but 
many maintained ties with the country of their origin. 
Not many military or naval men emerged from the mass — in the 
documents — as individuals; war plans and memoranda, though signed, 
were identical in their contents, details, and style. Only those who 
were detached from the purely military sphere came to be known in 
the country, for example, Ramsay, Bobrikov, Schauman, Seyn or 
Mannerheim. The presence of the troops in the country did not cause 
any perceptible degree of Russification even if a few tradesmen in 
the garrison towns learned some Russian. The few Russians or other 
nationalities who settled in the country after their service, were apt 
to become Finns over the years. 
The essential feature of an army, corps, division or regiment, is 
that it is an organized and disciplined hierarchy. It is not an horde 
or a mob, and it acts as ordered, not on its own initiative. Most of 
the lower ranks probably had not chosen to come to Finland, far away 
from their homes, but were ordered there by the Emperor and his 
generals, and their feelings and thoughts were not recorded in the 
official army and navy documents. A detailed social, demographic 
and economic as well as everyday history of the Russian garrison 
remains to be written. 
Russia's conflicts in other directions caused difficulties for Finland, 
too, though Finns had not much interest in the Near, Middle or Far 
East. The Imperial Russian navy had not been strong enough to 
prevent the 'naval enemy' from harming Finnish merchant fleet and 
harbours in 1854-55, but in 1914-17, though the dreadnoughts were 
a wasted effort, the Baltic fleet kept the aggressor away from the Gulf 
of Finland with modem weapons — minefields and heavy coastal guns. 
The enemy did not dare to approach the Finnish coasts until 1918, 
when the Imperial army no longer existed. 
Finland formed a glacis for the defence of St Petersburg. To secure 
this purpose, the country was administered separately from the Russian 
ministries, which guaranteed peace in the border country and the 
loyalty of its inhabitants. Finland in turn was protected by the Imperial 
might, and the border country was able to live in peace for more than 
one hundred years and grow from a Swedish province into what was 
in fact a Finnish national state under Russian sovereignty. Modem 




	 The loyalty of the Finns proved in 1854-55 made it possible for 
the Monarch to grant them an increasingly autonomous political 
system, which reinforced their national identity. When the Russian 
authorities noticed their mistake, it was too late; Finnish nationalism 
could not be revoked by the methods of the tsarist regime. It is 
probable, though, that the development of Finnish nationalism would 
have resulted in separatism, whatever the Russian policy might have 
been; this was, after all, the era of nationalism everywhere. Perhaps 
the 'Russian oppressor' was necessary for educating the Finns into a 
nation. 
From 1891, the Imperial government, nervous because of the 
separate national development of Finland, tried to extinguish 
separatism in the autonomous system of administration and make it 
an obedient organ of Russian power. The inhabitants of Finland had 
no intention of rising against their monarch until they thought that 
Nicholas II had broken his oath to respect the Finnish constitution. 
The juridical substance of the constitution was hazy, and totally 
contradictory views were held on it by Finnish constitutionalists and 
Russian nationalists at the end of the nineteenth century. From that 
time onwards the military staffs had no end of trouble in preparing 
countermeasures against supposed separatists, whose separatism had, 
in fact, been provoked by the measures themselves. The measures 
planned against a rising were not applicable to the general strike in 
1905. After that, until the war broke out, the memory of the paralyzing 
strike gave no peace to the generals, who had to plan for a war on 
two fronts, against the Finns and the Germans. 
Finns, who had been used to thinking that their country was an 
autonomous state in union with Russia, abandoned their loyalty 
towards their perjurer monarch, and by 1914 some Finns would have 
preferred the German enemy to the Russian defender of the country. 
However, for a while, the Russian army made all separatism hopeless, 
in spite of the growing dissatisfaction and separatism among the 
inhabitants; the Jäger movement in 1915-16 was a desperate gamble. 
Until the end of the summer of 1917, the Imperial navy — with its 
fleet and coastal fortresses — kept the enemy away from Finnish coasts 
and the army maintained Russian sovereignty in the country. 
The 22nd Army Corps, trained to defend the border country, was 
sent to die on other, more important fronts, and its successor, the 42nd 
Corps, was never tested in battle. It seems that even at its strongest 
it had too few troops dispersed too far from each other, guarding every 
possible direction, difficult to assemble in a counter-strike had the 
enemy appeared. Fortunately for the corps, the Germans could spare 
no thought, ships or troops for a flanking operation over the Baltic 	 409 
Sea and through Finland against St Petersburg, nor did the Swedes 
ever intend to join their Germanic kinsmen of the Central Powers. 
Though spared the experience of trench warfare, the personnel of 
the 42nd Corps changed often enough to be infected by the general 
war-weariness of their compatriots. Soldiers at the front were not the 
most eager revolutionaries, but men in the rear detachments and ships 
at anchor were the first to refuse to obey orders; this made revolution 
possible. 
Happily for the Finnish nation, the 'Finnish question', finliandskii 
vopros, was a symptom or one example of the innumerable and 
intractable problems with which the tsarist regime was faced. Russia 
could not be transformed into a modern unified national state, and 
acting a great power involved the Empire in the Great War, which 
only increased the problems so that the whole Empire with its army 
faced dissolution in 1917. Finns, deemed unworthy of military service, 
were spared the massacres on the Eastern Front, but could not escape 
the economic and social strains caused by the war, or the consequent 
revolution. 
The constitutional self-government, slowly developed from 1809 to 
1899, was gladly restored by the Provisional Government in the spring 
of 1917, but soon the revolution turned more radical and violent. 
The dissolution of the Imperial regime transformed the disciplined 
troops into soldier mobs and let loose their potential of violence. First, 
sailors of the Baltic fleet killed their officers, and then, in the autumn, 
a few soldiers joined Finnish hooligans in killing about thirty members 
of the bourgeoisie, and there was plenty of less extreme violence. The 
power vacuum was instantly filled by rival volunteer guards from the 
different components of Finnish society, and speeded up their 
polarization towards a civil war. The soldiers and sailors had no 
quarrel with the Finns; most of the killing was done by Finns 
themselves in 1918. 
Though unable to prevent social problems sharpening, the Western 
inheritance rendered possible the divorce from Russia in constitutional 
order and at the right historical moment, when Russia was at its 
weakest. The tradition was also strong enough to restore an organically 
developing social order instead of a radical Socialist experiment under 
Bolshevik influence. 
The weakening of the Russian Empire made German aspirations 
grow so that in 1917 Finland was included in their war aims and in 
1918 they sent their forces to intervene in the Civil War. The operation 
coincided rather well with the earlier expectations of the Russian 
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	 defence plans, only there was no longer any one to deny access to 
the invader. 
The main importance of the German armed intervention was to 
shorten the Finnish Civil War, to make the White victory definite, 
and to expel the numerically strong Russian Baltic fleet from the 
country. The German presence was welcomed by the Whites as a 
guarantee against a future revival of Russian power or popular 
disorder. Because the Germans were defeated elsewhere, they never 
had the chance to fulfil their own plans of domination in the country, 
so that Finns remained thankful for their unselfish help, and hoped 
for more, in vain in 1939-40, but successfully in 1941-44, against 
the same enemy. 
The British and the French Imperial armed forces in 1854-55 
caused havoc on Finnish coasts and among Finnish ships, which made 
Finns more loyal and trusted subjects of their Grand Duke. 
In 1914-18, the British Empire had no immediate influence on 
Finland, but it contributed, together with Russia, France and America, 
to the German fall in 1918, which freed the Finns from their 
protectors. 
In 1919-20 it was the turn of the British Empire to dominate the 
Baltic, but they had no reason to intervene in Finland after the country 
had dissociated itself from Germany, and allowed the Royal Navy to 
use its harbours and bases to attack Red Kronstadt and control the 
capitulated Germans. Great Britain seemed at the peak of her power, 
victorious in the Great War, and previous German colonies now 
coloured pink on the map. In fact, Britain, too, was exhausted by the 
four years of total war. Britain sent its navy but no army contingents 
to the Baltic, and the very small detachments in other theatres of the 
Russian civil war were soon withdrawn. 
History does not end at any 'historical' moment, but the ensuing 
events are outside the limits of the present story.' Russia was for two 
decades involved in her internal social experiments and it was only 
in 1939 that she could attempt to take back what she had lost. Thus, 
for a while, the border states were left independent and without the 
presence of any alien armed forces; they formed part of the Western 
world into which they had grown during the previous millennium. 
It is not certain that history has any direction or meaning; perhaps 
it just happens. There is no way of knowing what might have been 
the result if there had been no Russian garrison in Finland. With 
enormous sums of money, metal and men, perhaps even more of 
paper, the Empire had garrisoned its border country for eleven decades 
and secured the Imperial capital. The subject people was allowed to 
grow into a nation, but in the end tsarism managed to create an image 
of a hateful Russian in Finnish minds. The White Finn was probably 
equally hateful for the Reds. The memory of the difficult final phase 
of the Russian period in Finnish history troubled the Finnish-Russian 
relations for a long time afterwards. 
One of the impulses for writing this story was hearing the allegation 
that the Russian oppression in Finland was due to military reasons. I 
hope that I have been able to show in this book what were the military 
reasons behind the Imperial policy in the border country both before 
and during the said period; that it was not understood in the military 
staffs as oppression; that the soldiers and generals were not able to 
dictate the Russian policy though they were part of the governmental 
machinery; and that the military policy was partly formed by 
nationalist feelings, not only by rational considerations. 
But explanations are always partial and tentative, seldom 
conclusive, sometimes ridiculous; in the end, history may be 
inexplicable: "one damn thing after another" 2. The hasty and crude 
Marxist theory went out of fashion with its sponsors, the Soviet tank 
divisions, and it seems that the conclusion of an evolution scientist is 
I 	 For an up-to-date (August 1997) review of recent research of Soviet-Nordic 
relations, see: Sovjetunionen och Norden — konflikt, kontakt, influenser. Historial-
linen Arkisto 110:1, red. Sune Jungar & Bent Jensen. Finska Historiska 
Samfundet, Helsingfors 1997. 
2 	 as a critic described my writing. 
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applicable to history, too: "Reality in all its messy particularity is too 
complicated to theorize about [...] we can be certain that there are 
realms of no doubt fascinating and important knowledge that our 
species [...] will never enter [...] because the Heat Death of the 
universe will overtake us before we get there".3 
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3 	 Daniel C. Dennett, Darwin's Dangerous Idea; Evolution and the Meanings of 
Life, Penguin Books 1996 (Allen Lane, London 1995), p. 383, 497. 
Annex 
NAVY UNITS DURING THE 
WINTER OF 1916-1917 
Source: RGAVMF, fond 418, opis 1, 
delo 515, svedeniia o zimnoi 
dislokatsii sudov Baltiiskogo flota 20. 
II 1917 
HELSINKI 





IInd brigade (pre-dreadnoughts) 
— Andrei Pervozvannyi 
— Imperator Pavel I 
— Slava 








3rd destroyer division 
— Leitenant Il'in 
— Kapitan Izilmet'ev 
5th destroyer division 







6th destroyer division 
— Turkmenets Stavropolskii 
— Donskoi Kazak 
— Ukrainets 
— Voiskovoi 
7th destroyer division 
— Vynoslivyi 
— Vnimatelnyi  
— Inzhener-Mekhanik Dmitriev 






















auxiliaries of destroyer division 
— transport Kama 
— transport Oka 
— Vodoleino 2 
— gunboat Khivinets 
— auxiliary Tshaika 
— auxiliary Astarte 
— auxiliary Krechet 
1st guardship division 
— Kortun 
— auxiliary Kobiaik 






3rd guardship division 
— minesweeper Kitoboi 
— minesweeper Nevod 
— minesweeper Named 
— minesweeper Garpun 
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— minesweeper Iakor 
4th guardship division 
— minelayer Deksna 
— minelayer Lovat 
— transport Vyterga 
auxiliaries for guardships 
— steamer Zeia 
— steamer Buria 
— steamer Irtysh 
detachment of minelayers 
— minelayer Narova 
— minelayer Amur 
— minelayer Usta 
— minelayer Lena 
auxiliaries for minelayers 
— blockship no. 2 
— blockship no. 4 
— blockship no. 9 
— barge no. 44 
414 	 - barge no. 49 
— steamer no. 1 
— barge no. 5 
1st minesweeper division 
— auxiliary no. 214 
— auxiliary no. 215 
— auxiliary no. 216 
— auxiliary no. 217 
— auxiliary no. 218 
— auxiliary no. 219 
— auxiliary no. 220 
— auxiliary no. 222 
2nd minesweeper division 
— minesweeper Udamik 
— minesweeper Zapal 
— minesweeper Minrep 
— minesweeper Sashchitnik 
4th minesweeper division 
— minesweeper no. 18 
— minesweeper no. 19 
— minesweeper no. 22 
— minesweeper no. 103 
— minesweeper Kometa 
— Cheka 
5th minesweeper division 
— minesweeper no. 2 
6th minesweeper division 
— minesweeper no. 8 
8th minesweeper division 
— minesweeper Alesha Popovich 
— minesweeper Sviatogor 
auxiliaries for minesweeper divisions 
— transport Zaryv 
— hospital ship Nautilus 
— steamer no. 6 
communications service  
— auxiliary Porazhaiushchii 
— auxiliary no. 104 
— auxiliary no. 119 
— training ship no. 120 
— auxiliary Nevka 
freighter detachment 
— coaler Az 
— coaler Buka 
— coaler Vedy 
— coaler Glagol 
— coaler Dobro 
— coaler Est' 
— coaler Zhivoto 
— coaler Zemlia 
— coaler Izo 
— coaler Kako 
— coaler Leda 
— coaler Mistede 
— coaler Nash 
— coaler Pokoi 
— coaler Rtsy 
— coaler Slovo 
— coaler Tverdo 
— coaler Anadyr 
— ammunition transport Riga 
— ammunition transport Snariad 
— refrigerator ship Velikii Kniaz Alek-
sandr Mikhailovich 
— repair ship Tatiana 
— repair ship Tamara 
— barge Aramais 
— transport Alfavit 
— transport Alfa 
— transport Shcha 
Sveaborg fortress patrol 
— harbour ship no. I 
— harbour ship no. 2 
— harbour ship no. 3 
— harbour ship no. 4 
— harbour ship no. 5 
— harbour ship no. 6 
— harbour ship Stokfors 
— harbour ship Sekret 
— harbour ship Loviza 
— harbour ship no. 142 
— firefighting guardship Transgrund 
— firefighting guardship Ahkera 
— firefighting guardship Vuola 
— firefighting guardship Moriak 
— firefighting guardship Zaiava 
— icebreaker Tarmo 
— icebreaker Gorod Revel 
1st detachment of transport flotilla 
— transport Graf Tolstoi 
2nd detachment of transport flotilla 
— transport Vindava 
— transport Gogland 
— transport General Dragomirov 
— transport Myza 
— transport Kodyma 
— transport Linel' 
— transport Merkurii 
— transport Mikhail Lund 
— transport Mitava 
— transport Nargen 
— transport General Skobelev 
3rd detachment of transport flotilla 
— transport Vera 
— transport Dagmar 
— transport Gagara 
— transport Rus' 
— transport Sekret 
— transport Hera 
— transport Hektor 
— netlayer Ob 
4th detachment of transport flotilla 
— transport Burlak 
— transport Vyborg 
— transport Vaza 
— transport Dolli 
— transport Kaleva 
— transport Tor 
auxiliaries 
— hospital ship Ariadne 
hydrographic department 
— transport Opisnoi 
— transport Promernyi 
— special auxiliary Orel 
— harbour ship Slavianka 
— harbour ship Mina 
— harbour ship Bura 
— transport Azimut 
— auxiliary Biomeborg 
— motor boat Indeks 
rescue patrol 
— rescue ship Asistans 
— rescue ship Protektor 
— rescue ship Hero 
pilot department 
— yacht Ekenes 
— steamer Kurs 
— steamer Sekstan 
— steamer Iupiter 
Finnish customs department 
— steamer Vartio 
Peter the Great Fortress waterfront 
— icebreaker Truvor 
— steamer Finland 
— lightship Nekmangrund 
— lightship Snimav 
— steamer Astrea 
— steamer Bastis  
— steamer Egir 
— tug Chemomorskii no. 1 
— tug Chemomorskii no. 2 
— tug Chemomorskii no. 3 
— tug Halla no. 6 
— tug Halla no. 7 
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— transport Tosno 
— gunboat Giliak 
1st patrol ship division 
— auxiliary Iastreb 
2nd patrol ship division 
— Voron 
minelayer detachment 
— minelayer Svir 
8th minesweeper division 
— minesweeper Ilia Muromets 
— minesweeper Potok Bogatyr 
— minesweeper Mikula 
— minesweeper Dobrynia 
communications service 
— harbour ship Silaia 
Peter the Great Fortress waterfront 
— lightship Libayskii 
special hydrographic service 
— harbour ship Posilnyi 
— steamer Soldat 
KOTKA 
— harbour ship Eros 
— harbour ship Il'za 
LAPPOHJA 
— harbour ship Tral' 
— harbour ship Gorizont 
TURKU 
4th submarine division 
— Minoga 
— Makrel' 
— Feldmarshal Graf Sheremet'ev 
— Kasatka 
— transport Khabarovsk 
— auxiliary Sputnik 
— gunboat Bobr' 
— minesweeper Il'men 
— blockship no. 3 
— auxiliary Roksana 
— auxiliary Stvol 
— auxiliary no. 128 
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— auxiliary no. 129 	 PORI 
— transport Kivito 	 1st patrol division 
— transport Kimito 	 — auxiliary Posadnik 
— steamer no. 4 	 — auxiliary Voevoda 
— steamer no. 7 	 — auxiliary Kondor 
— patrol boat Pumba 	 — auxiliary Berkut 
— patrol boat Lamfa 
— patrol boat Sneg 	 MÄNTYLUOTO 
— patrol boat Led 	 — icebreaker Sampo 
— patrol boat Nyrok 
— patrol boat Mezen' 	 RAUMA 
1st transport division 	 3rd detached minesweeper flotilla 
— auxiliary no. 212 	 — transport Kapella 
— auxiliary no. 213 	 — transport Poluks 
4th transport division 	 Finnish customs department 
— minesweeper n:o 7 	 — steamer Vikengen 
communications service 	 — steamer Bordvakhten 
— harbour ship Skatudden 
— harbour ship Gel'singfors 	 DEGERBY 
— motor boat Karpo-Kalk 	 — steamer Marlograf 
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— motor boat Klio 
— motor boat Inio 	 ORO 
— transport Tse 	 — lightship Storklubben 
— tug Revel-Riga 
— transport Alinda 	 REVAL 
special hydrographic service 	 1st cruiser brigade 
— harbour ship Sever 	 — Riurik 
— harbous ship Vostok 	 — Baian 
— harbour ship Zapad 	 — Oleg 
— harbour ship Kartushka 	 — Bogatyr' 
— motor boat Vazis' 	 Ist destroyer division 
— motor boat Viushka 	 — Pobeditel' 
pilot department 	 — Zabiiaka 
— icebreaker Murtaja 	 — Orfei 
— steamer Volna 	 — Grom 
— steamer Tral' 	 3rd destroyer division 
— steamer Vil'manstrand 	 — Avtroil 
— steamer Valvoja 	 — Priamislav 
Finnish customs department 	 — Gavriil 
— steamer Aura 	 — Iziaslav 
— steamer Falken 	 — Konstantin 
— steamer Vesta 	 4th destroyer division 
— steamer Nordner 	 — Sibirskii Strelok 
— icebreaker Avans 	 — General Kondratenko 
— steamer Dragsf'ord 	 — Okhotnik 
— Pogranichnik 
MARIEHAMN 	 6th destroyer division 
submarine division 	 — Steregushchii 
— auxiliary Okhrannyi 	 — Strashnyi 
— auxiliary Tememik 	 — Zabaikalets 
— patrol boat Shaiva 	 2nd submarine division 
— patrol boat Nalash 	 — Tigr 
— patrol boat Pistolet 	 — L'vitsa 
— patrol boat Pulia 	 — Pantera 
— auxiliary Neptun 	 — Rys' 
3rd submarine division 
— Kuguar 	 BALTISCHPORT 
— Smeia 	 5 steamers 
— Leopard 
4th submarine division 	 NARGEN 
— A.G. -11 	 2 steamers 
— A.G. -12 	 TSEREL 
— A.G. -13 	 2 ships 
— A.G. -14 
— A.G. -14 	 LOKSA 
— icebreaker Petr Velikii 	 I ship 
— icebreaker Tsar' Mikhail Fedorovich 
— icebreaker Ermak 	 PETROGRAD 
— cruiser Avrora 
WERDEN 	 — submarine Forel' 
7 auxiliaries 	 — submarine Ersh 
auxiliaries 
RIGA 
— gunboat Khrabryi 	 KRONSTADT 
3 steamers 
	
— destroyer Letun 
4 motor boats 	 school and training ships 
ROGSKÜL 
	
— battleship Imperator Aleksandr II 
8 steamers 	 VIIPURI 
— steamer Suomi 
UST-DVINSK 
— 	 gunboat Grosiashchii 
COASTAL BATTERIES OF THE NAVAL FORTRESS OF EMPEROR PETER 
THE GREAT on the Finnish coast 
no. name 	 commissioned number and calibre of guns (mm) 
20 Mäkiluoto 20. VIII 1914 3x205 
25 Hästö 16. VII 1914 4x152 
27 Russarö 6. VIII 1915 4x75A 
2x75A 
28 	 -"- 6x234 
59 Örö X 1915 4x120 
61 -"- XII 1915 4x152 
60 -"- 1916 4x305 
62 Utö V 1915 4x152 
63 	 -"- XII 1915 4x152 
64a -"- VIII 1915 2x75A 
64 	 -'- VIII 1916 3x152 
65 Lemland IV 1916 4x120 
66 Stora-Klubben IV 1916 4x152 
68 Skattaudd IV 1915 4x120 
67 	 -'- IX 1915 4x152 
69 Hamnö VII 1916 2x120 
70 Karlsö V 1916 2x120 
71 Aland V 1916 3x152 
72 Åland V 1916 3x152 
73 Åland V 1916 3x152 
74 Åland V 1916 3x152 
20 Mäkiluoto V 1917 4x203 
13. V 1917 3x57AA 
? ? ? 6x14" 
Source: Amirkhanov, Morskaia krepost' Imperatora Petra Velikago, prilozhenie 4 & 
5, pp. 72-74 
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DETACHMENTS QUARTERED IN 
THE GARRISONS IN FINLAND IN 
THE AUTUMN OF 1917. 
VIIPURI 






garrison of Viipuri 
1st Viipuri Fortress Infantry Regiment 
2nd Viipuri Fortress Infantry Regiment 
3rd Viipuri Fortress Infantry Regiment 
1st Taman Cossack Regiment 
4th Horse Battery 
Viipuri Artillery Regiment 
4th Kuban Cossack Artillery Battery 
Staff of 42nd Army Corps 
office of the quartermaster-general 
office of the staff officer of the day 
office of lines of communication 
corps medical office 
office of the artillery inspector 
office of the staff quartermaster 
office of the corps rear commandant 
corps baggage train 
2nd Mobile Gasoline-Autocar Stores 
Staff of Finland Composite Border Di- 
vision 
42nd Motor-Cycle Detachment 
staff automobile command 
office of former Vlth army automobile 
detachment commander 
army committee (Soviet) 
commandant's horse command 
commandant's company 
signals command 
soldiers' committee for special purposes 
fire brigade 
East Finland provisions detachment 
magazine 
Viipuri fortress cashier 
Viipuri railway station commandant 
office of Viipuri fortress controller 
office of Viipuri town commandant 
office of constructor and engineer of the 
Viipuri fortress 
4th Marching Company 
Siberian Reserve Sapper Battalion 
Office of the 4th Fortress Constructor  
fortress automobile command 
office of Viipuri fortress quartermaster 
Viipuri fortress cattle 
Viipuri fortress provisions magazine 
Viipuri fortress quartermaster's clothing 
store 
office of Finland wireless telegraph di- 
vision 
42nd Corps Wireless Detachment 
2nd Detached Stationary Wireless Stati- 
on 
Vyborg wireless telegraph station 
post and telegraph detachment 
46th Field Telegraph Detachment 
46th Field Post Office 
8th Telegraph Labour Column 
Office of the Chief of the 1st Lines of 
Communications Section 
one company of the 46th Lines of Com- 
munication Battalion 
office of the district military chief 
Viipuri fortress sanitation office 
1st Viipuri Fortress Temporary Hospital 
2nd Viipuri Fortress Temporary Hospi- 
tal 
Viipuri local hospital 
Viipuri fortress lines of communication 
veterinary hospital 
medical observation post 
Sanitary-Hygienic Detachment no. 57 
veterinary-disinfecting detachment of 
the former Vlth Army 
KUOKKALA 
4th Finland Border Guards Foot Detach- 
ment 
ANTREA 
328th Pskov Druzhina 
LAPPEENRANTA 
Staff of the Caucasian 5th Division 
1st Caucasian Cossack Regiment 
5th Caucasian Cossack Foot Rifle De- 
tachment 
3rd Line Cossack Regiment 
Staff of the 367th Minsk Druzhina 
367th Druzhina 
134th Machine Gun Detachment 
horse sapper detachment 
HAMINA 
2nd Reserve Regiment 
KOUVOLA 
Staff of the 32nd Smolensk Druzhina 
32nd Druzhina 
Marching Company of the 421st Regi- 
ment 
corps clothing store 
magazine 
KORIA 
local sapper depot 
MIKKELI 
4th Caucasian Horse Artillery Battalion 
Staff 
6th Caucasian Horse Battery 








424th Regiment Staff 
2nd Battalion/424th Regiment 
3rd Battalion/424th Regiment 
Staff of 2nd Battalion/106th Artillery 
Brigade 
6th Battery/106th Artillery Brigade 
Lines of Communication Company no. 
27 
3rd and 4th platoons of 3rd Company of 
46th Lines of Communication Batta- 
lion 
Staff of 38th Light Artillery Store 
38th Light Artillery Stores (part) 
air observer command 
HELSINKI 
Staff of 92nd Militia Brigade 
3rd Ekaterinodarsk Cossack Regiment 
office of district military chief 
office of Finland local brigade 
Helsinki convoy brigade 
office of chief of military transports 
office of railway station commandant 
office of town commandant 
office of quartermaster 
TUUSULA 
division baggage train 
TAMMISAARI 
34th Smolensk Druzhina  
TURKU 
4th Petrograd Border Guards Horse De- 
tachment 
HÄMEENLINNA 
1st battalion/424th Regiment 
40th Sapper Battalion 
Mobile Field Bakery No. 180 
fortress cattle 
corps provisions transport 
4th Magazine 
Military-Sanitary Transport no. 121 
Staff of the 391st Minsk Druzhina 
391st Druzhina 
signals detachment of the 106th Division 
Ist Hospital of the 106 th Division 
2nd Hospital of the 106th Division 
office of district military chief 
TOIJALA 
lines of communication veterinarian 
hospital of the corps 
veterinary-disinfecting detachment of 
the corps staff 
TAMPERE 
office of the corps engineer 
Staff of the 106th Division 
422nd Regiment Staff 
422nd Regiment 
1st and 2nd platoons of 3rd Company of 
46th Lines of Communication Batta- 
lion 
Lines of Communication Company no. 
2 
Staff of 12th (fortifications) Constructor 
Tampere local wireless station 
corps field cashier 
corps provisions magazine 
office of divisional commandant 
anti-gas command of the staff of the 
106th Division 
Military-Police Telegraph no. 13 
Staff of 106th Artillery Brigade 
division baggage train 
HARJAVALTA 




38th Light Artillery Stores (part) 
RAUMA 
3rd, 4th(2 guns), 13th, 15th Detached 
419 
Coastal Batteries 
post and telegraph detachment 
PORI 
2nd, 4th(2 guns), 5th Detached Coastal 
Batteries 
43rd Don Cossack Regiment 
106th Detached Mine Company 
3rd Artillery Stores 
3rd Petrograd Border Guards Horse De- 
tachment 




Staff of 1st Group of Stationary Batte- 
ries 




Staff of 2nd group of Stationary Batte- 
ries 
2nd Detached Baltic Horse Brigade 
Staff 
3rd Baltic Horse Regiment Staff and 1st 
Squadron 
2nd Petrograd Border Guards Horse De-
tachment 
3rd Finland Border Guards Foot Detach-
ment 
post and telegraph detachment 
UUSIKAARLEPYY 
7th, 18th Detached Coastal Batteries 
ILMAJOKI 
5th Artillery Battalion/106th Artillery 
Brigade 
PIETARSAARI 
5th, 16th Detached Coastal Batteries 
KOKKOLA 
6th, 17th Detached Coastal Batteries 
2nd Finland Border Guards Foot De-
tachment 
KASKINEN 
8th, 10th Detached Coastal Batteries  
KRISTIINANKAUPUNKI 
11th, 14th Detached Coastal Batteries 
post and telegraph detachment 
OULU 
33rd Smolensk Druzhina 
1st Petrograd Border Guards Horse De- 
tachment 
1st Finland Border Guards Foot Detach- 
ment 
UNDER THE COMMAND OF THE 
BALTIC FLEET 
(at the beginning of 1917) 
REVAL and MÄKILUOTO 
land artillery batteries, part of which 




two regiments of fortress artillery 
two sapper companies 
two mine battalions 
one aviation company 
one telegraph company 
428th Lodeinopole Infantry Regiment 
128th Infantry Division Stafff 
509th Gzhatsk Regiment 
510th Volkhov Regiment 
511th Sychev Regiment 




three military hospitals 
Source: RGVIA, fond 2262, opis' I, 
delo 151, kvartirnoe raspisanie, 42 
armeiskii korpus. — The list was 
made for voting for the Constituent 
Assembly, but the number of soldiers 
was not given in it. 
Sources 
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DOCUMENTATION, MINISTERE 
DES AFFAIRES ETRANGERES, 
Paris. 
Correspondance Politique, Russie Nou-
velle Serie nr 13 Guerre 1916-1918 
Russie, vols. 707-710, Finlande I-IV, 
12 mars 1915-15 febr. 1918. 
AVPR = ARKHIV VNESHNEI 
POLITIKI ROSSII, Moskva. 
Fond kantseliariia 1905. 
Fond kantseliariia 1906. 
Fond ministra. 
BA-MA = BUNDESARCHIV- 
MILITÄRARCHIV, Freiburg i. Br. 
RM 5/v war plans and reports of the 
Reichsmarine. 
— 3597 Verträge mit den Baltenländern, 
Gr.H.Qu. 22.VI 1918. 
— 4648 Marine Konvention (Baltenlän-
dern). 
EMATSH = ETAT-MAJOR DE 
L'ARMEE DE TERRE, SERVICE 
HISTORIQUE, Vincennes. 
7 N 1475 — 7 N 1544 Attachés Militaires 
Russie. 
GARF = GOSUDARSTVENNYI 
ARKHIV ROSSIISKOI 





Fond 1778, opis 1, Kantseliariia ministra  
predsedatelia vremennogo pravitelst- 
va. 
NATIONAL ARCHIVES OF 
FINLAND, Helsinki 
KKK = Kenraalikuvernöörin kanslia, 
Governor-General's Chancery. 
— dela or files numbered annually. 
— special collections numbered separate-
ly. 
Ven sot asiak = Venäläiset sotilasasia-
kirjat, Russian military documents, 
numbered without order. 
VSV = Ministerivaltiosihteerin virasto, 
aktit, files of the office of the Minis-
ter State Secretary. 
V. Procopbn kokoelma: Akter, handlin-
gar och protokoll från Komiten un-
der K.P. Pobedonostseffs' ordföran-
de; Om behandlingen af Värnepligts-
frågorna, på urtima landtagen 1899, 
the Procope archives, on questions of 
national military service. 
Antti Hackzellin kokoelma (the Hack-
zell archive, mainly gendarme and 
okhrana documents). 
POLITISCHES ARCHIV, 
AUSWÄRTIGES AMT, Bonn. 
Abt I A, Russland 63, Akten betreffend 
die Alandsinseln. 
PRO = PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, 
Kew. 
PRO ADM 1-6 Baltic 1808. 
PRO ADM 1-7 Baltic 1808. 
PRO ADM 1-8550-29, Baltic/Arctic re-
ports. 
PRO ADM 2 Sec Out letters (1854-44). 
PRO ADM 12 1610 A index 1919. 
PRO ADM 12 1610 B index 1919. 
PRO ADM 12 1619 A digest 40-50. 
421 
PRO ADM 12 1619 B40-50. 
PRO ADM 12 1620 A Digest 52 Rus-
sia. 
PRO ADM 12 1620 B Digest 52 Russia. 
PRO ADM 137 part II British Navy 
Losses. 




Fond 19, Menshikov Aleksandr Sergee-
vich, Admiral 1787-1869. 
Fond 326, stroitel'nye chertezhy (kol-
lektsiia). 
Fond 353, shtab sukhoputnykh voisk, 
podchinennykh komanduiushchemu 
flotom baltiiskogo moria 1917-1918. 
Fond 415, minnye rabochie zhumaly 
422 	 (kollektsiia). 
Fond 417, Glavnyi Morskoi Shtab 1884-
1918. 
Fond 418, Morskoi General'nyi Shtab 
1906-1918. 
Fond 791, "Strazh", kreiser flotilii ot- 
del'nogo korpusa pogranichnoi stra- 
zhi Baltiiskogo flota 1873-1916. 
Fond 972, Sveaborgskii port 1808-1918. 
Fond 1345, upravlenie nachal'nika artil- 
lerii Sveaborgskoi kreposti ?-1918. 
Fond 1347, upravlenie intendanta Svea- 
borgskoi kreposti 188?-1918 
Fond 1350, Vyborgskaia krepost 1734-
1919. 
RGVIA = ROSSIISKII 
GOSUDARSTVENNYI 
VOENNO-ISTORICHESKII 




ARKHIV SSSR, Moskva. 
Fond 29, opis' 3, 15, Kantseliariia Voen-
nago ministerstva. 
Fond 366, opis' 1, Voennyi kabinet mi-
nistra predsedatelia politicheskago 
upravleniia Voennago ministra. 
Fond 400, opis' 6, Glavnyi shtab, Mo-
bilizatsionnyi otdel'. 
Fond 472, voina so Shvetsiei 1808-1809 
gg• 
Fond 928, Osobaia Finliandskaia voen-
no-tsenzurnaia komissiia. 
Fond 1019, opis 1, Shtab voisk v Fin-
liandii raspolozhennykh 1831-1864, 
Shtab otdelnago Finliandskago kor-
pusa 1815-1831. 
Fond 1338, Finliandskii voennyi okrug. 
Fond 1343, S.Peterburgskii voennyi ok- 
rug, Petrogradskii voennyi okrug. 
Fond 2222, opis I, 22 armeiskii korpus. 
Fond 2031, Shtab glavnokomanduiu- 
shchego armiiami sevemago fronta 
1915-1918. 
Fond 2262, 42 armeiskii korpus. 
Fond 2263, 42 armeiskii korpus. 
Fond 2359, 29 pekhotnaia diviziia. 
Fond 2380, 50-i pekhotnaia diviziia. 
Fond 2421, 106 pekhotnaia diviziia. 
Fond 2422, 107 pekhotnaia diviziia. 
Fond 2535, 1 finliandskaia strel'kovaia 
diviziia 1892-1918. 
Fond 2356, 2 finliandskaia strel'kovaia 
diviziia 1901-1918. 
Fond 2537, 3 finliandskaia strel'kovaia 
diviziia 1910-1918. 
Fond 2977, 428 lodeinopoleinyi polk. 
Fond 4902, Finliandskaia pogranichnaia 
svodnaia diviziia. 
Fond 4929, Finliandskaia pogranichnaia 
okhrana. 
Fond 6446, Upravlenie komendanta eta-
pa N:o 1 finliandskoi voennoi doro-
gi. 
Fond 8260, 92 brigada Gosudarstvenna-
go opolcheniia. 
Fond 9113, Abo-Olandskaia ukreplen-
naia pozitsiia Petrogradskogo voen-
nogo okmga. 
On the catalogue an instruction is 
written: "see cases 3648 & 3649 for 
complete reports 1919-1920"; three 
officials of the PRO searched in vain 
for these cases (in August 1995), and 
the explanation was that 'some 
learned persons' took these documents 
out of the normal files for writing the 
official History of the First World 
War, and they were never returned. 
Fond 13128, Vyborgskaia krepost' i 
podchinennye ei chasti i uchrezh- 
denii. 
Fond 16113, Sveaborgskaia krepost'. 
SOTA-ARKISTO, Military Archives 
of Finland, Helsinki. 
Sotahistoriallinen toimisto, J. Mannisen 
keräämiä tietoja Venäjän sotavoimis-
ta Suomessa vv. 1808-1918, Sota-ar-
kisto T 19168/5 (Collection of docu-
ments compiled by J. Manninen on 
the Russian armed forces in Fin-
land). 
Vanhempi kartta- ja piirroskokoelma. 
(Collection of old maps and de-
signs).  
Kriegsfalle und Absicht, Fortifika-
tionsverbot auf den Alands-Inseln 
aufzuheben, copies in Box 5, Itäval-
lan valtionarkisto (HAUS-, HOF-
UND STAATSARCHIV, WIEN). 
Published Documents 
Asiakirjat Valtiopäiviltä Helsingissä 
vuosina 1877-1878, Kolmas osa, 
Helsinki 1878. (Documents of the 
Parliamentary Committee on Na-
tional Service). 
Pöytäkirjat ja Asiakirjat ylimääräisiltä 
Valtiopäiviltä 1899. (Papers and Do-
cuments of the Diet). 
Documents on 
Microfilm 
Valtiopäivät; pöytäkirjat, asiakirjat, 
Helsinki 1907 - 1917. (Papers ands 
Documents of the Diet). 
423 
EDUSKUNNAN KIRJASTO, 
Helsinki (the Library of the Finnish 
Parliament). 
British Parliamentary Debates 1854, 
vols 130-132, vols 133-135. Micro-
films: mf G.B. 
NATIONAL ARCHIVES OF 
FINLAND 
Tsentralnyi Gosudarstvennyi Istoriches- 
kii Arkhiv SSSR, fond 728. Micro-
film NL 171. 
Tsentralnyi Gosudarstvennyi Voenno-Is- 
toricheskii Arkhiv SSSR, fond 35, 
delo 6/247. Microfilm NL 189. 
Tsentralnyi Gorsudarstvennyi Arkhiv 
Voenno-Morskogo Flota. Microfilm 
NL 158. 
Novoi povorot v nashikh voennykh re- 
formakh. (Miljutin's notes from 
1870). Gosudarstvennaia Ordena Le- 
nina Biblioteka Imeni V. I. Leni- 
na/Microfilm NL 218. 
General Correspondence England-Rus-
sia 1.I 1854-10.VII 1854, PRO, F.O. 
65:443-74:446. Microfilm Eng 14. 
Ministerium des Äusseren, Politisches 
Archiv, Behandl. des Ostsee im 
Adamov, E.A., Konstantinopol i proli-
vy, vol. I - IV, Moskva 1925-1926. 
[Bogdanovich] Istoricheskii ocherk 
deiatelnosti voennago upravleniia v 
Rossii v pervoe dvatsati-piati-letie 
blagopoluchnago tsarstvovaniia go-
sudaria imperatora Aleksandra Ni-
kolaevicha 1855-188 gg. vols. I — VI 
sostavlen general leitenantom Bog-
danovichem i polkovnikom Kho-
roshinym (e.a1). S.Peterburg, 1879-
1881. 
Die Europäischen Mächte und die Tür-
kei während des Weltkrieges, Kons-
tantinopol und die Meerengen, nach 
den Geheimdokumenten des ehem. 
Ministerium fair Auswärtige Angele-
genheiten, Red. A. Adamov, vols. I 
- IV, Dresden 1930-1932. 
Gosudarstvennaia Duma, Tretii sozyv. 
Stenograficheskie otchety. S. Peter-
burg 1907 - 1912. 
[Iakhontov] Tiazhelye dni, sekretnyia 
zasedaniia Soveta Ministrov 16 iiulia 
- 2 sentiabria 1915 goda, sostavleno 
A.N. Iakhontovym, b[yvshim] po- 
moshchnikom 	 Upravliaiushchago 
Delam Soveta Ministrov na osno-
vanii ero zapisei v zasedaniiakh po 
sekretnym voprosam. Arkhiv russkoi 
revoliutsii XVIII, Berlin 1926, pp. 
5 - 136. 
Isvolsky, Alexandre, Au service de la 
Russie; Correspondance diplomati-
que, recueillie par Helene Isvolsky. 
Paris 1937. 
Kirby, David, Finland and Russia 
1808-1920, from autonomy to inde-
pendence; a selection of documents. 
Studies in Russian and East Europe-
an History. Macmillan, London 
1975. 
Krasnyi Arkhiv, 5/1924, V(XXX)/1928. 
Lemke, Mikh., 250 dni v tsarskoi stavke 
(25.sent. 1915 - 2. iiulia 1916), Pe- 
terburg 1920. 
[Miliutin] Dnevnik D.A. Miliutina 1873-
1881, vols. I - VI, red. P.A. Zaionch-
kovskii, Moskva 1949-1950. 
Omang, Reidar, Norge og stromaktene 
1906-1914, Skrifter utg. av det kgl 




[Polivanov] Iz dnevnikov i vospominanii 
po dolzhnosti voennogo ministra i 
ego pomoshchika 1907-1916 gg. 
Red. A.M.Zaionchkovskii. Moskva 
1924. 
Pro Finlandia 1899; Les adressel inter-
nationales a S.M. L'Empereur Grand 
Duc Nicolas II, 1899. 
Samling af Placater, Förordningar, Ma-
nsfester och Påbud, sam andre All-
männa Handlingar, hvilka i Stor-
Furstendömet Finland sedan 1808 
års början ifrån trycket utkommit. 
Första delen 1808-1812. Abo 1821. 
(Official Publication of Laws and 
Decrees for Finland) 
Suomen Suuriruhtinaanmaan AsetusKo-
kous 1878, Asetuskokoelma 1901, 
1904. (Official Publication of Laws 
and Decrees for Finland). 
Zolotarev, A.M., "Materialy po voennoi 
statistike Rossii; Naselenie Rossii, 
kak istochnik komplektovaniia eia 
armiia, — na osnovanii dannyh za 
pervoe desiatiletie otbyvaniia obsh-
cheobiazael'noe voennoi povinnos-
ti." Voennyi Sbornik V / 1889, pp. 
98-143, VI / 1889, pp. 325-59. 
Press 
Finliandskaia okraina v Rossii; Sbornik 
statei, ocherkov, pisem, dokumentov 
i inykh materialov dlia izuchenii tak 
nazyvaemago 'Finliandskago vopro-
sa'. Vypusk pervyi, Moskva 1891. 
Finliandskaia Gazeta 1912. 
Finsk Militär Tidskrift 1901, 1903. 
Helsingfors Dagblad 1863. 
Kansan lehti 1917. 
Moskovskiia Vedomosti 1863, 1890, 
1891. 
Novoe Vremia 1905, 1911, 1916. 
Russkii Invalid 1863, 1898, 1899. 
Uusi Päivä 1917. 
Voennyi Sbornik 1889, 1896. 
Occasional newspaper cuttings annexed 
to the Governor-General's files, see 
footnotes. 
Works consulted 
Adams, Charles E., "Der Wiederaufstieg 
der russischer Kriegsmarine in den 
Jahren 1905-1914", Marine Rund-
schau 1/1964. 
Agar, Augustus, Baltic Episode, A Clas-
sic of Secret Service in Russian Wa-
ters. Hodder and Stoughton, London 
1963. 
Aho, Juhani, Hajamietteitä kapinavii-
koilta, vols. I-III, WSOY, Porvoo 
1918-19. 
Ahrenberg, Jac., Människor som jag 
känt; personliga minnen, utdrag ur 
bref och anteckningar, vols. I- VI, 
Söderström & Co., Helsingfors 
1904-1914. 
Ahto, Sampo, "Linnoitukst Suomessa 
autonomian aikana". 	 Venäläiset 
Suomessa 1809-1917. Historiallinen 
Arkisto 83, ed. by Pauli Kurkinen, 
Finnish Historical Society, Helsinki 
1984, pp. 181-87. (Fortresses in Fin-
land during the Period of Au-
tonomy). 
Ahto, Sampo, "Sotaretkillä". Suomen it-
senäistymisen vuodet 1917-1920, 
vol. II, pp. 178 -445. Valtion paina-
tuskeskus, Helsinki 1993. (On the 
Warpath). 
Airola, 011i & Harjunpää, Kaisu, Ruot-
sinsalmen merilinnoitus 1790 —
1855. Kymenlaakson museon jul-
kaisuja, n:o 1, Myllykoski 1978. 
(The Naval Fortress of Ruotsinsal-
mi). 
Akashi Motohiro, Rakka Ryusui; Col- 
onel Akashi's report on his secret 
cooperation with the Russian revolu-
tionary parties during the Russo-Ja-
panese war; selected chapters trans-
lated by Inaba Chiharu and ed. by 
Olavi K. Fält and Antti Kujala. Stu-
dia Historica 31, Finnish Historical 
Society, Helsinki 1988. 
Alanen, Pertti, Venäläiset maavoimat 
Suomessa Nikolai I:n aikana, M.A. 
thesis, Department of History, Uni-
versity of Tampere 1987. (The Rus-
sian Army in Finland during the 
Time of Nicholas I). 
A1'ftan, M. F., Voennoe obozrenie fin-
liandskago voennago okruga, pod 
glavnom rukovodstvom gener. shta-
ba Gen.-Leit. Glazova. Vols. I-II, 
F.Tilgman, Gel'singfors 1905 (I), Ti-
pografiia shtaba Finliandskago voen-
nago okruga (II), Gel'singfors 1901. 
Amirkhanov, L.I., Morskaia krepost' 
Imperatora Petra Velikago. Morskoi 
regional'nyi tsentr, izdatel'stvo 
'Ivanov i Leshchinskii', Sankt-Peter-
burg 1995. 
Andolenko, S., Histoire de I'armee rus-
se. Flammarion, Paris 1967. 
Apunen, Osmo, Suomi keisarillisen 
Saksan politiikassa 1914-1915. 
Tammi, Helsinki 1968. (Finland in 
the Politics of the German Empire). 
Arimo, Reino, Suomen linnoittamisen 
historia 1918-1944. Otava, Helsinki 
1981. (The History of Fortifications 
in Finland). 
Arimo, Reino, Saksalaisten sotilaalli-
nen toiminta Suomessa 1918. Studia 
historica septentrionalia 20, Societas 
historica Finlandiae septentrionalis, 
Rovaniemi 1991. (German Military 
Operations in Finland). 
Armfelt, Carl Alexander, Vid finska 
statssekretariatet i St. Petersburg; 
anteckningar från min tjänstetid Sö-
derström & Co., Helsingfors 1920. 
Åselius, Gunnar, "Hotbilden: svenska 
militära bedömingar av Ryssland 
1880-1914", pp. 197-208, Mellan 
björnen och örnen; Sverige och Ös-
tersjöområdet under det första 
världskriget, 1914-1918; föredrag 
hållna vid symposium i Visby, 4-7-
augusti 1993. Ed. Johan Engström, 
Armémuseum, Lars Ericson, Krig-
sarkivet, Stockholm 1994. 
Åselius, Gunnar, The "Russian men-
ace" to Sweden; the Belief System of 
a Small Power Security Elite in the 
Age of Imperialism. Stockholm stu-
dies in history 51, Sockholm Univer-
sity & Wiksell International, Stock-
holm 1994. 
Askew, William C., "Russian Military 
Strength on the Eve of the Franco-
Prussian War", The Slavonic and 
East European Review 30/1951-
1952, pp.185-205. 
Aspelmeyer, Dieter, Deutschland und 
Finnland während der beiden Weltk-
riege. Schriften aus dem Finnland-
Institut in Köln 7. Hamburg—Volks-
dorf 1967. 
Astala, Keijo, "Venäläistä puolustus- ja 
selustatoimintaa Suomessa vv. 1808-
1809 sodan edellä ja aikoina". His-
toriallinen Arkisto 61, Finnish His-
torical Society, Helsinki 1967, pp. 
148-295. (Russian Defence and Rear 
Activity before and during the War 
of 1808-09). 
Åström, Sven-Erik, "Kaupunkiyhteis-
kunta murrosaikana", Helsingin 
kaupungin historia, vol. IV:2, ajan-
jakso 1876-1918, Helsinki 1956. 
(Urban Society in Time of Change). 
Baryshnikov, N.I., "K.Enkel — pervyi 
predstavitel' nezavisimoi Finliandii v 
Petrograde". Rossiia i Finlandiia v 
XIX--XX vv; Istoriko-kulturnyi kon-
tekst i lichnost, pp. 50-55. Evropeis-
kii Dom, Sankt-Peterburg 1996 
Basker, Werner, Deutschlands Anne-
xionspolitik in Polen und Baltikum 
1914-1918. Veröffentlichungen des 
Instituts fir Geschichte der Völker 
der UdSSR an der Martin-Luther-
Universität Halle-Wittenberg, Reihe 
B Abhandlungen Bd 3, Rütten & 
Loening, Berlin 1962. 
Bastian, M.v., "Der Ostseekrieg", Der 
Große Krieg 1914/1918, vol. IV, pp. 
133-93, Leipzig 1922. 
Baumgart, Winfried, Deutsche Ostpoli-
tik 1918; Von Brest-Litowsk bis zum 
Ende des Ersten Weltkrieges. R.O1-
denbourg Verlag, Wien—München 
1966. 
Baumgart, Winfried, The Peace of Pa-
ris 1856. Studies in War, Diplomacy 
and Peacemaking. ABC-Clio, Santa 
Barbara, Calif. 1981. 
425 
Becker, Erik, Becker Bey; suomalainen 
sotilas ja poliitikko. Arvi A.Karisto, 
Hämeenlinna 1968. 
Behnen, Michael, Rüstung — Bündnis — 
Sicherheit; Dreibund und informeller 
Imperialismus 1900-1908. Bibliot-
hek des Deutschen Historischen Ins-
tituts in Rom, Bd. 60, Max Niemeyer 
Verlag, Tübingen 1985. 
Behncke, Vizeadmiral z.D., Unsere 
Marine im Weltkriege und ihre Zu-
sammenbruch. Verlag Carl Curtius, 
Berlin & Leipzig 1919. 
Benvenuti, Francesco, The Bolsheviks 
and the Red Army 1918-1922. Transl. 
by Christopher Woodall, Soviet and 
East Europe Studies, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge 1988. 
Bennett, Geoffrey, Cowan's War; The 




the Baltic, 1918-1920. Collins, Lon- 
don 1964. 
Berendts, E.N., Kratkii ocherk biud-
zhetnago prava Finliandii. S. Peter-
burg, Gosudarstvennaia tipografiia 
1909. 
Berghahn, Volker R., Rüstung und 
Machtpolitik; zur Anatomie des 
'Kalten Krieges vor 1914. Mannhei-
mer Schriften zur Politik und Zeitge-
schichte 5, Droste Verlag, Düssel-
dorf 1973. 
Berzins, V., "The seaports of Latvia af-
ter the outbreak of the First World 
War". Mellan björnen och örnen; 
Sverige och Östersjöområdet under 
det första världskriget, 1914-1918; 
föredrag hållna vid symposium i Vis-
by, 4-7- augusti 1993, pp. 43-48. 
Ed. Johan Engström, Armémuseum, 
Lars Ericson, Krigsarkivet, Stock-
holm 1994. 
Berzins, Valdis, "The Latvian Riflemen; 
Drama and Tragedy; Summary". 
Latviesu strelnicki — drama un tra-
gedija. Latvijas vestures instituta ap-
gads. Riga 1995. 
Beskrovnyi, L.G., Otechestvennaia voi-
na 1812 goda. Izdatel'stvo sotsial'-
no-ekonomicheskoi literatury, Mosk-
va 1962. 
Beskrovnyi, L.G., Russkaia armiia i 
fot v XIX veke; Voenno-
ekonomicheskii potentsial Rossii. 
Nauka, Moskva 1973. 
Beskrovnyi, L.G., Armiia i fot Rossii  
v nachale XX v. Ocherki voenno-
ekonomicheskogo potentsiala.. Nau-
ka, Moskva 1986. 
Beyrau, D., Militär und Gesellschaft im 
vorrevolutionären Russland. Beiträ-
ge zur Geschichte Osteuropas, Band 
15. Boehlen, Köln & Wien 1984. 
Biörklund, E., "Det ryska anfallsföreta-
get mot Sverige år 1914; Nya doku-
ment om det kritiska läget under de 
första augustidagama", Svensk 
Tidskrift 1936, pp. 231-55. 
Blomstedt, Yrjö, K. J. Ståhlberg, val-
tiomieselämäkerta.. Otava, Helsinki 
1969. (A Biography of S. the States-
man). 
Bobovich J.M., & Bovykin, V.I., "Ve-
näjän ja Suomen väliset taloudelliset 
suhteet ja ensimmäinen maailmanso-
ta". Historiallinen Arkisto 80/1983, 
Finnish Historical Society, pp. 147-
81. (Russo-Finnish Economic Rela-
tions and the First World War). 
Bobovich, I.M., Russko-finliandskie 
ekonomicheskie otnosheniia nakanu-
ne velikoi oktiabrskoi sotsialistiches-
koi revoliutsii (epokha imperializ-
ma). Izdatelstvo Leningradskogo 
Universiteta, Leningrad 1968. 
Bobrovski, P,O., Zavoevanie Ingrii Pet-
rom Velikom 1701-1703 gg. Tipogra-
fiia Departamenta Udelov, S.-Peter-
burg 1891. 
Bogdanov, A.V., Moriaki-Baltiitsy v 
1917 g. Voennoe izdatel'stvo Minis-
terstva Oborony Sojuza SSR, Mosk-
va 1955. 
[Bogdanovich] Istoricheskii ocherk dei-
atelnosti voennago upravleniia v 
Rossii v pervoe dvatsati-piati-letie 
blagopoluchnago tsarstvovaniia go-
sudaria imperatora Aleksandra Ni-
kolaevicha 1855-1880 gg., vols. I-
VI; Sostavlen general leitenantom 
Bogdanovichem i polkovnikom Kho-
roshinym (et al.). Tipografiia M. Sta-
siulevicha, S.Peterburg 1879-1881. 
Böhme, Helmut, "Die deutsche Kriegs-
zielpolitik und Finnland im Jahre 
1918". Deutschland und der Welt-
politik des 19 u. 20 Jahrhunderts; 
Festschrift für Fritz Fischer, pp. 
377-96, hrsg v. I. Geiss und B. J. 
Wendt, Bertelsmann, Düsseldorf 
1974. 
Böhme, Klaus-Richard, "Deutsche See- 
kriegfiihrung in der Ostsee 1914-
1918 und Schweden: Einige Aspek-
te". Mellan björnen och örnen; Sve-
rige och Östersjöområdet under det 
första världskriget, 1914-1918; före-
drag hållna vid symposium i Visby, 
4-7- augusti 1993, pp. 145-58. Ed. 
Johan Engström, Amtemuseum, Lars 
Ericson, Krigsarkivet, Stockholm 1994. 
Bohn, Robert, "Deutsche Kriegsziele im 
Ostseeraum im Ersten Weltkrieg". 
Mellan björnen och örnen; Sverige 
och Östersjöområdet under det förs-
ta världskriget, 1914-1918, föredrag 
hållna vid symposium i Visby, 4-7-
augusti 1993, pp. 25— 34. Ed. Johan 
Engström, Armémuseum, Lars Eric-
son, Krigsarkivet, Stockholm 1994. 
Bonsdorff, Carl von, "Finländska mill-
tärfrågor vid ryska tidens början" 
Särtryck ur Svenska litteratursällska-
pets förhandlingar och uppsatser 
32, Helsingfors 1919. 
Bonsdorff, Carl v., Gustaf Mauritz 
Armfelt; Levnadsskildring, vols. I -
IV. Skrifter utgivna av Svenska Lit-
teratursällskapet i Finland, vols. 
CCXII, CCXXIII, CCXXXI, 
CCXLV, Helsingfors 1930-1934. 
Bonsdorff, L.G.v., Den ryska pacifice-
ringen i Finland 1808-1809. Disser-
tation, University of Helsinki, Hel-
singfors & Lovisa 1929. 
Borodkin, M., Voina 1854-1855 gg. na 
Finskom poberezhie, istoricheskii 
ocherk. Tovarichestvo R. Golika i A. 
Bil'borg, S.Peterburg 1904. 
Borodkin, M., Iz noveishei istorii Fin-
liandii; Vremia upravleniia N. I. 
Bobrikova. R.Golike i A.Vil'borg, 
S.Peterburg 1905. 
Borodkin, M., Generalguvernör Bobri-
koffs minne. Förlagsaktiebolager He-
lios, Helsingfors, Björk & Björnson, 
Stockholm 1905. 
Borodkin, M., Istoriia Finliandii; Vre-
mia Imperatora Aleksandra II. Go-
sudarstvennaia tipografiia, S. Peter-
burg 1908. 
Borodkin, M., Istoriia Finliandii; Vre-
mia Imperatora Aleksandra I. Gosu-
darstvennaia tipografiia, S.Peterburg 
1909. 
Borodkin, M., Istoriia Finliandii, Vre-
mia Petra Velikago. Gosudarstven-
naia tipografiia, S.Peterburg 1910. 
Borodkin, M., Istoriia Finliandii; Vre-
mia Ekateriny II i Pavla I. Gosu-
darstvennaia tipografiia, S.Peterburg 
1912. 
Borodkin, M., "Finskiia voiska pri Im-
peratore Nikolae I", Voenno-Isto-
richeskii Sbornik 2/1914 pp. 153-66, 
3/1914 pp. 145-60, 4/1914 pp. 153-
66, S.Peterburg 1914. 
Bradley, John, Allied intervention in 
Russia 1917-1920. B.T. Batsford, 
London 1968. 
Bradley, John F.N., Civil War in Russia 
1917-1920. B.T. Batsford, London 
& Sydney 1975. 
Bremer, Aarne, Ilmavoimien osallistu-
minen Suomen vapaussotaan v. 
1918. Otava, Helsinki 1934. (The 
Participation of Air Forces in the 
Finnish War of Liberation in 1918) 
Brdningshausen, Konteradmiral a.D., 
Die politische Zersetzung und die 
Tragödie der deutschen Flotte, dar-
gestellt unter Benutzung amtlichen 
Aktenmaterialen. Deutsche Verlags-
gesellschaft fir Politik und Ge-
schichte, Berlin 1926. 
Bulgarin, Faddei, Sotilaan sydän; Suo-
men sodasta Engelin Helsinkiin. Ed. 
and translated [and abridged] by 
Marja Itkonen-Kaila. Suomalaisen 
Kirjallisuuden Seuran toimituksia 
645, Helsinki 1996. (The Memoirs of 
Bulgarin from the War of 1808-09 
and from Helsinki in 1838-40). 
Bushnell, John, "Peasants in Uniform; 
the Tsarist Army as a Peasant So-
ciety". Journal of Social History 
4/1980, pp. 565-76. 
Bushnell, John, "The Tsarist Officer 
Corps, 1881-1914; Customs, Duties, 
Inefficiency". American Historical 
Review, Oct. 1981, pp. 753-80. 
Bushnell, John, Mutiny amid Repressi-
on; Russian Soldiers in the Revolu-
tion of 1905-06. Indiana University 
Press, Bloomington 1985. 
Carlgren, W.M., Neutralität oder Al-
lianz; Deutschlands Beziehungen zu 
Schweden in den Anfangsjahren des 
ersten Weltkrieges. Stockholm Stu-
dies in History 6, Uppsala 1962. 
Carlowitz-Mayer, Einteilung und Dis-
lokation der Russischen Armee und 
Flotte, nebst Übersichten über die 
Kriegsformationen und Kriegsetats 
427 
and eine Eisenbahnskizze. Berlin 
1914. 
Castrén, Gunnar, "Helsinki kulttuurikes-
kuksena." Helsingin kaupungin his-
toria III:1, ajanjakso 1809-1875, 
Helsinki 1950, pp. 471-592. (History 
of Helsinki). 
Castren, Liisa, "Turun ylioppilaat ja ve-
näläinen varusväki 1810-1820-luvul-
la." Historiallinen Aikakauskirja 
1933, pp. 106-23. (Students and the 
Russian Garrison in Turku) 
Chemyaysky, Michael, Tsar and People; 
Studies in Russian Myths. Yale 
University Press, New Haven and 
London 1961. 
la Chesnais, P.G., La guerre civil en 
Finlande, Janvier-Avril 1918. Bos-
sard, Paris 1919. 




1917-1922; Itä-Karjalan itsehallin- 
tokysymys Suomen ja Neuvosto-Ve-
näjän välisissä suhteissa. Suom. Ka-
tariina Churchill. WSOY, Porvoo 
1970. (East Karelian Autonomy and 
Finnish-Soviet Relations). 
Clausen, S., Kapitän z.S., "Seepolitik 
and Seestrategie in der Seekriegsge-
schichte der Ostsee", Marine Rund-
schau April 1927, pp. 154-164. 
Conway's All the World's Fighting 
Ships 1860-1905. Conway Maritime 
Press, London 1989. 
Conway's All the World's Fighting 
Ships 1906-1921. Conway Maritime 
Press, London 1985. 
Curtiss, John Shelton, Russia's Crime-
an War. Duke University Press, Dur-
ham N.C. 1979. 
Daly, John C., Russian Seapower and 
the Eastern Question 1827-41. Mac-
millan in association with the School 
of Slavonic and East European Stu-
dies, London 1991. 
Danielson, Joh.Rich., Finska kriget och 
Finlands krigare 1808-1809. Från 
finskan av W. Söderhjelm. Weilin & 
Göös, Helsingfors 1897. 
Daniloff, J.N., Den Zusammenbruch 
entgegen; Ein Abschnitt aus der letz-
ten Epoche der rußischen Monar-
chie. Hahnsche Buchhandlung, Han-
nover 1928. 
Debesh, General'nago shtaba polkovnik, 
Osobennosti boevykh deistvii na Fin-
liandskoi mestnosti. S.Peterburg, s.a. 
Deist, Wilhelm, "Die Unruhen in der 
Marine 1917/18". Marine Rund-
schau 6/1971, pp. 325-43. 
Denikine, A.I., La decomposition de 
I'armee et du pouvoir fevrier - sep-
tembre 1917. J. Povobozky & Cie, 
Paris 1921. 
Deutschland und Finnland 1871 - 1914; 
Politik - Wirtschaft - Öffentliche 
Meinung. Herausgegeben von 011i 
Kaikkonen und Manfred Menger, 
University of Joensuu Publications 
in the Humanities, Joensuu 1992. 
Dreyer, V.N.von, Na zakate imperii. 
Izdanie avtora, Madrid 1965. 
Dubrovskaja, E.Iu., Gel'singforsskii 
sovet deputatov armii, flota i ra-
bochikh v 1917 godu (mart-oktjabr). 
Karel'skii nauchnyi Tsentr RAN, 
Institut iazyka, literatury i istorii, 
Petrozavodsk 1992. 
Egorov, I.V., Ot monarkhii k oktiabriu; 
vospominaniia. Lenizdat, Leningrad 
1980. 
Ehrnrooth, Magnus, Casimir Ehrn-
rooth, kolmen Aleksanterin - kahden 
tsaarin ja yhden ruhtinaan - uskolli-
nen palvelija. Otava, Helsinki 1967. 
(The Biography of Ernrooth). 
Emeljanoff, Nikolaj, Rysslands framt-
rängande rill Atlanten och de Rysk-
Svenska relationernas framtid; Svar 
på "ett varningsord" af Sven Hedin, 
Helsingfors Finska Bokhandel, Hel-
singfors 1915. 
Emeljanoff, N.B., Existerar 'den Ryska 
faran'? Sv. andels förl., Stockholm 
1916. 
Emets, V.A., "0 roll russkoi armii v per-
voi mirovoi voine 1914-1917 gg", 
Istoricheskie zapiski, 77/1965, pp. 
57-84. 
Enckell, Carl, Poliittiset muistelmani, 
vol. I, WSOY, Porvoo & Helsinki 
1956. (Political Memoirs). 
Englund, Peter, Ofredsår; Om den 
svenska stormaktstiden och en man i 
dess mitt. Atlantis, Stockholm 1993. 
Englund, Peter, Poltava; Berättelsen 
om en armes undergång. Atlantis, 
Stockholm 1988. 
Enqvist, Ove, Kuivasaari. Sotamuseon 
julkaisuja 1/1995. Helsinki 1995. 
Enqvist, Ove, Mäkiluoto. Helsinki 
1997. 
Eskola, Seikko, Suomen kysymys ja 
Ruotsin mielipide; Ensimmäisen 
maailmansodan puhkeamisesta Ve-
näjän maaliskuun vallankumouk-
seen; with an English summary. 
WSOY, Helsinki & Porvoo 1965. 
(Swedish Opinion on Finland 1914-
1917). 
Eskola, Seikko, "Finlands säkerhetspoli-
tiska roll åren 1914 — 1918", Mellan 
björnen och örnen; Sverige och Ös-
tersjöområdet under det första 
världskriget, 1914-1918; föredrag 
hällna vid symposium i Visby, 4-7-
augusti 1993, pp. 35-42. Ed. Johan 
Engström, Atmemuseum, Lars Eric-
son, Krigsarkivet, Stockholm 1994. 
Estlander, E., Elva årtionden ur Fin-
lands historia, vol. I: 1808-1878; 
vol. II: 1878-1898; vol. III: 1898-
1908; vol. IV: 1908-1917; vol. V: 
1917-1918. Söderström & Co., Hel-
singfors 1929-30. 
[F.] R. F., "Den finska militärens resery 
1883-1903", Finsk Militär Tidskrift 
1903, pp. 637-71. 
Fejtö, Francois, Requiem pour un em-
pire defunt; Histoire de la destructi-
on de l Åutriche-Hongrie. Edima-
Lieu Commun, Paris 1993. 
Fink, Troels, Spillet om dansk neutalitet 
1905-1909; L.C.F. Lütken og dansk 
udenrigs- og forssvarspolitik. Skrif-
ter udgivet af Jysk selskab for histo-
rie, sprog og literatur 6, Aarhus 
1959. 
Fink, Troels, Ustabil balance; Dansk 
udenrigs- og frsvarspolitik 1894-
1905. Skrifter udgivet af Jysk sels-
kab for historie, sprog og literatur 9, 
Aarhus 1961. 
Fink, Troels, Deutschland als Problem 
Danmarks, Die geschichtlichen Vor-
aussetzungen der dänischen Aussen-
politik. Die Deutsch-Dänischen Büc-
her 2, Wolff, Flensburg 1968. 
Finliandskaia okraina v Rossii; Sbor-
nik statei, ocherkov, pisem, doku-
mentov i inykh materialov dlia 
izuchenii tak nazyvaemago 'Fin-
liandskago voprosa'. Vypusk pervyi, 
izd. Sergei Petrovskii, Moskva 1891. 
"Finskie internatsionalisty", Grazhdans-
kaia voina i voennaia interventsiia v 
SSSR; Entsiklopediia. 'Sovetskaia 
Entsiklopediia', Moskva 1983, pp. 
628-29. 
Fischer, Fritz, "Deutsche Kriegsziele, 
Revolutionierung und Separatfrieden 
im Osten, 1914 bis 1918", Histori-
sche Zeitschrift 188/1959. 
Flot v Pervoi Mirovoi Voine. Red. N.B. 
Pavlovich. V 2 tomakh. T. 1: Deist-
viia russkogo flota. Voennoe Izdat. 
Ministr. Oborony SSSR, Moskva 
1964. 
Forsman, Rafael, Fredrik Cygnaeus kir-
jailijana ja ajanilmiönä. WSOY, 
Porvoo 1923.(The Life of Cygna-
eus). 
Forstner, Georg-Günther, Krieg in der 
Ostsee. Gustaf Weise Verlag, Rastatt 
1938. 
Franz, Gunther, Russlands Eintritt in 
den Weltkrieg; der Ausbau der rus-
sischen Wehrmacht und ihr Einsatz 
bei Kriegsausbruch; Mit Genehmi-
gung des Reichsarchivs und unter 
Benutzung amtlicher Quellen. Deut-
sche Verlagsgesellschaft für Politik 
und Geschichte, Berlin 1924. 
Fraseer, Eugenie, The House by the Dvi-
na; A Russian Childhood. Corgi 
Books, London 1997 (Mainstream, 
Edinburgh 1984). 
Freiman, K., "Pietari Suuren merilinnoi-
tus, erittäinkin sen meririntama v. 
1909-1913 suunnitelmien mukaan." 
Rannikkotykistön vuosikirja 1939, 
Helsinki 1939, pp. 74-98. (The Na-
val Fortress of Peter the Great, Es-
pecially its Seaward Front according 
to the Plans of 1909-1913) 
Frenkin, M., Russkaia armiia i revoliut-
siia. Logos, Munich 1978. 
Fuller, William C. Jr., Civil-Military 
Conflict in Imperial Russia, 1881-
1914. Princeton University Press, 
Princeton 1985. 
Gallen, Jarl, "La Finlande militaire en 
temps du Grand Duchb 1809-1917". 
Revue Internationale d'Histoire Mi-
litaire, edition finlandaise, Helsinki 
1961, pp. 193-211. 
[Ganivet] Suomalaiskirjeitä, kirjoittanut 
Angel Ganivet Helsingistä v. 1896-
97. Suomentanut, esitellyt ja selittä-
nyt Kaarle Hirvonen. WSOY, Por-
voo & Helsinki 1964. (Letters from 
Finland by G.). 
Gemzell, C.A., Organization, Conflict, 
and Innovation; A Study of German 
Naval Strategic Planning, 1888 - 
429 
1940. Lund Studies in International 
History 4, Scandinavian University 
Books, Esselte Studium, Lund Uni-
versity Press, Lund 1973. 
Georgievskie kavalery, Sbornik v 4-kh 
t., T. 1: 1769-1850. Ed. A.V. 
Shishov. Patriot, Moskva 1993. 
"Germanskaia interventsiia v Pribaltike 
i Belorussii 1918" & "Germanskaia 
interventsiia v Sovetskoi Rossii", 
Grazhdanskaia voina i voennaia in-
terventsiia v SSSR; Entsiklopediia. 
'Sovetskaia Entsiklopediia', Moskva 
1983, pp. 146-148. 
Getzler, Israel, Kronstadt 1917-1921; 
the Fate of a Soviet Democracy. 
Cambridge University Press, Cam-
bridge 1983. 
Gihl, Torsten, Den svenska utrikespoli-
tikens historia, vol. IV: 1914-1919. 
430 	 Norstedts, Stockholm 1951. 
"Gol'ts, Riudiger fon der", Grazhdans-
kaia voina i voennaia interventsiia v 
SSSR; Entsiklopediia. 'Sovetskaia 
Entsiklopediia', Moskva 1983, 
p.153. 
Goldfrank, David M., The Origins of 
the Crimean War. Longman, Lon-
don and New York 1994. 
Golovine, Lieutenant-General Nicholas, 
The Russian Army in the World War. 
Economic and Social history of the 
World War; Russian Series. Yale 
University Press, New Haven and 
London 1931. 
Goltz, von der, Toimintani Suomessa ja 
Baltian maissa. WSOY, Porvoo 
1920. Translated from the German 
original: Goltz, General Graf Rüdi-
ger von, Meine Sendung in Finn-
land und in Baltikum. Verlag von 
K.F. Kochler, Leipzig 1920. 
Goltz, Kenraalimajuri kreivi von der, 
"Saksan aseellinen apu; yleiskat-
saus". Suomen Vapaussota, vol. VII, 
pp. 5-36. (German Military Help for 
Finland in the War of Liberation). 
Graf, Daniel W., "Military Rule Behind 
the Russian Front, 1914 - 1917; the 
Political Ramifications". Jahrbücher 
für Geschichte Osteuropas, NF 
22/1974, pp. 390-411. 
Graf, H., La marine russe dans la 
guerre et dans la revolution 1914-
1918. Trad. de A. Thomazi. Payot, 
Paris 1928. 
Grazhdanskaia voina i voennaia inter-
ventsiia v SSSR; Entsiklopediia. So-
vetskaia Entsiklopediia, Moskva 
1983. 
Greenhill, Basil, & Giffard, Ann, The 
British Assault on Finland 1854-
1855; a Forgotten Naval War. Con-
way Maritime Press, London 1988. 
Greger, Rene, Die russische Flotte im 
ersten Weltkrieg 1914-1917. Leh-
mann, München 1970. 
Gripenberg, G.A., Lifgardets 3 finska 
skarpskyttebataljon 1812-1905, ett 
minnesblad. Söderström & Co, Hel-
singfors 1905. 
Gripenberg, G.A., "Suomen sota 1808-
1809", Oma maa, vol. I, WSOY, 
Porvoo 1920, pp. 951-961. (The War 
in Finland 1808-1809). 
Gripenberg, G.A., "Suomen kaarti", 
Oma maa, vol. VI, WSOY, Porvoo 
1911, pp. 895-902. (The Finnish 
Guards Battalion). 
Gripenberg, G., & Ignatius, Hannes, 
"Sotakoulut Suomessa", Oma maa, 
vol. II, Porvoo 1921, pp. 83-100. 
(Military Schools in Finland). 
Grot, Jakov, Matka Suomessa 1846. 
Suomentanut Pekka Hakamies. Suo-
malaisen Kirjallisuuden Seuran toi-
mituksia 393, Helsinki 1983. (A 
Voyage in Finland). 
Gummerus, Herman, Jääkärit ja akti-
vistit; Sotavuosien muistelmia Tuk-
holmasta ja Berliinistä. Suom. Eino 
Voionmaa. WSOY, Porvoo 1928. 
(Memoirs from the War Years). 
Gummerus, Herman, Aktiivisilta taiste-
luvuosilta. Sanatar, Helsinki 1935. 
(Reminiscences of Activism). 
Haapala, Pertti, Kun yhteiskunta hajosi. 
Edita, Helsinki 1996. (When Society 
Breaks Down). 
Haapanen, Väinö, 	 Upseerielämää; 
Muistikuvia suomalaisen armeijaup-
seerin palvelusajalta Venäjällä. Ota-
va, Helsinki 1928. (Memoirs of a 
Finnish officer of his Service in Rus-
sia). 
Haavikko, Ritva & Hämäläinen, Hel-
vi, Ketunkivellä; Helvi Hämäläisen 
elämä 1907 - 1954. WSOY, Porvoo-
Helsinki-Juva, 1993. (The Biography 
of Helvi Hämäläinen). 
Hagen, Mark von, Soldiers in the Pro-
letariat Dictatorship; The Red Army 
and the Soviet Socialist State, 1917-
1936. Studies of the Harriman Insti-
tute, Cornell University Press, Ithaca 
& London 1990. 
Haila, Sirpa, Venäläinen rationaali-
suus; 1910-luvun kasarmiarkkiteh-
tuuri sosiaalisena käytäntönä. Bib-
liotheca Historica 13, Finnish Histo-
rical Society, Helsinki 1996. (The 
Architecture of the Barracks in the 
1910's). 
Hainari, O.A., "Suuri venäläissota 
1495", Oma maa, vol. VI, Porvoo 
1925, pp. 504-16. (The Great Russian 
War). 
Hakalehto, Ilkka, "Oikeiston ja maalais-
liiton itsenäisyyspolitiikka", Vallan-
kumous 1917; tutkielmia Venäjän 
vallankumouksen vaikutuksista Suo-
messa ja imperiumin muilla reuna-
alueilla. Helsingin yliopiston poliit-
tisen historian laitoksen julkaisuja 
1/1987, Helsinki 1987, pp. 16-52. 
(The Policy for Independence of the 
Right and of the Agrarian Union). 
Häkkinen, Antti, Rahasta — vaan ei 
rakkaudesta; prostituutio Helsingis-
sä 1867-1939. Otava, Helsinki 1995. 
(Prostitution in Helsinki). 
Halicz, Emanuel, "Russian Policy to-
wards the Scandinavian countries." 
Imperial Power and Development; 
Papers on Pre-revolutionary Russian 
History. Ed. Don Karl Rowney, Sla-
vic Publishers, Columbus, Ohio 
1990, pp. 68-100. 
Halila, Aimo, Lahden historia. Julk. 
Lahden kaupunki, Lahti 1958. (The 
History of Lahti). 
Hällström, Olof af, "The fortress of 
Sveaborg". The naval fortresses in 
the Baltic area. V Baltic seminar in 
Kotka 30.7.-1.8. 1987. Publication 
number 14 in the series of provincial 
museum of Kymenlaakso, s.I. 1990, 
pp. 37-55. 
Halsti, Wolf H., Muistelmat, vol. I: Mies 
elää aikaansa 1905-1939. Otava, 
Helsinki 1973. (The Memoirs of 
Halsti). 
Hamilton, C.I., "Sir James Graham, the 
Baltic Campaign and War-Planning 
at the Admiralty in 1854", Histori-
cal Journal vol. 19, no. I, 1976, pp. 
89-112. 
Hannula, Erkki, "Ahvenanmaan asema  
maailmansodassa", Rannikkotykis-
tön vuosikirja 1935, Helsinki 1935, 
pp. 21-36. (Aland During the World 
War). 
Hannula, J.O., "Sotatapahtumat Suomes-
sa itämaisen sodan aikana vv. 1854-
1855", Taistelija 5/1934, pp. 161-
67. (Operations in Finland During 
the Crimean War). 
Hannula, J.O., "1800-luvun asevelvolli-
nen armeija", Asemies 1938, pp. 
42-46. (The National Service Army 
of the Nineteenth Century). 
Hannula, J.O., Finland's War of Inde-
pendence. Faber & Faber, London 
1939. 
Hannula, J.O., "Venäläisten tiedot jääkä- 
riliikkeestä", 	 Sotilasaikakauslehti 
1939, pp. 637-55. (Russian Informa-
tion of the Jäger Movement). 
Härdstedt, Martin, "Durchmarscher och 
kronoskjuts; Lokalbefolkningen och 
de militära transportproblemen under 
kriget 1808-09". Militärhistorisk 
Tidskrift 1995, pp. 7-40. 
Hautala, Kustaa, Oulun kaupungin his-
toria, vol. III. Osakeyhtiö Kaleva, 
Oulu 1975. (The History of Oulu). 
Hedin, Sven, Ett varningsord. A.Bon-
nier, Stockholm 1915. 
Heenan, Louise Erwin, Russian De-
mocracy's Fatal Blunder: the Sum-
mer Offensive of 1917. Praeger, New 
York 1987. 
Helme, Rein, 1812 aasta Eestis ja Lätis. 
Olion, Tallinn 1990. 
Herwig, Holger H., 'Luxury Fleet', The 
Imperial German Navy 1888-1918. 
George Allen & Unwin, London 
1980 
Hietaniemi, Tuija, "Kysymys järjestys-
vallasta 1917", Vallankumous 1917; 
tutkielmia Venäjän vallankumouksen 
vaikutuksista Suomessa ja impe-
riumin muilla reuna-alueilla. Helsin-
gin yliopiston poliittisen historian 
laitoksen julkaisuja 1/1987, Helsinki 
1987. (The Problem of Keeping Or-
der in 1917). 
Hiisivaara, Tapio, 'Tuhannenpa verran 
poikia läksi... ', Suomen kaarti Balka-
nin sodassa 1877-1878. WSOY, 
Porvoo 1968. (The Finnish Guards in 
the Balkan War). 
Hinkkanen-Lievonen, Merja-Liisa, Bri-
tish Trade and Enterprise in the Bal- 
431 
tic States, 1919-1925. Studia histori-
ca 14, Finnish Historical Society, 
Helsinki 1984. 
Hirn, Hans, Alexander Armfelt, Ungdom 
och läroår intil 1832. Skrifter utgiv-
na av Svenska Litteratursällskapet i 
Finland CCLXVII. Helsingfors 
1938. 
Hirn, Hans, Alexander Armfelt, Början 
av en statsmannabana 1832-1841. 
Skrifter utgivna av Svenska Littera-
tursällskapet i Finland CCCXV, Hel-
singfors 1948. 
[Hirn], Oolannin sota 1854-55, kirjoitta-
nut ja kuva-aineiston koonnut Marta 
Hirn, suom. Asser Jokinen. WSOY, 
Porvoo 1956. (The War in Åland). 
Hjelt, Edvard, Vaiherikkailta vuosilta, 
vol. I - II, (transl. from the Swedish 




från händelserika år, vol. I: Från 
verksamheten vid universitetet och 
senaten under ofärdestiden; vol. II: 
Från krigsåren och vistelsen i Tysk-
land. Söderström & Co., Helsingfors 
1920.) 
Hjelt, Edvard, Finlands självständighet; 
Från dröm till verklighet. Söder-
ström & Co., Helsingfors 1921. 
[Hoffmann] Die Aufzeichnungen des 
Generalmajors von Hoffman, vol. I-
II. Hrsg. Karl Friedrich Nowak, Ver-
lag fir Kulturpolitik, Berlin 1929. 
Holodkovskij, Viktor, Suomi ja Neu-
vosto-Venäjä 1918-1920. Tammi, 
Helsinki 1978. (Finliandiia i Sovets-
kaia Rossiia 1918-1920. Akademiia 
Nauk SSSR, Institut vseobshchei is-
torii 1975). 
Holodkovski, Viktor, Suomen työväen 
vallankumous 1918. Edistys, Mosko-
va 1979. (The Finnish Workers' Re-
volution). 
Holodkovskii see also Kholodkovskii. 
Hopmann, Admiral, Das Logbuch eines 
deutschen Seeoffiziers. August 
Scherl, Berlin 1924. 
Hornborg, Eirik, "Sotaväki ja sotatapah-
tumat", Helsingin kaupungin histo-
ria, vol. III:1, ajanjakso 1809-1875, 
pp. 201-54, Helsinki 1950 (Troops 
and Military Events in Helsinki). 
Hovi, Kalervo, Cordon sanitaire or bar-
Here de l'est? The emergence of the 
new French eastern European al-
liance policy 1917-1919. Annales  
universitatis Turkuensis, ser. B, vol. 
135, Turun yliopisto, Turku 1975. 
Hovi, Kalervo, Estland in den Anfangen 
seiner Selbständigkeit. University of 
Turku, Institute of History, General 
History Publications 8, Turku 1976. 
Hovi, Kalervo, Interessensphären im 
Baltikum; Finnland im Rahmen der 
Ostpolitik Polens 1919-1922. Studia 
Historica 13, Finnish Historical So-
ciety, Helsinki 1984. 
Hovi, Kalervo, "Miksi Aleksanteri I ei 
palauttanut Puolan itäalueita Puolan 
kuningaskuntaan". Oulun yliopisto, 
historian laitos, eripainossarja n:o 
126. Oulu 1985. (Why didn't Ale-
xander I Reunite the Polish Eastern 
Regions with the Kingdom of Po-
land). 
Hovi, Olavi, The Baltic Area in British 
Policy, 1918-1921; vol. I: from the 
Compiegne armistice to the Versail-
les treaty, 11.11.1918-20.1.1920. 
Studia historica 11, Finnish Histori-
cal Society. Helsinki 1980. 
Hubatsch, Walter, Unruhe des Nordens; 
Studien zur deutsch-skandinavischen 
Geschichte. Musterschmidt, Göttin-
gen 1956. 
Hubatsch, Walter, Der Admiralstab and 
die obersten Marinebehörden in 
Deutschland 1848-1945. Verlag für 
Wehrwesen Bernhard & Graefe, 
Frankfurt a.M. 1958. 
Hulden, Anders, Kuningasseikkailu Suo-
messa 1918. Tekijän käsikirjoituk-
sesta suomentanut Ritva Lassila. Kir-
jayhtymä, Helsinki 1988. (The Mo-
narchist Adventure in Finland). 
Hülsen, Ernst von, "Die deutsche Mitar-
beit an Finnlands Freiheit". Zeit-
schrift fiir Politik, Bd XV, Berlin 
1926. 
Hultin, Tekla, Päiväkirjani kertoo, vol. 
I: 1899-1914, vol. II: 1914-1918. 
Kustannusosakeyhtiö Sanatar, Hel-
sinki 1935, 1938. (The Diary of Hultin). 
Huxley, Steven Duncan, Constitutiona-
list Insurgency in Finland; Finnish 
'Passive Resistance' against Russifi-
cation as a Case of Nonmilitary 
Struggle in the European Resistance 
Tradition. Studia Historica 38, Fin-
nish Historical Society, Helsinki 
1990. 
Hyvämäki, Lauri, Ennen routaa; esseitä 
ja tutkielmia 1880-luvulta. Otava, 
Helsinki 1960. (Essays and Studies 
on the 1880's). 
Hyvämäki, Lauri, Suomalaiset ja suur-
politiikka; Venäjän diplomatia Suo-
men sanomalehdistön kuvastimessa 
1878-1890. WSOY, Porvoo & Hel-
sinki 1964. (The Finns and Great 
Power Politics; Russian Diplomacy 
in the Mirror of Finnish Press 1878-
1890). 
Iakovlev, V.V., Istoriia krepostei, evo-
lutsiia dolgovremennoi fortifikatzii. 
Poligon, 	 Sankt-Peterburg 	 1995. 
(Reprint of the 1935 edition). 
Iakupov, I.M., Revoliutsiia i mir; Sol-
datskie massy protiv imperialis-
ticheskoi voiny, 1917 - mart 1918. 
Mysl', Moskva 1982. 
Ignatius, Hannes, Sortovuosista itsenäi-
syyteen; muistelmia. Otava, Helsinki 
1926. (From the Years of Oppression 
to Independence; Memoirs). 
Idman, K. G., Maamme itsenäistymisen 
vuosilta; Muistelmia. WSOY, Por-
voo & Helsinki 1953. (The Memoirs 
of Idman). 
Ikonen, Kimmo, J.K.Paasikiven poliitti-
nen toiminta Suomen itsenäistymisen 
murrosvaiheessa. Historiallisia tutki-
muksia 158, Finnish Historical So-
ciety, Helsinki 1991. (The Political 
Activity of Paasikivi at the Begin-
ning of Finland's Independence). 
Ikonen, Kimmo, "'Politiikan on palvel-
tava sotilasjohtoa', Ludendorff ja 
Suomi 1917-1918". Niin tuli sota 
maahan! Sotien ja sotalaitoksen vai-
kutus suomalaiseen yhteiskuntaan. 
Jussi T. Lappalainen 60 vuotta 
23.10.1995. Turun historiallinen ar-
kisto 49, ed. Jari Niemelä, publ. Tu-
run Historiallinen Yhdistys, Turku 
1995, pp. 305-57. ('Politics Must 
Serve Military Leaders', Ludendorff 
and Finland 1917-1918). 
Immonen, Hannu, "Sotaministeri Milju-
tin ja vuoden 1878 asevelvollisuus-
laki", Historiallinen Aikakauskirja 
3/1983 (Miljutin and the Law of Na-
tional Service), pp. 168-74. 
Immonen, 011i, Lappeenrannan varus-
kuntahistoria. Etelä-Saimaan Kus-
tannus Oy, Lappeenranta 1992. (The 
History of the Garrison in Lappeen-
ranta). 
Impola, Heikki, "Suhteiden solmiminen 
länsivaltoihin ja Pariisin rauhankon-
ferenssi", Itsenäisen Suomen ulko-
politiikan alkutaival, Historian aitta 
XV, WSOY, Porvoo-Helsinki 1962, 
pp. 57-87. (Relations to the Western 
Powers and the Paris Peace Confe-
rence). 
"Ingermanlandskaia 	 avtonomiia", 
Grazhdanskaia voina i voennaia in-
terventsiia v SSSR; Entsiklopediia, 
'Sovetskaia Entsiklopediia', Moskva 
1983, pp. 225-26. 
In Quest of Trade and Security: The Bal-
tic in Power Politics 1500-1990, 
vols. I-II, ed. by W.M. Carlgren, K-
R. Böhme & G. Rystad. Probus, 
Stockholm 1994-95. 
"Internatsionalnye formirovaniia Kras-
noi armii", Grazhdanskaia voina i 
voennaia interventsiia v SSSR; En-
tsiklopediia., 'Sovetskaia Entsiklope-
diia', Moskva 1983, pp. 235-37. 
"Interventsiia antanty na severe", Grazh-
danskaia voina i voennaia intervent-
siia v SSSR; Entsiklopediia. 'Sovets-
kaia Entsiklopediia', Moskva 1983, 
pp. 231-32. 
Istoriia pervoi mirovoi voiny 1914-1918 
v dvukh tomakh. Institut voennoi is-
torii Ministerstva Oborony SSSR, 
Nauka, Moskva 1975. 
Itä-Karjala; Esitys Itä-Karjalan maasta 
ja kansasta, sen vapausliikkeen tä-
hänastisista vaiheista, nykyisistä ta-
loudellisista, sivistyksellisistä ja val-
tiollisista oloista sekä Karjalan kysy-
myksestä. Publ. Akateeminen Karja-
la-Seura, Helsinki 1934. (East Kare-
lian region, population, economic, 
cultural, and political conditions and 
the Karelian question). 
Itämerensuomalaiset: Heimokansojen 
historiaa ja kohtaloita. Ed. Mauno 
Jokipii. Atena, Jyväskylä 1995. (The 
history and fate of the Baltian-Fennic 
peoples). 
Itkonen, O.V., Muurmannin suomalai-
nen legioona. Kansanvalta, Helsinki 
1927. (The Finnish Murmansk Le-
gion). 
Jääskeläinen, Mauno, "Suomen suhteet 
Neuvosto-Venäjään itsenäisyysjulis-
tuksesta Tarton rauhaan", Itsenäisen 
Suomen ulkopolitiikan alkutaival, 
Historian aitta XV, WSOY, Porvoo 
& Helsinki 1962, pp. 7-29. (Finnish-
Russian Relations from the Declara-
tion of Independence to the Peace of 
Tartu). 
Jääskeläinen, Mauno, Die ostkarelische 
Frage; die Entstehung eines na-
tionale Expansionsprogramms und 
die Versuche zu seiner Verwirk-
lichung in der Aussenpolitik Finn-
lands in den Jahren 1918-1920. Stu-
dia Historica 6, Finnish Historical 
Society, Helsinki 1965. 
Jackson, J. Hampden, "German inter-
vention in Finland 1918", The Sla-
vonic Review XVIII/1939, pp. 93-
101. 
Jägerskiöld, Stig, Nuori Mannerheim. 
Otava, Helsinki 1965. (The Young 
M.). 




1906-1917. Otava, Helsinki 1965. 
Jägerskiöld, Stig, Mannerheim 1918. 
Otava, Helsinki 1967. 
Jägerskiöld, Stig, Valtionhoitaja Man-
nerheim. Otava, Helsinki 1969. (M., 
the Regent). 
Jalava, Antti, Tavallisen miehen tarina. 
Hänen omista kirjeistään ja puheis-
taan koonnut Ilona Jalava. WSOY, 
Porvoo & Helsinki 1948. (The Life 
of Jalava). 
Jane, Fred T., The Imperial Russian 
Navy. Reprinted from the fully re-
vised 1904 edition, Conway Mari-
time Press, London 1983. 
Järnefelt, Arvid, Vanhempieni romaani, 
vol. I - III. WSOY, Porvoo-Helsinki 
1929-30. (The Story of J's Parents). 
Järnefelt, Maija, Muistelmia. Kirjayhty-
mä, Helsinki 1982. (The Memoirs of 
J.). 
Jokipii, Mauno, "Heimosodat Vienassa 
ja Aunuksessa 1918-1922". Itäme-
rensuomalaiset: Heimokansojen his-
toriaa ja kohtaloita. Ed. Mauno Jo-
kipii. Atena, Jyväskylä 1995, pp. 
279-298. (The wars in Viena and 
Olonets). 
Jungar, Sune, Ryssland och den Svensk-
Norska unionens upplösning; Tsardi-
plomati och rysk-finländsk press-
opinion kring unionsupplösning från 
1880 till 1905. Acta Academiae 
Aboensis, ser. A, Humaniora vol. 37, 
nr. 3, Åbo 1969. 
Jussila, Osmo, "Vuoden 1905 suurlakko  
Suomessa venäläisten silmin", Histo-
riallinen Aikakauskirja 3/1975 (Rus-
sian Views on the General Strike in 
Finland), pp. 208-18. 
Jussila, Osmo, Nationalismi ja vallan-
kumous venäläis-suomalaisissa suh-
teissa 1899-1914. Historiallisia tutki-
muksia 110, Finnish Historical So-
ciety, Helsinki 1979. (Nationalism 
and Revolution in Russo-Finnish Re-
lations). 
Jussila, Osmo, Venäläinen Suomi. 
WSOY, Porvoo, Helsinki & Juva 
1983. (Russian Finland). 
[Juva] Suomen kansan aikakirjat, Suo-
malaisen historiallisen kirjallisuuden 
pohjalla esittänyt Einar W. Juva, vol. 
VIII, 1856-1899. Otava, Helsinki 
1935. (A History of the Finnish 
People). 
Juva, Einar W., Idän uhkan varjossa. 
Otava, Helsinki 1943. (Under the 
Eastern Menace). 
Juwelius, Einar W., Suomen sotahisto-
rian pääpiirteet, vol. I, Aika vuoteen 
1617. Otava, Helsinki 1927. (Finnish 
Military History until 1617). 
Kääntönen, Matti, "Tanskan salmet Sak-
san ongelmana 1914-1915", Sotilas-
aikakauslehti 9/1974, pp. 413-18. 
(The Danish Straits as a German 
Problem). 
Kääntönen, Matti, "Itämeri - unohdettu 
I maailmansodan rintama", Histo-
riallinen Aikakauskirja 2/1979, pp. 
139-42. (The Baltic Sea, a Forgotten 
Front of the First World War). 
Kaarle, Juha, "Ryssänlimppua, ripaskaa 
ja vallankumousta Turussa 1901-
1917", Kasarmin aidan kahden puo-
len; kaksisataa vuotta suomalaista 
varuskuntayhteisöä. Toim. Jussi T. 
Lappalainen. Historiallinen Arkisto 
101, Finnish Historical Society, Hel-
sinki 1993, pp.71-90. (The Russian 
Garrison in Turku). 
Kaikkonen, 011i, Deutschland and die 
Expansionspolitik der USA in den 
90er Jahren des 19. Jahrhunderts. 
Studia historica Jyväskyläensis 20, 
Jyväskylän yliopisto, Jyväskylä 
1980. 
Kaikkonen, 011i, "Deutschland, Russ-
land, Finnland; Grundlagen der ge-
genseitigen Beziehungen". Deutsch-
land and Finnland 1871-1914. Poll- 
tik—Wirtschaft— Öjfentliche Meinung. 
University of Joensuu Publications 
in the Humanities, Herausgegeben 
von 011i Kaikkonen and Manfred 
Menger, Joensuu 1992, pp. 9-21. 
Kaikkonen, 011i, "Die gesellschaftliche 
Situation Finnlands and die russisch-
finnische Beziehungen in der Sicht 
der 	 deutscher 	 Diplomaten", 
Deutschland and Finnland 1871-
1914; Politik — Wirtschaft — Öjfent-
liche Meinung. University of Joen-
suu Publications in the Humanities, 
herausgegeben von 011i Kaikkonen 
and Manfred Menger, Joensuu 1992, 
p. 23 et seq. 
Kaikkonen, 011i, "Saksan laivastosuun-
nitelmat Suomen suunnalla vuosina 
1871-1914." Oikeutta ja historiaa: 
Heikki Ylikankaan 50-vuotisjuhlakir-
ja. WSOY, Porvoo 1987, pp. 68-88. 
(German naval plans towards Fin-
land in 1871-1914). 
Kallas, Aino, Päiväkirja vuosilta 1897 
- 1906. Otava, Helsinki 1952. (The 
Diary of K.). 
Kalleinen, Kristiina, 'Itsenäisyyspyrki-
myksiä Venäjän vallankumouksen 
varjossa. Vallankumous 1917; tut-
kielmia Venäjän vallankumouksen 
vaikutuksista Suomessa ja impe-
riumin muilla reuna-alueilla.' Hel-
singin yliopiston poliittisen historian 
laitoksen julkaisuja 1/1987, Helsinki 
1987, p. 98-112. (Striving for inde-
pendence in the shadow of Russian 
revolution). 
Kamenskii, N., Sovremennoe polozhenie 
v Finliandii s tochki zreniia oborony 
gosudarstva; Kfznliandskomu vopro-
su v Gosudarstvennoi Dume. S. Pe-
terburg 1908. 
Kansallinen elämäkerrasto, vol. I—V. 
WSOY, Porvoo 1927-1934. (Na-
tional Biography). 
Karanko, T.T., "Paluutie". Jääkäri-in-
valiidi 1933, pp. 117-21. (Homeward 
bound). 
"Karel'skaja avantiura 1921-22", Grazh-
danskaia voina i voennaia intervent-
siia v SSSR; Entsiklopediia. 'Sovets-
kaia Entsiklopediia', Moskva 1983, 
p. 252. 
"Karel'skaia trudovaia kommuna", 
Grazhdanskaia voina i voennaia in-
terventsiia v SSSR; Entsiklopediia..  
'Sovetskaia Entsiklopediia', Moskva 
1983, p. 252. 
Kasarmin aidan kahden puolen; kaksi-
sataa vuotta suomalaista varuskun-
tayhteisöä. Ed. Jussi T. Lappalainen. 
Historiallinen Arkisto 101, Finnish 
Historical Society, Helsinki 1993. 
(Two hundred years of Finnish Gar-
rison Society). 
Kaukiainen, Yrjö, "Merenkulku", Suo-
men taloushistoria, vol. I. Tammi, 
Helsinki 1980, pp. 458-74. (A His-
tory of Finnish Seafaring). 
Kaukiainen, Yrjö, Sailing into Twilight; 
Finnish Shipping in an Age of Trans-
port Revolution, 1860-1914. Studia 
historica 39, Finnish Historical So-
ciety, Helsinki 1991. 
Kauppi, Ulla-Riitta, "Kymenlaakson lin-
noitustyöt taloudellisena vaikuttajana 
1700-1800-lukujen taitteessa", Ka-
sarmin aidan kahden puolen; kaksi-
sataa vuotta suomalaista varuskun-
tayhteisöä. Toim. Jussi T. Lappalai-
nen. Historiallinen Arkisto 101, Fin-
nish Historical Society, Helsinki 
1993, pp. 49-70. (The Economic Im-
pact of Fortification Works in the 
Kymi River Valley). 
Keep, John L.H., Soldiers of the Tsar; 
Army and Society in Russia 1462-
1874. Clarendon Press, Oxford 1985. 
Kemiläinen, Aira, "Nationalism in Nine-
teenth Century Finland", Miscella-
nea, Studia historica 33, Finnish 
Historical Association, Helsinki 
1989. 
Kemppinen, Kauko, Suomen kysymys 
Pietarissa v. 1906-1914. Suomen 
historian lisensiaattitutkimus, Tam-
pereen yliopisto 1981. (The Finnish 
Question in St.Petersburg 1906-
1914). 
Kennedy, Paul, The Rise and Fall of 
British Naval Mastery. Third editi-
on, Fontana Press, London 1991. 
Kepsu, Saulo, Pietari ennen Pietaria; 
Nevansuun vaiheita annen Pietarin 
perustamista. Suomalaisen Kirjalli-
suuden Seuran toimituksia 608, Hel-
sinki 1995.(The History of the Neva 
Delta before the Foundation of St 
Petersburg). 
Kersnovski, A.A., Istoriia russkoi armii 
v chetyre tomakh; tom pervyi: Ot 
Narvy do Parizha 1700-1814; tom 
435 
vtoroi: Ot vziatiia Parizha do poko-
reniia Srednei Azii 1814-1881; tom 
tretii: 1881-1915; tom chetvertyi: 
1915-1917. Golos, Moskva 1994-95 
(reprint). 
Ketola, Eino, "Suomen sosiaalidemo-
kraattisen puolueen itsenäisyyspoli-
tiika kesällä 1917", Vallankumous 
1917; tutkielmia Venäjän vallanku-
mouksen vaikutuksista Suomessa ja 
imperiumin muilla reuna-alueilla. 
Helsingin yliopiston poliittisen histo-
rian laitoksen julkaisuja 1/1987, Hel-
sinki 1987, pp. 7-15. (The Inde-
pendence Policy of the Finnish So-
cial Democratic Party). 
Kholodkovskii, Revoliutsiia 1918 goda 
v Finliandii i germanskaia intervent-
siia. Akademiia Nauk SSSR, Institut 
istorii, 'Nauka', Moskva 1967. 
436 	 Kholodkovskii see also Holodkovski. 
Kiep, Leisler, Saksan laivaston toimin-
ta Suomen vapaussodassa keväällä 
1918. WSOY, Porvoo 1923. (The 
Activity of the German Navy in the 
Finnish War of Liberation in the 
Spring of 1918). 
Kiep, Leisler, "Eckerön ja Hangon sopi-
mukset", Ensimmäiset aseve femme. 
Tampere 1943, pp. 30-39. (The Ag-
reements of Eckerö and Hanko with 
Swedes and Russians in April 1918). 
[Kilpeläinen] Irja Kilpeläinen kertoo ja 
muistelee. Ed. Simo Repo, Kirjapaja, 
Helsinki & Jyväskylä 1989. (The 
Memoirs of Kilpeläinen). 
Kiparsky, Valentin, Suomi Venäjän kir-
jallisuudessa. Suomen Kirja, Helsin-
ki 1943. (Finland in Russian Litera-
ture). 
Kirby, David, Finland and Russia 1808-
1920, from autonomy to inde-
pendence; a selection of documents. 
Studies in Russian and East Europe-
an History. Macmillan, London 
1975. 
Kirby, D.G., Finland in the Twentieth 
Century. C.Hurst & Company, Lon-
don 1979. 
Kirby, David, The Baltic World, 1772 
—1993; Europe's Northern Periphery 
in an Age of Change. Longman, Lon-
don 1995. 
Kitchen, Martin, The Silent Dictator-
ship; The Politics of the German 
High Command under Hindenburg  
and Ludendorff 1916-1918. Holmes 
& Meier, New York 1976. 
Kivi, Aleksis, Seitsemän veljestä. Vali-
tut teokset, ed. J.V. Lehtonen, neljäs 
painos, Otava, Helsinki 1951. (The 
Seven Brothers, first published in 
1870). 
Klemettilä, Aimo, "Lenin ja Suomen 
kansalaissota", Lenin ja Suomi, vol. 
II, pp. 163-293. (Lenin and the Fin-
nish Civil War). 
Klinge, Matti, "Itsenäisyys — jääkäriliike 
— sortokausi; käsitteistä ja tapauksis-
ta." Historiallinen Aikauskirja 
4/1969 (Independence — The Jäger 
Movement — The Years of Oppres-
sion), pp. 309-19. 
Klinge, Matti, Från lojalism till 
rysshat. Söderströms, Helsingfors 
1988. 
Klinge, Matti, Finlands historia 3, Kej-
sartiden. Schildts, Helsingfors 1996. 
Knox, Alfred, With the Russian army 
1914-1917, being chiefly extraits 
from the diary of a military attache. 
vols. I - II, Hutchinson & Co, Lon-
don 1921. 
Kochakov, B.M. Sotsial'nyi lostav sol-
dat tsarskoi armii v period impe-
rializma. Iz istorii imperializma v 
Rossii, Nauka, Moskva & Leningrad 
1959, pp. 347-70. 
Krenke, V.D., Oborona Baltiiskago pri-
berezhia v 1854-1856 godakh. Izdal 
V. Berezovskii, S.Peterburg 1887. 
Der Krieg in der Ostsee, vol. I: 1914 -
1915 by Rudolf Firle, Berlin 1921; 
vol. II: 1915 by Heinrich Rollmann, 
Berlin 1929 (Der Krieg zur See 
1914-1918, Hrsg. vom Marine-Ar-
chiv); vol. III: 1916 — 1918 by Ernst 
Freiherr von Gagern, Frankfurt am 
Main 1964. 
Kritskii, P., "Vseobshchaia voinskaia 
povinnost' v Velikom Kniazhestve 
Finliandskom, za desiatiletie s 1882 
do 1891 goda; statisticheskoe izsle-
dovanie", Voennyi Sbornik 1899, 6 
iiunia, pp. 310-24. 
Kroiakov, N.S., "K istorii 'ledovogo 
pokhoda' Baltiiskogo flota v 1918 
g". Istoricheskie zapiski 1952, pp. 3-
48. 
Krusius-Ahrenbeg, Lolo, Der Durch-
bruch des Nationalismus und Libe-
ralismus im politischen Leben Finn- 
lands 1856-1863. Annales Acade-
miae Scientiarum Fennicae, vol. B 
XXXIII, Helsinki 1934. 
Krusius-Ahrenberg, Lolo, Dagbladsse-
paratismen år 1863 och den begyn-
nande panslavismen. Historiska och 
litteraturhistoriska 	 studier, 	 vol. 
XXX, Skrifter utgvna av Svenska 
Litteratursällskapet i Finland, nr. 
346, Helsingfors 1954. 
Kujala, Antti, "Suomalaiset vallanku-
mousjärjestöt ja poliittinen rikolli-
suus 1906-1908". Historiallinen Ai-
kakauskirja 2/1981, pp. 106-24. 
(Finnish Revolutionary Organiza-
tions and Political Crime). 
Kujala, Antti, "March Separately — Strike 
Together; The Paris And Geneva 
Conferences Held by the Russian 
and Minority Nationalities' Revolu-
tionary and Opposition Parties, 
1904-1905." Akashi, Rakka ryusui), 
Studia Historica 31, Finnish Histori-
cal Society, Helsinki 1988, pp. 88-
167. 
Kujala, Antti, "Lenin, Venäjän vallanku-
mous ja Suomi", "Suomi vallanku-
mouksen punaisena selustana". Lenin 
ja Suomi, vol. II, pp. 39-109, 111-
224. (The Russian Revolution and 
Finland, its Red Rear). 
Kujala, Antti, Vallankumous ja kansal-
linen itsemääräämisoikeus; Venäjän 
sosialistiset puolueet ja suomalainen 
radikalismi vuosisadan alussa. Sum-
mary: Revolution and the right to na-
tional self-determination, Russian 
socialist parties and Finnish radica-
lism at the beginning of the twentieth 
century. Historiallisia tutkimuksia 
152, Finnish Historical Society, Hel-
sinki 1989. 
Kujala, Antti, Venäjän hallitus ja Suo-
men työväenliike 1899-1905. Histo-
riallisia tutkimuksia 194, Finnish 
Historical Society, Helsinki 1995. 
(The Russian Government and the 
Finnish Labour Movement). 
Kujala, Antti, "Venäjän hallituksen 
suunnitelmat Suomen palauttamises-
ta järjestykseen vuosina 1907-1914," 
(The Plans of the Russian Govern-
ment to Restore Order in Finland 
1907-1914). Historiallinen Aika-
kauskirja 4/1995, pp. 291-99. 
Kujanen, Hannu, "Krimin selkkaukset  
merenkulkumme kiusana ja kiihok-
keena autonomian ajalla", Niin tuli 
sota maahan! Sotien ja sotalaitoksen 
vaikutus suomalaiseen yhteiskun-
taan. Jussi T. Lappalainen 60 vuotta 
23.10.1995. Turun historiallinen ar-
kisto 49, ed. Jari Niemelä, publ. Tu-
run Historiallinen Yhdistys, Turku 
1995, pp. 231-44. (The Crimean 
Conflict as a Hindrance and Stimulus 
to Finnish Seafaring). 
Kuropatkin, A.N., Zadachi russkoi ar-
mii, tom 1-i: Zadachi armii po 
ob"edineniiu russkago plemeni i 
vykhodu k moriam Kaspiiskomu, 
Baltiiskomu i Chernomu. Rossiia 
dlia russkikh. Sklad V.A. Berezovs-
kaia, Komissiia voenno-uchebnykh 
zavedenii, S.Peterburg 1910. 
Kuropatkin, General, Memoiren; die 
Lehren des russisch-japanischen 
Krieges. Mit einer Einleitung Oberst 
a.D. Richard Gädke. Verlag Hans 
Bondy, Berlin 1909. 
Kuusanmäki, Jussi, "Den finska gar-
nisonstaden 1809-1917; Några as-
pekter", Den nordiska garnisonssta-
den, Historiallinen Arkisto 92, ed. by 
Gunnar Arteus & Kari Selän. Finnish 
Historical Society, Helsinki 1988, 
pp. 108-34. 
Kuussaari, Eero, Vapaustaistelujen tiel-
lä; sotahistoriallinen katsaus Suo-
men rajantakaisilla heimoalueilla 
1900-luvun alkupuolella käytyihin 
sotatoimien. Loviisan Uusi Kirjapai-
no, Loviisa 1957. (Fighting for Li-
berty beyond the Finnish Borders in 
Karelia). 
Kvick, Jyrki, Venäläisen sotaväen ma-
joittaminen Kuopiossa 1910-1918. 
Unpublished M.A. thesis, Depart-
ment of History, University of Tam-
pere, Tampere 1997. (Quartering 
Russian Troops in Kuopio 1910-18). 
Kylävaara, Keijo, Balkanin santaa. 
Arvi A.Karisto, Hämeenlinna 
I978.(A collection of Diaries, Let-
ters and Memoirs from the Finnish 
Guards in the Balkan War). 
Lacheret-Villate, M., "La preparation de 
l'Armbe russe en 1914", Revue 
d'Histoire de la Guerre Mondiale 
1931, pp. 113-34. 
Lackman, Matti, Jääkärimuistelmia. 
Otava, Helsinki 1994. (Jäger Me- 
437 
moirs). 
Lackman Matti, & Kemppainen, Ilpo & 
Pisto, Juha, Jääkärit marssivat, kai-
nuulaista sotahistoriaa. Kainuun 
museon julkaisuja, Kajaani 1993. 
(The Jägers March, Military History 
of the Kainuu region). 
Laine, Sirkku, Ensimmäisen maailman-
sodan maalinnoitus Helsingissä. 
Helsingin kaupungin rakennusviras-
ton julkaisuja 1996:3. (The Dry-land 
Fortress of Helsinki under the First 
World War). 
Laine, Unto, "Turun tulokaskasvit soti-
laiden jalanjäljillä." Kasarmin aidan 
kahden puolen; kaksisataa vuotta 
suomalaista varuskuntayhteisöä, ed. 
Jussi T. Lappalainen. Historiallinen 
Arkisto , vol. 101, Finnish Historical 




(Plants Imported to Turku by Sol- 
diers). 
Lambert, Andrew, "Preparing for the 
Russian war: British strategic plan-
ning, March 1853—March 1854", 
War & Society, Vol. 7, No. 2/Sep-
tember 1989, pp. 15-39. 
Lambert, Andrew, The Crimean War; 
British Grand Strateg against Rus-
sia, 1853-1856. Manchester Univer-
sity Press 1990. 
Lambi, Ivo Nikolai, The Navy and Ger-
man Power Politics, 1862-1914. Al-
len & Unwin, Boston 1984. 
Landtman, Gunnar, Finlands väg till 
oavhängighet. Skrifter utgifna af 
Svenska folkskolans vänner, ny följd 
I, Helsingfors 1919. 
Langhoff, August, Seitsemän vuotta 
Suomen edustajana valtaistuimen 
edessä; Muistelmia ja muistiinpano-
ja vuosilta 1906 - 1913. Suom. Eino 
Voionmaa. WSOY, Porvoo 1922. 
(Memoirs of Langhoff as Minister 
State Secretary). 
Lappalainen, Jussi T., Punakaartin 
sota, vol. I-II. Punaisen Suomen his-
toria 1918. Opetusministeriö & Val-
tion Painatuskeskus, Helsinki 1981. 
(The History of the Red Finland; The 
War of the Red Guards). 
Lappalainen, Jussi T., "Oskar I:s planer 
1854-1856". Militärhistorisk Tidsk-
rift 1984, pp. 5-18. 
Lappalainen, Jussi T., "Ex agmina hac-
capellorum libera nos Domine". 
Historisk Tidskrift for Finland 1986 
pp. 98-110. 
Lappalainen, Jussi T., "Från garnisons-
stad till skogsgarnison; Det finska 
garnisonssamhället under 250 år," 
pp. 53-73, Den nordiska gar-
nisonsstaden, Historiallinen Arkisto 
92, ed. Gunnar Arteus & Kari Selen. 
Finnish Historical Society, Helsinki 
1988. 
Lauerma, Matti, Kuninkaallinen Preus-
sin Jääkäripataljoona 27, vaiheet ja 
vaikutus. WSOY, Porvoo 1966. (The 
Royal Prussian Jäger Battalion 27, 
History and Importance). 
Lauerma, Matti, "Poliittisen luotettavuu-
den ongelma Jääkäripataljoona 
27:ssä", Historiallinen Aikakauskir-
ja 1/1960, pp. 116-125. (The Prob-
lem of Political Loyalty in the 27th 
Jäger Battalion). 
Lehonkoski, A., "Viron rannikon linnoi-
tukset ja Viron saarten valtaus maa-
ilmansodan aikana." Rannikkotykis-
tön vuosikirja 1938, Helsinki 1938, 
pp. 97-130. (The Fortifications on 
the Estonian Coast and the Conquest 
of the Estonian Islands during the 
World War). 
Lehti, A., "Brittiläisten merisotatoimet 
Suomenlahdella vv. 1918- 1919." 
Suomi Merella 3/1965, (British Na-
val Operations in the Gulf of Fin-
land), pp. 11-24. 
Lehto, Kirsti, Kytäjän kreivitär; Marie 
Linderin elämä. Otava, Helsinki 
1985. (The Life of Countess Linder). 
Lehtonen, Joel, "Kuolleet omenapuut", 
Weilin & Göösin joulukirja 1986, ed. 
Jukka Tarkka, Weilin & Göös, Hel-
sinki 1986, pp. 87-175. ("Dead apple 
trees"; a collection of stories first 
published in 1918). 
Lemke, Mikh., 250 dni v tsarskoi stay-
ke (25. sent. 1915 - 2. iiulia 1916). 
Gosudarstvennoe izdatelstvo, Peter-
burg 1920. 
Lenin ja Suomi, vols. I-III, Opetusminis-
teriö & Valtion Painatuskeskus, Hel-
sinki 1989. (Lenin and Finland). 
Leppänen, Glory, Tulesta tuhkaksi; 
Emmy Achte ja hänen maailmansa. 
Otava, Helsinki 1962. (Biography 
of Emmy Achte). 
Leppänen, Glory, Elämäni teatteria. 
Otava, Helsinki s.a. (The Memoirs of 
Leppänen). 
Leslie, R.F., Reform and Insurrection in 
Russian Poland 1856-1865. Univer-
sity of London Historical Studies 
XIII, London 1963. 
Lieto, A., "Menemme miinanpuhdistus-
työn alkuvaiheita v. 1918", Suomen 
Sotilas 1941, pp. 314-16, 333-34. 
(The Beginning of our Mineswee-
ping Operations in 1918). 
Lieven, D.C.B., Russia and the Origins 
of the First World War. The making 
of the 20th century. Macmillan, Lon-
don and Basingstoke 1987. 
Lilius, Aleko, Aikoja on eletty (Ett 
herrans liv, trans]. 011i Nuorto). 
WSOY, Helsinki & Porvoo 1957. 
Lilius, Aleko, Nuori mies panee toi-
meksi. (Ung man i farten, trans]. 
Aaro Vuoristo). WSOY, Helsinki & 
Porvoo 1958. 
Lincoln, W.Bruce, Passage through Ar-
mageddon; the Russians in War and 
Revolution. Oxford Paperbacks, Ox-
ford University Press, New York & 
Oxford 1986 (1996). 
Lindberg, Folke, "Bakom borggårdskri-
sen; Tyskland föreslår militär kon-
vention med Sverige 1910", Dagens 
Nyheter 11. VIII 1954. 
Lindberg, Folke, "De svensk-tyska ge-
neralstabsfdrhandlingama år 1910", 
Historisk Tidskrift 1957, pp. 1-28. 
Lindberg, Folke, Den svenska utrikes-
politikens historia, vol. III:4, 1872-
1914. Norstedts, Stockholm 1958. 
Lindequist, K.O., "Iso Viha", Oma maa, 
vol. I, Porvoo 1920, pp. 915-32 (The 
Russian Occupation in 1710-1721). 
Lindeqvist, K.O., Hämeenlinnan kau-
pungin historia, vol. III: Vuosina 
1809-75, Hämeenlinna 1930. (The 
History of Hämeenlinna). 
Linder, Paul, Keisarillisen kaartin up-
seerina. Otava, Helsinki 1938. (Me-
moirs of Linder.). 
Linke, Horst Günther, Das Zarische 
Russland und der Erste Weltkrieg; 
Diplomatie und Kriegsziele 1914-
1917. Wilhelm Fink, München 1982. 
Lubchenköv, lu., Spasitel' grada Petro-
va; General-fel'dmarshal Petr Khris-
tianovich Vitgenshtein. Georgievs-
kie kavalery, Sbomik v 4-kh t., T. 1: 
1769-1850. Ed. A.V. Shishov, Patri-
ot, Moskva 1993, pp. 349-56. 
Luckett, Richard, The White Generals; 
an Account of the White Movement 
and the Russian Civil War. Rout-
ledge and Kegan Paul, London and 
New York 1971. 
Ludendorff, Erich, Sotamuistelmani 
1914 - 1918. WSOY, Porvoo 1919. 
(Translated from the German ori-
ginal: Meine Kriegserinnerungen 
1914-1918, Ernst Sigfrid Mittler & 
Sohn, Berlin 1919). 
Ludendorff, Erich, Kriegführung and 
Politik.. E.S.Müller & Sohn, Berlin 
1922. 
Lundin, C.Leonard, "Finland", Russifi-
cation in the Baltic Provinces and 
Finland, 1855-1914, ed. Edward C. 
Thaden. Princeton University Press, 
Princeton, N. J. 1981, pp. 357-457. 
Luntinen, Pertti, The Baltic Question 
1903-1908. Annales Academiae 
Scientiarum Fennicae B 195, Helsin-
ki 1975. 
Luntinen, Pertti, "The Åland Question 
during the last years of the Russian 
Empire", The Slavonic and East Eu-
ropean Review 4/1976, pp. 557-71. 
Luntinen, Pertti, "Suomen voima sorta-
jan silmin", Historiallinen Aika-
kauskirja , 3/1978, pp. 211-28. (The 
Oppressor's View on the Finnish 
Voima or Force). 
Luntinen, Pertti, "Suomi Pietarin suoja-
na ja uhkana venäläisten sotasuunni-
telmissa 1854 -1914". (With an Eng-
lish Summary: Finland, Shield and 
Threat for St Petersburg in the Rus-
sian War Plans.) Historiallinen Ar-
kisto 79, Finnish Historical Society, 
Helsinki 1983, pp. 7-130. 
Luntinen, Pemi, Sotilasmiljoonat. Histo-
riallisia tutkimuksia 125, Finnish 
Historical Society, Helsinki 1984. 
(The Finnish Monetary Contribution 
to Russia in lieu of Military Service). 
Luntinen, Pertti, Venäläisten sotasuun-
nitelmat Suomen separatismia vas-
taan. Tampereen yliopisto, Historia-
tieteen laitoksen julkaisuja 11. Tam-
pere 1984. (Russian War Plans 
against Finnish separatism). 
Luntinen, Pemi, French Information on 
the Russian War Plans 1880-1914. 
Studia Historica 17, Finnish Histo-
rical Society, Helsinki 1984. 
Luntinen, Pemi, F.A. Seyn; A Political 
439 
Biography of a Tsarist Imperialist as 
Administrator of Finland. Studia 
Historica 19, Finnish Historical So-
ciety, Helsinki 1985. 
Luntinen, Pertti, Saksan keisarillinen 
laivasto Itämerellä. Aikeet, suunni-
telmat ja toimet. Historiallisia tutki-
muksia 143, Finnish Historical So-
ciety, Helsinki 1987. Zusammenfas-
sung: Die kaiserlich deutsche Flotte 
in der Ostsee. 
Luntinen, Pertti, "Itsenäisyyspäätös kyp-
syy", Irti Venäjästä, Itsenäistymisen 
vuodet 1917-1920, vol. I, VAPK, 
Helsinki 1992, pp. 194-243. 
Lyytinen, Eino, Finland in British Po-
litics in the First World War. Suo-
malaisen Tiedeakatemian toimituksia 
ser B nr. 207, Helsinki 1980. 




Rauman kaupungin historia, vol. IV. 
Rauma 1939. (The History of Rau-
ma). 
M[äkelä], M[atti] E., Amiraali von Trot-
ha ja Saksan apu Suomelle 1918. 
Hakkapeliitta 1940, pp. 1195-96. 
(Admiral v. Trotha and German Aid 
for Finland). 
Mann, Bernhard, Die baltischen Länder 
in der Deutschen Kriegszielpublizis-
tik 1914- 1918. Tübinger Studien zur 
Geschichte and Politik 19. J.C.B. 
Mohr, Tübingen 1965. 
Manninen, J., "Suomen laivasto Venäjän 
vallan aikana; Suomen meriekipaasi 
1830-1880", Suomen sotilas 5-
6/1930, pp. 58-61, 74. (The Finnish 
Naval Equipage). 
Manninen, Juuso, Venäläisten ulkomail-
ta saamat tiedot jääkäriliikkeestä. 
Jääkäri-invalidi 1933, pp. 63-66. 
(Information received by the Rus-
sians from abroad about the Jäger 
Movement). 
Manninen, Juuso, "Venäläisten suunni-
telmat suomalaisten osallistumisesta 
maailmansotaan", Suomen Sotilas-
aikakauslehti-Finsk Militär Tidskrift 
1933, pp. 397-412. 
Manninen, Juuso, "Pari venäläistä lai-
vastosuunnitelmaa Suomessa". Lai-
vastolehti 1934, pp. 110-12. 
Manninen, Ohto, "The Second Russian 
Pacific Squadron and French Neut-
rality", Archivum Historicum 68, 
Finnish Historical Society, Helsinki  
1985, pp. 91-209. 
Manninen, Ohto, "Punainen Tasavalta 
1859-1861; Leikkimielisestä sa-
laseurasta kansallishengen ahjoksi", 
Historiallinen Arkisto 89, Finnish 
Historical Society, Helsinki 1986, 
pp. 117-78. (The Red Republic; 
From a Playful Secret Society to Na-
tionalist Strivings). 
Manninen, Ohto, "Sodanjohto ja strate- 
gia"; "Taistelevat osapuolet". 	 It- 
senäistymisen vuodet 1917-1920, 
vol. II, VAPK, Helsinki 1994, pp. 
24-93, 94-177. 
Manninen, Ohto, "Finland Takes Sha-
pe", Historiallinen Aikakauskirja 
37/1997, pp. 129-135. 
Manninen, Turo, "Järjestysvalta järk-
kyy", "Kam-tit vastakkain", "Tie so-
taan". Itsenäistymisen vuodet 1917-
1920, vol. I, VAPK, Helsinki 1992, 
pp. 246-432. (The Shaking Forces of 
Order, The Guards Opposed to Each 
Other, The Way to the War) 
Mattila, T., "Krimin sota ja Suomen me-
ripuolustus", Suomen laivasto 




leelta". Suomi Merellä, 1/1962, 
4/1962, pp. 15-23, 96-107. (The 
Foundation of the Finnish Navy). 
Mattila, Tapani, "Suomen laivastovoi-
mien vaiheita ennen itsenäisyyden 
aikaa". Suomen laivasto 1918 — 1968 
, vol. I, Helsinki 1968, pp. 11-58. 
(Finnish Naval Forces before Inde-
pendence). 
Maude, George, Finland and Britain 
1854-1914. Ph.D. thesis, University 
of London 1970. 
Maude, George, "Finland in Anglo-Rus-
sian relations 1899-1910". The Sla-
vonic and East European Review, 
October 1970, pp. 557-81. 
Maude, George, "'Venäjän integraalinen 
osa'; Suomi brittiläisestä näkökul-
masta 1856-1899." Historiallinen 
Aikakauskirja, 2/1971, pp. 101-110. 
(Finland, an Integral Part of Russia, 
from the British Point of View). 
Mawdsley, Evan, The Russian Revolu-
tion and the Baltic Fleet; War and 
Politics, February 1917 — April 
1918. Studies in Russian and East 
European History. Macmillan Press, 
London 1978. 
Mawdsley, Evan, The Russian Civil 
War. Allen & Unwin, Boston 1987. 
Maynard, C., The Murmansk Venture. 
Hodder and Stoughton, London 
(1928). 
Mayzel, Matitiahu, The formation of the 
Russian general staff, 1880-1917; a 
social study. Cahiers du monde russe 
et sovietique, vol. XVI, 3-4/1975. 
Mechelin, Leo, Précis du droit publi-
que du Grand-duche de Finlande. 
G.W. Edlund, Helsingfors 1886. 
Mellan björnen och örnen; Sverige och 
Östersjöområdet under det första 
världskriget, 1914-1918; föredrag 
hållna vid symposium i Visby, 4-7-
augusti 1993. Ed. Johan Engström, 
Armémuseum, Lars Ericson, Krig-
sarkivet, Stockholm 1994. 
Menger, Manfred, Das imperialistische 
Deutschland und die Anerkenneung 
der Selbständigkeit Finnlands durch 
Sowjetrussland. Jahrbücher der Ge-
schichte der UdSSR und der volks-
demokratischen Länder 1967, Bd 11, 
pp. 143-55. 
Menger, Manfred, Die Finnlandpolitik 
des deutschen Imperialismus 1917-
1918. Akademie der Wissenschaften 
der DDR, Schriften des Zentralinsti-
tuts für Geschichte, Bd 38, Akade-
mi-Verlag, Berlin 1974. 
Menger, Manfred, "Nur seltene Anwan-
dlungen der Entrüstung? Deutsche 
Reaktionen auf die russische Finn-
landpolitik unter Nikolaus II". 
Deutschland und Finnland 1871 - 
1914; Politik — Wirtschaft — Offent-
liche Meinung, University of Joen-
suu Publications in the Humanities, 
Hrsg. 011i Kaikkonen and Manfred 
Menger. Joensuu 1992, pp. 97-133. 
Meurman, Agathon, Muistelmia vol. I, 
Helsinki 1909. (The Memoirs of M.) 
[Mikhailovskii-Danilevskii] 	 Opisanie 
Finliandskoi voiny v 1808 i 1809 go-
dakh. Polnoe sobranie sochinenii 
Aleksandr Ivanovich Mikhailovska-
go-Danilevskago, vol. II, v tipografii 
shtaba otdel'nago korpusa vnutren-
nei strazhi, Sanktpeterburg 1849. 
Mitchell, Donald W., A History of Rus-
sian and Soviet Sea Power. André 
Deutsch, London 1974. 
Monasterev, N., La Marina Russa du-
rante la Guerra Mondiale 1914-
1917. Trad. dal russo Amm. D. Mi-
raglia. Vallecchi, Firenze 1934. 
Munck, L., Suurvaltain välisen so-
danuhan vaikutus Suomen rannikon 
puolustuksen tehostamiseen v. 1885. 
Rannikkotykistön vuosikirja, 1937, 
pp. 170-71. (The Improvement of the 
Defence of the Finnish Coasts under 
the Threat of War between the Great 
Powers). 
[Muravev] "Graf Mikhail Nikolaevich 
Muravev, Zapiski ego o miatezhe v 
severozapadnom Rossii v 1863-1864 
gg", Russkaia Stanna, vol. XI 1882, 
pp. 386-432, vol. XII 1882, pp. 623-
46. S.Peterburg 1882. (Translated 
into German: Der Dictator von Wil-
na; Memoiren des Grafen M.N. Mu-
rawjew. Aus dem russischen, mit ei-
ner biographischen Einleitung. 
Dunkcer & Humbolt, Leipzig 1883). 
Murtola, Kari, Ison-Britannian Suomen 
sota 1808-1809. M.A. thesis, Depart-
ment of History, University of Tam-
pere, forthcoming. (Great Britain's 
Finnish War 1808-1809). 
Myllyntaus, Timo, "Suomen talouspoli-
tiikka ja valtiotalous 1809-1860", 
Suomen taloushistoria, vol. I, Tam-
mi, Helsinki 1980, pp. 333-365 (Fin-
nish Public Finances). 
Myslaevskii, A.Z., Petr Velikii; Sever-
naia voina na inzhermanlandskom i 
finskom teatrakh v 1708-1714 g. Ma-
terialy dlia istorii voennago iskusstva 
v Rossii, izdanie Voenno-Uchenago 
Komiteta Glavnago Shtaba. Voen-
naia tipografiia, S.Peterburg 1893. 
Myslaevskii, A.Z., Petr Velikii; Voina 
v Finliandii v 1712-1714 godakh; 
sovmestnaia operatsiia sukhoputnoi 
armii, galernago i korabel'nago flo-
tov. Materialy dlia istorii voennago 
iskusstva v Rossii. Voennaia tipo-
grafiia, S.Peterburg 1896. 
Närhi, Matti, "Venäläiset joukot Suo-
messa autonomian aikana", Venä-
läiset Suomessa, Historiallinen Ar-
kisto 83, Finnish Historical Asso-
ciation, Helsinki 1984, pp. 161-180. 
(Russian Troops in Finland during 
the Period of Autonomy). 
Naval fortresses in the Baltic area. V 
Baltic seminar in Kotka 30.7.- 
441 
1.8.1987. Publication number 14 in 
the series of provincial museum of 
Kymenlaakso , s.l. 1990. 
Neilson, Keith, Strategy and Supply; 
The Anglo-Russian Alliance 1914-
1917. Allen and Unwin, London 
1984. 
Nenonen, V., Lennätinlaitos ja telefoni 
Suomessa. Oma maa, vol. VI, 
WSOY, Porvoo 1911, pp. 164-68. 
(Telegraph and Telephone in Fin-
land) 
Nervander, E. & Estlander, C. G., 1854-
56 vuosien sota. Oma maa, vol. IV, 
Porvoo 1923, pp. 850-57. (The War 
of 1854-56). 
Nevakivi, Jukka Muurmannin legioo-
na; suomalaiset ja liittoutuneiden in-
terventio Pohjois-Venäjälle 1918-




Murmansk Legion; the Finns and 
the Allied Intervention in Northern 
Russia). 
Nevalainen, Pekka, Rautaa Inkerin ra-
joilla. Historiallisia tutkimuksia 195, 
Finnish Historical Society, Helsinki 
1995. (The War in Ingria). 
Niin tuli sota maahan! Sotien ja sotalai-
toksen vaikutus suomalaiseen yhteis-
kuntaan. Jussi T. Lappalainen 60 
vuotta 23.10.1995. Turun historialli-
nen arkisto 49, toim. Jari Niemelä, 
julk. Turun Historiallinen Yhdistys, 
Turku 1995. (The Influence of the 
Wars and the Military Establishment 
on Finnish Society). 
Nikula, Oscar, Turun kaupungin histo-
ria 1809-1856. Turku 1972. (The 
History of Turku) 
Nordenstreng, Sigurd & Halila, Aimo, 
Haminan historia, vol. II: Venäjän 
vallan alusta 1900-luvun alkuun 
(1742 — n. 1900). Julk. Haminan 
kaupunki 1975. (The History of Ha-
mina). 
Den nordiska garnisonsstaden, Histo-
riallinen Arkisto 92, ed. Gunnar Ar-
teus & Kari Selen, Finnish Historical 
Society, Helsinki 1988. 
Nortamo, Hj., Hakkri Iiro otta sota-
miähem besti. Nortamon kootut 
teokset , neljäs painos, vol. I, pp. 
145-54 WSOY, Porvoo 1947. (The 
story of a sailor recruited into the 
army). 
Novikov, I.N., "Sekretnaia missiia gene- 
ral-ad"iutanta F.F. Trepova v Fin-
liandiiu, fevral' 1916-go goda. (Po 
materialam rossiiskikh arkhivov)", 
Rossiia i Finlandiia v XIX—XX vv; Is-
toriko-kulturnyi kontekst i lichnost', 
Ed. by S.B. Koreneva, A.V. Prokho-
renko. Sankt-Peterburgskii nauchnyi 
tsentr Rossiiskoi Akademii nauk; 
Sankt-Peterburgskii Fond I. M.V. 
Lomonosova; Evropeiskii Dom, 
Sankt-Peterburg 1996, pp. 41-49. 
Nurmela, Tauno, Suuri pieni maailma. 
WSOY, Porvoo & Helsinki, 2nd enl. 
ed. 1967. (Memoirs of N.). 
Nurmio, Yrjö, Suomen itsenäistyminen 
ja Saksa. WSOY, Porvoo 1957. (Fin-
nish Independence and Germany). 
Nurmio, Yrjö, "Suomen ja Saksan suh-
teet itsenäisyysjulistuksesta vuoden 
1918 loppuun", Itsenäisen Suomen 
ulkopolitiikan alkutaival. Historian 
Aitta XV, WSOY, Porvoo 1962, pp. 
31-56. (Finno-German relations 
6.XII 1917-1918) 
O-B.[Oker-Blom], C., Kort öfversigt af 
försvarskrafternas organisation i 
närvarande tid. Wiborg 1872. 
"0 disproportsii v razvitii vooruzhen-
nykh sil Rossii nakanune pervoi mi-
rovoi voiny", Istoricheskie Zapiski 
83/1969, pp. 122-36. 
Oksala, Arvi, "Venäläisten linnoitustyöt 
Ahvenanmaalla ja Turun saaristos-
sa", Rannikkotykistön vuosikirja 
1935, Helsinki 1935, pp. 11-20. 
(Russian Coastal Fortifications on 
Åland and in the Turku Archipela-
go). 
Omang, Reidar, Norge og stormaktene 
1906-1914, Skrifter utg. av det kgl 
utenriksdep. arkiv 3, Oslo 1957. 
Onnela, Samuli, "Suomen Jäämeren ka-
lastuspaikkakysymys autonomian ai-
kana", Scripta historica, vol. VI, pp. 
31-92, Acta Societatis historicae Ou-
luensis, Oulu 1980. (The Problem of 
Finnish Fishing Grounds on the Arc-
tic Ocean during the Period of Au-
tonomy 1809-1917). 
Ordin, K.F., Pokorenie Finliandii; 
Opyt' opisaniia po neizdannym is-
tochnikam. Sobranie sochineniia po 
finliandskomu voprosu, vol. II - III. 
Red. V. K. Ordin. S.Peterburg 1909 
(1889). 
Osmonsalo, Erkki K., Suomen valloitus 
1808. WSOY, Porvoo 1947. (The 
Conquest of Finland). 
Osmonsalo, Erkki K., "Itsevaltiuden 
kausi", Suomen historian käsikirja , 
vol. II, WSOY, Helsinki &Porvoo 
1949, pp. 53-163. (The Period of Ab-
solutism). 
Osmonsalo, Erkki K., & Viljanen, T.V., 
"Suomen sota vv. 1808-1809", Suo-
men historian käsikirja, vol. I, 
WSOY, Helsinki & Porvoo 1949, 
pp. 689-742. (The War for the Pos-
session of Finland 1808-1809). 
Paasikiven muistelmia sortovuosilta, 
vols. I - II, WSOY, Porvoo & Hel-
sinki 1957. (The Memoirs of Paasi-
kivi from the Years of Oppression). 
Paasivirta, Juhani, Suomen Itsenäisyys-
kysymys, vol. I: Maaliskuun vallan-
kumouksesta valtalakiin, vol. II: 
eduskunnan hajoituksesta itsenäi-
syysjulistukseen. WSOY, Porvoo & 
Helsinki 1947, 1949. (The Finnish 
Independence 1917). 
Paasivirta, Juhani, Suomi vuonna 1918. 
WSOY, Porvoo & Helsinki 1957. 
(Finland in 1918) 
Paasivirta, Juhani, The victors in World 
War I and Finland; Finland's Rela-
tions with the British, French and 
United States Governments in 1918-
1919. Studia Historica 7, Finnish 
Historical Society, Helsinki 1965. 
Paavolainen, Jaakko, Poliittiset väki-
valtaisuudet Suomessa 1918; vol. I: 
Punainen terrori; vol. II: Valkoinen 
terrori. Tammi, Helsinki 1967. (Po-
litical Violence in Finland in 1918, 
I: The Red Terror, II: The White 
Terror). 
Paavolainen, Jaakko, Vankileirit Suo-
messa 1918. Tammi, Helsinki 1971. 
(The Prison Camps in Finland 1918) 
Paavolainen, Jaakko, Väinö Tanner, se-
naattori ja rauhantekijä, elämäkerta 
vuosilta 1912-1923. Tammi, Helsin-
ki 1979. (Biography of Tanner, Se-
nator and Peacemaker). 
Pakaslahti, Aaro, Suomen politiikka 
maailmansodassa, vols. I-II, WSOY, 
Porvoo 1933-34. (Finnish Politics in 
the World War). 
Palmen, E.G., & Gripenberg, G.A., 
"Suomen kansan puolustustaakka eri 
aikoina" (The Burden of Defence in 
Finland at Different Times). Oma  
maa, vol. I, WSOY, Porvoo 1907, 
pp. 586-98. 
Palmen, E.G., "Asevelvollisuudesta" 
(National Service), Oma maa, vol. 
IV. WSOY, Porvoo 1909, pp. 173-
87. 
Pekkola, Sulo-Weikko, Ihmisten kiusa-
na. K.J. Gummerus, Jyväskylä 1928. 
(The Memoirs of a Jäger from 1917-
1918). 
Petrov, M., Podgotovka Rossii k miro-
voi voine na more; S predisloviem 
M. Pavlovicha. Shtab RKKA, uprav-
lenie po issledovaniiu i ispol'-
zovaniiu opyta voin. Moskva & Le-
ningrad 1926. 
Pietiäinen, Jukka-Pekka, Rudolf Holsti, 
lehtimies, tiedemies, poliitikko 1881-
1919. Weilin & Göös, Espoo 1986. 
(Holsti, Journalist, Scientist, Politici-
an). 
Pietiäinen, Jukka-Pekka, "Suomen ulko-
politiikan alku", Itsenäistymisen 
vuodet 1917-1920, vol. III, VAPK, 
Helsinki 1992, pp. 252-472. (The 
Beginning of Finnish Foreign Poli-
cy). 
Pikoff, E., Landsmän i ryska marinen 
1808-1918. Suomen sukututkimus-
seuran julkaisuja XIV, Helsinki 
1938. (Finns in the Russian Navy). 
Plakans, Andrej, "The Latvians", Rus-
sification in the Baltic Provinces and 
Finland, 1855-1914, ed. Edward C. 
Thaden. Princeton University Press, 
Princeton, N. J. 1981, pp. 205-84. 
Pohjanvirta, Yrjö, "Inon linnoitus", So- 
tahistoriallinen Aikakauskirja 	 7, 
Helsinki 1988, pp. 59-84. (The Fort-
ress of Ino) 
Pohlebkin, V.V., "A.V. Suvorov Suo-
messa vuosina 1791-1792", Sotahis-
toriallinen aikakauskirja , Sotahisto-
riallisen Seuran ja Sotatieteen lai-
toksen julkaisuja 2/1982, pp. 149-
54. (Suvorov in Finland). 
Pohjolan-Pirhonen, Helge, Kansakunta 
löytää itsensä 1808-1855. Kansakun-
nan historia, vol. III. WSOY, Porvoo 
& Helsinki 1973. (The History of 
the Finnish Nation). 
Pokrovskii, M., Diplomatiia i voiny 
tsarskoi Rossii v XIX stoletii; sbornik 
statei. Istoricheskaia biblioteka 6. 
Overseas Publications Interchange, 
London 1991. 
Polivanov, A.A., Iz dnevnikov i vospo-
minanii po dolzhnosti voennogo mi-
nistra i ego pomoshchnika 1907 —
1916 g, s predisloviem Mikh. Pavlo-
vicha, ed. A.M. Zaionchkovskii. 
Vysshii voennyi redaktsionnyi sovet, 
Moskva 1924. 
Polvinen, Tuomo, Die finnischen Eisen-
bahnen in den militärischen und po-
litischen Plänen Russlands vor dem 
ersten Weltkrieg. Finnische Histori-
sche Gesellschaft, Helsinki 1962. 
Polvinen, Tuomo, Valtakunta ja raja-
maa; N. I. Bobrikov Suomen kenraa-
likuvernöörinä 1898 - 1904. WSOY, 
Porvoo, Helsinki & Juva 1984. Eng-
lish translation: Imperial Border-
land; Bobrikov and the Attempted 
Russification of Finland, 1898-1904. 
Translated by Steven Huxley. Hurst 
444 	 and Company, London 1995. 
Polvinen, Tuomo, Venäjän vallanku-
mous ja Suomi 1917-1920, vol. I; 
vol. II: toukokuu 1918 joulukuu 
1920. WSOY, Porvoo, Helsinki & 
Juva 1987. (The Russian Revolution 
and Finland). 
Polvinen, Tuomo, J. K. Paasikivi; val-
tiomiehen elämäntyö, vol. I: 1870-
1918 ; vol. II: 1918-1939; vol. III: 
1939-1944. WSOY, Porvoo, Helsin-
ki & Juva 1989, 1992, 1995. (The 
Life of Paasikivi, the Statesman). 
Protasov, L.G., "Klassovoi sostav soldat 
russkoi armii pered oktiabrem", Isto-
riia SSSR 1/1977, pp. 33-48. 
Ramsay, Anders, Muistoja lapsen ja 
hopeahapsen, vols. I—IV. WSOY, 
Porvoo & Helsinki 1966. (Memoirs 
of R.) 
Ranta, Raimo, Lappeenrannan kaupun-
gin historia 1743-1811, vol. II, Lap-
peenranta 1978. (The History of 
Lappeenranta). 
Ranta, Raimo, Vanhan Suomen talous-
elämä 1721-1743, vols. I-II. Histo-
riallisia tutkimuksia 130, Finnish 
Historical Society, Helsinki 1985. 
(The Economy of Old Finland). 
Ranta, Raimo, Viipurin komendantrikun-
ta 1710-1721; valtaus, hallinto ja oi-
keudenhoito. Historiallisia tutkimuk-
sia 141, Finnish Historical Society, 
Helsinki 1987. (The Comman-
dantship of Viipuri 1710-21; the 
Conquest, Administration, and Dis- 
pensation of Justice). 
Rasila, Viljo, Vuoden 1914 venäläistä-
misasetuksen synty. Historiallinen 
Aikakauskirja 1/1966, pp. 3-15. (The 
Origins of the Russification Decree). 
Rasila, Viljo, Torpparikysymyksen rat-
kaisuvaihe, Suomen torpparikysymys 
vuosina 1908-1919. Historiallisia 
tutkimuksia 31, Kirjayhtymä, Hel-
sinki 1970. (The Final Phase of the 
Crofter Problem). 
Rasila, Viljo, Jääkäreiden sosiaalinen 
tausta ja motiivit. Jääkäriliike, Etelä-
Pohjanmaan kesäyliopiston jul-
kaisusarja 9/1984. (The Social 
Background and Motives of the Jä-
gers). 
Raskolnikov, F.F., Kronshtadt i Piter v 
1917 godu. Izdatelstvo politicheskoi 
literatury, Moskva 1990. 
Rauanheimo, U. "Venäläiset joukot Suo-
messa maailmansodan 1914-1918 ai-
kana; niiden yleisryhmitykset ja toi-
mintasuunnitelmat", Tiede ja ase, 
Suomen sotatieteellisen seuran vuo-
sijulkaisu n:o 8, Helsinki 1950, pp. 
151-70. (Russian Troops in Finland 
in the First World War, their Forma-
tion and Operational Plans). 
Rauhala, K.W., "Suomen sotaväen ins-
pehtorihallitus ja sen arkisto", Histo-
riallinen arkisto, vol. XXXII, no. 
21, pp. 1-12. Helsinki 1924. (The 
Inspector's Office of the Finnish Mi-
litary and its Archives). 
R(auhala), K.W., "Zakrevski, Arseni", 
Kansallinen elämäkerrasto, vol. V, 
WSOY, Porvoo 1934, pp. 698-701. 
Raun, Toivo U., "The Estonians", Rus-
sification in the Baltic Provinces and 
Finland, 1855-1914, ed. Edward C. 
Thaden. Princeton University Press, 
Princeton, N. J. 1981, pp. 285-354. 
Rautkallio, Hannu, Kaupantekoa Suo-
men itsenäisyydellä; Saksan sodan-
päämäärät Suomessa 1917-1918. 
WSOY, Helsinki 1977. (German 
War Aims in Finland). 
Rhodes, Benjamin D., The Anglo-Ame-
rican Winter War with Russia, 1918-
1919; A Diplomatic and Military 
Tragicomedy. Contributions in Mili-
tary Studies, Number 71, Greenwood 
Press 1988. 
Rich, Norman, Why the Crimean War? 
A Cautionary Tale. University Press 
of New England, Hanover & London 
1985. 
Richmond, Herbert, "Englannin laivasto 
Itämerellä", Rannikkotykistön vuosi-
kirja, 1938, pp. 76-96. (The English 
Navy in the Baltic Sea). 
Rinta-Tassi, Osmo, "Lokakuun vallan-
kumous ja Suomen itsenäistyminen", 
Lenin ja Suomi, vol. II, Helsinki 
1989, pp. 83-161. (The October Re-
volution and Finnish Independence). 
Risberg, Einar, Suomen lennätinlaitok-
sen historia 1855-1955. Julkaissut 
Posti- ja lennätinhallitus, Helsinki 
1959. (The History of the Finnish 
Telegraphy). 
Roberts, Michael, The Swedish Impe-
rial Experience 1560-1718. Cam-
bridge University Press, Cambridge 
1979. 
Roos, Sigurd, Suomen kansallislakko, 
tekijän tarkastama ja täydentämä 
suomennos, vols. I—II. Alex.F. Lind-
berg, Helsinki 1907. (The Finnish 
National Strike). 
Rossiiskii imperatorskii fot 1696-1917; 
voenno-istoricheskii 	 spravochnik. 
Russkii mir, Moskva 1993. 
Rossiia i Finlandiia v XIX—XX vv; Isto-
riko-kulturnyi kontekst i lichnost'. 
Ed. by S.B. Koreneva, A.V. Prokho-
renko. Sankt-Peterburgskii nauchnyi 
tsentr Rossiiskoi Akademii nauk; 
Sankt-Peterburgskii Fond I. M.V. 
Lomonosova; Evropeiskii Dom, 
Sankt-Peterburg 1996. 
Roudasmaa, Stig, Oulun varuskunnan 
historia. Scipta historica VII, acta 
societatis historicae ouluensis, Kemi 
1981. 
Ruge, Kapitänleutnant, "Die Verwen-
dung der Mine im Seekriege 1914-
1918; Ihre Erfolge und Misserfolge". 
Marine Rundschau, Juni 1927, pp. 
257-66, Juli 1927, pp. 289-300. 
Rumiantsev, A.., Finliandiia vooruzha-
etsia; Soius Sila (Voima). S.Peter-
burg 1907. 
Runeberg, Carl Mickael, Finland under 
Orientaliska kriget. Svenska Littera-
tursällskapet i Finland, Borgå 1962. 
Ruohonen, Arvo, Laivoja ja laivamiehiä 
Tampereen vesillä; Yleiskuvaus ja 
muistelmia höyrylaivaliikenteen ajal-
ta, Tampere-seuran julkaisuja n:o 31, 
3rd ed. 1981. (Memoirs of Inland  
Lake Steamers). 
"Russie", La Grande Encyclopedie, in-
ventaire raisonnee des sciences, des 
lettres et des arts, par une sociöt6 de 
savants et de gens des lettres sous la 
direction de MM. Berthelot, sena-
teur, membre de l'Institut, et al. 
Tome vingt-huitieme, Robbinisme-
Saas. Paris s.a. (circa 1900), pp. 
1151-226. 
Russilcation in the Baltic Provinces and 
Finland, 1855-1914, ed. Edward C. 
Thaden. Princeton University Press, 
Princeton, N. J. 1981. 
Russkii Biograficheskii Slovar', vols. I—
XXV, Izdavaemaia Russkim Isto-
richeskim Obshchestvom, S.Peter-
burg, Petrograd, Peterburg 1896-
1918. 
Russko-turetskaia voina 1877-1878 gg. 
Voenizdat, Moskva 1977. 
Ruuth, Y.O., Itsenäisyyspolitiikan edel-
lytykset ja alkuvaiheet. K.J.Gumme-
rus, Jyväskylä 1918. (The Conditions 
and Early Stages of the Politics of 
Independence). 
Ryan, A.N., "The Defence of British 
Trade with the Baltic, 1808-12", 
English historical Review, Vol. 
LXXIV, 1959, pp. 443 - 66. 
Ryan, A.N., The Saumarez Papers: Se-
lection from the Baltic Correspon-
dentce of Vice-Admiral Sir James 
Saumarez, 1808-1812. Shortlands, 
London 1968. 
Ryan, Antony, "An Ambassador afloat: 
Vice-Admiral Sir James Saumarez 
and the Swedish Court", The British 
navy and use of Naval Power in the 
Eighteenth Century, Ed. Jeremy 
Black & Philip Woodbine. Leicester 
University Press, London 1988. 
[Ryl'skii] Kratkii ocherk Finliandskago 
teatra, sostavil general'nago shtaba 
podpolkovnik Ryl'skii. Izdanie shta-
ba okruga, S.Peterburg 1906. 
Ryl'skii, K., "Osobennosti takticheskikh 
deistvii v Finliandii", Otdel'nyi ot-
pusk iz zhurnala Obshchestvo rev-
nitelei voennykh znanii, S.Peterburg 
1909. 
Rytkönen, Seppo, "Die Wirtschaftsinte-
ressen des kaiserlichen Deutschlands 
in Finnland vor dem ersten Weltk-
rieg", Deutschland und Finnland 
1871-1914; Politik—Wirtschaft—Of- 
fentliche Meinung. Herausgegeben 
von 011i Kaikkonen and Manfred 
Menger, University of Joensuu Pub-
lications in the Humanities, Joensuu 
1992, pp. 63-96. 
Saab, A.P., The Origins of the Crimean 
Alliance. University Press of Virgi-
nia, Charlotteville, Va. 1977. 
Saab, A.P., The Peace of Paris 1856; 
Studies in War, Diplomacy and Pea-
cemaking. ABC-Clio, Santa Barbara 
Calif. 1981. 
Salokorpi, Hannu, Pietarin tie; Suoma-
lainen puolue ja suomettarelainen 
politiikka helmikuun manifestista 
1899 Tarton rauhaan 1920. Histo-
riallisia tutkimuksia 145, Finnish 
Historical Society, Helsinki 1988. 
Salovaara, Markku, "Suomalaisrykmen-
tit Venäjän kansalaissodassa", Sota- 
446 
	
historiallinen Aikakauskirja 12, So-
tahistorian seura ja Sotatieteen laitos, 
Jyväskylä 1993, pp. 7-45. (Finnish 
Regiments in the Russian Civil 
War). 
Saul, Norman E., Sailors in Revolt; the 
Russian Baltic fleet in 1917. The Re-
gents Press of Kansas, Lawrence 
1978. 
Schauman, August, Kuudelta vuosikym-
meneltä, vols. I-II, WSOY, Porvoo 
& Helsinki 1967. (Memoirs of S.). 
[Scheer] Deutschlands Hochseeflotte im 
Weltkrieg; persönliche Erinnerungen 
von Admiral Scheer. Druck and Ver-
lag von August Scherl, Berlin 1920. 
Schoultz, G.v., Englannin suuri laivasto 
maailmansodassa; mukanaolleen 
muistiinpanoja. 	 Otava, Helsinki 
1923. (The Grand Fleet in the World 
War; Memoirs of a Participant). 
Schubert, Inger, Schweden and das 
Deutsche Reich im Ersten Weltkrieg; 
Die Aktivistenbewegung 1914-1918. 
Bonner historische Forschungen 46. 
Bonn 1981. 
Schulman, H., Händelserna i Finland 
under Krimkriget åren 1854 och 
1855. Folkuppl. s., Helsingfors 1905. 
Schulman, Hugo, Striden om Finland 
1808-1809. Werner Söderström Osa-
keyhtiö, Borgå 1909. 
Schweizer, Robert, Autonomie and Au-
tokratie; Die Stellung des Grossfür-
stentums Finnland im russischen 
Reich in der zweiten Hälfte des 19.  
Jahrhunderts (1863-1899). Marbur-
ger Abhandlungen zur Geschichte 
und Kultur Osteuropas. Giessen 
1978. 
Schybergson, Carl Magnus, Från Tilsit 
till Sveaborgs kapitulation. Acta 
Academiae Aboensis, Humaniora 
VI:3, Åbo 1929. 
Screen, J.E.O., "Några synpunkter på of-
ficersutbildning i Ryssland och Fin-
land under autonomins tid". Histo-
risk Tidskrift för Finland 2/1974, 
pp. 81-109. 
Screen, J.E.O., Den kejserliga arméns 
sista århundrade: några nyutkomna 
undersökningar.. Historisk Tidskrift 
Or Finland 2/1982, pp. 127-37. 
Screen, J.E.O., Mannerheimin muuka-
laisvuodet. WSOY, Porvoo & Hel-
sinki 1972. (Mannerheim, the Years 
of Preparation, 1970). 
Screen, J.E.O., 'Våra landsmäm', Fin-
nish officers in Russian service, 
1809-1917; a selection of docu-
ments, Meddelanden från stiftelsens 
för Åbo Akademi forskningsinstitut, 
Åbo 1983. 
Screen, J.E.O., "Undersåte och medbor-
gare: finländska officerare i rysk 
tjänst", Historisk tidskrift för Fin-
land 1/1978, pp. 21-29. (Subjects 
and Citizens; Finnish Officers in 
Russian Service). 
Screen, J.E.O., "Venäläiset sotaoppilai-
tokset Suomessa", Venäläiset Suo-
messa 1809-1917. Historiallinen Ar-
kisto 83, Finnish Historical Society, 
Helsinki 1984, pp. 189-202. (The 
Russian Military Schools in Fin-
land). 
Screen, J.E.O., The Helsinki Yunker 
School 1846-1879; a Case Study of 
Officer Training in the Russian 
Army. Studia Historica 22, Finnish 
Historical Society, Helsinki 1986. 
Screen, J.E.O., "Suomen sotaväki 1881-
1901", Sotahistoriallinen Aikakaus-
kirja 14, Sotahistoriallisen Seuran ja 
Sotamuseon julkaisuja, Helsinki 
1995, pp. 40-59. 
Screen, J.E.O., The Finnish Army, 1881-
1901; Training the Rifle Battalions. 
Studia Historica 54, Finnish Histo-
rical Society, Helsinki 1996. 
Seaton, Albert, The Crimean War; a 
Russian Chronicle. St Martin's 
Press, London 1977. 
Seitkari, Olavi, "Piirteitä Suomen ruotu-
väen uudelleen järjestämisestä vv. 
1854-1856", Historiallinen Aika-
kauskirja 1937, pp. 182-200. (Fea-
tures of the Reorganization of the In-
delta Military). 
Seitkari, Olavi, "Suomen rautatiesantar-
miston perustamisvaiheista", Histo-
riallinen Arkisto, vol. XLIII, no. 8, 
pp. 1-39, Finnish Historical Society, 
Helsinki 1937. (Establishing the 
Railway Gendarmerie in Finland). 
Seitkari, Olavi, "Sotilaallisia organisaa-
tiokysymyksiä Krimin sodan jälkeen 
vv. 1856-1858", Historiallinen Ar-
kisto, vol. XLIV, pp. 391-404, Fin-
nish Historical Society, Helsinki 
1938. (Problems of Military Or-
ganization after the Crimean War 
1856-1858). 
Seitkari, 0., "Suomen sotalaitos Venäjän 
sotilashallinnon osana 1800-luvulla", 
Sotilasaikakauskirja 1/1939, pp. 6-
22, 2/1939, pp. 86-105. (The Finnish 
Military as Part of Russian Military 
Administration in the 19th Century). 
Seitkari, Olavi, "Suomeen sijoitettujen 
joukkojen liikekannallepanon taustaa 
v. 1863", Referat: Hintergrund zu 
der Mobilisierung der in Finnland 
untergebrcahten Truppen im Jahre 
1863, Historiallinen Arkisto, vol. 
XLVII, pp. 380-95, Finnish Histori-
cal Society, Helsinki 1940. 
Seitkari, Olavi, "Suomen julistaminen 
sotatilaan v. 1914", Suomalainen 
Suomi 5/1947, pp. 244-51. (Decla-
ring State of War in Finland in 
1914). 
Seitkari, Olavi, Vuoden 1878 asevelvol-
lisuuslain syntyvaiheet; Suomen soti-
lasorganisaatio- ja asevelvollisuus-
kysymys 1860- ja 1870-luvuilla. His-
toriallisia tutkimuksia XXXVI, Fin-
nish Historical Society, Helsinki 
1951. (Origins of the National Ser-
vice Law; Problems of Military Or-
ganisation and Military Service in 
the 1860's and 1870's). 
Senn, Alfred Erich, "The Entente and 
the Polish Question 1914-1916", 
Jahrbücher fir Geschichte Osteuro-
pas NF 25/1977, pp. 21-33. 
Sepp, H., "Tsaari Pietarin sotasuunnitel-
ma Viroa, Liivinmaata ja Suomea  
vastaan", Referat: Zar Peters 
Kriegsplan im J. 1704 gegen Estland, 
Livland un Finnland, Historiallinen 
Arkisto 43:1, pp. 1-37, Finnish His-
torical Society, Helsinki 1937. 
Seyn, F., "Podvizhnyi sbor voisk fin-
liandskago voennago okruga v 1895 
g.", Voennyi Sbornik 4/1896, pp. 
427-33. 
[Seyn], Suomen asevelvollisuus verrat-
tuna keisarikunnan yleiseen asevel-
vollisuuteen; esitelmä jonka piti 
yleisesikunnan 	 överstiluutnantti 
Seyn, suomennos venäjän kielestä. 
Helsinki 1899. (Finnish National 
Service Compared to the General 
National Service in the Empire). 
Shatsillo, K.F., Russkii imperializm i 
razvitie flota nakanune pervoi miro-
voi voiny, 1906 - 1914 gg. Nauka, 
Moskva 1968. 
Shatsillo, K.F., Rossiia pered mirovoi 
voinoi; Vooruzhennye sily tsarizma v 
1905-1914 gg. Akademiia Nauk 
SSSR, nauchno-populiarnaia seriia. 
Nauka, Moskva 1974. 
Sidorov, A.L.,"Iz istorii podgotovki tsa-
rizma k pervoi mirovoi voine", Is-
toricheskii arkhiv 2/1962, pp. 120-
55. 
Sillanmäki, Jouni, "Pohjan pojat Viroa 
vapauttamassa", Sotilasaikakausleh-
ti 4/1997, pp. 58-63. 
Sinkko, Erkki, Venäläis-suomalainen 
lehdistöpolemiikki 1890-1894. Acta 
Universitatis Tamperensis, ser A, vol 
76, Diss 217, Tampere 1976. (Rus-
so-Finnish Press Polemics). 
Smith, C. Jay Jr., The Russian Struggle 
for Power, 1914-1917; A Study of 
Russian foreign policy during the 
First World War. Philosophical Lib-
rary, New York 1956. 
Söderhjelm, Henning, Werner Söder-
hjelm, vols. I-II, Schildt's, Helsing-
fors & Borgå 1960. 
Soikkanen, Hannu, Kansalaissota do-
kumentteina, vols. I—II. Tammi, Hel-
sinki 1967, 1969. (The Civil War in 
Documents). 
Sotilaspojan käsikirja 1942 s.l. (A 
Handbook for the Soldier Boys' Or-
ganization). 
Souton, Georges-Henri, L 'or et le sang; 
Les buts de guerre economique de la 
premiere Guerre mondiale. Fayard, 
447 
Paris 1989. 
Sovetskaia Voennaia Entsiklopediia, 
vols. I—VI. Voennaia Izdatelstvo Mi-
nisterstva Oborony SSSR, Moskva 
1976-78. 
Sovjetunionen och Norden — konflikt, 
kontakt, influenser. Historiallinen 
Arkisto 110:1, red. Sune Jungar & 
Bent Jensen. Finska Historiska Sam-
fundet, Helsingfors 1997. 
Stegemann, Berndt, Die deutsche Ma-
rinepolitk 1916-1918. Historische 
Forschungen, Bd 4, Berlin 1970. 
Stein, F. von, Geschichte des Russi-
schen Heeres vom Ursprunge dassel-
ben bis zum Thronbesteigung des 





Stein, Hans-Peter, Der Offizier des rus- 
448 
	
sischen Heeres im Zeitalter zwischen 
Reform und Revolution, 1861-1905. 
Forschungen zur osteuropäische Ge-
schichte, 13/1967, pp. 346-507. 
Stewen, M.K., "Saksalaisten suunnitel-
ma hyökätä Pietariin Etelä-Suomen 
kautta I maailmansodan aikana". 
Sotilasaikakauslehti 1/1959, pp. 28-
31. (The German Plan of Attacking 
Petrograd through Southern Fin-
land). 
Stjemfelt, Bertil, "Åland 1918 — säregen 
föregångare till nutida FN-opera-
tioner". Kungliga Krigsvetenskaps 
Akademiens handlingar och tidskrift 
3/1981, pp. 87-129. 
Stone, Norman, The Eastern Front 
1914-1917. Hodder & Stoughton, 
London 1975. 
Suchtelen, Paul van, Kriget emellan 
Sverige och Ryssland åren 1808 och 
1809. Stockholm 1835. (The War be-
tween Sweden and Russia for the 
Possession of Finland). 
Sundbäck, Esa, "Britannian Suomea 
koskevat sotilaalliset suunnitelmat 
vuosina 1918-1919", Sotahistorialli-
nen Aikakauskirja 10, Sotahistorian 
seura ja Sotatieteen laitos, Jyväskylä 
1991, pp. 47-70. (Finland in British 
Military Plans 1918-1919). 
Suni, L. V., "0 meste Finliandii v voen-
no-strategicheskikh planakh tsarizma 
v 80-e gg. XIX v.", Skandinavskii 
Sbornik XXI. Tartuskii gosudarstven-
nyi universitet, Tallinn 1976, pp.  
100-12. 
Suomen historian käsikirja , vols. 
ed. Arvi Korhonen. WSOY, Porvoo 
1949. (Handbook of Finnish Histo-
ry)• 
Suomen itsenäistymisen vuodet 1917-
1920, vols. I - III. Opetusministeriö 
& Valtion painatuskeskus, Helsinki 
1992-93. (The First Years of Finnish 
Independence). 
Suomen laivasto 1918-1968 , vols. I-II. 
Otava, Helsinki 1968. (The Finnish 
Navy). 
Suomen luokkasota; historiaa ja muis-
telmia. Amerikan suom. sos. kustan-
nusliikkeiden liitto, Superior, Wis. 
1928. (The Class War in Finland, 
History and Memoirs). 
Suomen vapaussota vuonna 1918, vols. 
I—VIII, Julkaissut Vapaussodan his-
torian komitea, Otava, Helsinki 
1922. (The Finnish War of Liberati-
on 1918). 
Den svenska utrikespolitikens historia, 
vols. I—VI. P.A.Nordstedt & Söner, 
Stockholm, 1952-61. 
Sveriges krig åren 1808 och 1809, vols. 
I—IX. Svenska Generalstaben, Gene-
ralstabens krigshistoriska avdelning, 
Stockholm 1890-1922. 
Svetshnikov, M.S., Vallankumous ja 
kansalaissota Suomessa 1917 - 
1918; muistelmia ja aineistoa. 
Suom. O. Kostiainen. Otava, Helsin-
ki 1925. (Memoirs and Materials on 
the Revolution and Civil War in Fin-
land). 
Sweet, David W., "The Baltic in British 
Diplomacy before the First World 
War". Historical Journal 13/1970, 
pp. 451-90. 
T., "Viaporin pommitus elokuussa 1855; 
eräs 75-vuotismuisto", Suomen soti-
las 36-37/1930, pp. 484-86. (The 
Bombardment of Sveaborg). 
Takkinen, J., "Itä-Karjalan taistelut 
1921-22". Jääkäri-invaliidi 1933, 
pp. 88-94. 
Talas, Onni, Muistelmia itsenäisyys-
senaattorina ja lähettiläänä kymme-
nessä maassa. WSOY, Porvoo & 
Helsinki 1960. (Memoirs of Talas, 
Senator and Diplomatic Envoy in 
Ten Countries). 
Talvio, Paavo, "Viaporin linnoitus ja sen 
tykistö vuosisadan vaihteesta vallan- 
kumoukseen", Sotahistoriallinen Ai-
kakauskirja 2/1982, pp. 155-203. 
Summary: The Sveaborg Fortress 
from the Turn of the Century to the 
Revolution, pp. 201-03). 
Tanskanen, Aatos, Venäläiset Suomen 
sisällissodassa vuonna 1918. Acta 
Universitatis Tamperensis, ser A, 
vol. 91, Tampere 1978. (Russians in 
the Finnish Civil War). 
Tarle, E.V., Russkii fot i vneshniaia 
politika Petra I. Reprint of the 1949 
original. Firma Braks, Sankt-Peter-
burg 1994. 
Tarle, E.V., Krymskaia Voina. Vtoroe 
ispravlennoe i dopolnennoe izdanie, 
vols. I - II. Moskva & Leningrad 
1950 
Tasihin, Juhani, Venäjän kieli Venäjän 
Suomen politiikassa vuosina 1905-
1909. Suomen historian lisensiaatti-
työ Helsingin yliopistossa 1979. 
(The Russian Language in the Rus-
sian Policy in Finland; a licenciate 
study of the University of Helsinki). 
Terä, Martti V. & Tervasmäki, Vilho, 
Puolustus hallinnon perustamia- ja 
rakentamisvuodet 1918-1939. Tam-
mi, Helsinki 1973. (Establishing and 
Building the Defence Administration 
in Finland). 
Teräs, Kari, "Sota ja teollinen moder-
nisaatio; työn ja työsuhteiden ratio-
nalisoituminen ensimmäisen maail-
mansodan aikana", Niin tuli sota 
maahan! Sotien ja sotalaitoksen vai-
kutus suomalaiseen yhteiskuntaan. 
Jussi T. Lappalainen 60 vuotta 
23.10.1995. Turun historiallinen ar-
kisto 49, ed. Jari Niemelä. Turun 
Historiallinen Yhdistys, Turku 1995, 
pp. 245-78. (War and Industrial 
Modernization, the Rationalization 
of Work and Working Relations du-
ring the First World War). 
Thaden, Edward C., "The Russian Go-
vernment", Russification in the Bal-
tic Provinces and Finland, 1855-
1914, ed. Edward C. Thaden. Prin-
ceton University Press, Princeton, 
N.J. 1981, pp. 13-108. 
Thesleff, Marianne, Ihana elämä. (Jag 
föddes till ett ljuvligt liv, transl. Cai-
us Kajanti). Kirjayhtymä, Helsinki 
1980. 
Thesleff, Wilhelm, Upplevelser under  
krigsåren 1914-1918. Schild, Hel-
singfors 1919. (Impressions from the 
War Years). 
Tillotson, H.M., Finland at Peace and 
War 1918-1993. Michael Russell, 
Norwich 1993. 
Tommila, Päiviö, La Finlande dans la 
politique europeenne en 1809-1815. 
Studia Historica 3, Finnish Histori-
cal Society, Helsinki 1962. 
Tommila, Päiviö, Suomen autonomian 
synty 1808-1819. Julkaistu valtioneu-
voston 175 juhlan kunniaksi 2. päi-
vänä lokakuuta 1984. Valtioneuvos-
ton kanslia, Helsinki 1984. (The Ori-
gins of Finnish Autonomy). 
Törngren, Adolf, Från Finlands strid 
för rätt och frihet; Personliga upple-
velser åren 1901-1914. Skrifter ut-
givna av Svenska Litteratursällskapet 
i Finland CCXC, Helsingfors 1942. 
Torvinen, Taimi, Suomen puolustusta 
Kööpenhaminassa; Ina Langen sa-
lainen toiminta Danielson-Kalmarin 
asiamiehenä 1890-luvun alussa. 
WSOY, Porvoo & Helsinki 1967. 
(Danielson-Kalmari's Agent Ina 
Lange's Clandestine Activity in Co-
penhagen for the Finnish Cause). 
Torvinen, Taimi, "Borovitinov - kahden 
kansan syntipukki", Historiallinen 
Aikakauskirja 3/1976, pp. 226-31. 
(A Scapegoat of Two Nations) 
Torvinen, Taimi,"Autonomian ajan Se-
naatti", "Itsenäistyminen ja valtio-
muototaistelun aika 1917-1919", 
Valtioneuvoston historia 1917-1966, 
vol. I, pp. 7-130, 131-272. Helsinki 
1979. (Independence and the Strug-
gle for the Constitution). 
Treue, Wilhelm, Der Krimkrieg und die 
Entstehung der modemen Flotten. 
Göttinger Bausteine zur Geschichts-
wissenschaft, Band 18. Muster-
schmidt wissenschaftliche Verlag, 
Göttingen 1954. 
Tri veka rossiiskogo Hota 1969-1996, 
vols. I - III, ed. by F.N. Gromov and 
I.V. Kasatonov. Logos, Sankt-Peter-
burg 1996. 
Trukan, G.A., "Suuri lokakuu ja Suomi", 
Vallankumous 1917; tutkielmia Ve-
näjän vallankumouksen vaikutuksista 
Suomessa ja imperiumin muilla reu-
na-alueilla. Helsingin yliopiston po-
liittisen historian laitoksen julkaisuja 
449 
1/1987, pp. 113-16. 
Trulsson, Sven G., British and Swedish 
policies and strategies in the Baltic 
after the peace of Tilsit in 1807. Bib-
liotheca Historia Lundensis XXXX, 
CWK Gleerup, Lund 1976. 
Tsamutali, A.N., "Peterburgskii period v 
zhizni E.K. Engmana i O.K. Enkelia 
kak povod dlia sopostavleniia voen-
noi i voenne-inzhenemoi mysli v 
Rossii i Finliandii", Rossiia i Fin-
landiia v XIX-XX vv; Istoriko-kultur-
nyi kontekst i lichnost'. Ed. by S.B. 
Koreneva, A.V. Prokhorenko. Sankt-
Peterburgskii nauchnyi tsentr Ros-
siiskoi Akademii nauk; Sankt-Peter-
burgskii Fond I. M.V. Lomonosova; 
Evropeiskii Dom, Sankt-Peterburg 
1996, pp. 35-40. 




Rannikkopatteristo 1918-1993. Ran- 
nikkotykistön Upseeriyhditys r.y., 
Jyväskylä 1994. (The Coastal Artil-
lery Battalion of Kotka 1918-1993). 
Turner, L.C.F., "The Russian Mobiliza-
tion in 1914", The War Plans of the 
Great Powers 1880-1914, ed. Paul 
M. Kennedy. George Allen & 
Unwin, London 1979, pp. 252-66. 
Turner, L.C.F., Origins of the First 
World War. Foundations of Modem 
History. Edward Arnold, London 
1970. 
Turpeinen, Oiva, Keisarillisen Vendian 
viranomaisten suhtautuminen jääkä-
riliikkeeseen. Helsingin yliopiston 
historian laitoksen julkaisuja n:o 7, 
Helsinki 1980. (The Reactions of the 
Russian Authorities to Jäger Move-
ment). 
Ullman, Richard H., Intervention and 
the War. Anglo-Soviet Relations 
1917-1921, vol. I, Princeton Univer-
sity Press, Princeton, N.J. 1961. 
Ullman, Richard H., Britain and the 
Russian Civil War, Nov. 1918-Feb. 
1920. Princeton University Press, 
Princeton, N.J. 1968. 
Upton, Anthony, Vallankumous Suo-
messa 1917-1918. suom. Antero 
Manninen. Kirjayhtymä, Helsinki 
1980. (The Finnish Revolution 1917-
1918). 
Ushakov, K., Podgotovka voennykh 
soobshenii k mirovoi voine. Naucho-
ustavnoi otdel staba RICKA, Moskva  
& Leningrad 1928. 
Vahtola, Jouko, 'Suomi suureksi - Viena 
vapaaksi!'; valkoisen Suomen pyrki-
mykset Itä-Karjalan valtaamiseksi 
vuonna 1918. Studia historica Sep-
tentrionalia 17, Pohjois-Suomen his-
toriallinen Yhdistys, Rovaniemi 
1988. (Greater Finland, free Viena!) 
Vallankumous 1917; tutkielmia Venäjän 
vallankumouksen vaikutuksista Suo-
messa ja imperiumin muilla reuna-
alueilla. Helsingin yliopiston poliit-
tisen historian laitoksen julkaisuja 
1/1987. (Studies of the Influence of 
the Russian Revolution in Finland 
and other Border Countries). 
Valtanen, V, "Utön taistelu 10. 8. 1915". 
Rannikkotykistön vuosikirja 1939, 
Helsinki 1939, pp. 161-71. (The 
Battle of Utö). 
Vappula, Kari, Sotilaspapin virka Suo-
men ruotujakoisessa sotaväessä 
1812- 1880. Suomen kirkkohistorial-
lisen seuran julkaisuja 123. Helsinki 
1982. (The Office of Field Chaplain 
in the Indelta Army). 
Vappula, Kari, Sotilaspapin virka Suo-
men asevelvollisessa sotaväessä 
1881-1905. Summary: the Office of 
Field Chaplain in the Finnish Consc-
ript Army from 1881 to 1905. Suo-
men kirkkohistoriallisen seuran jul-
kaisuja 146, Helsinki 1989. 
Vares, Vesa, "Kulttuurin vai sotilaan 
asein? Porvarillisen pasifismin tausta 
ja sisältö vuosisadan vaihteessa sekä 
murtuminen vuoden 1918 sisällisso-
taan", Niin tuli sota maahan! Sotien 
ja sotalaitoksen vaikutus suomalai-
seen yhteiskuntaan. Jussi T. Lappa-
lainen 60 vuotta 23.10.1995. Turun 
historiallinen arkisto 49, ed. Jari Nie-
melä, publ. Turun Historiallinen Yh-
distys, Turku 1995, pp. 279-304. 
(Background and Essence of Bour-
geois Pacifism in the Beginning of 
the Century, and its Break-Up in the 
Civil War). 
Vasiukov, V.S., Vneshniaia politika vre-
mennogo pravitel'stva. Mysl', Mosk-
va 1966. 
Venäläiset Suomessa 1809-1917. Histo-
riallinen Arkisto 83, ed. by Pauli 
Kurkinen, Finnish Historical Society, 
Helsinki 1984. (Russians in Finland). 
Verner, Andrew M., The Crisis of Rus- 
sian Autocracy; Nicholas II and the 
1905 Revolution. Princeton Univer-
sity Press, Princeton, N. J. 1990. 
Viljanen, T. V., "Helsinki sotien jalois-
sa". Helsingin kaupungin historia 
IV:1, Ajanjakso 1875-1918, pp. 181-
210. Helsinki 1955. (Helsinki at 
War). 
Virkkunen, A.H., "Vanhan vihan aika ja 
nuijasota", Oma maa, vol. I, Porvoo 
1920, pp. 994-1005. (The War of 
1570-95 and Peasant Rebellion). 
Vitikka, Olavi, Yleisesikuntakommodo-
ri, "Britit Itämerellä 1500-1700-1u-
vuilla", Tiede ja Ase, Suomen Sota-
tieteellisen Seuran vuosijulkaisu N:o 
54, PunaMusta, Joensuu 1996, pp. 
179-211. (The British in the Baltic 
Sea in the 16th-18th centuries). 
Vladimirovich, Vsevolod, Revoliutsiia 
v Finliandii pri kniaze Ivane Obo-
lenskom. S.Peterburg 1905. 
(Vladimirovich = A. A. Rheinboth, 
a Bobrikoffian official in Finland, la-
ter police chief in Moscow, dismis-
sed for corruption). 
Voennaia Entsiklopediia, vols. I—XVIII, 
Tipografiia I.D. Sytina, S.Peterburg 
1911-15. 
Voionmaa, Eino, Tsaarivallan suoje-
luosaston toimintaa Suomessa; muu-
tamia yksityispiirteitä mieskohtaisen 
kokemuksen pohjalta; vangitsemise-
ni valtiopetoksesta ja olo tutkinto-
vankina Päävandin vankilassa Hel-
singissä. Pohjolan Kustannus-Osa-
keyhtiö, Oulu 1917. (The Reminis-
cences of Voionmaa about his Arrest 
by the Okhrana). 
Volkmann, Hans-Erich, Die deutsche 
Baltikumpolitik zwischen Brest-Li-
towsk and Compiegne; Ein Beitrag 
zur 'Kriegsschulddiskussion'. Ost-
mitteleuropa and Gegenwart 13, 
Böhlau Verlag, Köln & Wien 1970. 
Vooruzhennye sily Velikago Oktiabria. 
Akademiia Nauk SSSR—Institut 
voennoi istorii Ministerstva Oborony 
SSSR. Nauka, Moskva 1977. 
Vostochnaia Voina 1853-56 godov, vols. 
I—IV. Sochinenie generalleitenanta 
M.M. Bogdanovicha. S.Peterburg 
1876. 
[W] C.F. W., Kortfattad öfversikt af 
den vämepliktiga finska militärens 
utbildning under åren 1881-1901.  
Finsk Militär Tidskrift 1901, pp. 
571-609. 
Wacklin, Sara, Sata muistelmaa Poh-
janmaalta. WSOY, Porvoo 1966 
(1844-45). (Reminiscences of W.). 
Wade, Rex, The Russian Search for 
Peace, February-October 1917. Stan-
ford University Press, Stanford, Ca-
lif. 1969. 
Wade, Rex, Red Guards and Workers' 
Militias in the Russian Revolution. 
Stanford University Press, Stanford. 
Calif. 1984. 
Wallach, Jehuda L., Das Dogma der 
Vernichtungsschlacht, die Lehren 
von Clausewitz und Schlieffen und 
ihre Wirkungen in zwei Weltkriege. 
Bernard & Graefe Verlag für Wehr-
wesen, Frankfurt a.M. 1967. 
[Wallin] Itämainen sota Suomessa; 50-
vuotiseksi muistoksi kirjoittanut Väi-
nö Wallin. WSOY, Porvoo 1904. 
(The Fiftieth Anniversary of the Im-
pact of the Crimean War on Finland) 
Waltari, Mika, Tanssi yli hautojen, ro-
maani Porvoon valtiopäivien ajalta. 
11th edition WSOY, Porvoo 1987. 
(Dancing on the Graves, a Novel 
from the Time of the Porvoo Diet). 
War Plans of the Great Powers, 1880-
1914. Ed. by Paul M. Kennedy. Al-
len & Unwin, London 1979. 
Waris, Heikki, "Helsinkiläisyhteiskun-
ta", Helsingin kaupungin historia, 
vol. III: I, Ajanjakso 1809-1875, Hel-
sinki 1950, pp.7-212. (Society in 
Helsinki). 
Warner, Philip, The Crimean War; A 
Reappraisal. London 1972 
Watts, Anthony J., Pictorial History of 
the Royal Navy, vol. II, 1880-1914. 
Ian Allan, London 1971. 
Wegelius, K.A., Suomen leijona ja Sak-
san kotka, asevejeyden historiaa 
1914-1918. WSOY, Porvoo & Hel-
sinki 1938. (History of the Finnish-
German Brotherhood-in-Arms). 
Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918, die mili-
tärischen Operationen zu Lande. 
Achter Band: die Operationen des 
Jahres 1915: die Ereignisse im Wes-
ten im Frühjahr und Sommer, im Os-
ten vom Frühjahr bis zum Jahresen-
de. Bearbeitet im Reichsarchiv, Ber-
lin 1932. Dreizehnter Band: Die 
Kriegführung im Sommer und 
451 
Herbst 1917, die Ereignisse ausser-
halb der Westfront bis November 
1918; im Auftrage des Oberkom-
mando des Heeres bearbeitet und he-
rausgegeben von der Kriegsge-
schichtlichen Forschungsamt des 
Heeres, Berlin 1942. 
Westermarck, Edward, Minnen ur mitt 
liv. Holger Schildt, Helsingfors 
1927. 
Wildman, Allan K., The end of the Rus-
sian imperial army, vol I: The old 
army and the soldiers' revolt, March 
- April 1917; vol II: The road to So-
viet power and peace. Princeton Uni-
versity Press, Princeton, N.J. 1980, 
1988. 
Willberg, B., "Laivastomme toiminta 
Itä-Suomenlandella ja C-veneitten 
tuhoutuminen; Laivastohistoriallinen 
452 	 väläys", Suomi merellä 1/1956, pp. 
1-12. (Our Naval Activity on the 
Eastern End of the Gulf of Finland 
and the Destruction of the C-boats). 
Wilson, Michael, Baltic Assignment; 
British Submarines in Russia 1914 —
1919. Leo Cooper in association 
with Secker & Warburg, London 
1985. 
Wirtschafter, Elise Kimerling, From 
Serf to Russian Soldier. Princeton 
University Press, Princeton, N. J. 
1990. 
Woodward, David, The Russians at 
Sea. William Kimber, London 1965. 
Worth, Robert D., The Allies and the 
Russian Revolution; From the Fall of 
the Monarchy to the Peace of Brest-
Litovsk. Duke University Press, Dur-
ham, N.C. 1954. 
Zaionchkovskii, A.M., Vostochnaia voi-
na 1853-56 gg, s sviazi s sovremen-
noi ei politicheskoi obstanovkoi, 
vols. I - II, S.Peterburg 1908-13. 
Zaionchkovskii, A.M., Plany voiny; 
Podgotovka Rossii k imperialis-
ticheskoi voine; Ocherki voennoi 
podgotovke i pervonachalnykh pla-
nov; po arkhivnym dokumentam. 
Shtab RKKA, upravlenie po issledo-
vaniiu i ispolzovaniiu opyta voin, 
Moskva 1926. 
Zaionchkovskii, A., Podgotovka Rossii 
k mirovoi voine v mezhdunarodnom 
otnoshenii. Shtab RKKA, upravlenie  
po issledovaniiu i ispolzovaniiu opy-
ta voin, izdanie voennoi tipografli 
upravleniia delam narkomvoenmor i 
RVSSSR, Leningrad - Moskva 1926. 
Zaionchkovskii, P.A., Voennye reformy 
1860-1870 godov. Izdatel'stvo Mos-
kovskogo Universiteta, Moskva 
1952. 
Zaionchkovskii, P.A., Rossiiskii samo-
derzhavie v konets XIX stoletiia; po-
liticheskaia reaktsiia 80-kh - nachala 
90-kh godov. Mysl', Moskva 1970. 
Zaionchkovskii, P.A., Samoderzhavie i 
russkaia armiia na rubezhe XIX—XX 
stoletii, 1881-1903. Mysl', Moskva 
1973. 
Zaionchkovskii, P.A., Gosudarstvennyi 
apparat samoderzhavnoi Rossii v 
XIX v. Mysl', Moskva 1978. 
Zetterberg, Kent, "Sverige åren 1914-
18, en forskningsöversikt", Mellan 
björnen och örnen; Sverige och Ös-
tersjöområdet under det första 
världskriget, 1914-1918; föredrag 
hållna vid symposium i Visby, 4-7-
augusti 1993. Ed. Johan Engström, 
Armémuseum, Lars Ericson, Krig-
sarkivet, Stockholm 1994, pp. 61-
72. 
Zetterberg, Seppo, Die Liga der Fremd-
völker Russlands 1916-1918; Ein 
Beitrag zu Deutschlands antirussi-
schem Propagandakrieg unter den 
Fremdvölkern Russlands im ersten 
Weltkrieg. Studia Historica 8, Fin-
nish Historical Society, Helsinki 
1978. 
Zetterberg, Seppo, Viisi laukausta Se-
naatissa; Eugen Schaumanin elämä 
ja teko. Otava, Helsinki 1988. (Five 
Shots in the Senate; Schauman's Life 
and Deed). 
Zilliacus, Per, Jääkäriliikkeen synty ja 
päämäärät. Historiallinen Aikakaus-
kirja 1/1970, pp. 69-70. (The Ori-
gins and Aims of the Jäger move-
ment). 
Zolotarev, A.M., "Materialy po voennoi 
statistike Rossii; Naselenie Rossii, 
kak istochnik komplektovaniia eia 
armiia, — na osnovanii dannykh za 
pervoe desiatiletie otbyvaniia ob-
shcheobiazatel'noi voennoi povin-
nosti", Voennyi Sbornik V 1 1889, 
pp. 98 -143, VI / 1889, pp. 325-59. 
Index 
Aberdeen, Lord 76 
Abo see Turku 
absolute power, absolutism 43, 155-6, 
161, 169, 181, 187, 310 
access to Arctic Sea 390, Baltic Sea 261 
Acht, Nikolai von 53 
Acht von Achtfelsen, Christian 53 
acting governor-general 66, 95 
acknowledgement of Finland's inde-
pendence 365-6, 376, 394, by Britain 
399, by France 399, by Germany 
366, by Lenin, Soviet government 
372, 374-5, 393, by the USA 399, 
refusal by Russian Whites 399 
Active Committee 311, 330 
active detachment of Bolshevik fleet 
active military service 206 
activist Delegation abroad for the Libe-
ration of Finland 312, 330, 334-5 
active resistance, Activist movement, 
activists 173, 179, 183-4, 187, 189, 
193, 205, 251, 311n, 314, 316-9, 
323, 332-5, 337, 345-6, 349, 355, 
364, 374, 386, 393, 398, Finnish, see 
also Jäger movement, Voima 
Activist spies 342n 
Activists, Swedish 308-9, 312 
Adlerberg, Nikolai, Count 43n, 112, 
117-8, 130 
administration of Finland 210, 239, 256, 
277, see also autonomy, Finnish go-
vernment, Senate 
administration of fortresses 114, see also 
fortress administration 
Admiral-General 102 
Admiralty of Russia 154, 227 
Admiralty Staff, Admiralstab 264n, 
286, 314-7, 359, 375-8, 384-5, 390 
Adolf Fredrik, King of Sweden 25 
aeroplanes 246, 267, 290, 295, 379 
Afghanistan 139 
Agar, Augustus, Lieutenant Commander 
401-2 
agents 268, 326, 332, 335, 383, 385, 
385n, see also British, German 
agents 
agitation, agitators 239, 245, 254, 326 
agrarian party, agrarians, Agrarian Uni-
on 208, 398, 405 
Ahvenanmaa see Åland 
aircraft tenders 316 
airships 316, 349n, see also Zeppelins 
Akashi Motojiro, Colonel 184 
Åland (Ahvenanmaa) 16, 32m-33m, 36, 
38-9, 47, 49m, 51, 62, 73, 90, 100, 
196, 199n, 230-2, 263, 269, 272, 
286, 290, 294-6, 298, 304-5, 308, 
314-8, 323, 338, 341-2, 353, 359-60, 
377-8, 379m, 380, 399 
Alanen, Pertti 12, 62, 71n 
Albatros 287 
Alekseev, Mikhail Vasilevich, General 
343 
Alexander I 27, 30, 36, 38, 41-2, 45, 
54, 58-9, 75, 77, 130, 135, 191, 235, 
330-1 
Alexander II 43, 90, 93, 100-2, 108, 
110, 118-9, 119n, 130, 132, 134, 
138, 165, 191, 195, 248, 330-1, 405 
Alexander III 43, 102, 138, 141, 144-5, 
147, 159, 159n, 160-1, 165, 191, 
248, 291, 291n, 314, 330-1, 341 
Alexander III see also Border Guards, 
Libau 
Alexander gimnaziia 249, 381i 
Alexander the Great 206 
Alexander Theatre 251 
Alexander-Sinclair, Edwyn, Rear Admi-
ral 393 
Alexandra Fedorovna, Empress 307 
alien garrisons, races 250, 254 
Alix of Hesse 282, see also Alexandra 
Fedorovna 
Alliance of Three Emperors 148 
Allied Control Commission 286n 
Allied fleet 88, 296, 318, floating batte- 
ries 96 
Allied Powers, allies 77, 80, 90-1, 100, 
258, 292, 303, 400m 
Alsace 386 
Ältester deutscher Seeoffizier in Finn-
land 384 
America, American, Americans 24, 318-
9, 366, 393, 410, rebels 25, see also 
453 
USA 
Amu Dania 254 
Anadyr 	 240 
anarchy, Anarchists 246, 







276, 285, 287, 289, 297, 302, see 
armoured cars 356 
armoured cruisers 271-2, 273i, 285-8, 
401 
armoured open sea fleet 142 
armoured ships 138, 141-2, 189, 230, 
271, 287-8, 302, 317, 377 
armoured train 298, 346 
Army, Ist 352 
Army, Vth 220, 352 
Army, VIth 220-4, 226, 230, 232, 276, 
277m, 282, 292, 294-9 
Army, VIIth 220, 278n 
Army, VIIIth 220, 278n 
Army, IXth 278n 
Army, Xth 278n 
Army, XIth 278n 
Army, XIIth 294, 299, 352 
Army, XIIIth 352 
army, see also British, Bug, Finnish, 
French, German, Narev, Niemen, 
North, Russian, South, South-West, 
Swedish 
Army Corps, 1st 138, 147-8, 186, 223-4, 
230, 255n 
Army Corps, 10th Militia 
Army Corps, 13th 239 
Army Corps, 16th 186, 240 
Army Corps, 18th 220, 224, 230-1, 255n 
Army Corps, 20th 223, 353 
Army Corps, 22nd 190, 209, 222-4, 226, 
231-3, 239-41, 248, 252-3, 255, 
255n, 277, 278n, 290, 313, 409 
Army Corps, 42nd 277, 292-300, 301n, 
302-3, 305, 324, 326, 338-41, 344-5, 
350-2, 356-7, 362-3, 366-7, 369, 409 
Army Corps, 43rd 294, 298 
Arrogant 89i 
artel' 51, 117 
Artillery 18-9, 30-1, 35, 38, 61, 84-5, 
102, 107, 115-6, 118, 121, 123, 127, 
133, 	 135, 	 137, 	 151, 162, 164, 183, 
190, 194, 224-5, 233, 238, 240, 253, 
291, 303, 305, 326, 344n, 353, 373 
Artillery Academy 10 
Artillery 22nd Brigade 113 
Artillery 23rd Brigade 60, 114, 121n 
Artillery 24th Brigade 136-7, 149, 150n 
Artillery 41st Brigade 240 
Artillery 50th Brigade 233 
Artillery 120th Brigade 293n, 301n 
Artillery 4th Garrison Brigade 87 
Asia, Asian 21, 74m 119, 137, 196m 
260 
Asiatics 249, 270, 311, 365 
Aspö see Haapasaari 
assimilation see Russification 
also Kruunuvuorenselkä 
ancien regime 375 
Andrei Pervozvannyi 401 
Anglo-French entente 196 




Anna, Empress 22 
annexation of Arctic coast 389 by Fin- 
land, of East Karelia by Finland 386-
7, 394, 399, 403, of Åland by Ger-
many 377, of Scandinavia by Ger-
many 262, in the East by Germany 
454 	 309, 339, 361, Courland and Lithu- 
ania by Germany 333, Ino fortress 
district by Russia 235, Karelian Isth-
mus, Viipuri guberniia by Russia 
236-7, 252 
anti-Christian Turks 88 
anti-Finnish Russians 204, see also Fen- 
nophagi 
anti-German propaganda 337 
anti-Russian alliance 77, Finns, propa- 
ganda 263, 322, 330, 335 
anti-submarine craft 349n 
Antrea 301n 
approaches to St Petersburg 137, 277, 
299, 303, 385 
Apraksin, Fedor 20 
Arakcheev, Aleksei Andreevich, Gene- 
ral 38-9 
Archangel 72, 186, 286, 288, 388, 392 
Archbishop of Turku 
archipelago 91, 230, 254, 258, 268, 272, 
296, 339, see also Turku-Aland po- 
sition 
Arctic base 391, arctic coast 308, 323, 
385, 389, 405, harbour 389, 399, see 
also Murmansk, Petsamo 
Arctic Ocean 
aristocracy 71n 
armaments race 262, 253 
Armed Neutrality 24 
armed peace 137, 262 
armed resistance 210 
Armenia, Armenians 145, 156, 238 
Armfelt, Alexander 58n, 59, 95n, 137 
Armfelt, Gustav Mauritz 43, 43n, 55-6, 
58 
Atlantic coast, Ocean 43, 72, 78, 262, 
290, 308, 390 
attack through Finland to St Petersburg 
135, 269, 409 
Augsburg 285, 288, 336 
Aunus (Olonets) 393-4, 400m 
Ausbildungstruppe Lockstedt 312, see 
also Jäger movement 
Ausfeld, Eduard, Captain 335 
Austerlitz 30 
Austria, Austrian, Austrians 22, 24, 30, 
35, 45, 77-8, 91, 104-5, 112, 120, 
126, 139, 147-8, 154, 164, 220-1, 
227, 238-9, 253, 261, 266, 270, 279, 
307, 391 
Austria-Hungary 136 
Austro-German-Italian Triple Alliance 
148 
Auswärtiges Amt 312, 333, 375, 378 
autonomy of Finland 111, 118, 134, 
136, 156-8, 167, 170, 183, 188, 202, 
212, 216, 247, 269, 280, 284, 310-2, 
316, 321, 323, 331, 334, 354-5, 362, 
408-9, international guarantee for 
323, 331 
autonomy of Baltic Germans 269 
auxiliary ships 133, 195, 273i, 316, 
370n, 376 
aviation 256, 292n, 295, 305 
Avtroil 393 
Azard 401 
Azev, Evno 184, 247 
Aziia 184 
Azov 20 
Backmansson, Hugo 67i 
Bagration, Peter, Prince, Lieutentant Ge- 
neral 31, 35, 38, 39 
Baian 336, 401 
Balabin, Colonel 246 
Balkan 72, 77, 119-20, 124, 129-30, 
142, 147-8, 226, 246, 264, 270 
Baltic Army Corps 87 
Baltic 3rd Cavalry Regiment 301, 340 
Baltic coast 55, 75, 100, 103-4, 122, 
137, 139, 141, 149, 157-8, 220, 229, 
285-6 
Baltic countries, nations, peoples, pro-
vinces, states 16, 20, 24, 35, 47, 87, 
96, 99, 136, 146, 154, 156-7, 200, 
207, 215, 220, 230-1, 269, 294, 316, 
358-60, 365, 367, 374, 387-9, 395-7, 
398, 400m, 403 
Baltic 2nd Detached Cavalry Brigade 
301, 340 
Baltic Division, Ostseedivision, 378,  
388, 391 
Baltic fleet (Russian) 24, 65im 116-7, 
122, 137, 142, 197, 234, 246, 261, 
264, 271, 276, 282, 292, 296, 299, 
302-3, 324-5, 328, 333, 335-8, 341, 
346, 351-2, 357, 357n, 362, 370, 
387, 406, 408-10 
Baltic Germans 24, 54, 127, 238, 268-9, 
282, 309, 396 
Baltic German Freikorps 396 
Baltic military district 103 
Baltic region, world 12, 50, 72, 180, 
400m, 404, 411 
Baltic Sea 17, 17m, 19, 21, 23, 26, 34, 
39, 47-8, 50, 63, 72, 75, 78-9, 94, 
96, 101, 106, 108, 139, 141-3, 145i, 
148, 180, 187, 196-7, 221, 228-9, 
232, 257n, 261-3, 265-7, 270-1, 275, 
279, 285, 290, 307, 315, 317, 336, 
338, 349-50, 359-60, 376, 379m, 
388-9, 390-3, 395-7, 404, 406, 409 
Baltischport 230, 289 
Bank of Finland 242, 279, 282, 306 
Baratynski, Evgeni Abramovich 53 
Barck, Minister of Finance 281-2 
Barclay de Tolly, Mikhail Bogdanovich 
33m, 39 
Barclay de Tolly Grenadier Regiment 
86i 
barracks 51, 63, 65i, 73, 107, 113-4, 
132-3, 152, 175, 188-9, 201, 225, 
248-9, 256, 278-9, 370, 407 
Bashkirs, Bashkiria 57, 87, 365 
battlecruisers 257, 257n, 287-9, 316 
battlefield 284 
battle fleet 336 
battleships 142, 189, 195, 221, 227n, 
228, 263, 265, 267, 286-7, 289, 302, 
315-7, 325, 332, 349-50, 381 
Bauer, Lieutenant General 282 
Bay of Kronstadt 229 
Bay of Viipuri 115 
Bayern 349n, 350 
Befehlshaber der Baltischen Gewässer 
383 
Behrendts, Professor 212 
Belomorskii 89th Regiment 114, 230 
Beloostrov see Valkeasaari 
Belts 261, 285, 396 
Berdan rifle 104 
Berezina 48 
Berg, Fredrik Wilhelm Rembert von, 
Governor-General 43n, 60, 92, 94, 
96-9, 117 
Berlin 71n, 120, 125, 196, 261, 311-2, 
315n, 365, 375, 380, 387n 
455 
Bermondt-Avaloff, Prince 396, 396n 
Bernadotte, Jean Baptiste 34, 46, see 
also Karl Johan 
Bespokoinyi 257n 
Bethmann-Hollweg, Theobald von, 
Chancellor 315, 333 
bicycle companies 340 
Bishop of Turku 41 
Bismarck, Otto von 120 
Bizerta 257 
Björkö see Koivisto 
Björneborg see Pori 
Black Sea 26, 100, 105, 123, 137, 138n, 
147, 228 
Black Sea fleet 72, 78, 137, 194, 257, 
257n 
Blåfield, Colonel 159 
blockade 79, 143, 195, 197, 261, 266-7, 
270, 285-6, 302, 336, 390 
Bloody Sunday 181 
456 	 Blue Guard 206 
Bobrikov, Nikolai Ivanovich, Governor- 
General 147, 153, 157-8, 163, 168, 
170-2, 174, 177, 179, 181, 183, 203, 
208, 211, 216, 218, 237, 251, 259, 
262, 279, 310, 330, 339, 395, 407 
Bobrikovians 190-1, 200-1, 212, 236-7, 
243 
Bobr' 339, 393n 
Bodisco, Colonel 90 
Boeckmann, Vladimir, General, Gover-
nor-General 209-10, 212, 215, 226, 
247 
Boedicker, Vice-Admiral 388-9 
Boer War 154 
Bogatyr' 192 
Boisman, Toivo 243 
Bokhara 59 
Bolsheviks 14, 325, 328-9, 332, 344, 
350-1, 354, 356, 357n, 358, 360-4, 
367, 369, 371, 373n, 375-6, 384-8, 
392-400, 410, see also Red 
Bolshevik army, forces 399, 404 
Bolshevik Empire, Russia 394, 399, 402 
Bolshevik fleet, sailors 337, 363n, 385, 
393, 395, 397-8, 398n, 399, 401 
Bolshevik government, regime 328n, 
365, 375-6, 384, 387-8, 404-5, 
Bolshevik influence, intervention in Fin- 
land 371-2 
Bomarsund 51, 54, 73, 75, 82-3, 90-1, 
159n, 196 
border country (Finland) 112, 129, 149, 
155-6, 160, 163, 168, 188, 200, 210, 
215, 217, 219, 225, 252, 272, 279-
81, 293, 320-2, 330, 343, 347, 349,  
354, 375, 408-9 
border lands, regions, states of Russia 
73, 126, 177, 379n, 411 
border guards 208, 291, 296, 301, 318, 
341, 344, 357, 362, 366 
Border Guards Finland Brigade 341 
Border Guards Petrograd First Alexan- 
der III Brigade 291, 291n, 301, 301n, 
341 
Border Guards Finland Detached Com-
posite Division 301, 301n, 341, 344, 
362 
Borgå see Porvoo 
Borgo 138n 
Borisov 48 
Bornholm Strait 266 
Borodino 257, 257n 
Borodkin, Mikhail, Major General 54, 
69, 159, 191 
Borovitinov, Mikhail 280, 324 
Borovitskii reserve battalion 149 
Bosnian crisis 264 
Bosphorus 137, 228, 257, 261 
bourgeois, bourgeoisie 246, 324-5, 332, 
346, 348, 363-5, 368, 372, 409 
boycott 249 
boy scouts 205 
Brahestad see Raahe 
Brandenburg 287 
Bremen 287 
Brest, Brest-Litovsk 27n, 70, 72, 227, 
358, 360-1, 365, 371, 374, 384-5, 
387 
Brincken, A.F. von, Lieutenant General 
153, 162, 239 
Britain 11, 24, 30, 120, 138, 138n, 139, 
157, 180, 196, 221, 223, 260, 263-4, 
266, 313, 317, 359, 361, 366, 387, 
390, 392, 402, see also England 
British 21, 24, 35, 41, 78, 80, 96, 104-5, 
197, 228, 271, 286, 337, 377, 384, 
386-9, 397, 405 
British Admiralty 79, 244, 377, 397, 402 
British agents 383, 385, 385n 
British Ambassador 157 
British army, soldiers, troops 78, 96, 196 
British Empire 391, 398, 410 
British expeditionary Force 196, 261 
British expedition to Murmansk 374, 
386, 392, 394, 400n 
British frigates 80 
British influence, intervention in Baltic 
provinces and Russia 261, 359, 388. 
392, 400, 400n, 401, 404, 410 
British landings, raids 80, 143, 288, 338 
British merchant fleet 122 
British military attache, mission 350, 
402 
British naval officers 25, 71 
British Royal Navy 34-6, 47, 79, 101, 
125, 196, 260-1, 263, 265, 285, 288, 
290, 338, 391, 395-9, 401-2, 404-5, 
410 
British submarines 303, 309, 338, 350, 
375, 381, 381n, 398 
brothers-in-arms 81 i, 130, 164, 169, 219, 
399, see also Wafenbrüderschaft 
Brun, Th. 43n 
Brunnsparken see Kaivopuisto 
Brunow, G 146i 
Brusilov, Aleksei Alekseevich, General 
278n, 288, 340, 345, 350 
Budapest 148 
Budberg, Baron 144 
Bug 227 
Bug Army 148, 220 
Bulgaria 120, 138, 147, 382, 387, 391 
Bulgarian King 125n 
Bulgarin, Faddei 53 
Bulygin, A.G., Minister of the Interior 
181 
Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv 12 
Bunge, Ivan Khristianovich, Minister of 
Finance 138, 160 
Buxhoevden, Friedrich Wilhelm, Count 
von 30-1, 38, 41 
cabinet 187, see also Council of Minis- 
ters 
cadet, military, officer schools 45, 67i, 
68, 102, 103, 169 
cadres 127, 132, 149, 191, 227, 255 
Calypso 393n 
capital ships 138n 
Carabiniers of Prince Barclay de Tolly 
86 
Caradoc 393n 
Cardiff 393n, 396n 
Catherine II 24, 26, 29-30, 36, 76-7 
cattle detachments 341 
Caucasian, Caucasus 27n, 47, 53-4, 57- 
8, 60, 72, 77, 84, 103, 127, 137, 
145, 191, 200, 238, 309, 333, 340-2, 
365 
Caulaincourt, Louis, Marquis de 39 
cavalry 18-9, 30-1, 35, 38, 61, 87, 98, 
102-3, 121, 127, 133, 135, 162, 176i, 
177, 186, 224, 233, 291, 301, 303, 
340, 344, 346, 353, 357, 373, see 
also Cossacks 
Cavalry 1st Corps 344 
Cavalry 14th Division 342, 344  
Cedercreutz family 251 
censorship 277, 319 
Central Asia 103, 119, 139, 142, 200, 
238, 322 
central defence position in Finland 339-
40 
Central Europe 17, 24, 105 
Central Powers 330, 334-4, 360, 392, 
409 
central Russia 127 
Ceres 396n 
Chancery of Finland's Governor-Gene-
ral 164, 250 
Channel 261, 281 
Charles XII 19-20 
Charles XIII see Karl XIII 
chauvinism, chauvinists 105, 111, 136, 
144, 155, 158, 160, 163--4, 191, 200, 
206-7, 260, 280, 283, 310, 330 
Chenstokhovo 278n 
Chemiaev, General 119 
China 105, 270 
Chinese coolies 304, 304i 
Chinok 387n 
cholera 66, 70 
Chrichton shipyard 121, 138n 
Christians 105, Catholic 16, Orthodox 
248-9, 386, in Turkey 76, 119, 124, 
see also Lutheran 
Chudskii 424th Regiment 293n, 297-8, 
300, 362, 362n 
citizens' guard 189 
citizens' rights, civil rights 161, 187, 
240 
civil war in Finland 12, 361, 367-71, 
373, 375, 379n, 380, 393, 395, 410 
civil war in Russia 304, 392, 394-5, 411 
class battle, struggle 332, 365, 372 
clipper ships 142 
coastal artillery, coastal batteries 194, 
298, 300, 301n, 305, 336, 338, 340, 
345, 349 
coastal defence 72, 82, 88, 122, 141, 
157, 323, see also Naval Fortress of 
Peter the Great 
coastal fleet, flotillas, warships 26, 35, 
41, 47, 84, 91, 123, 142, 262, 265, 
285, 336 
coastal guards 153, 178, 187, 222, 228, 
234, 271, 296-7, 341, 387, 408 
Coastal Motor Boats, CMB, 399 
collaboration, collaborators 190, 204, 
218, 309, 311n 
commandant's offices 63, 175n 
commander-in-chief 102, 131, 207, 209, 
226, 239, 241, 245, 253, 350 
457 
Commander of the Baltic fleet 271, see 
also Essen, Kanin, Maksimov, Nepe- 
nin, Razvosov, Verderevskii 
commander of Finnish troops 131 
commander of German Baltic fleet 285, 
see Henry, Prince of Prussia 
commander of dry-land forces of the 
Baltic fleet 305 
commercial war 122, 267 
Committee for Finnish Affairs 42, 
135n, 200, 212 
committee for Finnish naval service 133 
committee for planning the defence of 
Finland 82, 121, 123 
Committee of Imperial Defence 194, 
203, 226 
committees of War Ministry on Finnish 
military service 159-60, 163, 165, 
168 
conscription, conscripts 21, 55, 100, 
161, 168, 170, 201, 219, 278, 323, 
326, strike 170, 216 
conservative, conservatives 126, 130, 
163, 167, 252, 310, 322, 330, 349, 
383 
Constantin Pavlovich, Grand Duke 24, 
53, 58 
Constantinople 34, 60, 76, 125 
Constituent Assembly 183, 324, 345, 
364 
constitution 26, 43, 74, 109-11, 118, 
130, 134, 159-61, 167, 210-11, 215- 
8, 310, 330, 354-4, 364, 408 
Constitutional Committee of the Diet 
331, 355 
constitutional conflict 157, 201, 211, 
214, 225, 249, 254, 269, 331, see 
also legislation for Finland, Finland'-
s position, Finnish question 
constitutional 	 procedure, 	 principle, 
rights 179, 183, 189, 203, 213, 215, 
346 
Constitutionalist Democrats, Russian 
218 
Constitutionalist Party, Constitutiona- 
lists 156, 163, 168, 170-1, 179, 183, 
189-91, 200, 204, 208, 211-2, 216, 
235, 277, 310, 355, 399, 408 
Continental Blockade 30, 36, 45 
continental coalition 196 
continental enemies 224 
continental front, war 145, 147, 149, 
231, 259, 270, 278, 304, 333, 340, 
344 
convoy 288-90, 309, 336, 361 
Copenhagen 184-5, 361  
cordon sanitaire 404 
Corps of Pages 71n, 103 
Cossack, Cossacks 21, 30, 57, 61-2, 64, 
84-5, 87, 103, 106, 114, 120, 127, 
137, 140, 151, 176i, 178-9, 186, 224, 
232-3, 239, 291, 293-4, 301, 325, 
341, 343-4, 351, 353, 353n, 356, 388 
Cossack 5th Caucasian Division 340, 
342, 344 
Cossack 1st Caucasian Regiment 341 
Cossack 8th Don Regiment 
Cossack 19th Don Regiment 120 
Cossack 43rd Don Regiment 340, 345 
Cossack 44th Don Regiment 87 
Cossack 53rd Don Regiment 116 
Cossack 3rd Ekaterinodarskii Regiment 
353, 353n 
Cossack 3rdKubanskii Regiment 353 
Cossack 8th Orenburg Regiment 173, 
256, 291, 293-4, 301 
Cossack 1st Taman Regiment 341 
Council of Ministers 201, 210-1, 213, 
215-8, 236-7, 243, 254, 256, 277, 
279, 321 
Council of People's Commissars 358, 
363, 365, 372, see also Soviet go-
vernment 
counter-revolutionaries 392, 401, see 
also Whites 
coup d'état 167, 189, 333, see also Feb-
ruary Manifesto 
Courland 140, 147, 268, 286, 289-90, 
296, 333, 358n, 396 
courts martial 208, 341 
Coventry 396n 
Cowan, Sir Walter, Rear Admiral 396, 
396n, 401-2 
Cracow 278n 
Crimea 19, 24, 26, 27n, 47, 60, 77-9, 
91, 404 
Crimean War 60, 66, 71, 75, 80, 88, 89i, 
93, 95n, 101, 106-8, 111, 114, 117, 
119, 122, 178, 270 
crofters, srofter soldiers 91, 92i, 93, 117, 
321-2, see also indelta 
Cromie, Francis, Commander 303 
cruisers 122, 138, 140, 142, 195, 227n, 
228, 271, 276, 302, 306, 317, 339, 
349n, 370n, 389, 397, 401, 402 
Curacao 396n 
Curlew 396n 
customs office, service 157, 184, 243-
244 
Czar see Tsar 
Czechs 388 
Daehn, Woldemar von 43n, 156 
Dagö see Hiidenmaa 
Dalkarleby 305n 
Danae 396n 
Danes 79, 96, 196, 262 
Danilov, Iu.N., General 259 
Danish attack, fleet, threat 26, 34, 36 
Danish Straits 34, 196-7, 261-2, 265-7, 
271, 302, 336, 350 
Danube 77, 119, 199 
Danubian Principalities 76-7 
Danzig 263, 265, 285, 287, 397, 400m, 
403 
Dardanelles 257 
Davidstad see Taavetti 
Decembrists 53, 58-9, 71n 
defeat of Russia 181, 218, 226-7, see 
also Russian army, Tsushima 
defeatism 306 
defence of Baltic coasts 139, 141, 158 
defence of St Petersburg 135, see also 
Finland glacis for St Petersburg 
Degerö v. Laajasalo 
Deiatel'nyi 362n 
Delegation Abroad for the Liberation of 
Finland 311-2, 330, 334-5, see also 
Activism, Jäger movement 
Demidov 38 
demilitarization 100-1, 195-6, 199n, 
263, 378 
demobilization 93, 336, 367-70 
democracy, democratic, democratizati- 
on, democrats 98, 156, 208, 251, 
308, 326, 328n, 330, 346 
Denisov, Lieutenant Colonel 61 
Denmark 19, 34, 40n, 72, 96, 112, 126, 
196-7, 262, 288, 316, 400m 
Denmark-Norway 43 
Desnenskii 512th Regiment 305, 324, 
353n 
destroyers 228-9, 257n, 271, 336, 397-8 
Detached Corps of Finland 50, 60-1 
Deutrich, Privy Councillor, Deputy Go- 
vernor-General 163, 181, 200, 208-9 
Deutschland battleship 266, 271 
Deutschland minelayer 286 
Devil 284 
Diana 339 
Diet 41, 43-4, 109-10, 118, 129-31, 133-
4, 160, 163, 165-7, 170, 176-7, 181-
3, 190, 208, 211, 213-4, 217-8, 236, 
244, 247, 280, 329, 331-3, 343, 345-
6, 348, 354-6, 363-4 
diplomacy, diplomats 185, 196, 213, 257 
disarmament 164-5, 169 
disarming Russians by Finnish Whites 
367 
disloyalty of Finns 156, 234, 237, 243 
disorder 188, 199, 203-4, 237, 322-3, 
344, 388, see also criminal activity, 
disloyalty, rebellion, revolt, revoluti- 
on 
dissatisfaction 238, 249, 310, 312, 320, 
322, 325-6, 347 
Disunited States of East Europe 206 
divided command of the defence of Bal- 
tic coasts 146 
division, divisions 220, 227 
division, Finnish 135 
Division, 1st 239 
Division, 4th 35 
Division, 5th 31, 34 
Division, 6th 35 
Division, 17th 31, 35 
Division, 21st 31, 34 
Division, 22nd 64, 83, 85, 106, 113-4, 
120, 230, 255n 
Division, 23rd 114, 136, 147, 230-1, 
255n 
Division, 23-19-20-21-22nd, Russian 
Division in Finland 61-2, 68, 120, 
121n 
Division, 24th 120, 136-7, 147-9, 230-1, 
255n 
Division, 25th 66 
Division, 29th 353, 353n 
Division, 36th 239 
Division, 37th 120, 147, 230, 239, 255n 
Division, 41st 186, 240 
Division, 45th 342-4, 356 
Division, 50th 224, 233, 253, 255n, 278 
Division, 62nd 253 
Division, 67th 224 
Division, 74th 278 
Division, 79th 253 
Division, 84th 278 
Division, 106th 293, 296, 300, 301n, 
351, 369, 398-9 
Division, 107th 293, 295-7, 305, 353n 
Division, 108th 294 
Division, 110th 294 
Division, 112th 343-4 
Division, 115th 300-1 
Division, 116th 294n 
Division, 118th 305 
Division, 128th 305, 338, 345, 351, 353, 
353n, 356 
Dniester 27n, 227 
Dolgorukov, Prince, Minister of War 85, 
91, 102 
Domination of the Baltic Sea 21-2, 228, 
267, by Germany 290, 302, 359 
Don 61-2, 87, 103, 114, 116, 120, 232, 
459 
340, 343, 345, see also Cossack 
Dorpat see Tartu 
Douglas, Gustaf Count 21 
Dragomirov, General 103 
Dragon 386n 
Dragoon 20th Regiment 255 
Dragoon 55th Finland Regiment 175 
dragoons 162, 168, 233, see also Finnish 
Dragoon Regiment 
Dreadnought, dreadnoughts 96, 196, 
228-9, 257, 265-5, 271, 272n, 286, 
288-9, 302. 349-50, 376-7, 389, 397, 
408 
Drumsö see Lauttasaari 
Dual Alliance 148, 157, 196, 227 
Dual Monarchy 136 
Dubno 72 
Dubrovskaia, Elena 348 
Dudzhanskii 458th Regiment 300 
Duma 199-200, 206, 209-10, 216, 218-9, 
460 	 227, 229-30, 238, 254, 257, 324 
Dünamunde 72, 82, 137, 141, 197 
Dundas, Sir Richard Saunders, Rear-Ad-
miral 94 
Dvina 47-8 
Dvinskii 91st Regiment 114 
Dybenko, Pavel 332, 354 
E 8 289 
E 9 287 
E 18 290 
E 19 289 
East Central Europe 309, 403 
East Karelia, Russian Karelia 15, 46, 
202, 237, 334, 386-7, 391-2, 400m, 
403, 405, self-determination of 405, 
independence of 386, see also Grea- 
ter Finland 
East Prussia 147, 278n, 307 
Eastern Europe 105 
Eastern Front 197, 288, 306, 321, 323, 
366, 392, 394, 409 
Eastern Rumelia 147 
Eastern Swedish nation 136 
Egorov, Ivan 249 
Ehrnrooth, Casimir 32n 
Einkreisung, encirclement 199, 333 
Ekenäs see Tammisaari 
Ekenes 138n 
Ekman, Sergeant Major 124i 
Ekman, Torsten, a journalist 124i 
Elbe 264 
elections in Finland 199, 208, 280, 345, 
348, 398 
Elimäki (Elimä) 56 
Elisenvaara 202  
Elizabeth, Empress 22-5, 29 
emigrantion, emigrants 118n, 172, 301, 
312, 318-9, 328 
Emir Bukharskii I38n 
Emperor of Russia 11, 22, 33, 42, 44-5, 
50, 58, 70-1, 80-1, 90, 98-100, 102, 
109-11, 113, 118, 124-5, 127-8, 131, 
138, 159-60, 167, 169, 179, 181, 
203, 212, 215-6, 251, 324, 329, 331, 
345, 407, see also Alexander I, Ale-
xander II, Alexander III, Nicholas I, 
Nicholas II, Paul, Peter I 
Empire see Bolshevik, British, German, 
Habsburg, Hohenzollern, Muscovite, 
Polish, Russian, Swedish, Turkish 
Empress of Russia 105, 307, see also 
Alexandra Fedorovna, Anna, Cathe- 
rine II, Elizabeth, Marna Fedorovna 
Enckell, Carl 330, 345-6, 356, 361, 367 
Enden, Rauno 13 
Enehjelm, af, police officer 143 
enemies, enemy of Russia 88, 135, 
150m, 151-2, 154, 178-9, 194, 221-
4, 227-32, 258-9, 268, 279, 281, 288, 
296-7, 299-301, 303, 310, 318, 320, 
322-3, 326, 339, 341, 346, 377, 408, 
see also naval enemy 
enemy invasion, landing 229, 232, 234, 
255-5, 259, 263, 278, 297, 299, 306-
7, 318, 323, 331, 323, 341, 343, 346 
engineers, engineer troops 64, 102-3, 
115-6, 133, 135, see also sappers 
England 74, 78, 118, 147, 172, 221, see 
also Britain 
English 74, 81i, 186, 188, 316, 382-3, 
392n, 398, see also British, naval 
enemy 
Enisei 290 
Eniseiskii 94th Regiment 137, 230 
enlisted detachments, soldiers 18-9, 44, 
56-7, 66, 68, 91, 125, 128, 132-3, 
406 
Entente 196, 199, 221, 260, 307, 307, 
310, 333, 359, 374, 376-7, 390, 392, 
402, 404, see also Allies, Western 
Powers 
Epantsin, Vice-Admiral 84 
Equity 374, 374n 
Eremin, Colonel 247, 318-9 
Ermak 380 
Esbo see Espoo 
escort craft, ships 288, 290, 316, 336 
Espoo (Esbo) 84, 91, 179, 273, 276m 
Essen, N.O. von, Vice-Admiral 246, 
264, 271-2, 286 
Estonia 17-8, I8n, 19-22, 95-6, 140, 
147, 22, 268, 294, 335, 358n, 361, 
374n, 376, 380, 393, 398n, 399, 
400m, 402, 404 
Estonian, Estonians 195, 206, 269, 393n, 
395-6 
Estonian army, troops 402 
Estonian coast 230, 272, 295, 338, 279 
Estonian constituent assembly 396 
Estonian islands 230, 290, 352, see also 
Hiidenmaa, Saarenmaa 
Estonian-Livonian army 206 
Estonian navy 380n, 395 
Estonian Provisional government 395-6 
ethnically separate troops 57, 64, 134, 
see also Finnish army, troops 
Etter, von 53 
Europe, European 18, 22, 25, 310, 330, 
359-60, 386 
European opinion, public 119, 269 
European Powers 30, 260, see also Great 
Powers 
European scientists 170 
evacuation 144, 306, 342-3 
exemption from military service 161, 
177, 201, 213, 256, 322 
exile 331 
explosives 195 
extreme Right 207 
Falkenhayn, General 288, 307-9, 311-2, 
317 
Fangstoss 361 
Far East 138n, 142-3, 180-1, 186-7, 
194, 197, 220, 223, 227-8, 274, 407 




Fatio, Morel 81i 
February Manifesto 1899 168, 170, 189 
Fennomans,fennoman 74, 99-100, 118, 




Fenno-Ugric 99-100, 206, 238 
field armies, troops 102, 121-2, 147, 
151-2, 180, see also Russian army 
field kitchens 195 
field telegraphy 224 
Filin 387n 
Finland 11-3. 16-7, 19-23, 25, 27n, 34-5, 
38, 41, 43-50, 53, 55, 59, 66, 71n, 
72-5, 77, 80, 84, 86, 90-1, 95, 97-9, 
108, 112, 117, 121-3, 129, 136, 138, 
146-7, 155, 165, 178, 181, 185-8,  
191, 195, 200, 203-4, 207-9, 213, 
215, 219, 221, 223, 231-2, 235-8, 
191, 200, 203-4, 207-9, 213, 215, 
219, 221, 223, 231-2, 235-7, 39-40, 
245, 249, 251, 254, 259, 262-3, 266, 
273, 277, 279, 281-2, 284, 286, 293, 
295, 299, 301, 303, 306-8, 321, 324, 
327, 329, 331, 335, 338-40, 342-3, 
350, 352-5, 359, 365, 370, 372n, 
373-6, 381, 384, 388-91, 399, 403, 
405, 407-9 
Finland 66 
Finland (Russian) Artillery Regiment 
175 
Finland glacis for St Petersburg 99, 137, 
143-4, 259, 296, 303, 316, 408 
Finland Germany's ally, vassal 390-1, 
410 
Finland (Russian) lines of communicati-
on staff 295 
Finland Military District 103, 113-4, 
116, 121, 141, 143, 146, 148, 151-4, 
162, 169, 172, 175, 178, 183, 226 
Finland (Russian) Rifle Brigades 253-5, 
255n, 256n, rifle troops 149, 225, 
233, 235, 248, 253-6, 278m 
Finland Station in St Petersburg 211 
Finland Swedish province 408 
Finland's position in Russian Empire 81, 
118, 128-30, 135, 155, 157, 161, 
168-9, 188-9, 192, 200, 205-6, 210, 
219, 222, 237, 245, 259, 284, 330-2, 
335, 355, 361, 399, 408-9, see also 
autonomy, finliandskii vopros, inde-
pendence, Russification 
Finliandskaia Gazeta 219, 251 
finliandskii vopros, Finnish question, 
problem 11, 129, 136, 155-6, 158, 
161-7, 170-2, 174, 181, 200, 207, 
210, 214, 218, 220, 239, 284, 311-2, 
315, 318, 346, 408-9 
Finliandskii zheleznyi most, Finland rail-
way bridge 212 
Finn, Finns, inhabitants of Finland, Fin-
nish people, population 16, 18, 23, 
26, 28, 33, 36, 37n, 42-5, 48, 52, 54, 
68, 74, 80-1, 89, 91, 98, 100-1, 109-
11, 113, 118, 124, 127, 131, 134, 
139, 151, 153, 155-8, 167, 169, 181, 
184-5, 190, 195, 197-8, 201, 203-4, 
207, 209-10, 212, 217-9, 225, 234, 
238, 342-3, 246, 249, 251, 254, 260, 
269, 269n, 277, 280-1, 283, 312, 
316, 318-9, 323, 327i, 330-1, 333-5, 
337, 343, 351, 354-5, 360, 372, 385-
7, 391, 398, 402, 407-8 
461 
Finn 138n 
Finns in Russian service 44, 50, 53, 66, 
62, 93, 113, 117, 124, 128, 167, 214, 
282, 407 
Finnish administration, bureaucrats, of-
ficials 42, 53, 68, 73-4, 98, 112, 117, 
130, 155-6, 171, 200, 207, 210, 226, 
23-6, 239, 277, 281, 328 
Finnish army, forces, troops 55, 74n, 91, 
131-2, 136, 144, 149-50, 158-60, 
162, 164-5, 167-70, 175, 184, 189, 
191, 201, 205-6, 210, 212-3, 218, 
238, 248, 252, 283, 315n, 330, 334, 
367, 369n, 371, 382-3, 394-5, 406 
Finnish artillery 135 
Finnish aspirations, cause, influence, op-
position, schemes 171-2, 202, 237, 
286, 311, 334, 403-4 
Finnish blood 239 




Finnish borders 26, 46, 133, 202, 202n, 
301, 385, 394, 405 
Finnish businessmen, industrialists 283, 
393 
Finnish citizens 68, 203 
Finnish coast 36, 74, 97, 139, 143, 195, 
202, 221, 235, 259, 294, 296-7, 299, 
306, 335, 341, 368, 378, 409-10 
Finnish Communist Party 398 
Finnish Division 124 
Finnish Dragoon Regiment 133, 135, 
137, 151, 175 
Finnish engineers 133, 135 
Finnish expansion, expeditions, inter-
vention 386, 395, to Artie Ocean 
390, to Estonia 395-6, to Karelia, 
Olonets, Viena 393-4, 393, 398n, 
399, 400m, 403-4, see also Greater 
Finland 
Finnish General Staff 65, 153 
Finnish-German naval treaty 390n 
Finnish government 53, 57, 160, 171, 
204, 279, 355, 376, 393, 3938, 405, 
see also Senate 
Finnish Historical Society 13 
Finnish-Karelian Society 202n 
Finnish language 24, 28, 43-4, 75, 98, 
136, 170, 269n, 312, 386 
Finnish leaders, party leaders, politicians 
125, 130, 161, 169, 171, 214, 218, 
249, 252, 311, 331, 399 
Finnish merchant fleet, ships 80, 110, 
376, 408, 410 
Finnish nation 16, 40m, 44, 74, 99-100, 
125, 128, 156, 330, 411 
Finnish national economy 117, 128, 135  
Finnish national military service 129-30, 
136, 156, 158-60, 165, 168-9, 176, 
181, 209, 217, 219 
Finnish naval service, navy 66, 68n, 
133, 384, 387, 399 
Finnish Office in Berlin 311 
Finnish officers in Swedish service 44, 
73 
Finnish parliament 201, 204, see also 
Diet 
Finnish Party 170-1, see also Old Finns, 
Young Finns 
Finnish pilots 268, 317 
Finnish-Polish relations 403 
Finnish press 236 
Finnish prisons 242 
Finnish provinces 43, 207, 236 
Finnish regiments, soldiers, troops of 
Swedish army 12, 13, 22, 31, 34, 38-
9, 44, 54 
Finnish-Russian peace 405, 411 
Finnish society 171, 189, 193, 362, 347, 
410 
Finnish sovereignty in Åland 377-8 
Finnish state 43, 73, 112, 134-6, 160-1, 
164, 169, 177, 188, 213, 217, 225, 
242, 247, 256, 335, 371, 407-9 
Finnish State Railways 112, 122, 125, 
141i, 187-8, 201, 211, 221, 241, 277, 
280, 407 
Finnish training battalion 49m, 57, 64, 
68, 71n 
Finnish treason 174, see also finliandskii 
vopros 
Finnish treasury 201, 242 
Finnish vagrant population 55 
fire brigades 205, 238, 334, 349, 364, 
see also Activists 
First World War 80, 118n, 126, 138, 
270, 300i, see also Great War 
Fischer-Lossainen, naval attache 314, 
315n 
Fisher, Sir John, Admiral 261, 288 
fishing boats, craft 186, 290, 366 
flagship 302, 324, 382 
Flanders 390 
fleet in being 285 
floating batteries 96, 123, 302 
flotillas see coastal, lake, minesweeper, 
river, torpedo boat flotillas 
Flottenverband fur Sonderunterneh- 
mung 349 
Foreign Ministry 111 
foreign policy 189 
foremost defence line in Finland 296, 
406 
fortifications, fortification works 227, 
258, 278, 280, 282, 296-7, 300, 303- 
4, 308, 340, 343, 347 
Fortral 387n 
fortress administration, commandant, 
district, esplanade 114, 179-80, 202- 
3, 228-9, 235-6, 241, 258, 273, 292n, 
294-5, 305 
fortress artillery 116, 121n, 175, 180, 
228-9, 258, 292n, 294-5, 305 
fortress battalions, infantry, troops 64, 
106-7, 114-6, 121, 121n, 151-2, 224, 
228-9, 258, 340 
Fort Slava 73, 82 
France 30, 45, 72, 76, 78, 100, 109, 112, 
118, 126, 138n, 148, 196, 259-60, 
264, 266, 366, 392, 398-9, 404, 410 
Frankfurt 389 
Franz Charles, Archduke 86 
Fredric, Prince of Netherlands 86, 86i 
Fredrikshamn see Hamina 
Freiburg i. Breisgau 12 
French, Frenchmen 41, 96-7, 126, 157, 
197, 229, 257, 161, 404 
French allies 238-9 
French archives 12 
French capital, credits 117, 138n 
French diplomats 39, 336, 337n, 338n 
French forces 78-9, 197, 266, 410 
French front 196 
French language 45 
French philosophers 25 
French revolution 26, 55, 126 
French subsidies 18 
Fria Ord 183 
Friberg, an officer 53 
Friedland 30 
Friedrich der Grosse 349n 
Friedrich Karl, Prince of Hesse 383, 
391, see also German King for Fin- 
land 
Friedrich Karl 285 
Fiihrungschaos 264n 
Furious 289 
Furuhjelm family 54 
Galitsia 148, 220, 278n 
Gallen, Jarl 13 
Gallipoli 288 
Gambier, Admiral Lord 34 
Gamlakarleby see Kokkola 
Gangut, gangut-class battleships 257, 
257n, 271, 349-50 
Gapon, Father 184 
Garrison Artillery 4th Brigade 87 
garrison infantry 90  
Gatchina 400m, 402 
Gavriil 401 
Gazelle 285 
Gel'singfors see Helsinki 
gendarmes 64, 162, 171, 173, 184, 188-
9, 194, 201, 205-6, 214-5, 223-4, 
238-9, 241, 243-7, 253, 256, 277, 
279, 292n, 295, 309, 318 
General-Admiral 229 
General Staff Academy 161 
general strike 187, 189-91, 193-4, 204, 
223, 226, 254, 277, 363, 408 
Geneva 183 
Geok Tepe 138 
Georgia, Georgians 206, 335 
Gerard, Nikolai, Governor-General 
191, 200, 203, 208-9, 215, 226, 247 
German, Germans 149, 156-7, 196-7, 
199-21, 227, 229, 238, 262, 264-5, 
296, 311, 321, 330, 342, 349-50, 
358, 360, 365-7, 380-1, 385-7, 395-
7, 403, 408 
German Admiralty Staff 264n, 286, 
314-7, 359, 375-8, 384-5, 390 
German advance, attack, invasion, ope-
rations 221, 234, 269, 271, 284, 308, 
312, 334, 37%, 409 
Germa agents, saboteurs, spies 266, 268, 
322, 335, 337, 373, 385n 
Germany army, troops 196-7, 232, 264, 
286, 288-9, 293, 298, 361, 381i, 389, 
391-2, 395 
German 8th Army 349 
German-Austrian front 257 
German-Austrian protectorate of Poland 
333 
German Baltic Division, Ostseedivision 
378, 380, 388, 391 
German Baltic fleet 197, 264n, 267, 
285-8, 302, 309, 336, 361, 387, 389 
German Bight 390 
German-British conflict in Finland 389 
German business circles, businessmen 
374, 390 
German capital, investments 330, 390 
German chancellor see Bethmann-Holl- 
weg, Bismarck, Hertling, Michaelis 
German coast 34, 142, 197, 265-6, 272, 
287, 336 
German colonies 410 
German consul 268 
German control of the Gulf of Kronstadt 
385 
German defeat, fall, retreat 310-1, 378, 
390n, 391, 410 
German domination of the Baltic Sea 
197, 290, 302, 359, 382 
German embassy in Moscow 383 
German Empire 311-2, 358, 378, 391, 
405 
German Emperor, Kaiser 143, 264n, see 
also William II 
German expedition, intervention 269, 
298, 311, 313, 333-4, 373, 374n, 
374-5, 377-8, 380, 388-9, 392, 410, 
see also German liberators 
German-Finnish joint company 374 
German fleet, navy 138, 142, 197, 261, 
264, 264n, 265, 271-2, 288, 290, 
298, 314, 316, 349, 358, 360, 382, 
389 
German Foreign Office 359, 383, see 
also Auswärtiges Amt 
German freighters, transports 289, 298, 
336 




375, 387, 390n, see also Ludendorff, 
OHL 
German hegemony, imperialism, in-
fluence, occupation, schemes, sphere 
of interest, war aims 269, 309-10, 
315, 333, 337, 359, 361, 373-6, 
379m, 382-6, 389-91, 396n, 400m, 
404, 410 
German harbours 266, 361 
German King for Finland 373, 383, see 
also Friedrich Karl of Hesse 
German landing, raids 147, 265, 269, 
271, 287, 298, 306, 335-6, 338-9, 
343, 378, 382, 389 
German language 24, 44-5 
German liberators 375, 381i, 382 
German military staffs 269, 309, 323, 
335, 388, see also OHL 
German Ministry of Marine 264n, 374 
German Ministry of War 312, 374 
German naval base in Murmansk 390-1 
German naval staffs 263, 269, 309, 338, 
388, see also Admiralstab 
German orientation, Germanophiles in 
Finland 262, 270, 308, 384, 398, 409 
German principalities 19, 196 
German spies 266, 268, 337, 373 
German submarines 390 
German victory 308, 310-1 
German war aims 
Germanic Empires 262, 270, 308, 409 
Germany 11, 16, 118, 126, 138n, 139, 
147-8, 154, 164, 183, 196, 221, 223, 
239, 253, 259-60, 263, 267-9, 281, 
289, 305, 309, 312, 320, 333-35, 
362, 367, 373, 377, 397-8, 400m,  
403 
glasnost' 12 




Golitsyn, Mikhail 20-1, 35, 38 
Goltz, Rüdiger von der 391, 396, 396n, 
378, 383 
Golub 387n 
Goncharov, S.O., Lieutenant General 
164 
Gorchakov, Aleksandr Mikhailovich, 
Prince, Chancellor 111 n 
Gorchakov, Dmitri, Prince 31 
Goremykin, Ivan Logginovich 199, 284 
Gornyi Dubniak 124 
Gottleben, Sofia Charlotte 53 
Gough, Sir Herbert, General 402 
Governor-General of Finland 24, 39, 42-
3, 50, 56-7, 59, 61, 70, 75, 84-5, 87-
8, 91, 95, 97-8, 100, 102, 112-3, 117, 
120, 125, 130-1, 137, 143, 147, 150, 
157, 163, 171-2, 178, 181, 183, 188, 
190-1, 200, 203, 210, 212, 215-6, 
219, 226, 239, 247, 251, 283, 312, 
318, 330, 344, 346, 351, 354, see 
also Adlerberg, Berg, Bobrikov, Hei-
den, Menschikoff, Nekrasov, Rokas-
sovskii, Seyn, Stakhovich, Steinheil, 
Zakrevskii 
Governor-General of Vilna 179 
governors 306-7 
Grand Duchy of Finland 13, 40n, 48-50, 
53-4, 60, 70, 75, 82-3, 87, 91, 98-9, 
101, 113, 118, 121, 129, 134, 137, 
140, 145i, 149, 150m, 157-8, 166-7, 
169, 179, 207, 218, 239, 260, 277, 
284, 296, 322-3, 337, 351, 363, 386, 
394, 399 
Grand Duchy of Warsaw 45 
Grand Duke of Finland 22-3, 42, 81, 
102, 310, 331, 362, 410 
Grande Armee 47 
Grand Fleet 285, 288-9 
Grand Prince of Muscovy 16 
grand vizier 252 
Grazhdanin 336 
Great Northern War 19, 22 
Great Powers 73, 76, 100-1, 112, 119, 
164, 198, 253, 260, 269-70, see also 
Austria, Britain, France, Germany, 
Russia 
great programme of Russification 284, 
310 
Great Russia 388 
Great War 115, 144, 199, 237, 243, 253, 184, 195, 197, 206, 221, 231, 233, 
257-8, 265, 270, 279, 283, 310, 324- 254, 266, 274, 289-91, 296-301, 307- 
5, 333, 335, 362, 373, 376, 390-1, 8, 316-8, 335, 340-1, 345, 376, 378 
395, 	 405, 	 409-10, 	 see 	 also 	 First 
World War 
Gulf of Finland 15, 23, 29, 34, 79, 87-8, 
94, 97, 101, 110, 123, 142, 186, 194, 
Greater Bulgaria 120 197, 221, 228, 230-1, 258, 263-4, 
Grater Finland 314, 386, 394, 399, 405 266-7, 	 271-2, 	 274, 	 276m, 	 285-6, 
Greater Poland 403-4 286n, 287-9, 298-9, 301-4, 315-7, 
Greater Rumania 386 339, 341, 352, 356, 374n, 376, 380, 
Greece, Greek, 54, 74 382-3, 386, 389, 391, 395, 398, 401, 
Greek War of Liberation 74, 124 405-6, 408 
Grenadier Artillery Brigade 113 Gulf of Kronstadt 385 
Grenadier Corps 61, 71 Gulf of Riga 141, 197, 259, 264, 266, 
Grenadier 1st Division 83m, 84-6, 86i, 
87, 106, 112-3 
286, 286n, 287-8, 302, 336, 338-9, 
349-50, 352 
Grenadier Regiment of Prince of Prussia 
86i 
grenadiers 48, 61, 70-1, 83m, 84-6, 86i, 
87, 90-1, 93, 96, 106, 112-3, 224, 
227 
Grigorovich, I.K., Admiral 257 
Grisslehamn 33m, 39 
Grodno 72, 191, 208-9, 225, 227 
Grodno Hussars 84- 87 
Gromoboi 339 
Grosser Kurfiirst 349n, 350 
Grossherzöglich Meckelnburg Jäger 
Battalion no. 14 377 
Grot, Jakov, Professor 51 
Gruz 387n 
guard duty 116, 134, 136, 178 
guardships 370n 
Guards 125, 326, 380 
Guards Artillery Brigade 230 
Guards Finnish 3rd Rifle Battalion 69-
70, 71n, 73, 91, 93, 110, 113-4, 116-
7, 124-5, 125n, 128, 131-3, 135, 
146i, 150m, 162, 168-9, 182, 185, 
191, 200n 
Guards cavalry 230, 239 
Guards Corps 27, 50, 53, 103-4, 124, 
130, 177, 186, 203, 207, 220, 226, 
230-1, 239, 
Güldenstubbe, Lieutenant General 85 
gunboats 122, 133, 138n, 272, 286-7, 
335, 339, 387 
Gustav V 308, 377 
Gustayssvärd see Kustaanmiekka 
Gustavus III 25-6, 43 
Gustavus IV Adolf 30, 42 
Gzhatskii 509th Regiment 305, 324, 
353n 
Haapamäki 202 
Haapaniemi Officers' School 45 
Haaparanta (Haparanda) 318, 330 
Haapasaari (Aspö) 341 
Habsburg Empire 104, 308 
Hague 165, 169, 355 
hakkapeliitta 18n 
Hakkri Iiro, a sailor in a story by 
Hj.Nortamo 71 
Hallberg, Karl Andreevich 65i 
Häme 35, 40m 
Hämeenlinna (Tavastehus) 32m, 33m, 
35, 41, 49m, 50-1, 56-7, 62-4, 71, 
83m, 85, 93, 98, 107-8, 112-4, 114n, 
116, 121, 132, 137, 143, 149-50, 
150m, 166n, I73n, 175n, 178, 202, 
222-3, 228, 233, 255, 255n, 256n, 
290n, 291n, 293n, 297, 300, 303, 
465 
Guards Finland Regiment 23, 27, 50 
Guards infantry 230 
339, 356 
Hämeenmaa 387 
Guards Jägers 50 Hamina (Fredrikshamn) 23, 27, 32m- 
Guards military band 124i 33m, 39, 40n, 43, 45, 49m, 50, 52, 
Guards Rifle detachments 230, 239 62-4, 73, 83, 83n, 113-4, 	 116, 	 121, 
Guards sapper battalion 240 137, 140, 149-50, 150m, 153, 175n, 
Guards Ural Cossack Regiment 239 
guerillas, partisans, popular uprising 21, 
186, 221-2, 	 233, 
304, 340 
248, 255n, 278, 
34, 36-7, 39, 42, 91, 162, 211, 222-3, 
231, 234, 238, 254, 259, 388 
Gulevich, General Lieutenant 324 
Gulf of Bothnia 15-7, 33, 33m, 34, 38-9, 
42, 48, 79-80, 97, 108, 140, 153,  
Hamina Cadet School 103 
Hammarskjöld, Hjalmar 308 
Hammerfest 308 
Hangö see Hanko 
Hangöudd see Hankoniemi 
Hanko (Hangö) 33, 56, 62-4, 72-3, 83, 
83m, 84-5, 88, 122, 195, 221, 232, 
289, 291n, 297-8, 338, 341, 350, 
352-3, 368, 378-9, 379n, 380, 387 
Hankoniemi (Hangöudd) 20-1, 23, 34, 




Hedlund, Victor, Major General, Sena-
tor 251 
Heiden, Fedor Logginovich, Governor- 
General 43n, 102, 143, 147, 157, 161 
Heinola 49m, 56-7, 64, 83m, 98 
Heligoland 148 
Helsingfors see Helsinki 
Helsingfors Dagblad 110-1 
Helsinki (Helsingfors) 20, 23, 32m-33m, 
38, 42, 44, 49m, 50-1, 56-7, 59, 62- 




84-6, 88, 91, 96-7, 106, 109-10, 112- 
4, 114n, 116, 116n, 122-3, 125, 128, 
132, 137, 138n, 140, 144, 149, 
150m, 171-3 , 173n, 174i, 176i, 178-
9, 185-6, 188-90, 193, 195, 197, 214, 
221-2, 225, 228, 231-5, 238-40, 249, 
251, 255n, 256, 265-6, 268, 271, 
273, 273i, 276-7, 283, 286n, 287, 
289-90, 291n, 293, 294n, 295-6, 299, 
300i, 302-3, 306, 314, 324-5, 328-9, 
329n, 330, 332, 336-8, 341, 343, 
345, 353, 366, 372-3, 375, 379m, 
380-1, 381i, 397, 400m, 402-3, 405 
Helsinki rural district 272, 276m 
Helsinki soviet 327, 333, 346, 348, 354, 
363 
Henry, Prince of Prussia, Commander of 
Baltic Fleet 285-8, 302, 317, 336, 
359 
Herat 138 
Hertling, Georg, Chancellor 333 
Hesse 282-3 
High Seas Fleet, Hochseeflotte 197, 
264n, 265-7, 285, 289, 302, 361, 378 
Hiidenmaa (Dagö, Hiiumaa) 230, 287-8, 
349 
Hindenburg, Paul von Beneckendorff 
und von, Field Marshal 307, 331 
Hippopotam 107 
Hintze, von I95n 
historians, historiography 328, 328n, 
354 
Hjelt, Edvard 209, 211-2, 215, 311, 365, 
375 
Hogland see Suursaari 
Hohenzollern Empire 307  
Hollola 56 
Holtzendorf, Admiral 375 
Home Guards 348-9, 374n 
Hoplax see Huopalahti 
Hopmann, Admiral 286-7, 289, 336 
hospital ships 329, 376, 384 
hostility of Finns to Russians 218, 223, 
231, 237, 259-60, 322 
Hufvudstadsbladet I 24i 
Huittinen (Hvittis) 56 
Hultin, Eelis, Captain 190n 
Hungary, Hungarians 70, 76, 136 
Huopalahti (Hoplax) 273 
Hussars 84, 87, 342 
Hvittis see Huittinen 
Hyvinkää (Hyvinge) 143, 152 
Iamburg see Jaama 
icebreakers 372, 378, 380, 393 
Idensalm see Iisalmi 
Ignat'ev, Nikolai Pavlovich, Count 120 
Iisalmi (Idensalm) 303, 314 
Immediatvortrag 264n 
Imperator 264n 
Imperator Aleksandr III 257n 
Imperatritsa Ekaterina Velikaia 257n 
Imperatritsa Manila 257n 
Imperial see Russian 
Imperial banners 219 
Imperial Council 167-8, 191, 216, 219 
Imperial Militia 29 
Imperial Palace in Helsinki 80 
Imperial prerogatives 187, 212, see also 
absolutism 
Imperial proposals for legislation 211, 
213 
Imperial yacht 244 
imperialism 19, 76, 392n 
import of grain 320-I 
indelta 18, 31, 31n, 45, 70, 74, 83m, 
91-2, 92i, 93, 107, 117, 262 
independence of East Karelia 386 
independence of Estonia 402, 404 
independence of Finland 110, 134, 161n, 
215, 249n, 250, 312, 313n, 314n, 
323, 331-5, 337, 343, 346, 364-6, 
372n, 374-5, 383, 393, 399, 402, see 
also acknowledgement of, Jinliands-
kii vopros, Finnish aspirations, War 
of Liberation 
India, Indian 72, 270, 396n 
Indrenius, Johannes, Rear Admiral 129 
infantry 18-9, 30-1, 35, 38, 61, 114, 116, 
120, 133, 135, 149, 162, 165, 178, 
195, 226-7, see also Divisions, fort-
ress infantry, rifles 
informers, informants 171, 205-6, 247 
Ingå see Inkoo 
Ingermanland, Ingria, Inkeri 15, 17-8, 
22, 206, 230, 237, 253, 394, 400m, 
402 
Inkon (Ingå) 
Ino fortress, fortress district 229, 235, 
237, 274, 276, 385 
Inspector of Artillery 194 
Inspector of Finnish Troops 57, 71 
Inspector of Military Schools 68 
Inspector of Rifle Troops 71 
internal independence, sovereignty 188, 
312, 331, 343, see also autonomy, 
separatism, finliandskii vopros 
International Court at the Hague 355 
international law, regulations 272, 289 
international waters 385 
internationalists 183 
Internationalist Mensheviks 354 
intervention in Balkan, Greece 74, 120, 
124 
intervention in Russia 104-5, 120, 392, 
397, 400n 
Irben Strait 290, 336 
Irish rebellion 336 
Irkutskii 93rd Regiment 137, 230 
iron ore transports from Sweden to Ger- 
many 289, 309, 315-6, 336, 359 
ironclad ships 107 
Isokyrö (Storkyro) 20 
Italia irredenta 386 
Italian, Italy 30, 104, 266, 396 
Iudenich, Nikolai Nikolaevich, General 
401-2 
Turev see Tartu 
Ivan, a soldier 52 
Ivan III 16 
Ivan IV the Terrible 19 
Ivangorod 72 
Ivanov, General, Aide-de-Camp 281 
Izborskii reserve battalion 149 
Izmail 257n 
Izvol'skii, Aleksand Petrovich, Minister 
of Foreign Affairs 195, 260 
Jaama (Iamburg) 136, 402 
Jacobin Fennomans 99 
Jade 383 
Jäger troops 55, 60-1 
Jäger Royal Prussian Battalion no. 27, 
Jäger movement, Jägers 313, 313n, 
318-21, 324, 333-5, 374, 374n, 376-
7, 383n, 387n, 393, 399, 409, see 
also Activists, independence, War of 
Liberation 
Jakobstad see Pietarsaari 
Janin, Colonel 239 
Jänissaari 20 
Japan 180, 196, 223, 392 
Japanese 186, 223 
Japanese General Staff 184 
Japanese guns, mortars 344n 
Japanese legation in Stockholm 215 
Japanese spies, spionage 215 
Japanese War 80, 138n, 227, 248, 263, 
270, see also Far East 
Järvinen, Markku 337n 
Jassy 26 
Jews, Jewish 51, 161, 238, 309 
Joensuu 202, 205, 299-300, 339 
John Grafton 184 




Jyväskylä 98, 314 
kagaali 170 
Kaipiainen 235 
Kaiser 375, see also William II 
Kaiser 349n 
Kaiserin 349n 
KaiserWilhelm Kanal 262 
Kaiserliche Marine 261, see also Ger- 
man fleet, navy 
Kaivopuisto (Brunnsparken) 96 
Käkisalmi (Kexholm) 22, 49n, 56, 62-4, 
72, 186 
Kalevala, national epic 99, 386 
Kalevala 66 
Kalix river (Kainuunjoki) 43 
Kalmucks 54, 57 
Kamenskii, Nikolai Mikhailovich 31, 
34-5 
Kangasala 56 
Kanin, Vice Admiral 286, 289, 325 
Kantsov, an officer 53 
Kaps'ul 387n 
Karakalpachians 206 
Karakozov, terrorist 117 
Karelia, Karelian, Karelian populations, 
Karelians 16-7, 27, 35, 38, 149, 202, 
236, 386, 388, 394, see also East Ka- 
relia, Greater Finland 
Karelian Isthmus 20, 22, 25, 46, 143, 
153, 186, 207, 223, 233, 239-40, 
252, 278, 291, 301, 341, 371, 382, 
385, 405 
Kargopolskii 425th Regiment 293n 
Karjaa (Karis) 84 
Karjala 387, 387n 
467 
Karl XII see Charles XII 
Karl XIII 46 
Karl XIV Johan (Bernadotte, Jean Bap- 
tiste) 46, 77 
Kaskinen (Kaskö) 297-8 
Katkov, Mikhail 105, 111, 155 
Kaulbars, an officer 53 
Kaulbars, A.V., General 192 
Kaunas (Kovno) 400m, 404 
Kausala 303 
Kazan 103, 149 
Kazanskii Regiment 230 
Keith, James 22 
Keksgol'mskii Regiment 27 
Kemi 205, 298 
Kemijoki 38, 43, 231 
Kerava 294 
Kerch 137 
Kerenskii, A.F., Minister of Justice, of 
War, Prime Minister 330-2, 337, 
468 	 343, 345, 350, 354, 356, 358, 361 
Keuruu 299 
Kexholm see Käkisalmi 
Kharkov 103, 181, 189 
Khiva, Emir of 58 
Khivinets 339 
Khokholians 206 
Khrabryi 286, 286n, 288 
Kiel 196, 265, 268, 285, 288, 336, 350, 
389 




King of Finland 391, see also Friedrich 
Karl of Hesse 
Kirby, David, Professor 12 
Kirkkonummi (Kyrkslätt) 84, 222, 233 
Kitchener, Herbert, Field Marshal Lord 
396n 
Kivennapa 114n, 236 
Knorring, Bogdan von 38-9 
Knox, Sir Alfred, Major General 350 
Koivisto (Björkö) 186, 195, 222, 229- 
30, 232-4, 278, 302-3, 359, 387, 389, 
398-9, 400m, 401, 405 
Kokkola (Gamlakarleby) 56, 80, 81i, 90- 
1, 197, 297-8, 300m, 341 
Kokovtsov, Vladimir Nikolaevich, Mi- 
nister of Finance 139n, 201, 213, 
218-9, 245, 252, 256, 270, 284 
Kola peninsula 289 
Kolberg 287-8, 336, 389 
Kolpinskii 422th Regiment 293n, 297, 
300, 362, 362n 
Koltchak, Admiral 398n  
König 349n 
König Albert 349n 
Kononov, a Russian tradesman 51 
Konstantin Konstantinovich, Grand 
Duke 119n 
Kontupohja 367 
Korff, Sergei, Baron, Deputy Governor- 
General 330 
Koria 235, 293n 
Komilov, Lavr Georgievich, General 
350, 354 
Korochanskii 457th Regiment 300 
Kothen, Casimir von 92 
Kotka 194, 221-2, 233-5, 274, 302, 304 
Kotka 138n 
Kotiin Island 20 
Kouvola 114, 153, 180, 233, 256n, 291n, 
298, 30In, 303, 367 
Kovel 225, 227 
Kraatz, Paul, Colonel, Senator 251 
Krambol 387n 
Krasnaia Gorka 229, 274, 376, 399, 402 
Krasnoe Selo 402 
Krasnoe Znamia 286n 
Kranoiarskii 95th Regiment 137, 230 
Kremlin 404 
Kristiinankaupunki (Kristinestad) 297, 
300n 




Kronshlottskii 200th Regiment 102 
Kronstadt 20, 23, 36, 47, 63, 72-3, 80, 
82-3, 83m, 96, 106, 115, 123, 137, 
141-2, 157, 189, 192, 194, 215, 221, 
228-9, 233-5, 237, 253, 258-9, 268, 
274, 276, 286n, 290, 294, 301n, 
363n, 380, 380n, 382, 385, 397-9, 
401, 405, 410 
Kruunuvuorenselkä (Kronobergsfjärden) 
97, 272, 276, 276m 




Kuopio 32m.33m, 49m, 57, 64, 83m, 93, 
98, 114n, 116n, 132, 150m, 166n, 
175n, 205, 233, 248, 250, 300, 306, 
314, 340n 
Kuropatkin, Aleksei Nikolaevich, Gene- 
ral, Minister of War 141, 163-5, 167, 
172, 176-7, 218, 308, 321 
Kustaanmiekka (Gustaysvärd) 266 
Kutusov, Field Marshal 306 
Kuznetsov, Major 90 
Kvick, Jyrki 340n 
Kymenkartano, Kyminkartano (Kym- 
menegård) 40m, 41, 49m, 62-3, 
114, 116n, 121-2, 175 
Kymi battalion 56 
Kymijoki, Kymi river 23, 29, 97, 107, 
122, 202, 222, 227-8, 231, 235-6, 
295-6, 339, 304, 382 
Kyminlinna 27, 137 
Kyyrölä 116n 
Laajasalo (Degerö) 152, 180, 276n 
labour troops 64, 323 
Lacy, Peter de 22 
Ladoga lake (Laatokka) 17, 22, 274, 
339, 386, 389,400m 
Ladoga 290 
Laene 393n 
Lahti (Lahtis) 180, 249, 256n, 3293, 
303, 342, 353, 356 
lake district, plateau, region 34, 112, 
231, 274, 297, 303, 318, 339 
Lakhta 240 
Lambsdorff, Count, Minister of Foreign 
Affairs 196 
land attack from Livonia towards St Pe- 
tersburg 299 
landing 36, 83m, 85, 87-8, 90-1, 98, 108, 
117, 123, 137-9, 	 143, 	 150m, 	 151, 
153, 179, 197, 222-4, 228-9, 231-4, 
257, 259, 265, 297, 314, 343 
landing boats 80 
Langemak, Admiral 388-9 
Langhoff, August, General, Minister 
State Secretary 200, 200n, 217 
language see Finnish, French, German, 
Russian, Swedish 
Länsipohja (Västerbotten) 41 
Lapland (Lappi) 41 
Lappalainen, Jussi T. 18n 
Lappeenranta (Villmanstrand) 22-3, 27, 
32m-33m, 50, 57, 63-4, 83m, 93, 
107, 116, 116n, 166, 133, 137, 145i, 
151, 168, 175, 256, 256n, 294, 299, 
301n, 342, 367 
Lappo see Lapua 
Lappohja (Lappvik) 232, 289, 295, 297, 
299, 325, 338 
Lapps 78 
Lappvik see Lappohja 
Lapua (Lappo) 34, 62 
lateral attack through Finland 354, 304 
Latin scripture 14 
Latvia, Latvian, Latvians, Letts 269, 
388, 395, 402-4 
Latvian Bolsheviks, riflemen 394-5  
Latvian-Soviet peace 404 
Lauenstein Army Group 286 
Lauttasaari (Drumsö) 96, 152, 180, 273, 
276m 
Lavansaari 303, 341 
Lazarev, M.P., Admiral 72 
League of Russia's Oppressed Minori- 
ties 309 
Lebensraum 307 
Left 163, 190, 194, 200, 218-9, 327i, 
333, 348, 350, 354, 358-9, 362, 364, 
372, see also Social Democrats, so- 
cialists, workers 
Left opposition in German Reichstag 
375 
Left Socialist Revolutionaries 354 
Leipzig 66 
Leitenant I!'in 257n 
Lembit 394n 
Lempäälä 303 
Lempi, aunt of a memoirist 52 
Lenin, V.I. 332-3, 351, 360-1, 361i, 
362, 364-6, 372, 385n 
Lennuk 393n 
Levant 76, see also Near East, Orient 
Libau 141-2, 149, 197, 229, 263-6, 268, 
271, 279, 286-90, 302, 317, 333, 
336, 361, 383, 396, 400m 
Liberal opinion, liberals 77, 88, 95n, 
108, 136, 161, 163, 190n, 199, 207, 
310, 324, 330, 398 
liberation army 314, 335 
liberation movement 336, see also Acti- 
vists, Jäger movement 
liberation of Bulgaria 125n, of Finland 
309, 311-2, 391, of Karelia 389, 393, 
of oppressed peoples 183, see also 
independence, Greater Finland, Ger- 
man guidance 
Library of Congress 14 
Lieska 387n 
light craft 383 
light cruisers 257, 287, 316, 365, 396, 
see also cruisers 
lighthouses 144, 198, 372, 376, 379, 
see also Pilot and lighthouse service 
Lilius, Aleko 303n 
line battalions, troops 55, 61, 83, 90-1, 
113 
lines of communication staffs 341, 367, 
395 
line tactics 68, 146i 
liquidation commission 371 
Lithuania, Lithuanian, Lithuanians 27n, 
105, 161, 220, 293, 299, 361, 388, 
400m, 403 
469 
Lithuanian rebellion 97 
Lithuanian-Soviet peace 404 
little entente 404 
Livonia 17-8, 21, 27n, 53, 96, 265, 268, 
296, 358n, 361 
Livonian coast 230 
local administration 203, 210, 213, 216, 
242, see also Diet, finliansdskii vop-
ros, Finnish government, Senate 
local detachments, troops 55, 102, 106, 
116, 140, 161, 227 
local languages 169, 171, 173, 247, see 
also Finnish language, Swedish lan-
guage, Russification 
local rebels 224, 233, see also finliands-
kii vopros, Voima 
Lockstedt 314, see also Ausbildungs- 
gruppe Lockstedt, Jäger movement 
Lodeinopoleinyi 428th Regiment 294n, 
305, 324, 353, 353n, 356, 356n, 362 
470 
	
Lohja (Lojo) 84, 341 
Loimu 387n 
Lojo see Lohja 
London 72, 94, 100, 318 
Lorraine 386 
Louhi 387n 
Loviisa (Lovisa) 49m, 62-3, 114, 116n, 
146, 221-2, 233-4, 380 
loyal opposition 193 
loyalty of Finns to Emperor, Russia 
101, 106, 108-11, 118, 125, 136, 
155, 161, 167, 179, 240, 252, 319- 
20, 355, 408-10, see also disloyalty 
Lübeck 197 
Lucius von Stoedten, H.E., Baron 309 
Ludendorff, Erich, General 307, 333-4, 
349-50, 359-61, 354, 374, 378, 389- 
91 
Luzhskii 423rd Regiment 293n, 297, 
300 
Luleå 33m 
Lutheran, Lutherans 16, 24, 42, 237, 
249-50 
Maarianhamina see Mariehamn 
Macdonald, Field Marshal 47-8 
Macedonia 24 
machine guns 104, 205, 231, 238, 247, 
303, 305n, 344 
Magdeburg 285 
Main Staff 57, 65, 147, 159-60, 177, 224 
Makarov 287 
Mäkiluoto 272m 393n 
Maksimov, A.S., Vice-Admiral 325, 
330-2, 336, 351 
Malmi 291n, 292n, 276m  
Maloiarskii 116th Regiment 353 
Manchuria 186-7, 196 
Manderstem 53, 68 
manifesto on martial law 240, on mili- 
tary contribution 214 
Manner, Kullervo 346 
Mannerheim, Carl 251 
Mannerheim, Carl Gustaf Emil 251, 
366, 372, 382, 383n, 391, 393n, 399, 
407 
Manninen, Ohto 12 
manoeuvres 115, 153, 162, 231, 234 
Mäntyluoto 297 
mare clausum 24, 72, 199n, 261, 389 
Marna Fedorovna, Empress I45i, 164, 
168 
Mariehamn (Maarianhamina) 290, 305 
Market Square in Helsinki I 74i 
Markgraf 349n, 350 
Markov, Vladimir, Lieutenant General 
214 
Marmara Sea 125 
Martens, Fedor Fedorovich von 261 
martial law, state of war 178, 190, 202, 
207-9, 237-46, 277 
Marxist 351, 411 
Masons 308n 
massacre in Balkan 119-20, of Russians 
in Finland 382 
Maude, George 13 
Maynard, General 392n 
maximalist 373, 373n 
MCB see Motor Coastal Boat 
Mechelin, Leo 136, 190-1, 193, 200, 
203, 205, 208-11, 215, 240, 249 
Mecklenburg 377 
Medical academy 103, 129 
Mediterranean Sea 19, 72, 120, 261, 266 
Mediterranean flotilla, squadron 24, 30, 
79, 137, 257 
Mellunkylä (Mellungsby) 273 
Memel 285 
men of independence 355, 364, see also 
Activists, Jäger movement 
Menschikoff, Menshikov 14n 
Menschikoff, Aleksandr Sergeevich, 
Prince 59, 61, 63n, 75-6, 83, 92, 95, 
99 
Menschikoff, Leonid 246 
Menshikov, Aleksandr Danilovich, Prin- 
ce 21, 43n 




Meurer, Vice Admiral 376, 378, 380-3, 
390 
Mexmontan, Nikolai, Colonel 146i, 
334-5, 342n 
Michaelis, Georg, Chancellor 333 
Middle East 407 
Mikhail Nikolaevich, Grand Duke 
Mikhail Romanov 19 
Mikkeli (St Michel) 32m, 33m, 83, 93, 
98, 114n, 116n, 132, 150m, 166n, 
175n, 186, 225, 233, 300, 306 
militarism, militarist, militarists 310, 
330, 360 
Military Academy of the General Staff 
103, 161n 
military administration zone 320n 
military assistance to civilian authorities 
204 
military bands 407 
military burden, contribution, expenditu-
re, tribute of the Finns 59, 73-4, 74n, 
106, 	 113, 	 127-8, 	 130, 134-5, 155, 
158-60, 163, 165-6, 169, 176-7, 181- 
2, 192, 201, 211-14, 217, 227, 243, 
256, 281-2, 285, 322 
military camps 116, 136, 145i, 185 
military chaplains 248 
Military Committee 311, see also Acti- 
vists, Jäger movement 
military communications 222-4, 227, 
234, 254, 295, 333, 335, 339, 344, 
366, 368 
Military Court of Appeal 65 
Military Department of the Senate 57 
military districts 103, 129, 141, 146, 
148, see also Finland, St Petersburg 
military district 
military governor 54, in Åland 378 
military headquarters, leaders, staffs 
277, 297, 299, 309, 312, 347 
military hospitals 258, 283, 292n, 295, 
321, 341 
military intervention 190, 194, 211-2, 
239, see also martial law 
military judges 242 
military plans 269, 308, 318, 335, 354, 
see also war plans 
military revolts 192-3, 205, 220, 246, 
see also Sveaborg revolt 
military settlements 102 
militia 29, 87, 127, 278, 290, 292-4, 
298, 301 
militia infantry 19 
Militia 1st Brigade 290 
Militia 60th Brigade 290, 291n 
Militia 62nd Brigade 292 
Militia 68th Brigade 291, 291n  
Militia 69th Brigade 292n 
Militia 92nd Brigade 301, 324, 340, 344, 
362 
Militia 10th Corps 290 
militia druzhiny 290, 290n, 291n, 293, 
301, 326, 357 
Miliutin, Dmitrii Alekseevich 102-3, 
104n, 114, 119, 126-7, 129-30, 140, 
147, 158-9, 165, 227 
mine companies, detachments 253, 
292n, 295, 340, 344 
minelayers 141, 195, 230, 266, 271, 
286-8, 290, 302, 339, 370n 
minefields, mines, mine warfare 115, 
194, 197, 228, 258, 161, 265, 267, 
272, 274, 285, 287-9, 296-8, 302, 
305, 336, 341, 379, 385, 398, 400, 
408 
minesweepers, minesweeping 287-8, 
316, 336, 339, 349n, 350, 361, 370n, 
374, 379 383-5, 387, 397, 399 
Minister of Finance 138, 139n, 196, see 
also Barck, Bunge, Kokovtsov, Witte 
Minister of Foreign Affairs 144, see also 
Gorchakov, Izvol'skii, Lambsdorff, 
Sazonov 
Minister of the Interior 66, 242, see also 
, Goremykin, Plehwe 
Minister of War 39, 83, 85, 87-8, 91, 
102-3, 113, 126, 129, 130-1, 135, 
166, 185, 194, 201, 203, see also 
Dolgorukov, Kerenskii, Kuropatkin, 
Miliutin, Shuvaev, Sukhomlinov, 
Sukhozanet, Vannovskii 
Minister State Secretary 43, 118, 130-
131, 156, 166, 172, 200, 208, 211, 
330, 345-6, 
Ministry of Communications 157, 242 
Ministry of Finance 160, 167, 201, 211, 
218, 227, 242, 244, 281 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 111, 195, 
257, 260, 284 
Ministry of the Interior 172, 181, 185, 
242 
Ministry of the Navy 72, 245, 257-8 
Ministry of War 111, 120, 141, 147, 
149, 153, 158-9, 163-4, 164n, 169, 
175, 182-3, 194, 225-6, 239, 243, 
254, 256, 258, 260, 280, 323 
minorities 127, 155, 161, 163, 190, 
199-200, 238, 252, 330-1, 309 
Minsk 47 
mobilization 18, 27n, 48, 104, 106, 108, 
120, 125, 141, 147-8, 151-2, 178, 
180, 186, 190, 194, 197, 220-3, 225, 
227, 230, 240, 243, 253-6, 277-8 
471 
mob rule 383 
moderate socialists 329, 331, 333, 354, 
358, see also Mensheviks, Social Re-
volutionaries 
Moldavia, Moldavians 76, 238 
Moltke, Helmuth, General 262, 307 
Moltke 349n 
Monarch of Finland 70, 110, 129, 136, 
201, 310, 408, see also Grand Duke, 
Friedrich Karl, German King, Pro-
visional Government 
monarchism, monarchists 99, 192, 208, 
260, 383-4, 388 
monarchy 383 
monitors 96, 122, 302 
Moon Sound 141-2, 195-6, 230, 258, 
266, 274, 286, 294n, 298, 304, 350 
mortars 104 
Mosabacka see Tapanila 




191, 224, 264, 298, 326, 361-2, 
357n, 383, 398, see also Muscovy 
Mosin 104, 175 
Moskovskiia Vedomosti 105, 111 
motor boats 244, 246, 256 
motor cars 256 
Motor Coastal Boats, MCB 401 
Motorcycle 42nd Detachment 301n, 340 
motor torpedo boats 286n, 290 
Muonionjoki (Muonio Älv) 40m, 41 
Murav'ev, N.K., Count, Governor-Ge- 
neral of Vilna 60, 179 
murder of officers 350, 409 
Murmansk 280, 308, 374, 385, 387-8, 
392, 394, 400n 
Murmansk coast 142, 384, 389-90 
Murmansk Legion 386, 392 
Murmans railway 308, 376, 386, 389 
Muscovites, Muscovite Empire 16, 22, 
335 
Muscovite nightmare 315 
Muscovy 16, 19 
Muslims, Mahommedans 51, 124 
Mussin-Pushkin, Vladimir 53 
Nadezhnyi, Dmitrii Nikolaevich 366 
Naissaari (Nargen) 230, 258, 266, 271, 
274, 296, 298 
Napier, Sir Charles, Vice-Admiral 79, 
94 
Napoleon 30, 34, 36, 41-2, 45-8, 55, 
58n, 79 
Napoleon III 76, 100, 104-5 
Napoleonic Wars 75 
Napue 20 
Narev army 220  
Nargen see Naissaari 
Narva 19-20, 28, 136, 194, 227-30, 235, 
274, 388-9, 395, 397m, 402 
Narvik 316 
Näsijärvi 107 
Nassau 287, 376-7, 389 
nation-in-arms 159 
National Archives of Finland 12 
National Guard 189, 193 
national military service 68, 126-7, 131, 
133, 135-6, 191, 210, 406, tribute in 
lieu of 192, 201 
national teaching 184 
National Socialist People's Red Army 
371 
nationalism, nationalists 44, 52, 95n, 
118-9, 149, 155-6, 160, 163-4, 169- 
70, 191, 200, 206, 210, 218, 248, 
250-2, 260, 328n, 348, 387n, 393, 
405-6, 408 
Nationalist Party, Russian 199 
nationalist press 236 
native peoples 127, 248 
nautical charts 268 
naval administration 72, see also Minis- 
try of Marine 
naval agreement 261 
naval attaché Fischer-Lossainen 317 
naval base 272, 273i, 286-7, 294, 302, 
361 
naval battle 158, 267, 314 
naval construction, naval construction 
programme 137-8, 141-2, 149, 194, 
196, 227-9, 256-8, 271 
naval defence 258, 263 
naval duel 264, 266-7 
naval enemy 139, 179, 260, 377, 391-2, 
408 
Naval 1st Equipage 65i, 66, 71n, 72, 84, 
93, 117, 133 
Naval 2nd Equipage 67, 91, 93, 117 
Naval Fortress of Emperor Peter the 
Great 258, 272, 286-7, 294, 294n, 
295-6, 301, 305, 338, 341, 351-2 
Naval General Staff 229, 257 
naval manoeuvres 230 
naval plans 258, 268-9, 318 
naval powers 139, 143-4, see also naval 
enemy, Western Powers 
naval rear position 
naval rivalry 253 
naval scare 74 
naval station 186 
naval war 264, 317 
Navarin 257n 
navy see British, German, Russian navy 
Navy Ministry 229, see als Ministry of 
Marine 
Near East 72, 75-6, 228, 257, 407, see 
also Levant, Orient 
Neishlott see Savonlinna 
Neishlottskii 87th Regiment 27, 49, 60- 
1, 63, 102, 113, 230 
Nekrasov, Nikolai Vissarionovich, Go- 
vernor-General 347, 351, 355-6, 361 
Nenonen, Marko, Dr 395 
Neo-Byzantian 248 
Nepenin, A.I., Vice-Admiral 324-5 
Netherlands 72, 86, 86i, 110-1 
neutral, neutrality 77, 100, 110-1, 263, 
271, 296, 308-9, 312, 316 
neutralization 405 
Neva 15, 20, 211, 395 
Neva bridge 211-2, 232 
Nevanlinna (Nyenschantz) 20 
New Russia 77 
Nicholas I 24, 43, 59, 61-2, 68, 71n, 
72, 74-7, 82-3, 90-1, 100, 102, 118, 
130, 248, 331 
Nicholas II 100n, 102, 154, 162-5, 167-
70, 181, 185, 187, 189-90, 194, 196, 
199-200, 207-11, 213-7, 228, 244, 
251-2, 257, 279-80, 284, 307, 310, 
324, 331, 343, 408 
Nicholas Nicholaevich the Elder 119-20 
Nicholas Nicholaevich, Supreme Com- 
mander-in-Chief 103-4, 194, 203-4, 
207, 223, 226-7, 235, 239, 307 
Niemen army 148, 223, 227 
Nikolaev Station 211 
Nikolaistad 100n, 141, 173n, see also 
Vaasa 
nomads 127, 322 
non-combatants 38, 120, 305 
non-Russian population 192, 200, 260, 
282, see also minorities 
non-Socialist parties in Finland 347-8, 
364-4 
Nordenstam, Lieutenant General 84 
North Africa 396n 
North Sea 77, 186, 196-7, 261-2, 264-5, 
270, 272, 285, 287-90, 298, 302, 
315, 317, 336, 349n, 349-50, 396 
North Sea Canal 266, see also Kaiser 
Wilhelm Kanal 
Northern Army 147, 232, 295 
Northern Front 267, 277, 294, 319, 321, 
339, 350, 356n 
Northern Quai 176i 
North-Western front 278n 
Norway, Norwegian, Norwegians 40m, 
43, 46, 196, 221, 263, 280, 288, 313,  
316, 359, 400m 
Norwegian border, coast 78, 280, 308 
Norwegian separatism 263 
Norwegian (hips 318 
Norwich, John Julius 14 
Nöteborg see Pähkinäsaari 
November Manifesto 1905 	 189-90, 
203, 240 
Novgorod, Novgorodian 15, 17, 46, 90, 
113-4, 230, 301, 335, 386 
Novgorodskii 114th Regiment 353 
Novik , novik-class 389, 393 
Novoe Vremia 219, 236, 322 
Novogeorgievsk 72 
Nummela 153 
Numminen, Pirkko 13 
Nurmes 202, 299, 314 
Nurmijärvi 84 
Nyenschantz see Nevanlinna 
Nykarleby see Uusikaarleby 
Nyland see Uusimaa 
Nyslott see Savonlinna 
Nystad see Uusikaupunki 
oblast' committee, Finland region com- 
mittee 327, 354, 363 
Obolenskii, Ivan, Prince, Governor-Ge- 
neral 181-3, 185, 188-91, 226 
Obruchev, N.N., General 102, 139-41, 
147, 153, 158 
occupation of Finland 241 
Ochakov 137 
October 1917 Manifesto 187, 199 
October revolution 363n, see revolution 
Odensholm 266 
Odessa 103, 192 
officer for Finnish affairs in the Ministry 
of War 131, 169 
OHL, Oberste Heeresleitung 194, 262, 
264, 317, 317n, 335, 349, 358, 368, 
387-8 
Oker-Blom, Theodor, Major General 
135 
Okhrana 215, 247 
Oland 266, 271 
Old Finland 29, 40m, 50, 55 
Old Finns, Old Finnish Party 170-1, 188, 
193, 208, 211-2, 246, 251 
Old Russia 364 
Oleg 397n, 401 
oligarchy 189 
Olkhovskii, Lieutenant General 153, 
209, 222, 234-5, 253, 254 
Olonets 386, 388, 398n, see also Aunus 
Omsk 103, 137 
Omskii 96th Regiment 137, 230 
473 
Onega lake 15, 17, 314, 385-6, 389, 392, 
400m 
Onega 77 
Onezhskii 90th Regiment 114, 230 
opolchenie 87, 127, 278, 290, see also 
militia 
oppressed peoples, oppression 217, 262, 
26%, 310, 312, 320, 330-1, 348, 
362, 408, 411 
Oranienbaum 142 
Oranovskii, Lieutenant General 350 
Orebro 47 
Ord 239 
Orenburg 27n, 103, 291, 293, see also 
Cossacks 
Orient, oriental 19, 110, 270, see also 
Levant, Near East 
Orovaiskii reserve battalion 149 
Orthdox Christians, church, creed, mo-
nasteries, priests 15, 42, 46, 51, 72, 
474 	 75-6, 119, 124, 236, 248-9, 386 
Oscar I 77 
Ösel see Saarenmaa 
Osman Pasha 124 




Ostseedivision 378, 382, see also Ger- 
man Baltic Division 
Ottoman administration 119 
Oudinot, Field Marshal 47 
Oulu (Uleåborg) 32m-33m, 38, 40m, 41, 
47, 52, 80, 83m, 93, 114n, 116n, 
132, 150m, 166, 173n, 197, 202, 
205, 255, 255n, 256n, 297-9, 291n, 
301n, 314, 341, 366 
Oulu river 231 
Paasikivi, Juho Kusti 251 
pacification 190, 199, 203, 252, 386 
Pacific Ocean 206 
Pacific Squadron 142 
Pähkinäsaari (Nöteborg) 15-6, 17m 
Päijänne lake 107 
Pallada 285 
Palmerstone, Lord 72, 76-7, 100 
Palmstierna, Erik, Swedish Minister of 
Marine 377 
Pamiat Azova 382, 397n, 401 
Pan-Fennic, Pan-Finnish 202, 206, 254, 
see also Greater Finland 
Pan-Islamists 238 
Pan-Slavic, Panslavist 105, 119 
paralysis of Russian power 226 
Paris 76, 100, 104, 183, 318, 337, 364 
Parkhomov, Lieutenant General 351 
Parliament, British 80, Finnish 108, 131, 
355, 398 
parliamentarism 156, 187, 208, 212, 214 
Parola 57, 108, 116 
Particular Service Squadron 139 
Paschenko, Lieutenant General 324 
Pasila 276m 
passive resistance 171, 179, 210, 216, 
277 
passport control 319 
patrol boats, craft, ships 195, 228, 339 
Päts, Konstantin 403-4 
Paukku 387n 
Paul I 22, 27, 30 
peace, peace conference 331, 360, see 
also Brest-Litovsk, Paris, Versailles 
peasant army 382 
peasant revolts 220, 327i 
Pechorskii 92nd Regiment 114, 230 
Peipohja 293n, 297 
penal companies, battalions 64, 195, 316 
Penaud, Charles, Rear-Admiral 
People's Commissars 366-7, 370, see 
also Council of, soviet government 
people's militia 331 




perjurer Emperor, Monarch 310, 409 
Perkjärvi 342 
Pemau (Pämu) 197 
Persia, Persians, Persian war 72, 74, 
105, 270 
Peter I 19-22, 24, 29-30, 79 
Peter and Paul Fortress 20 
Petersburg 361, 361n, 362, 371-2, 376, 
379m, 380, 387-9, 393-5, 398n, 402, 
405 
Petrograd 275, 279-80, 291, 294, 298-9, 
307-8, 314, 316, 318, 320, 324-6, 
330, 332, 338-9, 343, 345-6, 349, 
352, 354, 356, 361n, 363n, 365, 367, 
375 
Petrograd military district 339 
Petrograd Revolutionary Military Com-
mittee 357n 
Petrograd road 346 
Petrograd Soviet 350 
Petropavlovsk 257n, 271, 397, 401 
Petrovskii 88th Regiment 49, 53, 60-2, 
102, 113, 230 
Petrozavodsk 400m 
Petsamo 385, 399, 400m, 405 
Pieksämäki 202 
Pietarsaari (Jakobstad) 197, 221, 297, 
300n, 366 
Pihlajakari (Rönnskär) 266 
Pillau 263 
Pilot and Lighthouse service, pilots 133, 
144, 157, 208, 244, 268 
pioneers 359 
Pilsudski, Jozef 403 
Pingvin 387n 
pink Soviets 392 
Pitäjänmäki (Sockenbacka) 291n 
Pitka, Johan, Admiral 395 
PL 19 290 
Plamia 387n 
platsmaior 63 
Plehwe, von, General 320 
Plehwe, V.K. von, Minister State Secre- 
tary, Minister of the Interior 14, 172, 
181 
Plumridge, Rear-Admiral 80, 94 
Pobedonostsev, Konstantin 163, 170 
Podvoiskii, Nikolai Il'ich 367 
Pohjanmaa (Osterbotten) 58, 83, 85, 91, 
299, 366-7, 372, 374, 374n, 377 
Poland 16, 19, 24, 26, 29, 41, 45-6, 
70, 71n, 72-3, 77, 99, 102, 105, 
53, 
108, 
137, 145, 147-8, 155, 157, 200, 220, 
227, 286, 293, 296, 307, 315, 333, 
374, 400m, 403-4 
Poland a German-Austrian protectorate 
333 
Poles 104, 110-1, 156, 161, 206, 238, 
284, 309, 403-5 
police 	 171, 	 173, 	 176i, 189, 191, 193, 
200, 204-5, 204-5, 207, 223, 235, 
243, 246, 362, 348 
Polish army, troops 58, 65, 181, 404 
Polish insurrection, rebels, rebellion 65, 
70, 74, 95n, 97, 104-5, 108, 110-1, 
114, 127, 181, 284 
Polish Kingdom 105 
Polish-Lithuanian army 206 
Polish pans 54 
Polish refugees 76 
political criminals 242 
Polonia rediviva 386 
Polotsk 48 
Poltava 20-1 
Poltava 257n, 271 
Polvinen, Tuomo 12 




Popov, A.A., Admiral 123 
popular rising 172, 178, 187, 192, 195,  
224, 231, 246, 326, 334, 339, 343, 
368, 394, see also disorder, guerilla, 
revolt 
Pori (Björneborg) 32m-33m, 40m, 56-7, 
83m, 84, 93, 197, 221, 292n, 293, 
293n, 297, 299, 300n, 341 
Porkkala 91, 230, 232, 234, 258, 271, 
274, 294, 296-8, 338, 387 
Port Arthur 154 
Port Imperator Aleksandr III (Libau) 
142 
Porte 76, 83, 119 
Porthan, Henrik Gabriel 33 
Portugal 24 
Porvoo (Borgå) 42, 83n, 93, 140 
Posen 287, 377, 379, 383 
Posnania 403 
Possiet, Nikolai, Lieutenant Commander 
66 
Prästö 195 
pre-dreadnought battleships 287, 401 
President of Estonian Republic, riigi- 
vanem 
President of Finnish Republic 251, 277, 
353, 399, 401 
Prime Minister of Estonia 403 
Prime Minister of Finland 277, see also 
Paasikivi, Svinhufvud 
Prime Minister of Russia 187, 210, 218, 
345, see also Goremykin, Kerenskii, 
Kokovtsov, Lvov, Stolypin, Stürmer, 
Witte 
primitive populations 161 
Prinz Adalbert 287, 289 
Prinz Heinrich 287 
Prinzregent Luitpold 349n 
prison guards 242 
prisoners of war 37i, 90, 325, 382 
Procop6, Viktor Napoloen, General 164 
Procop6, Major General 153 
pro-Entente 402, see also Anglophile 
pro-Finland 402 
pro-German 263, 335, 374-5, 402, see 
also Germanophile 
Progressive liberals 405 
proletariat 184, 331-2, 365 
prostitution 258 
Provisional Government 324, 329-34, 
342-3, 346, 348-9, 354, 356, 358, 
409 
Prussia, Prussian, Prussians 22, 24, 30, 
35, 45, 69i, 77, 86i, 97, 112, 126, 
220, 258, 312, 358 
Pskov 28, 149, 379m, 388 
Public Record Office 12 
Pudozhskii 426th Regiment 294n 
475 
Pugachev, Emelian 59 
punitive expeditions 194, 199-200 
Pushkin, Aleksandr Sergeevich 53 
Pyrrhic victory 136 
qahal see kagaali 
quartermaster's branch 258 
Quartermaster General 259 
Qvanten, Emil von 77 
299-300, 304, 306, 339, 341, 345 
rebellion, rebels, 	 resistance 	 156, 	 168, 
178-9, 185, 188, 205, 207, 212, 215, 
222-4, 232-3, 239-41, 243, 246, 253- 
4, 277, 310-14, 318-9, 321, 334 
recruitment, recruits 18, 22, 28, 49-50, 
60, 64, 71, 87, 106, 125-6, 128, 148, 
167, 238, 313, 319-20, 323, 326, 341 
Red Army, Workers' and Peasants' 371, 
372n, 394, 402, 404 
Red Cross 283 
Red epidemic 364, 404, menace 400m, 
see also Bolshevism, Reds, revoluti- 
on 
Redern, von, Colonel 383 
Red Estonian-Russian army 395 
Red Finland 379m  
Red Finns 193, 328, 362, 366-7, 369i, 
369n, 371-3, 372n, 373-4, 378, 380-
2, 391, 394, 398, defeat of 372 
Red government in Finland 374, 377, 
382, 386 
Red Guards 189-90, 193, 206, 238, 349, 
363, 369-71, 373, 376 
Red Jägers 313n 
Red Manifesto 188 
Red Russia 337, 363n, 364, 373, 375, 
404 
Red, revolutionary sailors 383, 397, 401 
Red soldiers 388 
Red terror 383-4 
Reds, revolutionaries 183, 200, 236-7, 
242, 269, 337, 362, 367, 369i, 369n, 
371, 373-4, 378, 380-2, 391, 395-6 
Regensburg 389 
Regent of Finland 391 
Regiment, 45th 62 
Regiment, 46th 62 
Rehbinder, Robert Henrik, Count, Mi-
nister State Secretary 43n, 58, 58n 
Reich, German Empire 333 
Reichenau, Franz von 309 
Reichsland 387 
Reichstag 375 
Reinsurance Treaty 148 
reserves, reservists 106, 120-1, 126, 
148-9, 151, 180, 192, 195, 206, 217, 
220, 230, 238, 240, 243, 326 
reserve detachments, troops 132-3, 159, 
168, 220, 224-5, 227, 230, 233, 248, 
253, 278, 297, 300, 340 
resistance see active, armed resistance, 
passive resistance 
Respublika 401 
Restoration of Finland's autonomy 284, 
333 
restoration, revival of Imperial, Old, 
Tsarist Russia 330, 354, 383, 385, 
389, 397, 403-4, 410 
Retusaari (Kotlin) 20 
Reuter, Korvettenkapitän 384 
Reval (1918 Tallinn) 47, 73, 82, 96, 136, 
141, 186, 197, 230-1, 238-41, 258, 
265-6, 268, 272, 274, 276, 287, 290, 
302, 325, 338, 352, 356, 361, 372, 
379m, 380, 393, 396 
revolt 192, 238-41, 220, 228, 240, 284, 
327i, 332, 335, see also popular ri-
sing, disorder 
revolution 12, 26, 53, 59, 100n, 163, 
187-9, 199, 206, 208, 226-7, 250, 
260, 270, 372, 328n, 362, 392, 404, 
see also Bolshevik, Decembrist, 
Raahe (Brahestad) 40 
Raevskii, Nikolai 34 
raids 36, 39, 202, 230, 234, 271, 287, 
302, 336 
Räisänen, Maija 13 
railway, railways 112-3, 135, 187, 202, 
222-3, 241, 288, 298, 306, 320, 324, 
340, 342, 345, 367, Finnish 187-8, 
211, 221, 241, 277, 280, 407, Hel-
sinki-St Petersburg 122, 125, 145i, 
476 
	
Murmansk 308, 376, 386, 389, Rus- 
sian 201, 227, 280, 328 
railway bridges in Finland 122, 153, 
180, 198, 202, 211, 302 
Railway Square in Helsinki 188 
railway troops 224, 242, 254 
Ramsay, Anders Edvard, General, Sena-
tor 68, 71, 71n, 84, 96, 124i, 131, 
407 
Ramsay, Georg Edvard, Colonel 131 
Rasputin 307 
Rauma (Raumo) 62, 71, 107, 221, 293n, 
297, 299-300, 300n, 324 
Rautu 387n 
Rautu (Rautus) 
raw materials in Finland 374, 390 
Razvosov, A.V, Rear Admiral 351 
reactionaries, reactionary 101, 216 
rear defence position in Finland 274, 
French, Russian, World 
revolution in Finland 361-3, 366, 373 
revolution in March 1917 324 
revolution in Scandinavia 374 
revolutionery activity, movement, spirit 
184, 192-3, 237-8 
revolutionary central committee in Fin-
land 363. 
revolutionary chaos, mob 320, 345 
revolutionary Russia 364 
revolutionizing 269, see also minorities 
Reynaud, French Consul in Helsinki 
337, 366 
Rheinland 377, 379 
Riazan 28, 151 
rifle battalions, sharpshooter battalions, 
Finnish 132-3, 135, 137, 147, 150m 
rifle brigades, regiments, troops 64, 71, 
149, 150n, 162, 172-3, 173n, 174-5, 
175n, 179-80, 193, 224-5, 227 
Rifle Regiment of Officers' Rifle School 
305, 353 
rifle troops 175, I75n, 180, see Finnish 
Rifle Battalions, Finland (Russian) 
Rifle Brigades 
Riga 47-8, 70, 97, 141, 147, 229, 268, 
287, 289, 296, 299, 334, 349, 379m, 
383n, 400m, 404 
Riga 240 
Right, rightists 200, 206-7, 210, 218-9, 
245, 252, 332, 354, 362 
Riihimäki 112, 143, 222, 233-4, 256n, 
290n, 291n, 293, 293n, 294, 298, 
345, 356, 380 
Riurik 302, 401 
river flotilla 119, 119n, 304 
Rochensalm see Ruotsinsalmi 
Rochensalm 138n 
Rodichev, F.Iu. 324-5, 329, 331 
Roediger, A.F., General, Minister of 
War 185, 190, 194, 201, 203-4, 213, 
226 
Rokassovskii, Platon Ivanovich, Gene-
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Rumania 120, 148, 226 
Rumanian Front 294 
Rumiantsev, Count 38 
rump Senate 354 
Runeberg, Johan Ludvig 71 
Ruotsinsalmi (Svensksund, Rochensalm) 
26-7, 44, 49n, 50, 62-3, 73, 82-3, 
83m, 94, 140 
Russarö 266, 287 
Russia, Empire 11-2, 14-7, 17m, 19, 22, 
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217-8, 244-5, 249, 269, 280, 309, 
319, 321-3, 310, 330-1, 346, 355, 
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smugglery, smuggling of arms 66, 172, 
183, 185, 193, 205, 238, 243, 246-7, 
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348, 362-3, 405 
Social Democratic Party, Finnish 170, 
183, 193, 364-5, 372, 392 
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245, 249, 252, 258, 260 
Stralsund 197 
Stralsund 389 
Strassburg 286, 288, 336, 389 
strike, strikers, strikes 188, 192, 246, see 
also general strike 
Strike 129th Battalion 353 
Stuarts 22 
students 110, 126, 184, 189, 310-1, 
311n, 312, 326 
Stürmer, Boris 307 
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329n, 338, 341, 345, 351-3, 368, 
379m, 380, 387 
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Prince, Minister of the Interior 181 
Svinhufvud, Pehr Evind 251, 277, 331, 
364-5, 375 
svoboda 325, 328 
Sweden 11, 15-6, 17m, 19-20, 22, 24, 
26, 29-30, 33, 39, 40m, 41, 43, 45-9, 
72, 77-8, 88, 100, 128, 136, 143, 
149, 153, 169, 196, 198, 223, 262-3, 
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385n, 398 
Tsar, Tsarism, Tsarist government, regi-
me 11, 19, 22, 52, 77, 163, 170, 183-
4, 188, 197-200, 208, 220, 263-4, 
269, 282, 307, 310-1, 320, 324-5, 
327i, 329-30, 332, 347-8, 354, 368, 
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